THE  MARQUIS  DE  LA  FAYETTE 


IN 


THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION. 


WITH  SOME  ACCOUNT  OF  THE 


ATTITUDE  OF  FRANCE  TOWARD  THE  WAR  OF 
INDEPENDENCE. 


BY 

CHARLEMAGNE  TOWER,  JR.,   LL.D. 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES. 
VOL.  I. 


PHILADELPHIA: 

J.  B.   LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY. 
1895. 


COPYRIGHT,  1894, 

BY 
CHARLEMAGNE  TOWER,  JR. 


ELECTROTYPED  AND  PRINTED  BY  J.  B.  LIPPINCOTT  COMPANY,  PHILADELPHIA,  PA.,  U.S.A. 


PREFACE. 


I  HAVE  endeavored  in  these  volumes  to  trace  the 
career  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  in  America,  from 
the  time  when  he  came  here  in  1777  until  he  returned 
to  France  after  the  surrender  of  Earl  Cornwallis,  in 
1781.  I  have  used  for  this  purpose  the  letters  preserved 
among  his  private  papers  which  were  published  in  his 
Memoirs  and  Correspondence  by  his  family  after  his 
death,  and  I  have  carefully  examined  a  large  number 
of  manuscripts  in  this  country,  among  the  official  docu 
ments  of  the  Department  of  State,  as  well  as  in  private 
collections  and  those  of  institutions  to  which  access  has 
been  granted  me. 

I  have  taken  especial  care  to  present  in  detail  the 
military  operations  of  the  Virginia  Campaign,  during 
which  La  Fayette  held  an  independent  command,  with 
as  close  attention  to  his  own  statements  as  possible,  fre 
quently  in  his  own  words,  in  order  that  I  might  give  a 
faithful  account  of  the  part  he  played. 

I  have  followed  also  with  some  minuteness  of  detail 
the  efforts  of  M.  de  La  Fayette  in  our  behalf  at  the 
Court  of  Versailles  during  the  year  1779  whilst  he  was 
in  France  upon  leave  of  absence ;  for  his  incessant 
presentation  of  the  American  cause  at  that  time  to  the 
Cabinet  of  King  Louis  XVI.,  and  particularly  to  the 
Comte  de  Vergenues  and  the  Conite  de  Maurepas,  had 


IV  PREFACE. 

an  influence  which  contributed  very  greatly  to  the  ulti 
mate  establishment  of  independence  in  the  United  States. 

In  coming  before  the  public  with  this  narrative,  I 
beg  leave  to  acknowledge  my  obligation  to  M.  Henri 
Doniol,  Correspondant  de  Flnstitut,  Directeur  de  1'Im- 
primerie  Nationale,  who  has  rendered  an  international 
service  to  France  and  America  by  the  publication  of  his 
admirable  work,  "  Histoire  de  la  Participation  de  la 
France  a  TEtablissement  des  Etats-Unis  d'Amerique." 

Students  of  American  history  are  indebted  to  M. 
Doniol  for  the  collection  and  arrangement  of  documents 
relating  to  the  part  which  the  Government  of  France 
took  in  the  uprising  of  the  Colonies  of  North  America 
against  Great  Britain,  as  well  as  to  its  participation  in 
the  War  of  Independence  and  in  the  establishment  of 
the  American  people  as  a  nation,  which  have  been  pre 
served  in  the  Archives  of  France  for  more  than  a  cen 
tury,  most  of  them  unknown,  many  of  them  forgotten, 
and  all  of  them  difficult  of  access  to  inquirers  upon  this 
side  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean.  His  exceedingly  painstaking 
researches  have  presented  to  us  the  sources  from  which 
Americans  may  obtain  a  definite  comprehension  and  form 
a  proper  estimate  of  the  early  relations  of  France  to  our 
country. 

Comparatively  few  people  of  the  present  generation 
are  aware  of  the  inestimable  benefits  which  the  French 
nation  conferred  upon  our  forefathers  during  the  Amer 
ican  Revolution,  at  a  time  when  America  was  without 
credit  abroad  and  when  our  cause  aroused  no  other 
national  sympathy  in  the  world  than  that  of  our  faithful 
ally. 


PREFACE.  V 

France  had  her  grievances  against  Great  Britain  as 
well  as  we,  it  is  true ;  and  she  entered  into  our  contest 
for  reasons  which  were  satisfactory  to  herself,  in  the 
same  manner  as  every  nation  has  enlisted  in  a  foreign 
cause  since  the  beginning  of  recorded  history.  But  for 
us  Americans  the  essential  facts  to  be  remembered  in 
connection  with  the  alliance  are  that  we  went  of  our  own 
accord  to  France  to  ask  for  help,  and  that  we  received  it 
from  her.  Not  only  did  she  encourage  us  by  the  per 
mission  which  she  granted  our  agents  to  obtain  supplies 
and  munitions  of  war  in  her  ports  for  the  maintenance 
and  equipment  of  the  Continental  army,  but  she  em 
ployed  her  own  credit  to  borrow  large  sums  of  money 
which  she  advanced  to  Congress,  and  she  sent  her  sol 
diers  and  her  sailors  to  serve  under  the  command  of 
General  Washington  and  to  fight  for  us  in  the  battles 
of  the  Republic. 

Many  of  the  darkest  moments  of  the  Revolution  were 
illumined  by  new  hope  when  means  were  supplied  us, 
in  the  midst  of  an  almost  desperate  struggle,  by  the 
powerful  hand  of  France;  and  the  documents  in  the 
French  Archives  bear  witness  to  the  constant  solicitude 
with  which  the  American  cause  was  watched  over  and 
protected  by  the  Comte  de  Vergennes,  Secretary  of  State 
for  Foreign  Affairs,  whose  name,  with  the  names  of 
Rochambeau,  d'Estaing,  Gerard,  La  Luzerne,  and  de 
Grasse,  must  always  be  held  in  honor  in  the  United 
States. 

In  quoting  from  the  documents  of  France,  I  have 
usually  given,  besides  the  folio  and  number  by  which 
each  is  designated  in  the  Archives,  a  reference  to  M. 


VI  PKEFACE. 

Doniol's  work,  in  order  to  assist  students  in  their  ex 
amination  of  that  repository  of  American  history,  from 
which  I  have  obtained  much  of  the  genealogy  of  the 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  as  well  as  his  coat  of  arms, 
which  I  have  reprinted  here. 

Through  the  courtesy  of  General  George  Washington 
Custis  Lee  I  have  been  permitted  to  copy  the  portrait,  by 
Charles  Willson  Peale,  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  as 
a  frontispiece  to  the  first  of  these  volumes.  This  por 
trait,  which  hung  for  many  years  at  Mount  Vernon,  was 
painted  for  General  Washington,  from  whom  it  de 
scended  to  its  present  owner,  General  Lee. 

I  have  been  honored  by  Madame  Corcelle  Marquise 
de  Chambrun,  who  has  sent  me  a  copy  of  a  miniature 
of  Madame  de  La  Fayette  painted  about  the  time  of  her 
marriage,  which  I  have  used  at  the  beginning  of  the 
second  volume.  And  I  beg  leave  to  return  my  thanks 
to  M.  le  Comte  d'Assailly,  who  has  aided  me  with  a 
generous  interest  in  my  work. 

I  desire  to  express  my  grateful  sentiments  to  Cornell 
University  for  copies  of  the  maps  of  the  Sparks  Collec 
tion,  now  in  its  Library,  from  the  originals  made  for 
General  de  La  Fayette,  showing  the  operations  at 
Gloucester,  at  Barren  Hill,  at  Monmouth,  and  at  New 
port,  which  I  have  reproduced;  to  Harvard  University 
for  copies  of  the  Sparks  MSS. ;  to  the  New  York  His 
torical  Society  for  copies  of  the  Steuben  MSS. ;  and  to 
the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania  for  copies  of  the 
MSS.  of  General  Anthony  Wayne. 

I  am  indebted  for  valuable  assistance  in  the  prepara 
tion  of  my  work  to  Hon.  A.  A.  Adee,  Assistant  Secre- 


PREFACE.  Vll 

tary  of  State,  to  A.  R.  Spofford,  LL.D.,  the  distin 
guished  Librarian  of  Congress,  to  M.  le  Professeur 
Georges  Cardon,  of  Paris,  and  especially  to  my  friend 
and  fellow-student  Frederick  D.  Stone,  Esq.,  Librarian 
of  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania. 

The  references  which,  for  brevity,  have  been  made 
in  the  foot-notes  to  the  "  Memoires  de  ma  Main,"  the 
"  Memoires  historiques,"  and  the  "  Correspondance  de 
La  Fayette,"  are  to  the  "  Memoires,  Correspondance  et 
Manuscrits  du  General  Lafayette,  publics  par  sa  famille," 
Paris,  H.  Fournier  aine,  Editeur,  6  vols.,  1837-38. 

CHARLEMAGNE  TOWER,  JR. 

PHILADELPHIA,  December,  1894. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  1. 


CHAPTER    I. 

PAGE 

THE  COMING  OF  LA  FAYETTE  TO  AMERICA 1 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE  HOSTILE  SENTIMENT  IN  FRANCE  TOWARD  GREAT  BRITAIN     60 

CHAPTER    III. 

RELATIONS  OF  THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT  WITH   THE   COLO 
NIES  OF  NORTH  AMERICA 91 

CHAPTER    IV. 

EFFORTS   OF   THE   OOMTE   DE  VERGENNES   TO   UNITE   FRANCE 
AND  SPAIN  IN  THE  AMERICAN  WAR 117 

CHAPTER    V. 

BEGINNING  OF  DIPLOMATIC  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  FRANCE  AND 
THE  UNITED  STATES 142 

CHAPTER    VI. 

PROGRESS  OF  THE  WAR  IN  AMERICA  UPON  THE  ARRIVAL  OF 
LA  FAYETTE 171 

CHAPTER    VII. 

LA  FAYETTE'S   FIRST  SERVICE  IN  THE  CONTINENTAL  ARMY — 

BRANDY  WINE  AND  GLOUCESTER 216 

ix 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTEE    VIII. 

PAGE 

THE  PROJECTED  EXPEDITION  AGAINST  CANADA  IN  1778  .    257 


CHAPTEE    IX. 

ALLIANCE  BETWEEN  FRANCE  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES    ....   292 

CHAPTEE    X. 

LA  FAYETTE  AT  VALLEY  FORGE  AND  BARREN  HILL 317 

CHAPTEE    XL 

RETREAT  OF  THE  BRITISH  ARMY,  AND  BATTLE  OF  MONMOUTH   343 

CHAPTEE    XII. 

THE  EXPEDITION  OF  THE  COMTE  D'ESTAING 394 

CHAPTEE    XIII. 
OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ALLIED  FORCES  AT  NEWPORT 431 

CHAPTEE    XIV. 

OPERATIONS  OF  THE  ALLIED  FORCES  AT  NEWPORT—  Continued  .    456 


LIST  OF  MAPS  IN  VOLUME  I. 


PAGE 

PLAN  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  BKANDYWINE 222 

MAP  SHOWING  THE   OPERATIONS   OF   GENERAL    DE    LA   FAYETTE 

AT  GLOUCESTER  IN  1777 248 

MAP   SHOWING   THE   OPERATIONS    OF   GENERAL   DE    LA    FAYETTE 

AT  BARREN  HILL  IN  1778 328 

MAP  TO  ILLUSTRATE  THE  MILITARY  OPERATIONS  WHICH  LED  TO 
THE  BATTLE  OF  MONMOUTH 346 

MAP  OF  THE  BATTLE  OF  MONMOUTH 368 

MAP  SHOWING  THE  POSITION  OF  THE  ALLIED  FORCES  AT  NEW 
PORT  IN  1778    .  .    456 


LIST  OF  MAPS  IN  VOLUME  II. 


PAGE 

MAP     SHOWING    THE     POSITIONS    OCCUPIED     BY    THE     AMERICAN 

TROOPS  AFTER  THE    RETREAT    FROM  RHODE  ISLAND,  30TH 
AUGUST,  1778 8 

MAP  SHOWING  THE  ROUTE  OF  THE  MARQUIS  DE  LA  FAYETTE  IN 

CHESAPEAKE  BAY  IN  1781 244 

MAP  OF  THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  THE  MARQUIS  DE  LA  FAYETTE  AND 
LORD  CORNWALLIS  IN  VIRGINIA  IN  1781 288 

MAP  SHOWING  THE  OPERATIONS  OF  THE  MARQUIS  DE  LA  FAY 
ETTE  BETWEEN  RICHMOND  AND  WILLIAMSBURG  IN  THE  VIR 
GINIA  CAMPAIGN  OF  1781 342 

xi 


THE  MARQUIS  DE  LA  FAYETTE 


IN 


THE  AMERICAN  REVOLUTION 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE   COMING    OF    LA   FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA. 

ONE  of  the  most  picturesque  and  interesting  figures 
of  the  American  Revolution,  which  counted  among  its 
leaders  and  supporters  many  of  the  remarkable  men  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  is  that  of  a  youth  of  nineteen,  born 
of  an  illustrious  family  of  the  ancient  nobility  of  France 
and  bred  in  the  midst  of  the  most  conservative  influences 
of  the  old  regime,  who  suddenly  came  upon  the  scene  as 
a  defender  of  liberty  and  a  champion  of  human  rights. 
This  young  French  nobleman,  who  had  left  his  home  and 
crossed  the  ocean  to  fight  in  the  American  War  of  Inde 
pendence,  illustrated  to  an  extraordinary  degree  the  sym 
pathetic  interest  with  which  men  in  distant  parts  of  the 
world  watched  the  struggle  in  wrhich  the  Colonies  of 
North  America  were  then  engaged  :  the  earnestness  of  his 
convictions  and  his  zeal  in  the  cause  of  freedom  aston 
ished  the  members  of  the  Continental  Congress  before 
whom  he  appeared  in  the  summer  of  1777  and  announced 
himself  as  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette. 

It  was  difficult  then  to  comprehend,  it  excites  amaze 
ment  even  now,  that  a  foreigner  should  unite  his  efforts 
with  ours  in  a  contest  in  which  he  had  no  personal  inter- 

VOL.   I.  — 1  1 


Z  THE   COMING    OF   LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA. 

est  and  no  advantage  to  gain  beyond  the  establishment  of 
a  principle, — the  principle  of  liberty,  upon  which  is  based 
the  system  of  our  national  rights. 

Strange  as  it  appeared,  however,  this  was  the  motive 
which  brought  La  Fayette  to  America.  With  the  single 
thought  of  aiding  in  the  foundation  of  the  United  States 
as  a  free  and  independent  nation,  he  served  America  with 
unswerving  devotion  throughout  the  War  of  Independence, 
and  asked  for  no  compensation  beyond  the  privilege  of 
fighting  in  the  Continental  army  as  an  American  soldier 
in  defence  of  liberty. 

The  enthusiasm  which  impelled  La  Fayette  thus  to 
espouse  the  cause  of  the  American  people  arose  from  his 
ardent  love  of  freedom ;  the  sources  of  his  inspiration  are 
not  to  be  sought  amid  the  influences  which  were  at  that 
time  active  and  which  led  subsequently  to  the  participa 
tion  of  France  in  the  American  war,  but  were  the  gener 
ous  impulses  of  his  own  heart. 

It  was  believed  for  a  long  time,  even  in  France,  that  his 
service  in  America  was  connected  in  some  manner  with 
the  known  friendship  of  the  Cabinet  of  Versailles  for  the 
Colonies  of  North  America  and  with  the  alliance  into 
which  King  Louis  XVI.  entered  with  us,  later,  against 
Great  Britain. 

But,  while  he  played  a  very  important  part  and  ren 
dered  valuable  services  to  the  United  States  by  negoti 
ating  in  our  behalf  at  the  French  Court  after  the  alliance, 
it  is  probable  that  La  Fayette  would  have  come  to  America 
if  France  had  never  declared  war  in  our  favor ;  and  cer 
tainly  France  would  have  participated  in  the  American 
Revolution  if  La  Fayette  had  never  existed. 

His  coming  was  so  far  from  being  part  of  the  plan  of 
the  French  ministry  that  it  was  opposed  and  even  for 
bidden  by  the  Government.  But  the  difficulties  which  he 
encountered  in  carrying  out  his  undertaking  served  only 
to  intensify  his  efforts.  The  storm  of  opposition  from  his 


THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  6 

family,  the  threatened  penalties  of  disobedience  to  the 
King,  the  separation  from  those  he  loved,  the  grief  of  his 
young  wife,  were  all  subordinated  to  the  great  purpose  of 
his  life,  his  leaving  France  to  help  America ;  a  step  which 
his  angry  relatives  called  a  coup  de  tete,  but  which  was  in 
fact  an  act  of  chivalry. 

The  family  of  La  Fayette  was  one  of  the  very  ancient 
houses  of  France.  It  took  its  name  and  title  from  a  small 
fief  in  Auvergne,  called  Fayette,  or  La  Fayette,  mentioned 
in  a  document  which  was  executed  by  one  of  the  lords  of 
the  tenure,  as  Villa  Faya,  about  the  year  1000. 

At  that  remote  period  the  ancestors  of  the  La  Fayettes 
had  already  established  their  local  importance  in  the  prov 
ince  of  Auvergne  and  had  begun  to  form  the  alliances 
which,  in  succeeding  centuries,  were  to  connect  them  with 
some  of  the  most  powerful  and  distinguished  families  of 
the  kingdom.  The  race  was  a  military  one.  Its  represen 
tatives  fought  in  the  wars  from  the  time  of  the  Crusades, 
with  great  honor  to  themselves  as  well  as  to  the  name 
they  bore,  and  with  loyal  devotion  to  France ;  many  of 
them  having  fallen,  as  the  French  writers  expressively 
describe  it,  "  morts  bravement  a  1'ennemi." 

The  original  family  name  was  Motier ;  which  became, 
from  the  tenure  of  the  seigneurie  of  La  Fayette,  Motier 
de  La  Fayette.  We  find  it  represented  in  the  middle  of 
the  thirteenth  century  by  the  head  of  the  house,  Pons 
Motier,  Seigneur  de  La  Fayette,  from  whom,  through  a 
younger  son,  the  line  of  our  General  de  La  Fayette  is 
derived.  This  Pons  Motier,  who  died  about  the  year  1300, 
married,  in  1240,  Alix  Brim  de  Champetieres,  making 
thus  an  alliance  from  which  sprang  two  branches  of  the 
family, — the  elder  known  by  the  name  of  Gilbert  Motier 
de  La  Fayette,  and  the  younger  by  that  of  Roch  Motier 
de  Champetieres.  The  elder  of  these  branches  inherited 
the  estates  and  bore  for  many  generations  the  title  of 
Seigneurs  de  La  Fayette ;  whilst  the  other,  that  of  Motier 


4  THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA. 

de  Champetieres,  occupied  for  a  long  time  a  position  of 
merely  local  importance,  until,  by  the  failure  of  heirs  male 
in  the  elder  branch  and  through  substitutions  made  by  will 
in  favor  of  members  of  the  younger,  the  titles  and  estates 
of  the  family  descended  to  the  Motiers  de  Champetieres, 
who  were  ultimately  known  as  the  family  of  La  Fayette. 

The  landed  possessions  of  their  ancestors  were  situated 
near  Forez,  at  the  sources  of  the  river  Dore,  where  they 
continued  to  reside  until  the  latter  part  of  the  fifteenth 
century.  At  that  time,  Gilbert  Motier  IV.  married  Isa- 
beau  de  Polignac,  with  whom  he  moved  farther  south,  to 
ward  Velay,  in  Auvergne,  and  established  his  residence  at 
the  castle  of  Saint-Romain,  in  the  little  district  of  Cha- 
liergue.  Here  his  descendants  remained,  and  here,  also, 
the  descendants  of  the  younger  branch  came  afterward 
to  join  them ;  for  about  the  year  1600,  Jean  Motier  de 
Champetieres,  who  was  called  Seigneur  of  Champetieres, 
le  Bouis,  de  Paulin,  and  la  Garde,  Chevalier  of  the  King's 
orders,  and  governor  of  the  town  and  castle  of  Monis- 
trol,  in  Velay,  married  Jeanne  de  Polignac,  Baronne  de 
Vissac,  through  whom  his  descendants,  the  Motiers  de 
Champetieres,  became  Barons  of  Vissac  and  inherited  the 
ancient  castle  of  Vissac,  in  Auvergne,  whose  ruined  walls 
may  still  be  seen,  as  may  also,  not  very  far  away,  those 
of  Saint-Romain,  the  feudal  residence  of  the  elder  branch. 
Extraordinary  measures  were  taken  during  several  centu 
ries  to  prevent  the  loss  of  the  family  name  and  titles 
through  failure  of  heirs  male  in  the  direct  line  of  descent 
or  by  alienation  through  the  marriage  of  females  into 
other  families,  and  frequently  the  inheritance  was  devised 
to  younger  brothers,  or  even  to  collateral  kindred,  in  order 
that  the  continuance  of  the  family  might  be  assured ;  a 
precaution  rendered  all  the  more  necessary  by  the  ravages 
of  war  in  a  family  in  which  nearly  every  man  was  a 
soldier,  and  which  at  times  was  threatened  with  extinc 
tion  by  losses  in  battle, — so  much  so,  indeed,  that  it  be- 


THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  5 

came  traditional  in  the  family  that  the  La  Fayettes  all 
died  in  battle  and  died  young. 

A  substitution  of  this  character,  of  very  great  impor 
tance  to  our  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  took  place  at  the  end 
of  the  seventeenth  century,  by  which  his  branch  of  the 
family,  the  Motiers  de  Champetieres,  inherited  the  name 
and  estates  of  the  elder  branch  of  Motier  de  La  Fayette 
and  ultimately  also  the  title  of  Marquis  to  which  they  had 
attained.  The  Comte  Rene-Armand  de  La  Fayette,  by 
his  will  dated  the  llth  of  May,  1692,  devised  the  estates 
of  the  house  of  Motier  de  La  Fayette,  and  with  them  the 
name  of  La  Fayette,  to  the  great-grandfather  of  our  Mar 
quis  de  La  Fayette,  Charles  de  Motier  de  Champetieres, 
Chevalier  and  Baron  of  Vissac,  Seigneur  de  Vedieres, 
Fargettes,  Jax,  and  le  Bouschet,  to  the  exclusion  of  his 
brother,  the  Abbe  Louis  de  La  Fayette,  who  was  in  holy 
orders,  and  of  his  daughter,  Marie-Magdelaine  Motier, 
dame  de  La  Fayette,  who  had  become  by  marriage  Du- 
chesse  de  la  Tremoille.  From  this  time,  therefore,  the 
younger  branch  of  Motier  de  Champetieres  assumed  the 
name  of  Motier  de  La  Fayette  ;  though  the  marquisate  of 
La  Fayette  descended  to  Mme.  de  la  Tremoille  from  her 
father.  She  devised,  however,  by  her  will,  dated  the  3d 
of  July,  1717,  to  her  cousin,  Jacques  Roch  Motier,  the 
seigneurie  of  La  Fayette,  situate  in  the  parishes  of  Four- 
nols  and  Eschandelis,  in  Auvergne.  This  cousin,  Jacques 
Roch  Motier,  having  died  in  war  without  issue,  the  title 
passed  to  his  younger  brother,  Michel  Louis  Christophe 
Roch  Gilbert  de  Motier  de  La  Fayette,  the  father  of  our 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  who  thus  became  head  of  the 
house,  both  as  Baron  de  Vissac  and  as  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette,  in  succession  to  a  long  line  of  ancestors  illustrious 
in  the  annals  of  Auvergne  and  in  the  history  of  France. 

They  were  distinguished  in  the  wars  from  very  early 
times,  as  the  family  records  amply  show.  Pons  Motier 
de  La  Fayette  was  at  Acre,  in  1250;  Jean  Motier  de  La 


b  THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA. 

Fayette  fell  at  the  battle  of  Poitiers,  in  1356  ;  and  Gilbert 
Motier  III.,  Marechal  in  the  wars  of  Charles  VII.,  is  still 
remembered  in  France  as  one  of  the  celebrated  leaders  of 
his  century.  His  son,  Charles  Motier,  was  knighted  at 
the  siege  of  Rouen,  in  1449,  and  after  other  military  ser 
vice  he  appears  as  Deputy  to  the  States-General  at  Tours, 
in  1468.  Gilbert  Motier  IV.  was  at  the  Court  during  the 
reigns  of  Louis  XI.  and  Charles  VIII.  Antoine  de  La 
Fayette  commanded  the  King's  artillery,  and  Louis  was 
governor  of  Boulogne.  The  Comte  Rene-Armand,  to 
whom  we  have  already  referred  in  connection  with  the 
substitution  made  by  him  under  the  provisions  of  his  will 
in  1692,  was  captain  in  the  King's  regiment  in  1659,  col 
onel  of  the  regiment  of  La  Fare  in  1680,  and  afterward 
brigadier  of  infantry  toward  the  end  of  that  century. 
The  line  of  Motier  de  Champetieres  kept  pace  in  this  ser 
vice  of  the  King.  Thus,  Jean  Motier  de  Champetieres 
was  Senechal  of  Auvergne  in  1604.  Two  of  his  grand 
sons  were  distinguished  soldiers :  Jean-Marie,  Baron  de 
Vissac,  spent  his  life  in  camps  and  on  the  battle-field, 
through  nearly  thirty  years  of  service,  and  we  find  him 
Lieutenant  du  Roi  at  Strassburg  in  1692 ;  the  other, 
Claude  Motier,  "  Chevalier  de  Vissac,"  died  at  Troyes  in 
1692,  after  thirty-eight  years  of  service,  having  been 
present  at  sixty-five  sieges  and  taken  part  in  numerous 
pitched  battles.  The  grandfather  of  our  Marquis,  Edouard 
Motier,  had  a  brilliant  military  career,  and  was  wounded 
at  Philipsbourg,  at  Mons,  and  at  Speyer ;  later,  his  uncle, 
Jacques  Roch  Motier,  and  his  father,  encountered  the 
destiny  of  their  race.  They  were  both  killed  in  battle, 
—his  uncle  at  the  age  of  twenty-three,  and  his  father,  as 
we  shall  see,  before  he  had  reached  twenty-five  years. 

Among  the  women  of  the  family  of  La  Fayette  were 
two  especially  who  added  lustre  to  the  name, — one,  by  the 
charm  of  beauty  and  of  graceful  manner,  Louise  Motier 
de  La  Fayette,  the  object  of  great  admiration  on  the  part 


THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  7 

of  King  Louis  XIII.,  and  the  other,  by  her  intelligence 
and  the  brilliancy  of  her  imagination,  Marie  Madelaine 
Pioche  de  La  Vergne,  Comtesse  de  La  Fayette,  who  was 
born  in  1634  and  who  married  in  1655  Jean  Frangois 
Motier,  Comte  de  La  Fayette.  She  was  the  celebrated 
author  of  "  Zai'de"  and  of  the  "  Princesse  de  Cleves :" 
the  Comte  d'Haussonville  has  written  in  our  time  a  most 
attractive  account  of  her.1 

The  La  Fayettes  were  very  widely  related  by  marriage 
with  prominent  families  in  France,  among  them  those  of 
Polignac,  Bourbon-Busset,  Marillac,  de  Tremoille,  Mont- 
boissier,  de  Lusignem-Lezay,  la  Riviere,  and  de  Bouille, — 
the  latter  an  illustrious  house,  from  which  sprang  the  distin 
guished  French  general  of  that  name,  and  whose  continued 
public  services  to  France  have  produced  notable  men  down 
to  our  own  day,  the  head  of  it,  the  enlightened  and  courtly 
Marquis  de  Bouille,  having  been  Ambassador  of  France 
at  Madrid  within  the  last  twenty  years.  The  father  of 
General  La  Fayette,  Michel  Louis  Christophe  Roch  Gilbert 
de  Motier  de  La  Fayette,  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  Baron 
de  Vissac,  Seigneur  de  Siaugues-Saint-Romain  and  Fix, 
married,  on  the  22d  of  May,  1754,  Marie  Louise  Julie  de 
La  Riviere,  daughter  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Riviere,  grand 
daughter  of  the  Comte  de  La  Riviere  and  de  Ploeuck, 
lieutenant-general,  and  captain  of  the  second  company  of 
the  Mousquetaires  du  Roi  (the  Mousquetaires  Noirs). 
Upon  the  occasion  of  his  marriage  with  this  young  lady, 
whose  family  possessed  an  influence  at  Court  which  was 
immediately  exerted  in  his  favor,  the  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette,  at  that  time  but  twenty -two  years  of  age,  received 
the  cross  of  St.  Louis  and  was  made  colonel  of  the  regi 
ment  of  Grenadiers  de  France.2 


1  Mme.  de  La  Fayette,  par  le  Comte  d'Haussonville,  de  1' Academic  Fran- 
caise,  Paris,  1891. 

2  Curiously  enough,  there  is  no  record  of  the  date  at  which  the  family  of 
La  Fayette  acquired  its  title  of  marquis,  or  of  the  services  by  which  it  attained 


8  THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA. 

He  lived  during  the  short  period  of  his  married  life  in 
the  castle  of  Chavaniac,  an  ancient  "  maison  forte"  which 
is  described  by  M.  Doniol,  himself  a  native  of  Auvergne, 
as  "  a  great  and  rather  heavy  manor-house  fortified  in 
the  fourteenth  century,  situated  only  a  little  way  from  the 
castles  of  Saint-Romain  and  Vissac,  though  lower  down 
toward  the  plain.  It  arrests  the  attention  of  the  traveller 
by  the  odd  pigeon-house  coverings  of  its  towers,  which 
have  lost  their  symmetry  through  restorations  of  the  roof 
after  its  destruction  by  fire,  and  by  the  crenellated  terrace 
of  its  dungeon.  It  formed,  with  a  little  village  which 
grew  up  about  its  walls  upon  the  rugged  hills,  a  parish  of 
the  '  collecte'  of  Saint-Georges  d'Aurat,  in  the  i  election' 
of  Brioude,  in  the  province  and  '  generalite'  of  Auvergne. 
From  its  windows,  through  which  there  is  a  view  far  over 
the  surrounding  country,  the  eye  discovers  the  Allier, 
looking  in  the  direction  of  Langeac,  Paulhaguet  toward 
the  north,  and  here  and  there  farm-houses  or  neighboring 
castles  built  upon  the  cone-like  hills  of  the  volcanic  for 
mation.  The  landscape,  relieved  by  the  fresh  green  of 
the  valleys,  in  its  setting  of  mountain  ranges  whose  crests 
arise  in  outline  one  after  the  other  along  the  sky,  and 
dotted  here  and  there  by  clumps  of  fir-trees,  has  something 
of  the  severity  of  mountain  scenery,  though  tempered  by 
the  variety  of  color  and  softened  by  the  distant  background 
which  the  eye  can  reach." 

To-day  the  surroundings  of  this  ancient  place  are  not 
much  changed.  The  village  is  now  the  seat  of  a  commune 
in  the  canton  of  Paulhaguet,  in  the  centre  of  the  depart 
ment  of  the  Haute-Loire,  and  the  little  town  of  Brioude 
has  become  the  chef-lieu  of  the  arrondissement.  The  rail 
ways  have  penetrated  its  solitudes,  and  close  by  are  the 
stations  of  Saint-Georges  d'Aurat,  Rougeac,  and  La  Chaux, 

to  this  distinction.  M.  Doniol  says  of  it,  "A  quelle  e"poque  et  par  quelles 
circonstances  la  seigneurie  de  La  Fayette  est-elle  devenue  un  marquisat  ?  On 
ne  1'a  pas  d^couvert."  (La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  676,  note.) 


THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  9 

upon  the  line  from  Langeac  to  Puy  and  to  Saint-Etienne. 
But  the  old  house  stands  there  yet,  somewhat  grizzled 
perhaps  by  time,  still  looking  out  over  the  Auvergne 
mountains,  undisturbed  by  the  lapse  of  a  century  and 
more  since  the  days  when  it  cradled  a  boy  whose  career 
was  destined  to  win  the  gratitude  of  a  nation  and  to  make 
its  ancient  walls  the  object  of  affectionate  interest  across 
the  sea  in  the  New  World. 

In  it  was  born,  on  the  6th  of  September,  1757,  the 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette  of  the  American  Revolution,  who, 
at  his  baptism  upon  the  following  day,  in  the  little  church 
of  Chavaniac,  as  appears  by  a  copy  of  the  parish  register 
now  in  the  archives  of  the  French  Ministry  of  War,  was 
called  "tres  haut  et  tres  puissant  seigneur,  Monseigneur 
Marie-Joseph-Paul-Yves-Roch-Gilbert  Dumotier  de  La 
fayette,  fils  legitime  a  tres  haut  et  tres  puissant  seigneur 
Monseigneur  Michel-Louis-Christophle-Roch-Gilbert  Du 
motier,  marquis  de  Lafayette,  baron  de  Vissac,  seigneur 
de  Saint-Remain  et  autres  places,  et  a  tres  haute  tres 
puissante  dame  Madame  Marie-Louise-Julie  Delariviere." 

His  father,  Colonel  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  was  dead 
when  this  son  was  born,  having  fallen  at  the  head  of  his 
grenadiers  in  the  little  battle  of  Hastenbeck,  on  the  26th 
of  July  of  that  same  year,  1757,  when  he  was  not  as  yet 
twenty-five  years  of  age.  La  Fayette  himself,  in  writing 
of  it  many  years  later,  says  that  the  grenadiers  were  reck 
lessly  exposed  in  that  engagement  by  their  commander, 
who,  having  been  ordered  to  defend  a  certain  point,  drew 
them  up  on  open  ground,  where  they  were  helplessly  de 
stroyed.  The  Prince  de  Chimay,  an  intimate  friend  of 
his  father,  was  killed  at  the  head  of  the  battalion  which  he 
commanded,  and  Colonel  de  La  Fayette,  who  was  next 
in  rank,  pressing  forward  to  take  his  place,  was  mortally 
wounded  by  a  discharge  from  an  English  battery.1 

1  M.  de  La  Fayette  referred  to  his  father's  death  as  having  occurred  at  the 
battle  of  Minden  :  "  Ma  nais-sance,  qui  suivit  de  pres  la  mort  de  inon  pere  ii 


10  THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA. 

Thus  the  young  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was  left  at  his 
birth  alone  under  the  protection  of  his  mother.  He  found 
himself  not  only  the  head  of  his  house,  but  also  the  last 
male  representative  of  the  long  line  of  ancestors  from 
whom  he  sprang,  his  father's  only  brother  having  been 
killed  in  the  Italian  wars  without  leaving  issue,  and  the 
other  children  in  the  family  being  girls.  His  early  years 
were  spent  at  the  old  manor-house  of  Chavaniac,  where 
his  grandmother  still  lived,  a  woman  of  strong  character 
and  excellent  principles,  descended  from  one  of  the  sturdy 
mountain  races  of  Auvergne,  the  Suat  de  Chavaniac.  She 
and  the  boy's  mother,  with  the  assistance  of  two  aunts 
who  came  there  to  live,  reared  him  with  tender  solicitude. 
They  trained  him  to  manly  exercise  in  the  development 
of  a  vigorous  constitution,  dreading  the  approach  of  the 
day  when  he  also  should  become  a  soldier  and  go  to  the 
wars,  and  yet,  by  force  of  long  family  habit,  unable  to 
resist  the  conviction  that  it  would  surely  come,  and  that 
this  was,  after  all,  but  the  natural  and  proper  way  for  a 
La  Fayette  to  bear  worthily  his  family  name  and  to  sus 
tain  his  inherited  rank  and  station.  The  impressions  of 
these  early  years  in  Auvergne  sank  deeply  into  the  mind 
of  La  Fayette.  He  loved  the  place,  and  he  spoke  of  it 
with  tenderness  and  affection  in  looking  back  to  it  through 
the  complex  vicissitudes  of  his  after-life. 

The  means  of  the  family  at  that  time  were  small ;  for, 
although  they  had  landed  estates,  these  do  not  appear  to 
have  been  very  productive.  In  former  years  their  reve 
nues  from  preferment  at  Court,  or  from  the  service  of 
the  King,  had  stood  them  in  stead ;  but  now  there  was 
nothing  of  this  kind  for  them,  and  they  were  obliged  to 
live  frugally  for  persons  of  their  condition. 

Minden."  (Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  6.)  But  the  battle  of  Minden  was  not 
fought  until  August,  1759,  two  years  after  M.  de  La  Fayette  was  born.  I 
have,  therefore,  followed  M.  Doniol  (La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  656), 
who  places  the  death  of  Colonel  de  La  Fayette  at  Hastenbeck  in  1757. 


THE    COMIXG    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  11 

At  the  age  of  eleven,  the  young  La  Fayette  was  taken 
to  Paris  to  begin  his  education,  and  was  placed  under  the 
charge  of  the  Abbe  Fayon,  at  the  College  du  Plessis,  a 
school  to  which  were  sent  at  that  time  young  gentlemen 
of  similar  rank.  During  the  pursuit  of  his  studies  there, 
his  mother's  uncle,  the  Comte  de  La  Riviere,  placed  him 
in  the  army  lists,  in  order  that  he  might  secure  as  early 
as  possible  the  advantages  of  military  promotion.  He 
was  enrolled  in  the  Mousquetaires,  and  occasionally  got  a 
holiday  from  school  in  order  to  be  present  at  a  review. 
In  the  mean  time,  his  mother,  anxious  to  secure  for  him 
all  the  prestige  to  which  his  family  connections  entitled 
him,  had  come  up  from  her  province  and  had  been  pre 
sented  at  Court  by  her  aunt,  who  had  married  into  the 
influential  family  of  Lusignem-Lezay :  so  that  in  the 
course  of  the  next  few  years  the  young  Marquis,  who  had 
now  grown  to  be  a  large-framed  and  somewhat  ungainly 
boy,  as  he  says  himself  in  his  Memoirs,  diffident  in  ap 
pearing  before  people,  acquired,  through  contact  with  the 
polished  society  of  the  Court,  the  graceful  address  and 
the  cultivated  manner  which  he  retained  afterward  through 
his  life. 

Very  soon  after  leaving  Auvergne  to  go  to  school,  he 
had  the  misfortune  to  lose  his  mother,  who  died  in  Paris 
in  the  year  1770,  by  which  event  he  was  left,  at  the  age 
of  thirteen,  without  near  relatives  with  the  exception  of 
his  grandmother.  He  was  no  longer  poor,  however,  for 
his  mother's  uncle,  the  Comte  de  La  Riviere,  whose  death 
occurred  about  this  time,  had  made  La  Fayette  his  heir 
and  had  left  to  him  a  very  large  estate.  Placed  as  he 
was,  therefore,  with  rank  and  title  at  Court,  with  excel 
lent  conduct  in  his  relations  at  college,  and  with  more 
than  ordinary  means  of  his  own,  he  became  very  natu 
rally  an  object  of  interest  in  the  society  of  the  capital ; 
and  it  was  not  long  before  it  was  discovered  that  here  was 
a  young  gentleman  who  might  be  an  exceedingly  desira- 


12  THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.         [1774. 

ble  match  for  some  one  of  the  daughters  of  the  families 
seeking  at  Court  suitable  alliances  with  noblemen  equal  in 
distinction  with  themselves.  La  Fayette's  good  fortune 
directed  him  here  as  it  had  done  before :  he  made  a  con 
nection  which  added  to  the  value  of  his  present  position 
the  influence  and  prestige  of  one  of  the  very  great  fami 
lies  of  France,  that  of  Noailles.  He  married,  on  the  llth 
of  April,  1774,  at  the  hotel  de  Noailles,  rue  St. -Honor  e, 
Mademoiselle  Marie  -  Adrienne  -  Franchise  de  Noailles, 
daughter  of  the  Due  d'Ayen,  Marechal  du  Camp  et 
Armees  du  Hoi,  afterward  Due  de  Noailles ;  and  he  ob 
tained  a  wife  who  was  not  only  to  enjoy  the  triumph  of 
his  youth  in  his  first  successes  that  came  very  quickly 
thereafter,  but  was  also  to  pass  with  him  through  the  tem 
pest  of  the  French  Revolution,  and,  in  his  days  of  grief, 
disappointment,  and  captivity,  to  support  him  with  almost 
unequalled  devotion. 

Mme.  de  La  Fayette  has  given  us  an  interesting  ac 
count  of  this  courtship,  in  the  charming  narrative  written 
by  her  in  description  of  her  home  life  and  as  a  tribute  of 
filial  affection  to  the  memory  of  her  mother.1  She  says, 
in  speaking  of  herself  and  her  sister  Louise,  afterward 
Vicomtesse  de  Noailles,  "  We  were  scarcely  twelve  years 
old  when  M.  de  La  Fayette  was  proposed  as  a  husband 
for  one  of  us,  he  himself  being  at  that  time  but  fourteen. 
His  extreme  youth,  and  the  isolated  character  of  his  posi 
tion,  for  he  had  lost  all  his  near  relatives  and  was  without 
any  one  in  whom  he  had  confidence  to  guide  him,  as  well 
as  his  large  fortune  entirely  free  from  restrictions,  which 
my  mother  considered  a  source  of  grave  danger,  led  her, 
after  careful  consideration,  to  refuse  him,  in  spite  of  the 
good  reports  as  to  his  character  that  we  heard  from  all 
those  who  knew  him.  She  persisted  in  her  refusal  for 
several  months." 

1  Notice  sur  Mme.  la  Duchesse  d'Ayen,  par  Mme.  de  Lafayette,  ea    fille. 
Paris,  1869. 


1774.]         THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  13 

During  this  time,  the  Due  d'Ayen,  who  had  selected  the 
Marquis  as  his  son-in-law,  stoutly  held  out  against  the 
objections  of  his  wife,  with  whom  he  appears  actually  to 
have  quarrelled  upon  this  subject,  until  finally,  says  Mine, 
de  La  Fayette,  "  after  he  had  assured  my  mother  that  her 
daughter  should  not  leave  her  during  the  first  few  years, 
and  after  arranging  to  defer  the  marriage  for  two  years  at 
least,  and  having  taken  steps  to  complete  the  education  of 
M.  de  La  Fayette  in  the  mean  time,  she  accepted  him 
whom  she  afterward  cherished  as  a  most  tenderly  loved 
son,  whose  sterling  value  she  learned  and  justly  under 
stood  from  the  first  moment  that  she  knew  him.  Her 
consent  thus  obtained  brought  about  a  reconciliation  be 
tween  her  and  my  father.  Our  joy  at  this  event  cannot 
be  expressed  in  words,  and  the  memory  of  that  day,  the 
21st  of  September,  1772,  shall  never  be  effaced  either  from 
my  heart  or  from  my  mind." 

The  hotel  de  Noailles,  the  family  mansion  of  the  Due 
d'Ayen,  was  in  the  rue  St. -Honors,  not  far  from  the 
palace  of  the  Tuileries,  upon  ground  now  occupied  by  the 
rue  d'Alger.  There  La  Fayette  lived  during  the  first 
years  after  his  marriage,  like  one  of  the  children  of  the 
household,  pursuing  his  studies  as  they  did  theirs,  and 
going  afterward,  under  the  supervision  of  M.  de  Noailles, 
whose  military  services  had  brought  him  into  close  inti 
macy  with  the  King  and  who  occupied  a  very  influential 
position  at  Court,  to  the  military  school  for  young  noble 
men  called  the  "  Academic  de  Versailles."  There  the 
instruction  of  the  good  Abbe  Fay  on  was  exchanged  for 
the  more  practical  training  of  a  veteran  officer,  who  took 
the  young  Marquis  in  charge,  to  give  him  some  under 
standing  of  matters  of  warfare  and  to  prepare  his  mind 
for  the  active  career  of  a  soldier. 

Nothing  could  exceed  the  gentleness  of  character  of  the 
Duchesse  d'Ayen,  who  was  now  a  mother  to  the  Marquis 
de  La  Fayette,  or  the  charm  of  the  domestic  life  which  she 


14  THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.         [1774. 

had  created  for  her  husband  and  her  family  of  girls,  as  it 
is  described  by  Mine,  de  La  Fayette.  Although  her  rela 
tion  to  the  Court  exacted  from  her  that  attention  to  social 
duties  and  to  matters  of  entertainment  which  was  incum 
bent  upon  her  in  her  position  as  a  "  grande  dame," — and 
she  fulfilled  all  these  with  scrupulous  care,  as  she  did 
every  obligation  of  her  life, — yet  she  found  time  every 
day  to  give  her  personal  direction  to  the  education  and 
training  of  her  children,  to  influence  the  forming  of  their 
characters  as  each  developed  toward  womanhood,  to  watch 
the  tendencies  of  each  mind  and  to  guide  it  toward  what 
was  right,  and  by  her  own  exalted  piety  to  set  for  them 
the  standard  of  life  which  made  of  them  all  afterward 
excellent  women.  She  was  a  splendid  example  of  virtue 
and  high  principle  amid  the  surroundings  of  the  long  and 
dissolute  reign  then  drawing  to  its  close.  Her  influence 
was  very  great  upon  the  mind  of  La  Fayette,  toward 
whom  she  showed  a  loving  tenderness ;  and  he  mourned 
her  bitterly  years  afterward,  when,  during  the  Reign  of 
Terror  in  France,  she  went  with  admirable  fortitude  to 
the  guillotine,  in  expiation  of  crimes  in  which  certainly 
the  actions  of  her  own  life  had  had  no  part. 

The  first  year  of  the  married  life  of  the  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette  passed  merrily  in  the  society  of  a  very  exclusive 
collection  of  young  people  which  formed  about  the  salons 
of  Marie  Antoinette,  to  which  he  and  his  wife  were  freely 
admitted,  amid  many  balls  at  the  palace,  or  entertainments 
at  the  theatre,  after  which  the  Duchesse  d'Ayen  was  in  the 
habit  of  inviting  them  all  to  take  supper  together  at  her 
house  ;  although  that  sort  of  amusement  was  very  little  to 
his  taste,  partly  on  account  of  his  natural  diffidence  and 
partly  because  his  disposition  was  serious  and  led  him  to 
be  reflective  rather  than  gay.  He  speaks  with  very  slight 
enthusiasm  of  "  the  short  favor  I  enjoyed  of  a  society  of 
young  people  of  whom  I  was  one,"  of  "  the  unfavorable 
impression  created  by  my  silence"  and  "  the  awkwardness 


1774.]         THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  15 

of  my  manners,  which  never  could  properly  adjust  them 
selves  to  the  required  graces  of  the  Court"  or  to  the  de 
mands  made  upon  them  by  the  occasion  of  a  supper  in 
town.1 

The  young  noblemen  with  whom  he  associated  at  this 
time  had  a  meeting-place  at  a  cafe  in  Paris  called  the 
"  Epee  de  Bois,"  where  they  indulged  their  tendency  for 
amusement  by  parodies  upon  some  of  the  older  people  of 
the  Court,  by  inventing  new  costumes  which  they  took  it 
upon  themselves  to  introduce  and  to  oblige  their  elders  to 
wear  upon  public  occasions,  thus  bringing  the  old  regime 
into  mild  ridicule,  and  by  other  inventions  of  the  sort, 
which  induced  them  upon  one  occasion  to  enact  a  travesty 
of  the  Parlement,  then  recently  summoned  after  having 
been  long  in  abeyance ;  an  escapade  in  which  La  Fayette 
took  a  leading  part,  and  which  gave  offence  at  the  palace 
and  came  near  making  serious  trouble  for  them  all.  After 
that  they  were  separated  and  most  of  them  sent  to  their 
regiments.2  This  open  disrespect  for  the  institutions  of  the 
old  regime  in  France  foreshadowed  the  revulsion  of  feeling 
that  was  about  to  take  place  in  the  nation  after  the  weak 
and  disgraceful  reign  of  Louis  XV. ;  it  showed  itself  even 
among  the  younger  members  of  the  aristocracy,  wrho  looked 
to  the  accession  of  the  new  King  with  a  certain  feeling  of 
emancipation  from  the  burden  of  institutions  for  which 
they  had  no  reverence.  A  desire  for  liberty  was  in  the 
minds  of  men  ;  not  strong  enough  as  yet  to  lead  to  open 
expression,  but  a  desire,  no  doubt,  that  was  a  precursor  of 
the  Revolution  which  was  gradually  making  itself  felt. 

La  Fayette  says  of  himself,  "  I  was  delighted  with  re 
publican  stories,  and  when  my  relatives  secured  a  place  for 
me  at  Court,  I  did  not  hesitate  to  give  offence  in  order  to 
maintain  my  independence."  The  Marechal  de  Noailles 


1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  7. 

2  Se"£iir,  Memoires. 

3  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  8. 


16  THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.         [1775. 

was  extremely  anxious  to  attach  him  to  the  suite  of  one  of 
the  royal  princes,  a  position  at  that  time  eagerly  sought 
after,  as  conferring  immediate  distinction  at  Court  and 
opening  the  way  to  opportunities  of  preferment.  It  was 
distasteful,  however,  to  La  Fayette,  who  scorned  the 
intrigues  of  the  Court,  and  whose  independent  nature 
made  it  impossible  for  him  to  assume  the  duties  and  the 
daily  life  of  a  courtier.  It  embarrassed  him  in  this  case 
to  refuse  an  offer  made  by  a  friend  who  was  interested  in 
him  and  who  desired  to  do  him  a  favor,  so  he  determined 
to  escape  the  necessity  by  giving  offence  to  the  Prince. 
He  succeeded  in  that,  and  the  negotiations  were  imme 
diately  discontinued.  It  is  said  that  King  Louis  XVIII., 
the  personage  in  question,  never  forgave  him  the  insult. 

It  was  whilst  his  mind  was  in  this  somewhat  rebellious 
condition  that  La  Fayette  first  heard  of  the  event  which 
was  to  play  so  important  a  part  in  shaping  the  course  of 
his  life, — the  uprising  in  the  Colonies  of  North  America. 
He  has  referred  to  this  in  the  account  of  himself  given 
in  the  Memoirs  which  he  wrote  several  years  later,  and 
which  were  published  by  his  family  after  his  death ;  and 
he  narrated  the  story  very  fully  to  Mr.  Jared  Sparks  in 
1828,  when  that  gentleman  visited  him  in  France  for 
the  purpose  of  obtaining  such  information  as  he  might 
be  able  to  give  regarding  the  American  Revolution  to  aid 
in  the  preparation  of  the  Writings  of  Washington,  for 
which  Mr.  Sparks  was  then  collecting  the  materials.1 
All  the  circumstances  of  this  incident  tend  to  show  that 
up  to  that  time  La  Fayette  knew  nothing  whatever  of  the 
Americans  or  of  their  struggle  with  the  mother-country, 
and  they  have  a  very  important  bearing  upon  the  analysis 
of  his  character  and  the  study  of  his  early  career,  as  well 
as  his  relations  to  the  American  War ;  because  they  show 
how  spontaneous  and  real  was  his  enthusiasm  for  the 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vol.  v.,  Appendix. 


1775.]         THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  17 

cause  he  adopted,  and  how  absolutely  free  from  selfish 
motives  was  the  determination  which  led  him  to  espouse 
our  interests,  which  made  him  willing,  if  necessary,  to 
sacrifice  his  career  in  France,  to  brave  the  angry  protests 
of  his  family,  to  disregard  the  stern  admonition  of  his 
Government  and  run  the  risk  of  being  treated  as  a  de 
serter,  in  order  that  he  might  join  his  efforts  to  ours  in  the 
struggle  for  liberty.  The  idea  of  freedom  appears  to  have 
aroused  a  feeling  in  his  mind  that  brought  into  play  the 
strongest  impulses  of  his  nature,  and  to  have  presented  to 
him  a  conception  of  heroism  which  took  complete  posses 
sion  of  his  being.  He  says,  in  writing,  years  afterward, 
of  the  American  cause,  "  Never  had  so  noble  a  purpose 
offered  itself  to  the  judgment  of  men !  This  was  the  last 
struggle  of  liberty  ;  its  defeat  then  would  have  left  it 
without  a  refuge  and  without  hope."  l 

He  knew  neither  our  country  nor  our  people ;  he  did 
not  speak  our  language ;  it  is  not  probable  that  up  to  that 
time  he  had  ever  heard  the  name  of  a  single  American. 
The  story  of  wrong  done  to  a  brave  people  called  forth  his 
sympathy  ;  their  heroic  struggle  for  independence  enlisted 
him  in  their  cause,  and  he  determined  to  fight  for  them. 

In  the  month  of  August,  1775,  the  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette  was  attached  to  the  regiment  "  de  Noailles,"  which 
was  commanded  by  his  cousin  the  Prince  de  Poix  and  was 
stationed  at  that  time  at  Metz,  when  it  happened  that 
the  Duke  of  Gloucester,  brother  of  King  George  III.  of 
England,  who  was  travelling  through  France  with  his  wife 
on  his  way  to  Italy,  stopped  for  a  day  or  two  at  Metz  and 
was  entertained  by  the  governor,  the  Comte  Charles  Fran- 
§ois  de  Broglie,  at  a  dinner  to  which  the  chief  officers  of 
the  garrison  were  invited.2  La  Fayette  was  included  in 


1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  9. 

3  I  have  chosen  to  follow  M.  Doniol  in  fixing  the  date  of  this  dinner  in  the 
year  1775,  although  Mr.  Sparks,  in  the  Appendix  of  vol.  v.  of  the  Writings  of 
Washington,  refers  to  it  as  having  taken  place  in  the  summer  of  1776.  It  is 
VOL.  1.— 2 


18  THE   COMING   OF   LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.         [1775. 

the  number ;  for,  although  he  was  not  yet  eighteen  years 
of  age,  his  rank  and  his  connection  with  the  powerful 
house  of  Noailles  entitled  him  to  consideration ;  besides 
which,  the  Comte  de  Broglie,  himself  a  soldier  of  distinc 
tion,  had  been  the  commanding  officer  of  La  Fayette's 
father  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and  saw  him  fall,  and  he 
very  naturally  singled  out  the  son  with  a  feeling  of  affec 
tionate  attachment. 

The  Duke  of  Gloucester,  who  did  not  agree  with  his 
brother  the  King  in  all  matters,  was  especially  opposed  to 
his  treatment  of  the  American  Colonies  and  to  the  prose 
cution  of  the  war.  He  did  not  hesitate  to  express  himself 
at  times  with  considerable  bitterness  in  this  connection 
about  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain.  He  even  spoke  occa 
sionally  in  the  presence  of  hearers  to  whom  his  words  had 
an  important  bearing  and  by  whom  they  were  carefully 
reported  to  superiors  who  were  constantly  on  the  alert  to 
detect  the  current  of  popular  feeling  in  England  and  to 
anticipate  the  occurrence  of  political  complications. 

This  prince,  therefore,  in  the  intimacy  of  a  dinner-table, 
surrounded  by  a  company  of  noblemen  whose  presence 


very  probable  that  La  Fayette  mistook  the  exact  date,  in  referring  to  it  many 
years  afterward  in  conversation  with  Mr.  Sparks,  without  documents  from 
which  to  refresh  his  memory  ;  for  his  papers  had  all  been  destroyed  at  Cha- 
vaniac  during  the  French  Revolution.  We  know  from  other  sources,  how 
ever,  that  the  Duke  of  Gloucester  made  his  visit  to  France  in  1775.  There  is 
a  letter  in  the  French  Archives  (Depot  de  la  Guerre,  vol.  no.  3694  ;  quoted 
by  M.  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  t.  i.  p.  108),  from  the  Prince 
de  Montbarey  to  the  Marquis  de  Castries,  dated  at  Lille,  the  30th  of  July, 
1775,  announcing  the  arrival  of  the  Duke  and  Duchess  of  Gloucester,  travel 
ling  as  the  Earl  and  Countess  of  Connaught,  which  says  that  they  were 
going  to  Valenciennes,  Rheims,  Verdun,  Metz,  Nancy,  Luneville,  Strassburg, 
Munich,  Innspruck,  Venice,  and  thence  to  Rome.  Another  letter,  from  the 
Bishop  of  Verdun,  dated  the  7th  of  August,  1775,  to  the  Comte  de  Vergennes 
(Angleterre,  t.  511,  no.  70),  informs  the  minister  that  they  had  been  enter 
tained  by  the  bishop  at  Verdun,  and  adds,  "Their  Royal  Highnesses  left 
here  yesterday  afternoon  at  three  o'clock  for  Metz."  Also,  a  letter  from  the 
duke  himself,  dated  at  Strassburg,  the  25th  of  August,  1775,  thanking  King 
Louis  XVI.  for  his  entertainment  in  France,  shows  that  he  was  about  to  leave 
French  territory  nt  that  date.  (Angleterre,  t.  511,  no.  106.) 


1775.]        THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  19 

would  naturally  invite  him  to  throw  off  his  reserve,  was 
not  likely  to  be  extremely  careful  of  what  he  said.  In 
connection  with  some  letters  which  he  had  recently  re 
ceived  from  home,  he  began  to  talk  of  America,  He  ex 
plained  the  causes  of  the  disagreement  which  had  arisen 
between  Great  Britain  and  its  Colonies,  and  he  described 
the  outbreak  which  had  occurred,  the  fixed  purpose  of 
the  King  to  bring  the  Colonists  back  to  subjection,  and 
the  repressive  measures  then  being  determined  upon  in 
England  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Americans,  he 
said,  were  opposing  force  by  force  in  the  defence  of  their 
rights,  and  from  the  appearance  of  things  at  that  moment 
the  war  was  likely  to  be  a  long  one. 

This  conversation  arrested  the  attention  of  La  Fayette, 
who  became  at  once  intensely  interested.  He  listened  to 
every  word  that  the  duke  uttered,  and  he  obtained  per 
mission  to  satisfy  the  longing  for  information  upon  this 
subject  which  had  suddenly  sprung  up  in  his  mind,  by 
asking  numerous  questions, — to  which  the  duke  replied. 

The  impression  then  made  upon  him  was  of  the  kind 
which  go  deep  down  into  men's  hearts  and  remain  there 
forever ;  and  it  took  possession  of  him  from  that  moment, 
almost  to  the  exclusion  of  every  other  purpose.  Very 
many  years  afterward,  he  told  Mr.  Sparks  that  "  the  cause 
seemed  to  him  just  and  noble,  from  the  representations  of 
the  duke  himself;  and  before  he  left  the  table  the  thought 
came  into  his  head,  that  he  would  go  to  America  and  offer 
his  services  to  a  people  who  were  struggling  for  freedom 
and  independence.  From  that  hour  he  could  think  of 
nothing  but  this  enterprise,  and  he  resolved  to  go  to  Paris 
to  make  further  inquiries."  1 

Here,  however,  he  found  himself  surrounded  by  grave 
and  unexpected  difficulties  ;  for,  in  the  enthusiasm  which 
impelled  him  toward  the  object  he  now  had  in  view,  and 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  445. 


20  THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.         [1776. 

thinking,  naturally  enough,  only  of  himself,  he  had  uncon 
sciously  stepped  upon  the  stage  before  the  play  was  ready, 
and  for  a  moment  there  was  danger  that  he  might  seriously 
disturb  the  setting.  The  attitude  of  France  toward  Great 
Britain  in  the  years  1775  and  1776  was  one  of  extremely 
delicate  adjustment.  She  was  under  the  jealous  and 
watchful  eye  of  Lord  Stormont,  the  British  Ambassador, 
whom  not  the  slightest  movement  escaped  ;  who  was  ready 
at  any  moment  to  charge  her  Government  with  bad  faith, 
or  to  call  the  ministry  to  account  for  breach  of  inter 
national  contracts. 

There  was  a  decided  sympathy  on  the  part  of  the 
French  Cabinet  toward  the  American  Colonists,  through 
which  aid  had  already  begun  to  go  out  secretly  to  them 
from  France ;  though  the  appearance  of  neutrality  was 
carefully  maintained,  and  peace  continued  with  Great 
Britain.  But  it  did  not  suit  the  plans  of  the  Comte  de 
Vergennes,  the  Secretary  of  State  in  France,  to  have  a 
young  French  nobleman  like  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
make  a  demonstration  before  the  world  in  favor  of  the 
people  whom  the  English  nation  at  that  time  called  insur 
gents,  and  the  English  Government  rebels. 

It  was,  perhaps,  well  enough  if  some  obscure  subject 
of  the  French  King  should  escape  out  of  one  of  his  ports 
and  go  to  America ;  the  minister  was  willing  to  over 
look  that,  and  in  fact  the  incident  could  produce  no 
serious  result.  But  the  same  procedure  upon  the  part 
of  a  man  of  rank  and  position  like  La  Fayette  might 
very  properly  be  assumed  to  have  the  sanction  of  the 
ministry,  and,  unless  it  were  disavowed,  must  inevitably 
compromise  the  Government.  La  Fayette  discovered 
this  very  quickly,  and  it  greatly  retarded  his  progress, 
though  it  did  not  defeat  the  ultimate  fulfilment  of  his 
purpose. 

It  is  not  easy  to  follow  his  footsteps  immediately  after 
he  left  Metz  to  go  to  Paris,  for  his  Memoirs  are,  unfortu- 


1776.]         THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  21 

nately,  very  meagre  as  to  this  part  of  his  life.  We  know, 
however,  that  he  kept  in  view  the  one  object  of  going  to 
America,  though  the  only  reference  he  makes  to  it  is  that 
"  certain  circumstances  which  it  is  not  necessary  for  me  to 
narrate  led  me  to  expect  from  my  family  nothing  but 
opposition  upon  this  subject;"1  and  in  this  he  was  evidently 
not  deceived ;  for  Mme.  de  La  Fayette  informs  us,  speak 
ing  particularly  of  the  Due  d'Ayen,  "  My  father  and  all 
my  family  were  violently  angry  upon  hearing  of  this 


news."  2 


La  Fayette  naturally  confided  his  ambition  to  two  of 
his  intimate  friends,  the  Vicomte  de  Noailles  and  the  Vi- 
comte  de  Segur,  who,  being  about  the  same  age  as  himself, 
were  inspired  with  a  desire  for  glory  and  grew  eager  to 
join  him ;  but,  as  they  were  not  independent,  as  he  was, 
and  were  obliged  to  look  to  their  families  for  support, 
their  circumstances  forced  them  to  ask  permission,  which 
was  promptly  refused.  La  Fayette  then  turned,  with  the 
hope  of  assistance,  to  his  commander,  the  Comte  de  Brog 
lie,  to  whom  he  confided  his  project.  M.  de  Broglie  re 
ceived  it,  as  all  mature  advisers  had  done,  with  disfavor. 
He  told  him  that  it  was  fraught  with  so  many  hazards, 
without  the  prospect  of  the  least  advantage,  that  he  could 
not  countenance  it.  "  When  La  Fayette  found  him  thus 
determined,  he  requested  that  at  least  he  would  not  betray 
him,  for  he  was  resolved  to  go  to  America.  The  Comte 
de  Broglie  assured  him  that  his  confidence  was  not  mis 
placed  ;  '  but/  said  he,  '  I  have  seen  your  uncle  die  in 
the  wars  of  Italy,  I  witnessed  your  father's  death  at  the 
battle  of  Minden,  and  I  will  not  be  accessory  to  the  ruin 
of  the  only  remaining  branch  of  the  family/  He  then 
used  all  his  powers  of  argument  and  persuasion  to  divert 
La  Fayette  from  his  purpose,  but  in  vain." 

1  M6moires  de  ma  Main,  i.  10. 

2  Notice  sur  Mine,  la  Dnchesse  d'Ayen,  p.  56. 
8  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  446. 


22  THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1776. 

Whilst  La  Fayette  was  not  in  the  least  deflected  from 
his  intention,  his  conduct  at  this  time  bears  out  the  de 
scription  given  of  him  by  his  friend  the  Comte  de  Segur, 
who  knew  him  as  well  as,  if  not  better  than,  any  other  of 
his  companions  at  this  period,  when  the  circumstances  of 
their  lives  had  thrown  them  together  and  seemed  to  prom 
ise  a  future  in  which  they  saw  themselves  united  in  the 
same  career.  "  His  exterior/'  he  said,  "  apparently  so 
cold  to  one  who  merely  saw  him,  concealed  in  reality  the 
most  active  mind,  the  most  determined  character,  and  the 
most  enthusiastic  spirit. " l  La  Fayette  renewed  his  en 
treaties  to  the  Comte  de  Broglie,  of  whom  he  says,  "  after 
he  found  that  he  could  not  stop  me,  he  entered  into  my 
plans  with  a  paternal  kindness/7  and  who  finally  consented 
to  introduce  him  to  the  Baron  de  Kalb,  then  in  Paris,  also 
seeking  an  opportunity  to  go  to  North  America.2 

The  Baron  de  Kalb,  as  he  was  called,  though  his  proper 
name  was  Johann  Kalb,  was  a  German,  somewhat  over 
fifty  years  of  age,  who  had  served  through  several  cam 
paigns  in  the  French  army  and  in  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
and  had  been  an  officer  under  the  command  of  the  Due  de 
Broglie,  by  whom  he  had  been  created  assistant  quarter 
master-general  (aide-mar echal  des  logis)  and  had  been 
given  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel.  By  means  of  the 
friendship  he  had  succeeded  in  acquiring  for  himself  of 
the  Marshal  Due  de  Broglie  and  of  his  brother  the 
Comte  de  Broglie,  through  his  devoted  attachment  to 
them  and  to  their  interests  and  his  constant  readiness  to 
serve  them  whenever  they  had  occasion  to  make  use  of 
him,  Kalb  had  found  opportunity  from  time  to  time  to 
gratify  the  desires  of  an  exceedingly  restless  nature,  and 
to  attain,  to  some  extent  at  least,  the  objects  of  a  personal 
ambition  which  prevented  him  from  leading  a  quiet  life, 
such  as  his  ample  means  would  have  enabled  him  to  do. 

1  Segur,  Memoires,  i.  61.  a  Sparks,  ubi  supra. 


1776.]        THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  23 

Besides  his  military  career,  which  had  given  him  the 
reputation  of  an  intelligent  and  reliable  soldier,  as  he 
undoubtedly  was,  he  had  been  employed  upon  one  or  two 
secret  missions  by  the  French  Cabinet,  through  which  he 
had  come  into  contact  with  European  political  questions 
.and  had  acquired  some  experience  of  men  and  of  affairs. 
Upon  one  of  these  occasions  he  had  been  sent  to  Holland, 
and  afterward  the  Due  de  Choiseul,  then  Prime  Minister, 
whose  practised  eye  had  foreseen,  even  long  before  this 
time,  that  serious  trouble  was  about  to  arise  between  Eng 
land  and  her  Colonies,  had  sent  him  to  America  toward 
the  end  of  the  year  1767,  to  make  a  report  upon  the  con 
dition  of  feeling  here. 

Kalb  was  familiar,  therefore,  with  our  country,  and  he 
spoke  English  very  well.  He  was  at  this  time  about  to 
set  out  upon  another  secret  mission,  under  the  protection 
and  in  the  interest  of  the  Comte  de  Broglie,  in  further 
ance  of  a  plan  conceived  by  that  nobleman,  by  which  Kalb 
was  to  return  to  America  to  join  the  Colonists  and  to  take 
part  with  them  as  a  general  officer  in  the  American  army.1 
The  interest  he  showed  in  America  was  not,  however,  born 
of  any  attachment  that  he  felt  for  its  people,  or  of  any 
great  sympathy  with  them  in  the  struggle  in  which  they 
were  by  this  time  fully  engaged.  His  ultimate  purpose 
was  to  enter  a  field  in  which  he  might  win  credit  and  dis 
tinction  for  himself,  and,  upon  his  return  to  Europe  after 
the  war,  to  obtain  the  promotion  in  the  French  army  which 
he  had  coveted  for  years,  but  which  had  been  denied  him, 
very  probably  because  as  a  foreigner  he  failed  to  gain  ad 
vancement  to  the  exclusion  of  men  who,  being  at  home, 
had  more  influence  than  he.  Through  the  intervention 
of  the  Comte  de  Broglie  at  the  War  Department,  and  for 
the  purpose  of  his  secret  mission  to  America  in  the  per- 

1  For  an  account  of  this  see  "  Le  Stathoudorat  du  Comte  de  Broglie," 
Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  50 ;  also,  Dr.  Charles  J.  Stille,  in 
The  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  xi.  369. 


24  THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.        [1776. 

sonal  interest  of  that  gentleman,  Kalb  was  granted  a  leave 
of  absence  for  two  years,  with  a  promise  of  promotion,  and 
he  obtained  subsequently,  on  the  6th  of  November,  1776, 
a  commission  of  brigadier-general  for  the  French  Islands. 
His  biographer  tells  us,  "  In  France  he  now  had  little  or 
nothing  to  hope  for,  while  a  wide  field  was  opened  to  him, 
on  the  other  side  of  the  ocean.  Honor  and  renown  in 
vited  him  to  try  his  fortunes  there.  He  made  up  his 
mind  to  go ;  resolving,  however,  before  preparing  for  his 
departure,  to  await  the  expected  arrival  in  Paris  of  the 
American  Agent,  Silas  Deane,  which  was  delayed  until 
the  beginning  of  July,  1776."  x 

Shortly  after  this,  the  news  of  the  Declaration  of  Inde 
pendence  was  received  in  Europe,  where  it  began  to  at 
tract  general  attention  to  the  war  in  the  English  Colonies, 
which  before  that,  although  well  understood  and  watched 
with  great  interest  by  the  various  Cabinets  in  Europe,  had 
made  little  impression  upon  the  mind  of  the  general  pub 
lic.  The  announcement,  however,  that  England  was  likely 
to  lose  its  grasp  upon  the  rich  possessions  which  it  held  in 
the  New  World,  and  the  consequent  loss  of  prestige  that 
it  was  expected  to  suffer  as  an  arbiter  in  shaping  the 
course  of  European  affairs,  as  well  as  the  necessary  weak 
ening  of  its  power  of  aggression,  always  regarded  with 
unconcealed  dread  and  suspicion,  produced  a  violent  out 
break  of  feeling  in  France. 

Silas  Deane  wrote  to  Congress  in  November,  1776,  "  The 
rage,  as  I  may  say,  for  entering  the  American  service  in 
creases,  and  the  consequence  is,  that  I  am  crowded  with 
offers  and  proposals,  many  of  them  from  persons  of  the  first 
rank  and  eminence,  in  the  sea  as  well  as  land  service."  2  M. 
Dubois-Martin,  secretary  to  the  Comte  de  Broglie,  writing 
to  Kalb  a  few  weeks  later,  says,  "  Two  persons  have  to-day 
informed  me  that  a  prohibition  has  been  published  against 

1  Kapp's  Life  of  Kalb,  p.  81. 

2  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  191. 


1776.]        THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  25 

discussing  the  war  in  the  cafes.  The  precaution  is  a  timely 
one,  for  the  war  is  at  present  the  subject  of  every  conver 
sation."  In  November,  1776,  Kalb  presented  himself 
to  Mr.  Deane,  who  immediately  reported  to  Congress  as 
follows  :  "  Count  Broglio,  who  commanded  the  Army  of 
France  the  last  War,  did  me  the  honor  to  call  on  me 
twice  yesterday  with  an  officer  who  served  as  his  Quarter 
master  General  the  last  AVar,  and  has  now  a  regiment  in 
his  service ;  but  being  a  German,  and  having  travelled 
through  America  a  few  years  since,  he  is  desirous  of 
engaging  in  the  service  of  the  United  States  of  North 
America.  I  can  by  no  means  let  slip  an  opportunity 
of  engaging  a  person  of  so  much  experience,  and  who 
is  by  every  one  recommended  as  one  of  the  bravest  and 
most  skillful  officers  in  the  kingdom.  .  .  .  This  gentle 
man  has  an  independent  fortune,  and  a  certain  pros 
pect  of  advancement  here ;  but  being  a  zealous  friend  to 
liberty,  civil  and  religious,  he  is  actuated  by  the  most  in 
dependent  and  generous  principles  in  the  offer  he  makes 
of  his  services  to  the  States  of  America."  2  Mr.  Deane 
thereupon  engaged  Kalb  for  the  American  service,  with 
the  rank  of  major-general,  and  the  contract  was  executed 
on  the  1st  of  December,  1776,  Kalb  engaging  for  him 
self  and  for  fifteen  officers  of  various  grades  who  were  to 
accompany  him.  It  was  intended  to  send  him  out  from 
the  port  of  Havre  on  a  vessel  sailing  ostensibly  for  Santo 
Domingo,  but  in  reality  bound  for  the  United  States, 
loaded  with  a  cargo  of  arms,  tents,  and  ammunition  for 
the  insurgents.  The  enterprise  failed,  however,  after  Kalb 
had  actually  reached  Havre,  ready  to  sail,  because  a  delay 
occurred  in  loading  the  vessel  on  account  of  news  which 
arrived  about  that  time,  of  reverses  to  the  American  arms  ; 
and  before  it  could  be  proceeded  with,  Lord  Stormont, 
who  had  gained  information  of  this  enterprise,  made  so 

1  Kapp's  Life  of  Kalb,  p.  89. 

2  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  191. 


26  THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.        [1776. 

vigorous  a  protest  that  the  French  ministry  was  obliged 
to  issue  an  order  prohibiting  the  expedition  ;  in  conse 
quence  of  which  it  had  to  be  set  aside  for  the  moment.1 

It  is  at  this  point  that  Kalb's  movements  become  of 
interest  in  the  history  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  for 
Kalb  turned  to  him  for  aid  and  encouragement  in  his 
plans.  La  Fayette  was  still  bravely  struggling  against 
the  obstacles  that  surrounded  him,  though  he  was  fast 
approaching  the  time  when  he  should  equip  an  expedition 
for  himself  to  set  out  to  America  and,  as  we  shall  see,  to 
take  with  him  in  his  following  a  number  of  the  officers 
who  intended  to  sail  in  the  expedition  from  Havre,  among 
whom  was  Johann  Kalb. 

It  was  toward  the  end  of  the  year  1776  that  the  Comte 
de  Broglie,  in  fulfilment  of  his  promise,  had  introduced 
La  Fayette  to  Kalb,  about  the  time  when  the  latter  was 
negotiating  with  Silas  Deane  for  his  entry  into  the  Ameri 
can  service  and  planning  for  his  departure  as  soon  as  pos 
sible  from  Havre.  The  appearance  upon  the  scene  of  this 
young  nobleman,  possessed  of  family  influence  and  family 
connection  far  beyond  those  of  any  foreigner  who  up  to 
that  time  had  openly  espoused  the  American  cause,  was 
hailed  with  great  satisfaction  not  only  by  Kalb,  but  also 
by  Silas  Deane,  to  whom  about  this  time  he  had  been 
presented.  Although  it  was  necessary  to  use  great  caution 
in  holding  intercourse  with  the  American  Commissioner, 
who,  as  La  Fayette  said,  "  was  in  Paris,  but  his  voice  was 
drowned  by  the  loud  protestations  of  Lord  Stormont,  and 
people  were  afraid  to  visit  him,"  2  yet  those  who  knew  his 
official  connection  with  the  American  Congress  held  very 
constant  communication  with  him,  and  from  his  little 
house  at  Passy  he  was  already  carrying  on  an  extensive 
traffic  in  arms  for  the  Colonies,  which  was  connived  at  by 
the  French  Government,  to  be  officially  denied,  however, 


Kapp's  Kalb,  p.  91.  2  Me  moires  de  ma  Main,  i.  10. 


1776.]        THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  27 

when  the  British  Ambassador  followed  up  its  progress  too 
closely,  to  be  allowed  then  to  slumber  for  a  short  period, 
and  to  be  begun  again  when  it  seemed  safe.  La  Fayette, 
piloted  by  Kalb,  escaped  the  danger  of  discovery  and  suc 
ceeded  in  obtaining  an  interview  with  Mr.  Deane,  to  whom 
he  explained  his  purpose  and  declared  his  intention  of 
going  to  America.  He  was  very  kindly  received  by  the 
Commissioner,  though  La  Fayette  appears  to  have  felt 
that,  after  all,  he  had  not  much  to  offer  him  as  an  in 
ducement  when  it  was  estimated  at  its  actual  value ;  for 
he  said  afterward,  "  In  presenting  my  nineteen-year-old 
face  to  Mr.  Deane,  I  spoke  more  of  my  zeal  than  of  my 
experience ;  though  I  tried  to  make  as  much  as  I  could 
out  of  the  small  excitement  that  my  going  away  was 
likely  to  cause." l  Mr.  Deane  saw  value  enough  at  a 
glance,  however,  in  this  acquisition,  and  did  not  hesitate 
to  enter  into  an  agreement  with  the  young  Marquis.2 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  11. 

2  Herr  Kapp  fixes  the  date  of  this  interview  (Life  of  Kalb,  p.  87)  between 
the  1st  and  the  7th  of  December,  1770,  because  the  contract  executed  by 
Kail)  with  Mr.  Deane  is  dated  the  1st  of  December  and  La  Fayette  is  not 
mentioned  in  it,  while  the  contract  entered  into  by  La  Fayette   and  Mr. 
Deane,  in  which  Kalb  appears  as  one  of  the  parties,  is  dated  on  the  7th  of 
that  month.     It  appears  very  likely  that  La  Fayette's  contract  was  dated 
back  at  the  time  it  was  finally  executed  ;  for  the  negotiations  were  not  con 
cluded  until  some   time  after  Kalb  returned   to  Paris,  and  we   know  that 
he  spent  at  Havre  the  greater  part  of  December,  from  letters  written  to  him 
from  Paris  on  the  8th,  14th,  and  17th  of  that  month,  and  that  the  arrange 
ments  between  him  and  La  Fayette  and  Mr.  Deane  were  not  definitively 
closed  until  February,  1777.     M.  Doniol  suggests  that  the  selection  of  an 
earlier  date  was  made  at  the  instance  of  Mr.  Deane,  he  having  assumed  the 
responsibility  of  engaging  these  foreign  officers  whilst  he  was  the  sole  repre 
sentative  in  France  of  the  American  Congress,  and  that  "Deane,  acting  by 
himself,  probably  carried  back  the  date  of  the  contract  to  a  time  prior  to 
that  at  which  he  learned  of  the  arrival  of  Franklin,  because  this  arrival 
modified  his  official  capacity,  for  he  executed  it  as  *  Deputy  of  the  American 
States-General.'  "     (La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  380.)     Dr.  Franklin 
arrived  in  Paris  on  the  18th  of  December,  1776.      No  doubt  the  date  of 
the  contract  was  assumed  for  some  purpose  of  convenience,  though  there 
is  nothing  in  our  documents  to  show  why  Kalb's  first  contract  was  dated 
on  the  1st  of  December,  and  La  Fayette's,  in  which  he  joined,  on  the  7th 
of  that  month. 


28  THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1776. 

After  the  interview  which  La  Fayette  had  with  Mr. 
Deane  his  purpose  was  more  strongly  fixed  than  ever, 
although  an  official  prohibition  had  come  from  the  minis 
try  which  covered  his  case  and  that  of  his  two  friends  the 
Vicomte  de  Noailles  and  the  Vicomte  de  Segur.  M.  de 
Noailles,  hoping  to  overcome  the  objections  of  his  family 
to  his  going  to  America,  had  applied  directly  to  the  War 
Office  for  a  commission  to  serve  as  an  officer  in  the  army 
of  the  American  Colonies,  to  which  application  the  Prime 
Minister,  M.  de  Maurepas,  replied  that  he  was  not  aware 
of  the  entry  of  French  officers  into  the  service  of  the 
English  Colonies.  A  step  of  this  kind  would  be  an  act 
of  hostility,  assuredly  opposed  to  the  wishes  of  the  King. 
The  King,  he  said,  was  greatly  pleased  at  the  evidence 
of  zeal  shown  by  the  Vicomte  de  Noailles,  but  he  must 
not  think  of  going  to  America.  Whereupon  M.  de  No 
ailles  and  M.  de  Segur  were  obliged  to  abandon  their 
project,  "  consternes,"  as  Segur  says,  at  this  turn  in  affairs, 
and  mortified  at  the  loss  of  an  opportunity  to  assert  their 
military  talents  from  which  they  had  hoped  to  win  honor 
and  glory.1  But  La  Fayette  determined  to  face  the  pro 
hibition  alone,  and  M.  Dubois-Martin,  secretary  to  the 
Comte  de  Broglie,  wrote  on  the  8th  of  December  to  Kalb, 
who  was  still  at  Havre,  expecting  to  sail  for  America  in  a 
few  days,  "  Our  young  Marquis  does  not  despair ;  he  still 
has  the  greatest  desire  to  go.  M.  de  Noailles,  having  re 
nounced  his  own  designs,  will  probably  endeavor  to  dis 
suade  the  Marquis  from  adhering  to  his,  in  which  attempt 
he  will,  of  course,  be  seconded  by  his  family.  The  latest 
news,  which  occupies  all  the  world  here,  is  the  arrival  of 
Mr.  Franklin  at  Nantes.  He  will  set  out  for  Paris  to 
morrow."  Instead  of  allowing  himself  to  be  influenced, 
however,  as  M.  Dubois-Martin  suspected  he  might,  into 
giving  up  his  design  and  returning  quietly  to  his  regi- 

1  Segur,  Memoires. 


1776.]        THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA. 


29 


merit,  which  was  indeed  what  his  family  earnestly  wished 
him  to  do,  La  Fayette  set  before  himself  a  reminder  of 
the  glory  of  his  ancestors  as  a  spur  to  his  own  strength 
of  purpose  and  his  desire  to  follow  worthily  after  those 
sturdy  soldiers  in  their  long  history  of  military  prowess 
in  which  no  La  Fayette  was  ever  known  to  turn  back. 
He  selected  as  his  device  for  the  arms  he  bore,  as  Marquis 
de  La  Fayette,  that  of  the  famous  marshal  of  his  name 
who  loyally  served  the  King  against  his  enemies  in  the 
fifteenth  century,  the  words  Cur  Non  f  assuming  it,  as  he 
says,  "  in  order  that  they  might  serve  me  both  as  an  en 
couragement  and  a  response,"  at  a  time  when  all  his  im 
pulses  carried  him  in  one  direction  and  all  the  influences 
about  him  strove  to  turn  him  into  another.1 


'*, 


THE   ARMS  OF   LA   FAYETTE. 


In  the  mean  time,  Kalb,  who  had  returned  to  Paris 
from  Havre,  renewed  his  connection  with  the  Marquis  de 
La  Fayette,  who  had  been  following  with  great  interest 
the  progress  of  Kalb's  expedition,  and  who  now  received 

1  The  former  device  was,  "  Vis  sat  contra  fatum." 


30  THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1776. 

him  after  its  failure  with  many  expressions  of  sympathy 
and  regret.  He  declared  that  he  was  willing  to  make 
a  trial  himself,  even  if  it  involved  the  fitting  out  of  an 
expedition  at  his  own  expense,  and  he  assured  Kalb  that 
he  should  never  give  up  until  he  had  succeeded  in  going 
to  America;  whereupon  Kalb's  spirits  were  revived  by 
the  hope  that  he  might  yet  by  this  means  carry  out  his 
own  designs.  He  proposed  to  La  Fayette  that  they 
should  go  together  to  see  the  Comte  de  Broglie,  who  was, 
as  we  have  seen,  sincerely  attached  to  the  young  Marquis. 
He  was  Kalb's  patron  in  his  undertaking,  though  there  is 
no  evidence  that  La  Fayette  knew  it  or  even  suspected 
that  the  Comte  de  Broglie  had  ambitious  designs  himself 
in  connection  with  the  American  Revolution  in  further 
ance  of  which  he  was  sending  out  Kalb  as  his  agent. 
La  Fayette  has  not  mentioned  it  in  any  of  his  writings, 
and  the  Kalb  papers  through  which  Herr  Kapp  was  first 
to  throw  light  upon  the  obscure  details  of  this  transaction 
contain  nothing  that  indicates  his  acquaintance  with  it. 
They  went  together  to  Ruffec,  the  country-seat  of  the 
Comte  de  Broglie,  with  whom  they  spent  two  or  three 
days  in  discussing  the  plan  which  La  Fayette  proposed 
to  adopt.  At  the  conclusion  of  this  visit  it  was  agreed 
"  that  the  voyage  to  America  must  be  made,  in  spite  of  all 
obstacles," l  and,  having  discussed  the  question  how  this 
might  be  done,  they  decided  that  La  Fayette  should  buy 
a  ship  and  a  cargo  at  once. 

The  news  from  America  at  this  time  continued  to  be 
more  and  more  discouraging,  and  reports  were  current  in 
France  that  General  Washington's  army  had  been  anni 
hilated  by  the  British,  that  his  whole  force  was  reduced 
to  three  thousand  troops,  and  that  the  British  commander, 
having  driven  him  out  of  New  York  and  Long  Island, 
was  pursuing  him  with  an  army  of  thirty  thousand  men 

1  Kapp's  Kalb,  p.  100. 


1777.]       THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  31 

through  New  Jersey.  Even  the  American  Commission 
ers,  in  the  uncertainty  of  the  moment,  when  it  was  impos 
sible  to  decide  how  much  truth  there  might  be  in  these 
stories  of  disaster  at  home,  sent  word  to  La  Fayette  that, 
under  the  circumstances,  it  seemed  better  to  them  that  he 
should  postpone  his  undertaking.  But  he  went  at  once  to 
see  Mr.  Deane,  and,  after  thanking  him  for  the  frankness 
with  which  he  had  pointed  out  the  dangers  of  an  expedi 
tion,  said  to  him,  "  Heretofore  I  have  been  able  to  show 
you  only  my  willingness  to  aid  you  in  your  struggle :  the 
time  has  now  come  when  that  willingness  may  be  put  to 
effective  use,  for  I  am  going  to  buy  a  ship  and  to  take  your 
officers  out  in  it.  Let  us  not  give  up  our  hope  yet ;  it  is 
precisely  in  time  of  danger  that  I  want  to  share  whatever 
fortune  may  have  in  store  for  you."  l 

He  took  steps  immediately  to  put  into  execution  his 
plan  of  securing  a  ship,  which  was  an  exceedingly  diffi 
cult  thing  to  do  without  discovery  upon  the  part  of  the 
British  Ambassador,  whose  agents  were  closely  watching 
every  port,  and  who,  upon  the  slightest  intimation  that 
an  expedition  of  this  character  was  fitting  out,  would 
have  made  such  representations  as  to  oblige  the  French 
ministry  to  forbid  it.  So  great,  indeed,  was  this  danger 
that  La  Fayette  did  not  dare  to  visit  Dr.  Franklin,  who 
was  then  in  Paris.  He  was  enabled  to  communicate  with 
him,  however,  through  the  mediation  of  Mr.  Carmichael, 
the  secretary  to  the  American  Commissioners,  who,  being 
less  known  as  an  agent  of  the  Colonies,  was  less  likely  to 
attract  attention  ; 2  and  by  this  means  he  obtained  the  ap 
proval  both  of  Dr.  Franklin  and  of  Mr.  Deane,  whom  he 
kept  constantly  informed  of  the  progress  he  was  making. 
He  decided,  after  careful  reflection,  that  Bordeaux  would 
be  a  safer  place  for  him  to  negotiate  in  than  any  northern 
port  of  France,  because  it  was  more  remote  and  conse- 

1  M^moires  clc  ma  Main,  i.  12.  2  Ibid. 


32  THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

quently  less  carefully  watched  by  Lord  Stormont's  people, 
and  he  turned  in  that  direction  to  find  the  ship  he  sought. 
For  this  purpose  there  happened  to  be  at  hand  a  man 
exactly  suited  to  the  business,  in  the  person  of  Lieutenant 
Francois  Dubois-Martin,  brother  to  the  Comte  de  Broglie's 
secretary,  who  was  attached  to  one  of  the  King's  regi 
ments  then  stationed  at  Port-au-Prince.  M.  Dubois-Mar 
tin  had  come  to  France  shortly  before  that  time,  commis 
sioned  to  buy  uniforms  for  his  regiment ;  he  had  executed 
this  commission  at  Bordeaux,  and  had  then  gone  to  Paris 
to  see  his  brother  before  returning  to  his  post.  During 
his  visit  there  he  heard  of  the  expedition  which  Kalb 
intended  to  take  to  North  America,  and  upon  expressing 
a  great  desire  to  join  it  he  was  enrolled,  with  the  rank  of 
major,  among  the  officers  who  were  to  sail  from  Havre. 
After  the  ministerial  prohibition  and  the  consequent  fail 
ure  of  the  enterprise,  Dubois-Martin  had  gone  again  to 
visit  his  brother,  and  he  was  now  upon  the  point  of  start 
ing  for  the  West  Indies.  La  Fayette  picked  out  this  man 
as  the  agent  whom  he  required ;  he  had  had  some  busi 
ness  experience  in  making  purchases  for  his  regiment,  and 
in  addition  to  that  he  had  dealt  at  Bordeaux  in  this  con 
nection,  so  that  he  had  a  certain  familiarity  with  that  city 
and  its  merchants,  which  was,  of  course,  very  necessary  in 
carrying  out  a  delicate  mission  of  this  kind.  Dubois- 
Martin — "  le  petit  Dubois,"  as  he  was  called  by  the  Comte 
de  Broglie — set  out  at  once  for  Bordeaux,  where  he  very 
soon  made  arrangements  for  a  vessel  and  reported  his 
success  to  La  Fayette.  The  merchants  from  whom  he 
bought  the  ship  were  Messrs.  Recules  de  Basmarins,  Raim- 
baux  et  Cie. ;  the  vessel  was  commanded  by  one  Captain 
le  Boursier,  and  it  was  called  La  Victoire ;  under  the 
agreement,  it  was  to  be  delivered  by  the  middle  of  March, 
1777.  The  price  agreed  upon  by  Dubois  was  one  hun 
dred  and  twelve  thousand  francs  for  the  ship  and  the 
cargo,  one-quarter  of  which  La  Fayette  was  to  pay  in 


1777.]       THE   COMING    OF   LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  33 

cash,  and  the  remainder  in  fifteen  months  from  the  date 
of  delivery. 

During  the  interval  between  the  date  of  the  purchase 
of  his  vessel  and  the  time  of  its  delivery  a  few  weeks  later, 
La  Fayette  employed  his  leisure  by  fulfilling  a  promise 
made  by  him  to  visit  in  London  his  uncle  the  Marquis  de 
Noailles,  then  the  Ambassador  of  France  to  the  Court  of 
St.  James.  He  went  in  company  with  the  Prince  de  Poix? 
and  stayed  in  England  three  weeks,  during  which,  as  a 
representative  nobleman  from  the  French  Court,  intro 
duced  by  the  Ambassador,  he  was  received  with  distin 
guished  attention  in  English  society  and  was  also  presented 
to  King  George.1  He  has  been  criticised  by  English 
writers  for  this  visit  to  England  at  a  time  when  he  knew 
that  he  was  about  to  take  up  arms  against  that  country ; 
but  the  engagement  to  go  there  had  been  made  by  him 
some  time  previously,  and  if  he  had  declined  at  this  time  to 
fulfil  it  he  could  not  have  given  a  sufficient  excuse  to  the 
Marquis  de  Noailles,  who  was  expecting  him,  and  who,  as 
La  Fayette  assured  Mr.  Sparks,  knew  nothing  of  his  plans 
about  the  American  War.  "  I  could  not  decline  the  invi 
tation  without  exposing  my  secret,  and  by  accepting  it  I 
was  able  to  divert  attention  from  the  preparations  I  was 
then  making."  He  was  fully  conscious,  however,  of  what 
he  owed  to  himself  as  an  honorable  man,  and  during  the 
time  he  was  in  London  he  scrupulously  avoided  any  act 
that  could  lead  him  into  a  position  such  as  he  ought  not 
to  occupy,  or  that  could  give  him  any  information  which 
he  had  no  right  to ;  and,  as  he  afterward  said,  if  he  in 
dulged  himself  in  the  pleasure  that  a  boy  of  nineteen 
might  naturally  feel  in  standing  before  King  George,  in 
going  to  the  house  of  Lord  George  Germain,  Secretary 
for  the  Colonies,  and  in  meeting  at  the  opera  Sir  Henry 
Clinton,  whom  he  was  afterward  to  meet  at  Monmouth, 


1  Memoiresde  ma  Main,  i.  l.l)> ;  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  447. 
VOL.  I.— 3 


34 


THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA. 


[1777. 


yet  he  strictly  refused  to  visit  any  of  the  seaports  where 
preparations  were  being  made  for  the  war,  especially  the 
harbor  of  Portsmouth,  where  he  was  invited  to  see  an 
armament  then  fitting  out  to  go  to  America.  At  the  end 
of  three  weeks  he  went  back  to  Paris,  but,  not  wishing  to 
arouse  the  suspicions  of  his  relatives  by  his  return,  he  con 
cealed  himself  at  Kalb's  house  in  Chaillot,  then  a  suburb 
of  Paris,  where  he  "  remained  three  days  and  saw  the 
Americans  and  a  few  friends,'7  and  it  was  during  this  time 
that  he  made  his  final  arrangements  for  setting  out. 

The  contract  which  he  entered  into  with  Mr.  Deane  in 
regard  to  his  serving  in  the  American  army,  and  the  rank 
he  was  to  be  given,  as  well  as  the  various  grades  of  the 
officers  whom  he  agreed  to  take  with  him  in  his  ship,  are 
as  follows : l 

"  List  of  Officers  of  Infantry  and  Light  Troops  Destined  to  Serve  in 
the  Armies  of  the  States-  General  of  North  America. 


Name  of  Officers. 

Rank. 

—  i  — 
Commencement  of  their 

Pay. 

M.  de  la  Fayette, 

Major-general, 

December  7,  1776. 

Baron  de  Kalb, 

do. 

November  7,  1776. 

Delesser, 

Colonel, 

December  7,  1776. 

De  Valfort, 

do. 

do. 

De  Fayols, 

Lieutenant-  colonel, 

November  20,  1776. 

De  Franval, 

do. 

December  1,  1776. 

Dubois  Martin, 

Major, 

November  7,  1776. 

De  Gimat, 

do. 

December  1,  1776. 

De  Vrigny, 

Captain, 

do. 

De  Bedaulx, 

Capitaine, 

Captain, 

December  1,  1776. 

De  la  Colombe, 

Lieutenant, 

do. 

Candon, 

do. 

November  7,  1776. 

i  i  The  mentioned  ranks  and  the  pay,  which  the  most  honorable 
Congress  shall  affix  to  them,  to  commence  at  the  periods  marked 


Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  220. 


1777.]        THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  35 

in  the  present  list,  have  been  agreed  to  by  us  the  undersigned, 
Silas  Deane,  in  quality  of  Deputy  of  the  American  States-Gen 
eral,  on  the  one  part,  the  Marquis  de  la  Fayette  and  the  Baron 
de  Kalb  on  the  other  part.  Signed  double  at  Paris  this  7th  of 
December,  1776. 


"DE  KALB, 

a 


THE  MARQUIS  DE  LA  FAYETTE, 
"SILAS  DEANE." 

Annexed  to  the  foregoing  contract  is  this  special  agree 
ment  with  La  Fayette : 

"The  desire  which  the  Marquis  de  la  Fayette  shows  of  serving 
among  the  troops  of  the  United  States  of  North  America,  and  the 
interest  which  he  takes  in  the  justice  of  their  cause,  make  him 
wish  to  distinguish  himself  in  this  war,  and  to  render  himself  as 
useful  as  he  possibly  can  ;  but  not  thinking  that  he  can  obtain 
leave  of  his  family  to  pass  the  seas  and  serve  in  a  foreign  country, 
till  he  can  go  as  a  general  officer,  I  have  thought  I  could  not 
better  serve  my  country,  and  those  who  have  entrusted  me,  than 
by  granting  to  him,  in  the  name  of  the  very  honorable  Congress, 
the  rank  of  major-general,  which  I  beg  the  States  to  confirm  to 
him,  to  ratify,  and  deliver  to  him  the  commission  to  hold  and 
take  rank,  to  count  from  this  day,  with  the  general  officers  of  the 
same  degree.  His  high  birth,  his  alliances,  the  great  dignities 
which  his  family  hold  at  this  Court,  his  considerable  estates  in 
this  realm,  his  personal  merit,  his  reputation,  his  disinterested 
ness,  and,  above  all,  his  zeal  for  the  liberty  of  our  provinces,  are 
such  as  have  only  been  able  to  engage  me  to  promise  him  the  rank 
of  major-general  in  the  name  of  the  United  States.  In  witness 
of  which  I  have  signed  the  present  this  7th  of  December,  1770. 

"  SILAS  DEANE, 
"Agent  for  the  United  States  of  America." 

"On  the  conditions  here  explained  I  offer  myself,  and  promise 
to  depart  when  and  how  Mr.  Deane  shall  judge  proper,  to  serve 
the  United  States  with  all  possible  zeal,  without  any  pension  or 
particular  allowance,  reserving  to  myself  the  liberty  of  returning 
to  Europe  when  my  family  or  my  king  shall  recall  me. 

"Done  at  Paris,  this  7th  of  December,  1776. 

"THE  MARQUIS  DE  LA  FAYETTE."  ' 

1  We  have  already  referred  to  the  fact  that  the  contract  made  by  Mr.  Deane 
with  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  and  the  Baron  de  Kalb  was  not  executed 


36  THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

La  Fayette  decided  that,  in  order  to  set  out  from  France 
without  being  restrained  by  the  entreaties  of  his  relatives 
or  the  commands  of  the  Government,  he  must  go  secretly, 
without  even  taking  leave  of  his  family.  This  was  all  the 
more  trying  for  him  because  he  loved  his  young  wife 
tenderly  and  had  one  child,  a  daughter,  a  little  over  a 
year  old,  both  of  whom  it  seemed  cruel  to  leave  without  one 
last  embrace  before  starting  upon  an  expedition  fraught 
with  great  peril  and  from  which  he  might  never  return. 
But  he  was  well  aware  that  this  was  his  only  course ;  for 
the  Due  d'Ayen  would  certainly  have  had  him  arrested 
and  placed  under  orders  from  the  King  expressly  for 
bidding  him  to  go  to  America,  if  he  had  by  any  chance 
discovered  that  La  Fayette  seriously  contemplated  such 
a  step.  He  wrote  the  following  letter  to  announce  his 


until  some  time  in  February,  1777,  though  it  bears  date  the  7th  of  December, 
1776,  and  we  have  called  attention  to  M.  Doniol's  theory  as  to  the  cause  of 
its  having  been  thus  dated  back.  What  appears  to  be  extremely  probable, 
from  a  consideration  of  all  the  circumstances,  is  that  the  agreement  here 
given  between  Mr.  Deane  and  La  Fayette  alone  was  made  soon  after  the 
Marquis  first  met  the  Commissioner,  when  he  had  as  yet  no  definite  plan  of 
going  to  America  ;  because  he  declares  in  it  his  willingness  "  to  depart  when 
and  how  Mr.  Deane  shall  judge  proper."  This  date  would  be,  according  to 
Herr  Kapp,  between  the  1st  and  the  7th  of  December  ;  for  he  fixes  the  meet 
ing  between  these  two  dates  because  La  Fayette  is  mentioned  in  the  contract 
made  on  the  7th  of  the  month  and  not  in  that  of  the  1st.  This  may,  how 
ever,  be  incorrect ;  for  we  shall  see  below  that  Mr.  Deane  said,  "  It  was  exe 
cuted  in  November  last,  long  before  their  [his  colleagues']  arrival."  When 
La  Fayette  executed  his  contract  with  Mr.  Deane  in  conjunction  with  Kalb, 
he  had  already  bought  his  vessel  and  cargo,  and  was  able  to  insert  in  the 
document  the  names  of  the  officers  whom  he  intended  to  take  with  him  to 
America.  It  is  most  likely  that  at  the  execution  of  this  final  agreement  the 
contract  originally  made  with  Kalb  was  modified  to  suit  the  change  that  had 
taken  place  in  his  plans,  and  the  written  understanding  first  had  by  Mr. 
Deane  with  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was  redated,  or,  possibly,  re-executed, 
at  the  same  time  ;  the  two  documents  having  been  then  united  to  make  sub 
stantially  one  contract,  bearing  date  the  7th  of  December,  1776.  M.  Doniol's 
suggestion  as  to  the  dating  back  of  the  instrument  would  accord  entirely 
with  this  ;  for  we  shall  see  that  Mr.  Deane  says  of  his  agreement  with  La 
Fayette,  "My  colleagues  have  had  no  knowledge  of  it,"  thus  bearing  out 
the  idea  that  he  acted  alone  and  wished  to  fix  the  date  at  a  time  before 
Dr.  Franklin  reached  Paris. 


1777.]        THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  37 

departure,  which,  although  dated  in  London,  was  not  de 
livered  to  the  Due  d'Ayen  until  La  Fayette  had  left  Paris 
to  join  his  vessel  at  Bordeaux  :l 

"  LONDON,  9  March,  1777. 

"  You  will  be  surprised,  my  dear  papa,  at  what  I  ain  about  to 
tell  you.  It  has  been  harder  for  me  than  I  can  express,  not  to 
have  consulted  you  before  ;  my  respect  for  you,  my  affection  and 
my  confidence  in  you,  must  convince  you  of  this  ;  but  my  word 
had  been  given,  and  I  was  bound  by  it.  I  am  sure  you  would  not 
have  respected  me  if  I  had  been  false  to  that ;  so  that  I  hope  the 
step  I  am  now  going  to  take  will  give  you  at  least  a  good  opinion 
of  my  right  intentions.  I  have  found  a  singularly  good  oppor 
tunity  to  distinguish  myself  and  to  gain  experience  in  my  pro 
fession.  I  am  now  a  general  officer  in  the  army  of  the  United 
States  of  America.  They  have  lent  me  their  confidence  in  return 
for  the  openness  of  my  conduct  and  the  great  interest  I  have  taken 
in  their  cause  ;  while,  on  my  side,  I  have  done  everything  I  could 
for  them  ;  and  their  welfare  will  always  be  as  dear  to  me  as  my 
own.  In  a  word,  my  dear  father,  I  am  now  awaiting  in  London 
news  from  my  friends  ;  and  as  soon  as  it  arrives  I  shall  set  out 
from  here,  and,  without  stopping  in  Paris,  I  shall  go  aboard  a 
vessel  which  I  have  loaded  and  which  belongs  to  me.  My  com 
panions  in  the  expedition  are  the  Baron  deKalb,  an  officer  of  the 
highest  distinction,  brigadier  in  the  army  of  the  King  and  major- 
general  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  like  myself,  and  some 
excellent  officers  who  are  ready  to  share  the  fortune  of  my  adven 
tures.  I  am  filled  with  joy  at  having  found  so  good  an  oppor 
tunity  to  increase  my  experience  and  to  do  something  in  the  world. 
I  know  very  well  that  I  am  making  an  immense  sacrifice,  and  it 
will  be  harder  for  me  than  for  any  one  to  leave  my  family,  my 
friends,  and  you,  my  dear  father,  because  I  love  you  all  more  than 
any  one  ever  loved  before.  But,  after  all,  this  voyage  is  not  a 
long  one ;  people  go  farther  every  day  for  the  sole  pleasure  of 
travelling  ;  and,  besides,  I  hope  I  shall  return  from  it  better 
deserving  the  esteem  of  everybody  who  is  kind  enough  to  miss 
me  during  my  absence.  Good-by,  my  dear  father.  I  hope  to 
see  you  soon  again.  Do  not  withdraw  your  affection  from  me, 
for  I  earnestly  long  to  deserve  it,  and  I  do  deserve  it  by  the 
love  I  have  for  you  and  the  respect  I  shall  continue  to  bear  for 
you  all  my  life.  Your  affectionate  son, 

"LA  FAYETTE." 

1  Correspondance  de  La  Fayette,  i.  82. 


38  THE   COMING   OF   LA   FAYETTE   TO   AMERICA.        [1777. 

This  letter  was  received  by  the  Due  d'Ayen  with  disap 
pointment  and  chagrin.  He  went  at  once  to  the  ministry 
with  the  news,  and  presented  the  case  so  forcibly  that  an 
order  was  issued  directing  La  Fayette  to  return  to  his  duty, 
and  couriers  were  sent  after  him  on  the  road  to  Bordeaux, 
whither  it  was  learned  he  had  gone.  Mme.  de  La  Fayette 
was  greatly  distressed  at  hearing  of  her  husband's  depart 
ure,  though  she  showed  that  confidence  in  him  which  never 
waned,  and  the  courage  which  always,  through  the  severe 
trials  of  their  after-life,  bore  witness  to  her  patience  and 
her  womanly  steadfastness.  Her  mother,  the  Duchesse 
d'Ayen,  encouraged  and  supported  her  in  this ;  for  she 
alone  of  all  the  family  took  the  side  of  La  Fayette  and 
foresaw  that  he  had  enlisted  in  a  cause  that  was  worthy  of 
him  and  was  likely  one  day  to  bring  him  honor.  Mme.  de 
La  Fayette  says l  that,  in  spite  of  the  anger  of  her  father 
and  all  the  family,  "  my  mother,  anxious  for  the  effect  of 
it  upon  me,  was  herself  distressed  by  the  thought  of  the 
danger  and  the  separation  from  a  son  whom  she  loved  so 
tenderly  ;  and  yet,  although  she  was  the  last  person  in  the 
world  to  be  led  by  ambition,  by  the  thirst  for  glory,  or  by 
the  love  of  enterprise,  she  judged  the  undertaking  of  M. 
de  La  Fayette  at  that  time  as  it  was  judged  two  years 
afterward  by  every  one  else.  She  broke  to  me  herself  the 
news  of  this  cruel  separation,  and  consoled  me  by  seeking 
every  opportunity  to  help  M.  de  La  Fayette,  with  that 
nobleness  of  mind  and  that  elevation  of  character  which 
were  the  moving  impulses  of  her  nature. " 

In  the  mean  time,  La  Fayette  and  Kalb  had  left  Paris 
on  the  night  of  the  16th  of  March,  1777,  for  Bordeaux, 
where  they  arrived  on  the  19th,  having  travelled  three 
days  by  post. 

The  biographer  of  Kalb  has  thought  it  wise  to  reject 
the  account  of  the  difficulties  of  this  part  of  the  journey 

1  Vie  de  la  Duchesse  d'Ayen,  p.  56. 


1777.]       THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  39 

as  they  are  described  by  La  Fayette  himself  in  his  "  Me- 
moires"  and  by  Mr.  Jared  Sparks,1  out  of  "  a  due  regard 
for  the  truth  of  history,"  as  Herr  Kapp  says,  "  because 
the  ministers,  instead  of  opposing,  connived  at  the  journey 
of  Kalb  and  La  Fayette  so  far  as  their  position  allowed 
them  to  do  so.  La  Fayette  says  as  much  himself,  when, 
in  the  year  1800,  he  writes  to  Madame  Geymueller,  the 
daughter  of  his  friend,  '  His  [Kalb's]  departure  was  fa 
vored  by  the  Comte  de  Broglie  and  secretly  sanctioned  by 
the  French  Government.'  What  was  true  of  Kalb  must 
apply  to  La  Fayette,  for  they  travelled  together."  But 
this  last  statement  is  not  historically  correct.  There  was 
a  very  wide  difference  between  the  two  men  and  between 
their  relations  to  the  French  Government.  Kalb,  a  for 
eigner  in  the  French  service,  was  going  to  America  as  the 
agent  of  the  Comte  de  Broglie,  in  the  furtherance  of  am 
bitious  plans  which  the  Count  desired  to  have  carried  out 
if  possible ;  and,  with  this  in  view,  the  latter  had  not  only 
used  his  influence  at  the  War  Office  to  obtain  for  Kalb 
a  leave  of  absence  for  two  years,  but  had  secured  a  pro 
motion  for  him  as  a  reward  for  going. 

Unquestionably  the  departure  of  Kalb,  so  far  as  it  at 
tracted  any  official  attention  whatever,  was  connived  at  by 
the  French  Government,  as  was  probably  also  the  depart 
ure  of  the  other  officers  who  engaged  with  Silas  Deane 
to  accompany  him  in  the  expedition ;  for,  after  all,  the 
ministers  were  very  friendly  to  the  Americans,  and  were 
quite  willing,  as  we  know,  to  lend  them  any  assistance 
that  they  could  without  exciting  the  hostility  of  Great 
Britain.  But  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was  a  man  of 
very  great  prominence,  whose  open  declaration  in  favor 
of  the  insurgents  by  going  to  America  to  fight  for  them 
was  sure  to  attract  public  attention.  It  was  likely  to  em 
barrass  the  ministry  at  an  extremely  critical  moment,  and 

1  Meinoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  14  ;  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  448. 


40  THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMEKICA.        [1777. 

there  was  danger  that  this  act  might  gravely  compromise 
the  French  Ambassador  in  London,  La  Fayette's  kins 
man,  under  whose  protection  he  had,  only  a  few  days  be 
fore,  been  presented  at  the  English  Court.  His  case,  from 
its  very  nature,  could  not  be  connived  at ;  not  because  the 
ministers  did  not  sympathize  with  any  attempt  that  might 
aid  the  Americans  and  damage  England,  but  because  the 
particular  circumstances  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
obliged  them  to  act. 

The  Due  d'Ayen  regarded  La  Fayette's  project  as  an 
act  of  folly,  not  to  call  it  a  disgrace,  and  he  went  to  the 
Comte  de  Vergennes  with  all  the  intensity  of  his  family 
pride  aroused,  determined  that  he  would  prevent  it.  Ap 
pealed  to  thus  openly  in  the  case  of  an  officer  of  the  King's 
army — for  La  Fayette  was  captain  in  the  regiment  de 
Noailles — about  to  go  abroad  without  leave,  there  was  no 
course  left  to  the  Government  but  to  warn  him  not  to  quit 
the  kingdom,  and,  above  all,  not  to  go  to  America  to  fight 
against  King  George,  with  whom  His  Most  Christian 
Majesty  was  at  peace.  Therefore  La  Fayette's  difficulties 
were  real.  A  lettre-de-cachet  was  despatched  after  him, 
which  the  Marquis  says  was  "  peremptory."  It  forbade 
him  to  go  to  the  American  continent,  under  pain  of  dis 
obedience,  and  he  was  ordered  to  Marseilles  for  further 
instructions.1  His  departure  from  Paris  created  an  ex 
traordinary  feeling,  especially  among  his  younger  friends, 
who  sympathized  with  him  in  an  adventure  which  many 
of  them  would  gladly  have  shared.  He  became  the  object 
of  general  interest,  almost  a  hero,  in  the  conversations  of 
the  cafes,  the  salons,  and  the  theatres ;  and  one  lady  is 
reported  to  have  exclaimed,  in  her  admiration  for  him, 
that  if  the  Due  d'Ayen  treated  so  badly  a  splendid  young 
man  like  La  Fayette,  he  need  not  expect  to  marry  the 
rest  of  his  daughters.2 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  14. 

2  Vie  de  Mme.  de  Lafayette,  par  Mme.  de  Lasteyrie,  sa  fille,  p.  197,  note. 


1777.]       THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  41 

But  the  attitude  of  the  Government  gave  rise  to  con 
siderable  uneasiness  among  the  associates  of  the  Marquis 
de  La  Fayette,  lest  the  undertaking  might  result  in  trouble 
for  him  and  possibly  even  be  looked  upon  as  a  subject  of 
offence  on  the  part  of  those  who  had  been  instrumental  in 
aiding  him  to  carry  it  out.  There  is  evidence  of  this  in 
a  letter  which  Mr.  Deane  felt  it  necessary  to  write  to  M. 
Gerard,  Secretary  of  the  Foreign  Office,  as  follows : 

"SiR, — You  have  enclosed  two  original  letters  from  the  Baron 
du  Kalb,  which  please  to  present  to  his  Excellency  the  Comte  de 
Vergennes,  and  tell  him  I  refer  to  iny  uniform  conduct  to  justify 
what  I  have  had  the  honor  of  relating  to  you  this  evening  ;  as  to 
facts,  Moils.  Comte  de  Broglio  has  received  this  evening  a  letter 
from  Moils,  le  Marquis  de  Lafayette  which  he  will  communicate. 
I  refer  to  that  Nobleman,  and  am  willing  to  rely  on  his  relation  of 
this  affair,  for  niy  justification,  more,  for  my  approbation,  since 
to  gain  a  most  gallant  and  amiable  young  Nobleman  to  espouse 
our  cause,  and  to  give  to  the  world  a  specimen  of  his  native  and 
hereditary  bravery,  surely  cannot  be  deemed  criminal.  I  have 
nothing  to  add  to  what  I  have  had  the  honor  of  relating  to  you 
personally  upon  this  subject,  except  that  I  rely  on  the  Comte  de 
Broglio  to  explain  any  and  every  part  of  my  conduct  in  this 
affair, — that  my  colleagues  have  had  no  knowledge  of  it,  as  it  was 
executed  in  November  last,  long  before  their  arrival,  and  that  I 
shall  do  everything  in  my  power  to  satisfy  every  one  that  my  con 
duct  has  been  strictly  honourable.  I  have  the  honor  to  be  your 
most  obedt.  and  very  humble  servant. 

"S.  DEANE. 

"Apl.  2,  1777." 

This  letter  was  evidently  not  delivered,  and  it  was  re- 
addressed  by  Mr.  Deane  the  next  day  with  the  accom 
panying  note  : 

"  SIR, — I  sent  the  inclosed  last  evening  a  few  minutes  after  you 
left  Paris,  and  therefore  now  send  my  servant  express  with  it.  I 
cannot  but  feel  uneasy  untill  I  have  fully  vindicated  my  conduct 
in  this  affair  ;  and  therefore  ask  you  not  only  to  inform  him  that 
I  rely  upon  him,  to  shew  these  letters,  if  necessary,  in  niy  justifi- 

1  French  Archives,  Etats-TJnis,  t.  2,  Mo.  89  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la 
France,  ii.  392. 


42  THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

cation,  to  his  Majesty  and  his  other  ministers.  I  have  the  honor 
to  remain  with  the  utmost  respect,  Sir,  your  most  obedt.  and  very 
humble  servt. — 

11  SILAS  DEANE. 
"PARIS,  3  April,  1777." 

This  proves  beyond  question  that  the  departure  of  La 
Fayette  was  not  regarded  with  indifference  by  the  Cabinet 
or  looked  upon  in  the  same  light  as  that  of  Kalb  and 
the  others  who  accompanied  him,  that  the  orders  of  the 
Government  were  not  merely  formal,  and  that  his  going 
was  not  connived  at.  Mr.  Silas  Deane  was  probably  better 
informed  than  any  one  else,  outside  of  the  Cabinet  itself, 
as  to  the  policy  of  the  French  Government  in  regard  to 
the  American  Colonies.  He  was  in  constant  intercourse 
with  the  ministry  upon  this  subject ;  indeed,  he  was 
present  in  France  as  a  Commissioner  of  the  United  States 
Congress,  secretly  recognized  by  the  Comte  de  Vergennes, 
and  the  agent  through  whom  negotiations  were  carried 
on,  until  the  end  of  the  year  1776,  for  the  shipments  of 
arms  and  munitions  of  war  which  were  then  being  made. 
And  yet  Mr.  Deane  was  alarmed  at  the  evident  disap 
proval  of  the  conduct  of  La  Fayette  on  the  part  of  the 
King  and  his  ministers  ;  he  was  fearful  that  in  this  matter 
he  had  gone  one  step  too  far,  and  that  he  might  have 
damaged,  instead  of  helping  as  he  had  intended  to  do,  the 
cause  of  the  United  States  in  France  :  he  therefore  hastened 
to  clear  his  colleagues  from  any  responsibility  in  the  con 
tract  with  La  Fayette,  and  to  assure  M.  de  Vergennes  of 
his  honesty  of  purpose  and  his  friendship  toward  France. 
He  wrote  again,  a  few  days  later,  directly  to  the  Comte  de 
Vergennes,  in  transmitting  to  him  some  despatches  which 
he  had  just  received  from  the  Congress  : 

"PARIS,  5th  Apl.,  1777. 

"Sin, — I  have  the  honor  of  enclosing  to  Your  Excellency, 
agreeable  to  my  promise  to  Mr.  Gerard,  copies  of  my  letters  re^ 
specting  Mons.  La  Fayette,  which  I  hope  will  be  agreeable,  and 
can  only  say,  I  have  felt  much  on  the  occasion  for  the  delicate 


1777.]        THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  43 

honor  of  the  Marquiss,  lest  some  report  injurious  to  him  should 
be  spread,  in  either  country  ; — no  country  need  be  ashamed  of 
him,  and  I  am  sure  he  will  one  day  justify  to  the  world  that  my 
early  prejudices  in  his  favor  were  well  founded."  l 

At  all  events,  the  King  issued  a  general  order  through 
the  Ministry  of  War,  which  was  signed  by  himself,  for 
bidding  any  of  his  officers  to  take  service  in  the  English 
Colonies,  and  enjoining  such  as  should  arrive  in  the 
Islands  of  America  with  that  purpose  in  view,  "  especially 
the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,"  to  return  at  once  to  France ; 
and  secret  instructions  were  sent  to  the  wardens  in  all  the 
seaports  to  watch  carefully  all  vessels  sailing  thence,  to 
search  them  if  necessary,  and  to  prevent  the  shipment  of 
arms  and  munitions  of  war  to  North  America. 

The  Marquis  de  Noailles,  the  French  Ambassador  at 
London,  who  felt  very  keenly  the  discomfort  of  the  posi 
tion  in  which  he  had  been  placed  by  this  incident,  hastened 
to  write  to  M.  de  Maurepas,  the  Prime  Minister : 

"LONDON,  8  April,  1777. 

"I  learned  yesterday,  M.  le  Comte,  with  extreme  surprise, 
through  my  letters  from  Paris,  that  M.  de  La  Fayette  has  gone  to 
America.  Fortunately  for  him,  his  youth  may  shield  him  from 
the  responsibility  of  his  thoughtless  acts.  This  is  the  only  conso 
lation  left  to  me  in  the  chagrin  I  feel  in  view  of  his  most  inconsid 
erate  behavior.  There  is  no  doubt  that  his  plans  were  made  before 
he  came  to  London,  where  he  spent  some  fifteen  days  at  the  end 
of  February  and  the  beginning  of  March  ;  though  I  wish  now 
that  he  had  intimated  to  me,  even  in  the  most  remote  way,  the 
voyage  upon  which  he  has  just  started  out.  I  should  have  had  no 
difficulty  in  bringing  him  back  to  reason,  for  I  should  have  given 
him  a  better  understanding  of  the  principles  of  emulation  and  of 
honor,  of  which  he  is  following  now  only  the  idea  and  not  the  real 
substance  or  the  true  precepts.  He  left  here  a  week  or  ten  days 
before  M.  de  Poix,  with  whom  he  came.  I  asked  him  his  reason 
for  going  away,  but  I  was  entirely  satisfied  when  he  told  me  that 
no  bad  news  of  any  kind  was  taking  him  back  to  France.  He 


1  French  Archives,  Etats-LJnis,  t.  2,  No.  93  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de 
la  France,  ii.  393. 


44  THE   COMING   OF   LA   FAYETTE   TO   AMERICA.        [1777. 

concealed  his  intentions  from  his  travelling  companion,  from  me, 
and  from  everybody  ;  of  that  there  is  no  doubt  in  my  mind.  His 
presentation  at  Court  here  could  serve  him  in  no  other  way  than 
in  the  fulfilment  of  a  duty  which  I  required  of  him.  It  is  evident 
that,  with  no  one  but  himself  to  consult,  he  did  not  realize,  by 
very  much  indeed,  the  consequences  of  what  he  was  about  to  do. 
I  confess  that  if  he  had  seen  fit  not  to  come  to  London  to  extend 
his  carnival,  I  should  be  free  to-day  from,  at  least  one  source  of 
regret ;  for  I  should  not  be  reminded  that  I  had  the  honor  of 
presenting  him  to  the  King  of  England  only  a  moment  before 
he  started  out  in  this  most  extraordinary  proceeding."  l 

The  Ambassador  was,  of  course,  not  held  in  the  least 
responsible  for  any  part  of  the  affair,  and  indeed  very 
little  more  was  said  of  it  in  the  despatches  ;  the  Comte  de 
Vergennes  merely  adding,  in  his  own  hand,  at  the  end  of 
an  official  communication,  "It  is  with  great  regret,  M.  le 
Marquis,  that  I  mention  to  you  M.  le  M18  de  La  Fayette. 
His  age  may  perhaps  justify  his  escapade ;  but  I  am  truly 
sorry,  not  only  for  the  interest  that  you  and  the  Due 
d'Ayen  have  in  the  matter,  but  also  because  I  am  afraid 
he  may  fall  in  with  some  English  man-of-war,  and,  not 
being  distinguished  from  the  mass  of  adventurers  who 
come  into  their  hands,  may  be  treated  with  a  harshness 
not  entirely  unknown  to  that  nation." 

If  the  minister  had  nothing  more  serious  to  communi 
cate  than  his  personal  fears  that  something  unpleasant 
might  happen  to  La  Fayette,  of  course  M.  de  Noailles 
found  no  further  cause  to  disturb  his  mind ;  though  he 
did  not  quite  lose  sight  of  the  subject,  for  he  wrote  home 
that  Lord  Suffolk  had  said  to  him,  with  a  rather  malicious 
expression  upon  his  face,  "  The  winds  have  been  pretty 
good  during  the  last  few  days  for  vessels  sailing  from 
England  to  America ;"  by  which,  the  Marquis  said,  he  did 
not  know  whether  he  meant  that,  in  spite  of  all  obstacles 
thrown  in  the  way  by  France,  England  would  not  give 

1  Angleterre,  t.  522,  fol.  370 :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  396. 


1777.]        THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  45 

up  her  purpose  of  subduing  the  Colonies,  or  whether  he 
merely  wanted  to  draw  out  some  expression  in  regard  to  a 
person  closely  allied  to  him  who  had  recently  gone  to  join 
the  American  army. 

But  the  Ambassador  added  that  he  felt  very  much  more 
at  ease,  afterward,  when  he  heard  that  the  Comte  de  Bank- 
lay,  marechal-de-camp  in  the  army  of  the  French  King, 
had  arrived  in  London  and  had  petitioned  his  British 
Majesty  to  be  allowed  to  go  to  America  and  serve  as  a 
volunteer  in  the  army  of  General  Howe,  continuing, 
"  They  have  no  longer  any  ground  to  reproach  us  with 
partiality,  since  we  can  point  to  the  example  of  a  general 
officer  who  is  willing  to  make  all  sorts  of  sacrifices  to 
espouse  the  cause  of  England  in  one  of  the  most  serious 
quarrels  she  has  ever  had."  This  extraordinary  offer  of 
M.  de  Banklay's  was  actually  made  in  the  month  of  May, 
1777,  and  was  rejected  by  Lord  George  Germain  with  a 
polite  cynicism  which  certainly  could  not  have  encour 
aged  any  one  else  to  follow  the  example.  Having  ex 
pressed  the  high  appreciation  with  which  the  King  had 
learned  of  M.  de  Banklay's  attachment  to  the  English 
cause,  he  continued,  "  The  situation  of  affairs  in  America 
and  the  character  of  the  war  now  being  carried  on  there 
would  make  it  impossible  for  the  commander-in-chief  to 
show  you  the  attention  due  to  your  rank  and  your  per 
sonal  merit.  His  Majesty,  therefore,  prefers  to  forego  the 
advantage  he  should  gain  from  your  service  rather  than  to 
expose  you  to  what  might  be  inconvenient  or  disagree 
able."  M.  Doniol  testifies  that  this  is  the  only  case  of 
the  kind  that  occurred  in  France  during  the  war.1  In  the 
mean  time,  the  latest  courier  from  Versailles  had  brought 
the  Marquis  de  Noailles  a  letter  from  M.  de  Vergennes 
telling  him  that  he  need  have  no  further  solicitude  about 
his  nephew,  because  "  M.  de  La  Fayette  has  been  most 

1  Angleterre,  t.  523,  No.  47  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  399. 


46  THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

fortunately  overtaken  by  the  King's  messenger  at  San 
Sebastian ;  he  has  respected  the  order  of  the  King,  and 
has  immediately  returned." 

La  Fayette,  having  reached  Bordeaux,  in  company  with 
Kalb,  on  the  19th  of  March,  1777,  discovered  that  his 
movements  were  known  at  Court  and  that  the  King's 
order  would  issue  for  his  arrest.  As  he  knew  that  it  was 
likely  to  overtake  him  forthwith  if  he  remained  in  France, 
he  determined  to  put  out  with  his  ship  as  soon  as  it  could 
be  made  ready,  and,  going  to  the  nearest  port  in  Spain, 
to  await  there  the  ship's  papers.1  But  he  was  delayed 
several  days  by  the  final  preparations  for  his  vessel  to  go 
to  sea,  during  which  time  he  sent  a  messenger  to  Paris  to 
learn  the  latest  news  and  to  see  if  possibly  the  interdict 
might  be  removed. 

Kalb  wrote  to  his  wife  from  Bordeaux  on  the  20th  of 
March,  "  There  is  still  a  possibility  that  our  departure 
may  be  prevented.  I  find  so  many  matters  still  to  be  ar 
ranged  that  the  minister  will  receive  notice  of  the  journey 
of  the  Marquis  in  time  for  his  prohibitory  order  to  arrive 
before  we  go  to  sea.  Notwithstanding  the  ardor  with 
which  we  are  at  work,  nothing  is  more  uncertain  than 
this  voyage.  At  this  moment  a  courier  has  been  de 
spatched  to  ascertain  the  effect  produced  by  the  news  of 
our  proceedings  and  to  prevent  an  interdict  from  issuing." 
And  on  the  23d  of  March  he  wrote,  "  We  are  still  igno 
rant  whether  our  departure  will  not  be  prevented,  as  our 
vessel,  so  long  detained  already,  cannot  go  out  into  the 
stream  before  to-morrow."  2 

They  finally  went  aboard  La  Victoire,  however,  on  the 
night  of  the  25th  of  March ;  and  Kalb  wrote  again  to  his 
wife,  on  the  morning  of  the  26th,  "  In  two  hours  we  shall 
be  in  the  open  sea.  We  are  weighing  anchor  in  the  most 
glorious  weather.  I  shall  certainly  write  you  again  before 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  448.  a  Kapp's  Kalb,  104. 


1777.]        THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  47 

my  arrival  in  America,  because  we  have  to  enter  a  Eu 
ropean  port,  and  shall  probably  wait  at  San  Sebastian  for 
the  return  of  a  courier  sent  to  Paris." 

By  the  laws  of  France  at  that  time,  it  was  necessary  for 
every  passenger  on  a  vessel  going  out  of  a  French  port  to 
obtain  a  certificate,  signed  by  the  proper  official,  setting 
forth  the  place  of  his  birth,  his  age,  his  general  appear 
ance,  and  his  destination.  M.  Doniol,  who  leaves  no  stone 
unturned  under  which  he  is  likely  to  discover  the  infor 
mation  he  seeks,  has  dug  out  of  the  papers  of  the  Admi 
ralty,  preserved  in  the  Tribunal  de  Commerce  at  Bor 
deaux,  the  record  of  these  certificates  or  permits  issued  in 
1777  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  Kalb,  and  their  com 
panions.  That  of  La  Fayette  is  dated  "  at  Bordeaux,  the 
22d  March,  1777,"  and  he  is  described  as  "  Sr  Gilbert 
du  Mottie,  Chevalier  de  Chavaillac,  age  de  20  ans,  taille 
haute,  cheveux  blond,"  who  is  about  to  embark  on  "  La 
Victoire,  Cap6  Lebourcier,  pour  aller  au  Cap  ou  ils  vont 
pour  affaires."  It  includes  the  names  of  some  other 
members  of  his  following,  and  is  signed  by  him  as  Gil 
bert  du  Motier,  using  his  family  name  and  his  title  of 
"  Chevalier  de  Chavaniac,"  by  which  he  was  probably  not 
known  except  in  his  native  province.  Both  of  these  were 
evidently  spelled  in  the  certificate  by  an  official  who  knew 
none  too  much  about  orthography  and  who  cared  nothing 
whatever  about  the  particular  subjects  of  the  King  whose 
names  he  was  then  inscribing.2 

After  leaving  Bordeaux,  the  Victoire  was  headed  for 
the  Spanish  coast,  and  very  soon  arrived  at  Los  Pasajes, 
a  little  harbor  on  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  in  the  province  of 
Guipuzcoa,  a  few  miles  to  the  east  of  San  Sebastian  and 
only  a  short  distance  from  the  French  frontier.  Upon 
going  ashore,  La  Fayette  discovered  that  his  troubles  were 

1  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  Franco,  ii.  384. 

2  See  these  interesting  certificates,  as  given  by  M.  Doniol,  La  Participation 
de  la  France,  ii.  384,  419,  420. 


48  THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

not  yet  ended.  The  two  officers  who  had  been  sent  after 
him  from  Versailles  with  the  King's  lettre-de-cachet  had 
followed  by  land  from  Bordeaux,  and  presented  the  order 
to  him  at  Los  Pasajes.  At  the  same  time,  letters  came 
to  him  from  the  ministers  and  from  some  members  of  his 
family,  insisting  upon  his  return.  The  lettre-de-cachet 
commanded  him  to  proceed  to  Marseilles  and  to  wait  there 
for  further  orders.  The  letters  from  the  ministers  charged 
him  with  violating  his  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  King  and 
with  rashly  committing  an  act  which  might  involve  the 
Government  with  other  Powers.  His  family  censured  him 
in  a  tone  of  pointed  reprimand,  assuring  him  that  his  con 
duct,  if  persisted  in,  would  ruin  both  them  and  himself.1 
This  is  what  La  Fayette  related  upon  the  subject,  in  1828, 
to  Mr.  Sparks,  who  adds  to  the  foregoing,  "  It  must  be 
observed,  however,  that  his  wife  did  not  join  in  this  out 
cry  ;  she  approved  of  his  enterprise  from  the  beginning, 
and  threw  no  obstacles  in  his  way.  The  family  were  pre 
paring  for  a  tour  in  Italy,  and  the  design  was  that  he 
should  meet  them  at  Marseilles,  go  with  them  on  this  tour, 
and  thus  be  diverted  from  his  American  project," 

Kalb's  annoyance  at  this  delay  increased  daily,  as  did 
also  his  fear  that  his  own  ambition  might  yet  be  defeated 
and  that  he  might  be  prevented  from  going  to  America 
this  time,  as  he  had  been  before.  He  wrote  to  his  wife, 
on  the  28th  of  March,  "  It  will  not  be  necessary  to  wait 
here  for  the  return  of  the  courier  sent  to  Paris,  because 
another  has  been  sent  to  us  from  Bordeaux,  who  came 
here  yesterday.  He  brought  the  orders  of  the  Court 
commanding  the  Marquis  to  repair  to  Toulon,  there  to 
await  the  arrival  of  the  Due  d'Ayen  and  the  Comtesse  de 
Tesse,  his  sister,  and  to  travel  with  them  to  Italy.  This 
is  the  end  of  his  expedition  to  America  to  join  the  army 
of  the  insurgents.  He  is  at  this  moment  leaving  for  Bor- 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  448. 


1777.]        THE   COMING   OF   LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  49 

deaux,  whence,  if  possible,  he  will  proceed  to  Paris,  being 
loath  to  go  to  Italy.  I  am  now  obliged  to  wait  for  the 
courier  whom  La  Fayette  is  to  send  to  me,  either  from 
Bordeaux,  if,  on  obtaining  from  the  commandant  of  that 
place  more  satisfactory  information  of  the  King's  com 
mands,  he  finds  it  necessary  to  abandon  the  journey,  or 
from  Paris,  if  he  is  permitted  to  go  there  and  then  fails  in 
securing  the  consent  of  the  Due  d' Ayen  to  his  proceeding. 
Time  will  hang  heavy  on  my  hands  here  in  the  mean  time. 
I  do  not  believe  he  will  be  able  to  rejoin  me,  and  have  ad 
vised  him  to  compromise  with  the  owner  of  the  ship  at  a 
sacrifice  of  twenty  or  twenty-five  thousand  francs." 

Kalb  underestimated,  however,  the  force  of  character 
and  the  determination  of  the  young  gentleman  whose 
courage  he  so  readily  disposed  of.  This  was  not  by  any 
means  "  the  end  of  his  expedition,"  though,  it  must  be 
confessed,  it  was  rather  a  staggering  blow,  for  it  brought 
to  bear  upon  him  at  the  same  moment  all  the  force  of 
duty  to  the  King  and  of  affection  for  his  family,  either  of 
which  had  always  hitherto  been  the  signal  for  unhesi 
tating  obedience  in  the  mind  of  La  Fayette.  He  deter 
mined  to  go  back  to  France  with  the  officers  who  bore  the 
King's  order,  to  report  himself  to  the  commandant  at 
Bordeaux,  and  to  make  a  further  effort  to  release  himself 
from  the  prohibitions  by  which  his  steps  were  now  beset. 
Accordingly,  he  started  for  Bordeaux  at  once,  by  land, 
taking  the  road  which  leads  through  St.-Jean-de-Luz. 

"  The  letters  of  my  family  were  terrible,"  he  said,  in 
speaking  of  it  several  years  afterward,  and  although  "  the 
consequences  of  the  anathema,  the  laws  of  the  realm,  the 
authority  and  the  anger  of  the  Government,  influenced 
me  to  take  this  step,  yet  far  more  so  did  the  grief  and  the 
pregnancy  of  my  dearly  loved  wife  and  the  thought  of  my 
family  and  friends."  He  presented  himself,  therefore,  to 


1  Kapp's  Kalb,  104.  '  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  14. 

VOL.  1.— 4 


V^'      / 
..  >  \\j k-  y 

\\\^   ,-,t       ^// 


50  THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

M.  de  Fumel,  the  commandant  at  Bordeaux,  and  made  a 
formal  declaration  that  he  alone  would  be  answerable  for 
the  consequences  of  his  evasion,  for  he  began  to  feel 
assured  now  that  there  was  very  little  hope  of  his  obtain 
ing  permission  to  go,  especially  after  receiving  a  letter 
from  his  intimate  friend  the  Vicomte  de  Coigny,  who 
wrote  from  Versailles  that  there  was  much  excitement 
against  him  at  Court,  that  the  British  Ambassador  had 
made  strong  representations,  and  that  there  was  not  the 
remotest  prospect  of  his  receiving  a  favorable  reply.1 
Thereupon  La  Fayette  decided  to  go  to  America,  come 
what  might.  Whilst  he  was  at  Bordeaux,  following  up 
the  circumstances  which  led  him  to  this  conclusion,  Kalb 
was  still  aboard  La  Victoire  in  Los  Pasajes,  growing  con 
stantly  more  impatient  as  the  days  went  by  without  bring 
ing  him  the  tidings  he  was  expecting  from  the  Marquis. 
He  occupied  the  time  which  was,  as  he  had  foreseen, 
"  hanging  heavy  on  his  hands,"  by  writing  letters  to  his 
wife  which  show  that  his  disappointment  had  produced  a 
feeling  of  irritation  toward  La  Fayette,  whom  he  blames 
almost  in  the  same  breath  for  not  having  abandoned  the 
expedition  altogether  and  for  not  having  proceeded  with 
it  in  spite  of  remonstrance  from  anybody.  But  his  let 
ters  are  interesting  in  this  connection,  and  they  are  also 
extremely  important  in  the  history  of  La  Fayette,  because 
they  are,  as  to  many  incidents  of  the  voyage  which  they 
narrate,  the  only  documents  which  we  now  possess.  He 
wrote  to  her  on  the  6th  of  April,  a  little  less  than  a  week 
after  La  Fayette  had  left  him  to  go  to  Bordeaux,2  "  I  had 
flattered  myself  with  the  hope  of  receiving  news  from  the 
Marquis  from  Bordeaux  last  evening.  If  they  do  not 
arrive  to-day  or  to-morrow,  our  stay  here  will  be  a  very 
long  one,  as  in  that  case  he  will  not  write  until  he  gets  to 
Paris ;  for  certainly  neither  M.  de  Maurepas  nor  the  Due 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  449. 
3  Kapp's  Kalb,  105. 


1777.]       THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  51 

d'Ayen  will  permit  him  to  rejoin  us.  If  the  Marquis  has 
not  already  made  a  bargain  with  the  ship's  owner,  his 
blunders  will  cost  him  dear.  I  call  them  blunders  because 
his  course  was  silly  from  the  moment  he  could  not  make 
up  his  mind  quietly  to  execute  his  project,  undisturbed  by 
threats.  It  was  the  letter  of  the  Vicomte  de  Coigny,  re 
ceived  by  the  courier  sent  to  him,  on  his  return  to  Bor 
deaux,  which  produced  this  sudden  change  of  purpose. 
If  that  letter  had  not  found  him  already  in  the  boat  which 
was  to  carry  us  aboard  our  vessel,  I  believe  La  Fayette 
would  have  returned  at  once,  and  in  my  opinion  he  would 
have  acted  properly.  When  he  asked  my  advice  about 
what  he  should  do,  I  thought  it  my  duty  to  dissuade  him 
from  disregarding  the  wishes  of  his  father-in-law  and  the 
commands  of  the  King.  On  the  contrary,  I  advised  him 
to  give  way  to  his  family  and  to  avoid  a  rupture  with  them. 
Had  he  not  constantly  flattered  himself  that  he  had  the 
approval  of  the  Due  d'Ayen,  I  should  always  have  warned 
him  not  to  go  so  far  as  he  went.  He  always  assured  me 
that  his  family  sanctioned  his  plans,  that  his  father-in- 
law  himself  intended  at  some  time  to  go  to  America  with 
the  Vicomte  de  Noailles,  and  that  even  Madame  de  La 
Fayette  had  been  made  acquainted  with  his  intentions  by 
her  parents  and  would  approve  of  them.  I  have  always 
thought  him  to  blame  for  keeping  the  matter  secret  from 
his  wife  until  the  moment  of  his  departure.  If  he  had 
told  me  in  Paris  what  he  has  admitted  since,  I  should  have 
remonstrated  most  earnestly  against  the  whole  scheme. 
As  it  is,  the  affair  will  cost  him  some  money.  But  if  it 
be  said  that  he  has  done  a  foolish  thing,  it  may  be  answered 
that  he  acted  from  the  most  honorable  motives  and  that  he 
can  hold  up  his  head  before  all  high-minded  men."  And 
on  the  same  day  he  wrote,  "  The  reasons  which  drove  us 
to  enter  this  port  still  detain  us  here,  for  we  must  have 
the  permission  of  the  Marquis,  or  of  the  owner  of  the 
vessel,  before  proceeding  on  our  voyage.  By  a  letter  of 


52  THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

Messrs.  Raimbaux  &  Cie  I  learn  that  he  reached  Bor 
deaux  on  the  3d  and  immediately  sent  a  courier  to  Paris, 
whose  return  he  is  awaiting.  This  shows  that  he  is  reluc 
tant  to  abandon  his  project  and  his  vessel,  and  still  hopes 
to  obtain  the  consent  of  his  family  and  of  M.  de  Maure- 
pas.  I  hardly  think  he  will  succeed.  It  will  not  be 
before  the  llth  that  I  shall  know  what  to  expect,  even 
if  La  Fayette  should  receive  an  immediate  answer  from 
Paris.  This  long  delay  is  intolerable.  I  shall  be  too 
late  for  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  and  am  so  much 
the  more  mortified  as  Mr.  Deane  offered  me  a  passage  on 
one  of  his  ships.  If  the  matter  be  still  long  protracted,  I 
shall  either  return  to  Paris,  or  betake  myself  to  the  Isle 
of  Re  or  to  Nantes,  to  wait  for  news  from  Mr.  Deane." 

On  the  12th  of  April  he  wrote,  "  At  this  moment  the 
post  brings  me  a  letter  from  the  Marquis  dated  the  5th,  at 
Bordeaux.  He  says  he  was  refused  permission  to  proceed, 
and  that  he  fears  being  compelled  to  go  to  Toulon.  He  is 
now  waiting  for  the  return  of  his  courier  sent  to  Paris, 
and  will  inform  me  at  once  of  the  answer  he  receives." 
And  again,  on  the  15th  of  April,  "  The  Marquis  writes 
from  Bordeaux,  under  date  of  the  12th  instant,  that  he  was 
on  the  point  of  leaving  for  Marseilles,  where  the  royal 
order  requires  him  to  report  himself  to-day.  He  says 
that  the  Court  devotes  great  attention  to  this  affair  of  his, 
but  he  still  hopes  to  gain  over  the  Due  d'Ayen,  so  as  to  be 
at  liberty  to  rejoin  me.  He  therefore  requests  me  not  to 
sail  before  receiving  another  letter  from  him  from  Toulon 
or  some  other  point.  If  I  am  to  wait  until  he  gets  to 
Marseilles,  I  shall  have  to  stay  here  until  the  26th.  La 
Fayette's  letter  shows  that  the  ship  is  still  held  in  his 
name.  He  requests  me  to  have  an  eye  to  his  interests  and 
to  see  that  his  investment  is  realized  as  soon  as  possible." 

At  that  very  moment  La  Fayette  had  left  Bordeaux  on 
his  way  back  to  the  ship,  and  had  made  the  final  effort 
which  led  to  his  escape  from  further  obstacles  and  to  his 


1777.]        THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  53 

actual  departure  for  America.  He  was  joined  in  Bordeaux 
by  a  young  French  officer,  a  friend  of  his,  the  Vicomte  de 
Mauroy,  who  had  also  obtained  an  appointment  from  Mr. 
Deane ;  and  in  company  with  him  he  started  in  a  post- 
chaise  to  return  to  Los  Pasajes,  having  written  to  M.  de 
Maurepas  that,  as  the  Government  had  not  absolutely  re 
fused  to  remove  its  interdict,  he  should  accept  its  silence  as 
consent, — a  "  plaisanterie"  to  which  he  referred  in  after- 
years  with  a  smile.  He  had  told  the  commandant  at  Bor 
deaux  that  he  should  go  to  Marseilles,  in  compliance  with 
the  King's  order ;  but  as  soon  as  he  and  his  companion 
had  got  safely  outside  the  town  they  changed  their  course 
and  turned  their  faces  toward  San  Sebastian.  Whilst  the 
Vicomte  de  Mauroy  sat  in  the  chaise,  La  Fayette  disguised 
himself  in  the  costume  of  a  post-boy  and  went  ahead  on 
horseback. 

Everything  prospered  with  them  on  their  journey  until 
they  came  to  St.-Jean-de-Luz,  where  the  daughter  of  the 
innkeeper  at  whose  house  they  stopped  recognized  in  the 
pretended  post-boy  the  gentleman  whom  she  had  seen,  only 
a  few  days  before,  travelling  toward  Bordeaux  ;  and  a  sud 
den  exclamation  of  surprise  from  her,  which  was  only  half 
suppressed  at  a  sign  from  La  Fayette,  came  very  near 
exposing  him.  Some  officials  who  had  been  following  him 
came  up  soon  after,  but,  the  girl  having  sent  them  in  the 
wrong  direction,  La  Fayette  and  M.  de  Mauroy  were 
enabled  to  continue  their  journey  to  Los  Pasajes,  where 
they  arrived  safely  on  the  17th  of  April.  Kalb's  last 
letter  from  there  to  his  wife  was  dated  on  the  17th,  and 
told  her,— 

"  At  this  moment  the  Marquis  has  arrived,  and  he  is 
prepared  to  set  out  with  us  in  a  day  or  two.  He  came  to 
this  conclusion  by  receiving  assurances  from  every  one  in 
Paris  that  none  other  than  the  Due  d'Ayen  had  procured 
the  royal  order,  and  that  all  the  world  is  in  favor  of  La 
Fayette's  enterprise  and  greatly  dissatisfied  with  his  father- 


54  THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

in-law  for  having  obstructed  his  course,  and  that  finally 
the  ministers,  on  being  asked  their  real  sentiments  in  the 
matter,  answered  that  they  would  have  said  nothing  at  all 
but  for  the  complaints  of  the  Due  d'Ayen.  We  have 
therefore  resolved  to  steer  for  our  destined  port,  if  no  un 
foreseen  obstacle  intervenes.  This  is  the  last  letter  I  shall 
write  you,  if  not  from  Europe,  at  least  from  this  harbor." 

The  French  Government  took  no  further  steps  to  delay 
longer  a  project  which  circumstances  had  obliged  it  to 
notice  officially,  but  to  which  the  ministers  themselves  felt 
no  very  bitter  hostility  ;  serious  questions  of  state  in  regard 
to  their  policy  toward  Great  Britain  coming  up  at  this 
time  drove  the  incident  from  their  minds,  and  the  visit 
which  the  Emperor  Joseph  II.  of  Austria  made  at  that 
moment  to  Paris  engrossed  the  Cabinet  with  matters  of 
international  concern.  Everybody  in  Parisian  society  was 
talking  of  La  Fayette's  exploit  with  admiration  and  ap 
proval,  and  M.  de  Vergennes,  the  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  remarked  that  he  had  heard  La  Fayette  had  run 
off  again,  but  that  he  should  take  good  care  this  time  not 
to  mention  it  to  the  King. 

The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  sailed  from  Los  Pasajes  for 
America  in  La  Victoire,  on  Sunday,  the  20th  of  April, 
1777.  He  had  with  him,  besides  the  Vicomte  de  Mauroy 
and  Johann  Kalb,  the  following  officers :  Colonel  de  Les 
ser,  Colonel  de  Valfort,  Lieutenant-Colonel  de  Fayolles, 
Lieutenant-Colonel  de  Franval,  Major  Dubuysson,  Major 
de  Gimat,  Major  Dubois-Martin,  Captain  de  Vrigny,  Cap 
tain  de  Bedaulx,  Captain  de  la  Colombe,  Captain  Capi- 
taine,  Lieutenant  Candon,  and  an  American  named  Price, 
who  had  been  recommended  by  Mr.  Deane,  and  who  is 
described  in  the  official  permit  as  "  Leonard  Price,  aged 
22,  native  of  Sauveterre."1 


1  Besides  these,  the  certificate  of  La  Fayette  contains  the  names  of  Jean 
Simon  Camus,  Michel  Moteau,  Francois  Aman  Roge,  and  Antoine  lledon. 
Of  these,  however,  Camus  is  the  only  one  who  signed  the  certificate. 


1777.]       THE   COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.  55 

Upon  getting  out  to  sea,  La  Fayette  ordered  his  captain 
to  sail  directly  for  the  United  States,  although  their  papers 
were  taken  out  for  the  West  Indies.  The  captain  replied 
that  he  could  not  obey  that  order,  because  the  ship's  papers 
protected  them  only  in  going  to  the  West  Indies,  and  if 
they  were  caught  by  an  English  cruiser  making  for  the 
United  States  they  would  instantly  be  made  prisoners  and 
their  cargo  seized ;  whereupon  La  Fayette  repeated  his 
order  to  sail  for  North  America,  threatening  in  case  of 
disobedience  to  put  the  ship  in  charge  of  the  second  officer ; 
but,  observing  an  extraordinary  unwillingness  on  the  part 
of  the  captain,  he  talked  further  with  him,  and  discovered 
that  he  had  smuggled  on  board  the  vessel  several  thousand 
dollars'  worth  of  goods  which  he  intended  to  sell  in  the 
West  Indies,  and  that  this  was  the  cause  of  his  fear  of 
being  overtaken  by  an  English  man-of-war.  The  cap 
tain's  peace  of  mind  was  restored,  however,  by  a  promise 
on  the  part  of  La  Fayette  to  indemnify  him  in  case  of 
loss  by  capture,  whereupon  he  agreed  to  steer  as  he  was 
directed  to  do,1  and  La  Fayette,  who  knew  that  La  Victoire 
could  not  make  any  reasonable  show  of  a  fight,  with  her 
"  two  old  cannon  and  a  few  muskets,"  having  made  up  his 
mind  to  blow  her  up  rather  than  to  be  taken  by  the  British, 
settled  himself  down  for  his  voyage.2 

It  was  a  long  and  a  very  tedious  one.  Fortunately,  we 
have  some  account  of  it  from  his  own  pen  ;  for,  after  he 
had  been  at  sea  somewhat  over  a  month,  he  wrote  to  Mine, 
de  La  Fayette  a  letter  dated  on  board  La  Victoire,  the  30th 
of  May,  1777  : 3 

u  It  is  from  very  far  away  that  I  am  writing  to  you,  dear  heart, 
and  to  this  cruel  separation  is  added  the  still  more  dreadful  uncer 
tainty  of  the  time  when  I  shall  hear  from  you  again.  I  hope;  how 
ever,  that  it  is  not  very  distant,  for,  of  all  the  many  causes  that 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  450. 

2  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  15. 

8  La  Fayette,  Correspondance,  i.  84. 


56  THE    COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

make  me  long  to  get  ashore  again,  there  is  nothing  that  increases 
my  impatience  like  this.  How  many  fears  and  anxieties  I  have 
had  in  addition  to  the  pain  of  leaving  behind  me  all  that  is  most 
dear  !  How  did  you  take  my  second  departure  f  Did  you  love 
me  the  less  ?  Have  you  forgiven  me  ?  Have  you  thought  that, 
at  all  events,  we  should  have  been  separated,  I  in  Italy  dragging 
along  a  life  with  no  chance  to  distinguish  myself,  surrounded  by 
people  who  are  most  hostile  to  my  projects  and  my  views'?  But, 
after  all,  this  reflection  could  not  prevent  me  from  feeling  terribly 
at  the  awful  moment  when  we  were  losing  sight  of  land.  Your 
grief,  that  of  my  friends,  Henriette,1 — it  all  came  before  my 
mind  with  frightful  vividness,  and  for  an  instant  I  felt  that 
I  had  nothing  to  say  in  defence  of  what  I  was  about  to  do.  If 
you  knew  what  I  have  suffered,  what  weary  days  I  have  passed 
thus  flying  from  everything  that  I  love  best  in  the  world  !  Must 
I  yet  learn,  besides  all  this,  that  you  refuse  to  forgive  me? 
Indeed,  my  dear  heart,  in  that  event  I  should  be  pitiable  beyond 
expression. 

"But  I  am  telling  you  nothing  about  myself  and  my  health, 
and  I  am  sure  these  things  are  of  interest  to  you.  I  have  been, 
ever  since  my  last  letter  to  you,  in  the  most  dismal  of  countries  ; 
the  sea  is  so  wearisome,  and  I  believe  we  have  the  same  doleful 
influence  upon  each  other,  it  and  I.  I  ought  to  have  landed 
before  this,  but  the  winds  have  cruelly  opposed  me.  I  shall  not 
see  Charlestown  for  eight  or  ten  days  longer.  That  is  where  I 
expect  to  land,  and  it  will  be  a  great  pleasure  for  me.  Once  I  am 
there,  I  shall  have  every  hope  of  getting  news  from  France ;  I 
shall  then  learn  so  many  interesting  details,  not  only  of  what  I 
am  going  to  find  before  me,  but  above  all  about  what  I  have  left 
behind  with  such  great  regret.  Provided  I  find  that  you  are  well 
and  that  you  still  love  me,  and  that  a  certain  number  of  our 
friends  are  in  the  same  condition,  I  shall  take  philosophically 
everything  else,  whatever  it  may  be,  or  from  whatever  direction 
it  may  come.  Though,  if  my  heart  were  wounded  in  its  tender est 
spot,  if  you  did  not  love  me  as  before,  I  should  be  indeed  too  mis 
erable.  But  I  need  not  fear  that,  need  I,  my  dear  heart  ?  I  was 
very  ill  during  the  first  part  of  the  voyage,  and  I  had  the  conso 
lation  vouchsafed  to  the  wicked,  that  of  suffering  in  company 
with  many  others.  I  treated  myself  in  my  usual  way,  and  I 
recovered  sooner  than  the  rest ;  now  I  am  about  as  well  as  if  I 


1  His  first  child,  born  December  15,  1775,  who  died  in  1777,  during  his 
absence  in  America. 


1777.]       THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  57 

were  on  land ;  I  feel  sure  that,  once  I  am  ashore,  I  shall  have 
perfect  health  for  a  long  time  to  come.  Do  not  allow  yourself  to 
feel  anxious  that  I  am  running  great  danger  in  the  occupation 
that  is  before  me.  The  post  of  major-general  has  always  been  a 
warrant  of  long  life.  It  is  so  different  from  the  service  I  should 
have  had  in  France,  as  colonel,  for  instance.  With  my  present 
rank  I  shall  only  have  to  attend  councils  of  war.  Ask  any  of 
the  French  generals,  of  whom  there  are  so  many,  because,  once 
having  attained  that  rank,  they  run  no  further  risk  and  they  do 
not  make  way  for  others  as  they  would  do  in  lower  grades  of  the 
service.  In  order  to  show  you  that  I  am  not  trying  to  deceive 
you,  I  will  admit  that  we  are  in  danger  at  this  moment,  because 
we  are  likely  at  any  time  to  be  attacked  by  an  English  vessel  and 
we  are  not  strong  enough  to  defend  ourselves.  But  as  soon  as  I 
land  I  shall  be  in  perfect  safety.  You  see  that  I  tell  you  every 
thing  in  order  that  you  may  feel  at  ease  and  not  allow  yourself  to 
be  anxious  without  cause. 

"I  shall  not  write  you  the  journal  of  my  voyage,  because 
here  one  day  follows  another,  and,  what  is  worse,  they  are  all 
alike.  Nothing  but  sky  and  nothing  but  water  ;  and  to-morrow 
it  will  be  just  the  same.  .  .  .  But  now  let  me  talk  of  more  im 
portant  things,  of  you,  of  our  dear  Henriette,  of  her  brother  or 
her  sister, — whichever  it  may  be, — Henriette  is  so  lovable  herself 
that  she  makes  me  wish  for  a  girl  ;  but,  whatever  our  new  child 
may  be,  I  shall  welcome  it  with  very  sincere  happiness.  Do  not 
lose  a  moment  in  sending  me  the  joyful  news  of  its  birth.  Mr. 
Deane  and  my  friend  Carmieliael  will  aid  you  in  this,  and  I  am 
sure  they  would  neglect  no  opportunity  to  make  me  happy  as 
quickly  as  possible.  Write,  or  send  me  a  reliable  man,  like 
Landin,  for  example  ;  for  it  would  be  such  a  pleasure  to  talk  with 
any  one  who  had  seen  you.  However,  do  in  this  matter  as  you 
think  best.1 

"  7th  June. — I  am  still  out  upon  this  dreary  plain,  which  is  be 
yond  all  comparison  the  most  dismal  place  that  one  can  be  in.  I 
try  to  console  myself  a  little  by  thinking  of  you  and  of  our  friends 
at  home,  and  I  picture  to  myself  the  joy  of  meeting  you  again. 
What  a  delightful  moment  that  will  be  when  I  come  home,  when 
I  rush  in  unexpectedly  to  take  you  into  my  arms, — and  perhaps  I 
shall  find  you  with  your  children.  I  have  an  exquisite  pleasure 

1  La  Fayctte's  second  daughter,  Anastasie,  was  born  in  July,  1777.  She 
was  married,  in  1798,  to  the  Comte  Charles  de  Latour-Maubourg.  She  died 
in  1863. 


58  THE    COMING    OF    LA    FAYETTE   TO    AMERICA.        [1777. 

in  thinking  of  that  time.  Do  not  think  that  it  is  very  distant ;  it 
will  seein  long  enough  to  me,  no  doubt,  but  in  point  of  fact  it  will 
not  be  as  long  as  you  imagine.  Without  being  able  to  foretell  the 
day  or  the  month,  without  being  able  to  predict  the  course  of 
events,  I  know  that  the  exile  until  next  January,  prescribed  for 
me  by  the  Due  d'Ayen,  seemed  so  interminable  that  I  am  not 
going  now  wilfully  to  inflict  upon  myself  a  long  separation. 

' '  But  consider  the  difference  between  my  occupation  and  my 
present  life  and  what  they  would  have  been  if  I  had  gone  upon 
that  useless  journey.  As  the  defender  of  that  liberty  which  I 
adore,  free  myself  beyond  all  others,  coming  as  a  friend  to  offer 
my  services  to  this  most  interesting  republic,  I  bring  with  me 
nothing  but  my  own  free  heart  and  my  own  good  will,  no  ambi 
tion  to  fulfil  and  no  selfish  interest  to  serve ;  if  I  am  striving 
for  my  own  glory,  I  am  at  the  same  time  laboring  for  its  wel 
fare.  I  trust  that  for  iny  sake  you  will  become  a  good  American  ; 
it  is  a  sentiment  made  for  virtuous  hearts.  The  happiness  of 
America  is  intimately  connected  with  the  happiness  of  all  man 
kind  ;  she  is  destined  to  become  the  safe  and  venerable  asylum 
of  virtue,  of  honesty,  of  tolerance,  of  equality,  and  of  peaceful 
liberty. 

""We  have  had  small  alarms  from  time  to  time,  but,  with  a 
little  care  and  with  reasonably  good  fortune,  I  hope  to  get  through 
without  serious  accident,  and  I  shall  be  all  the  more  pleased 
because  I  am  learning  every  day  to  be  extremely  prudent.  You 
remember  the  Vicomte  used  to  say  that  i  travelling  develops  the 
youthful  mind, '  and  if  he  never  repeated  it  more  than  once  every 
morning  and  once  at  night,  I  should  not  think  that  too  often,  for 
I  am  coming  more  and  more  to  understand  the  truth  of  that 
assertion.  I  have  no  idea  where  he  is  now,  the  poor  Vicomte, 
nor  the  Prince,  nor,  indeed,  any  of  my  friends,  and  I  am  suffering 
cruelly  from  this  lack  of  news.  Whenever  you  have  a  good  op 
portunity  to  talk  with  any  of  those  I  love,  give  them  a  thousand, 
ten  thousand  kind  greetings  from  me. 

"  We  have  begun  to-day  to  see  certain  kinds  of  birds  which 
indicate  that  the  land  is  near.  The  hope  of  arriving  there  is 
sweet,  for  my  life  in  this  region  is  very  dull.  Fortunately  I  am 
well  enough  now  to  occupy  myself  a  little,  and  I  spend  my  time 
between  my  military  books  and  my  study  of  English.  I  am 
making  progress  with  that  language,  which  will  soon  become 
so  necessary  to  me. 

"  Adieu.  Night  coming  on  obliges  me  to  stop,  for  I  have  lately 
forbidden  the  use  of  lights  about  the  ship  ;  see  how  careful  I  am  ! 


1777.]        THE   COMING   OF    LA    FAYETTE    TO    AMERICA.  59 

Good-by,  then ;  but  with  my  fingers  directed  a  little  by  the  im 
pulses  of  my  heart,  I  have  no  need  of  lights  to  tell  you  that  I 
love  you  and  shall  love  you  all  my  life." 

In  the  mean  time  the  American  Commissioners  in 
France  prepared  for  La  Fayette's  reception  in  the  United 
States  by  the  following  letter  addressed  to  Congress : l 

"The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  a  young  nobleman  of  great 
family  connexions  here  and  great  wealth,  is  gone  to  America  in  a 
ship  of  his  own,  accompanied  by  some  officers  of  distinction,  in 
order  to  serve  in  our  armies.  He  is  exceedingly  beloved,  and 
everybody's  good  wishes  attend  him  ;  we  cannot  but  hope  he  may 
meet  with  such  a  reception  as  will  make  the  country  and  his  ex 
pedition  agreeable  to  him.  Those  who  censure  it  as  imprudent 
in  him  do  nevertheless  applaud  his  spirit,  and  we  are  satisfied 
that  the  civilities  and  respect  that  may  be  shown  him  will  be 
serviceable  to  our  affairs  here,  as  pleasing  not  only  to  his  powerful 
relations,  and  to  the  Court,  but  to  the  whole  French  nation.  He 
has  left  a  beautiful  young  wife  big  with  child,  and  for  her  sake 
particularly  we  hope  that  his  bravery  and  ardent  desire  to  distin 
guish  himself  will  be  a  little  restrained  by  the  General's  prudence, 
so  as  not  to  permit  his  being  hazarded  much,  but  on  some  im 
portant  occasion. 

"B.  FRANKLIN.    SILAS  DEANE. 

"  PA  HIS,  25  May,  1777." 

Thus  came  La  Fayette  to  America.  Slowly  he  made 
his  way  across  the  sea,  his  heart  always  turning  back  to 
his  beloved  France,  whilst  his  generous  sympathy  for  a 
struggling  nation  gave  him  courage  to  face  the  dangers 
that  surrounded  him,  and  filled  his  mind  with  noble 
thoughts  of  self-sacrifice,  of  patience,  of  heroism,  in  the 
cause  of  that  liberty  which,  as  he  said,  he  adored. 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  324. 


60  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1774. 


CHAPTER    II. 

THE     HOSTILE     SENTIMENT     IN     FRANCE     TOWARD     GREAT 

BRITAIN. 

AT  the  time  of  La  Fayette's  departure  for  America, 
France  was  upon  the  very  verge  of  war  with  England, 
although  as  yet  this  was  a  carefully  guarded  state  secret, 
and  we  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  La  Fayette  had 
knowledge  of  it.  The  outbreak  of  the  American  Revo 
lution  was  the  occasion  of  this  almost  hostile  attitude  of 
the  two  countries  ;  but  tjie  causes  of  it  are  to  be  sought  in 
the  events  of  many  years  before.  They  lay  in  the  deep- 
seated  resentment  which  had  taken  hold  of  the  French 
mind  as  the  result  of  former  humiliation  and  former  defeat, 
from  which  the  nation  had  not  recovered  either  in  its 
material  resources  or  in  its  national  pride, — injuries  which 
every  French  statesman  believed  must  be  avenged  before 
France  could  ever  again  be  truly  great.  England  was  to 
them  the  source  of  the  evil  which  had  befallen  their 
country  since  the  middle  of  the  century.  It  had  made 
war  upon  her,  it  had  taken  her  provinces  away  from  her, 
it  had  defeated  her  armies,  and  by  its  superiority  at  sea 
it  threatened  her  commerce.  It  was  the  "hereditary 
enemy,"  whose  movements  were  always  to  be  watched  with 
suspicion,  lest  success  might  strengthen  its  haughty  spirit 
and  its  insatiable  thirst  for  power  should  lead  to  further 
aggression  upon  nations  not  sufficiently  strong  to  resist 
its  ever-increasing  force.  Men  in  France  believed  that 
peace  must  be  maintained  with  this  enemy  as  the  only 
hope  of  present  safety,  but  that  peace  would  last  only 
until  the  opportunity  should  occur  when  the  country 


1774.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  61 

might  safely  go  to  war.  Whether  the  uprising  in  the 
Colonies  of  North  America  was  about  to  present  this 
opportunity,  was  a  question  to  which  the  ministers  and 
diplomatists  of  France  had  given,  for  several  years,  the 
closest  attention.  They  followed  the  course  of  events  with 
intense  satisfaction  as  the  Revolution  progressed  through 
the  Colonies  until  it  called  for  serious  efforts  from  the 
mother-country  to  control  it ;  they  hailed  with  delight  the 
news  that  the  Colonists  were  stubbornly  contending  for 
their  rights,  and  that  England  could  no  longer  command 
obedience,  but  was,  on  the  contrary,  likely  to  lose  her 
sovereignty  over  America  altogether. 

Whilst  the  enemy  was  thus  distracted  by  party  dissen 
sion  at  home  and  weakened  by  the  demands  of  a  war 
which  obliged  it  to  send  its  navy  and  its  troops  to  the 
other  side  of  the  world,  the  day  might  come  when  France 
should  strike  a  blow  that  would  crush  her  rival,  humbled 
then  by  the  breaking  up  of  its  own  empire  and  the  loss 
of  its  richest  possessions.  This  was  the  dream  of  French 
statesmen  ;  and  in  it  they  saw  the  glory  of  France  re 
stored,  the  prestige  of  her  military  power  renewed,  the 
strength  of  her  navy  increased  to  command  respect  for 
her  Hag  upon  the  seas,  and  her  position  in  the  councils  of 
Europe  equal  once  more  to  that  which  had  been  won  for 
her  by  the  great  King  Louis  in  the  century  before.  No 
body  in  France  believed  that  the  Seven  Years'  War  was 
definitively  closed.  The  Treaty  of  Paris  had  brought 
peace,  it  is  true,  and  its  provisions  had  then  been  fulfilled 
for  many  years,  with  the  renewal  of  what  were  made  to 
appear  like  the  most  cordial  diplomatic  relations  with 
Great  Britain,  based  upon  assurances  of  mutual  confidence 
and  respect.  But  to  all  Frenchmen  the  Treaty  of  Paris 
was  not  a  peace  ;  it  was  a  cessation  of  hostilities.  Its  obli 
gations,  honestly  assumed,  meant  to  their  minds  efface- 
ment,  national  destruction  and  disgrace  ;  and  no  man  who 
loved  his  country  could  consent  to  accept  the  terms  of  an 


62  THE   HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1774. 

agreement  forced  upon  her  by  the  disasters  at  Rossbach 
and  at  Minden. 

How  true  this  is  may  be  seen  from  a  state  paper  ad 
dressed  to  King  Louis  XVI.  by  his  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  and  still  preserved  in  the  Archives  of  France,1  in 
which  the  situation  is  described  with  such  clearness  that 
no  one  can  doubt  the  sentiment  of  the  time : 

4  *  The  humiliating  peace  of  1763  was  bought  at  the  price  of  our 
possessions,  of  our  commerce,  and  of  our  credit  in  the  Indies ;  at 
the  price  of  Canada,  Louisiana,  Isle  Royale,  Acadia,  and  Sene 
gal.  It  established  the  opinion  among  all  nations  that  there  was 
left  in  France  neither  power  nor  resource  ;  the  envy  which  up  to 
that  time  had  been  the  moving  influence  in  the  politics  of  all  other 
Courts  in  their  relations  to  France  now  degenerated  into  a  sort 
of  contempt :  the  Cabinet  of  Versailles  had  neither  credit  nor  in 
fluence  with  any  Court ;  instead  of  being,  as  she  had  formerly 
been,  the  centre  of  every  great  undertaking,  she  had  now  become 
merely  a  silent  looker-on ;  nobody  consulted  her ;  no  one  even 
counted  as  of  any  value  her  approval  or  her  dissent.  In  a  word, 
France,  the  greatest  Power  in  Europe,  had  become  absolutely  in 
active  ;  she  had  lost  credit  with  her  allies,  and  she  had  no  consid 
eration  from  other  Powers.  Such  was  our  sad  and  humiliating 
position  at  the  time  when  Your  Majesty  succeeded  to  the  throne. 
.  .  .  We  need  but  to  read  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  and  especially  the 
negotiations  which  preceded  it,  to  comprehend  the  ascendency 
assumed  by  England  over  France,  and  to  observe  how  greatly  that 
arrogant  nation  enjoyed  the  pleasure  of  having  humiliated  us. 
...  I  do  not  hesitate,  Sire,  to  declare  that  a  people  may  meet 
with  reverses  and  may  be  forced  to  submit  to  the  imperious  law 
of  necessity  and  of  self-preservation  j  but  when  these  reverses  and 
this  humiliation  are  unjust,  when  their  end  and  aim  are  to  increase 
the  pride  of  an  arrogant  rival,  such  a  people  owes  it  to  itself,  to 
its  honor,  its  dignity,  and  its  position  before  men,  to  free  itself 
as  soon  as  it  is  able.  If  it  neglects  this  and  allows  fear  to  turn 
it  from  its  duty,  it  but  adds  degradation  to  disgrace,  and  makes 
itself  an  object  of  contempt  in  its  own  day  and  in  time  to  come." 

Curiously  enough,  it  was  not  a  combination  of  European 

1  Affaires  e"trangeres,  Memoires  et  Documents,  t.  410,  No.  11  :  Doniol,  La 
Participation  de  la  France  a  1' Etablissement  des  Etats-Unis  d'Amerique,  i.  2. 


1774.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  63 

politics,  the  intrigues  of  a  European  Court,  or  the  ambi 
tion  of  a  European  monarch  that  was  expected  now  to  fur 
nish  the  opportunity  which  France  sought  of  avenging 
herself,  but  the  remote  Colonies  of  North  America,  whose 
existence  beyond  the  Atlantic  Ocean  was  otherwise  scarcely 
ever  mentioned  or  thought  of.  The  uneasiness  excited  by 
the  passage  of  the  Stamp  Act,  coming  almost  immediately 
after  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  arrested  the  at 
tention  of  the  Due  de  Choiseul,  Prime  Minister  of  Louis 
XV.,  a  sagacious  observer  and  an  ardent  politician,  long 
versed  in  affairs  of  state,  ambitious  beyond  aught  else  for 
the  greatness  of  France,  the  exigencies  of  whose  career 
had  obliged  him  to  sign  the  much-hated  Treaty  of  1763, 
and  who  is  said  to  have  consoled  himself  in  that  moment 
of  humiliation  with  the  thought  that  it  was  a  treaty 
which  would  soon  be  broken.  He  detected,  with  unerr 
ing  judgment,  a  weak  spot  in  the  British  Empire  which 
he  was  convinced  would  develop  and  extend  and  would 
some  day  be  the  source  of  serious  trouble  to  the  Eng 
lish  Government.  He  went  further  than  that :  he  de 
clared  that  he  saw  influences  then  at  work  which  were 
destined  to  reach  throughout  the  Colonies,  to  incite  them 
against  the  restraints  of  the  ministerial  Government,  and 
ultimately  to  wrest  them  from  the  grasp  of  the  mother- 
country  ;  and  he  announced  this  opinion  to  the  King  as 
early  as  the  year  1765, — a  remarkable  case  of  political 
foresight  in  a  distant  observer,  who  saw  in  a  small  cloud 
upon  the  horizon  a  forerunner  of  the  storm  that  was  to 
come.  It  was  all  the  more  remarkable  because  nobody  in 
England  dreamed  of  the  danger  at  that  time,  nor,  indeed, 
had  men's  minds  been  brought  to  consider  it  in  the  Colo 
nies  themselves,  where  a  separation  from  the  mother- 
country  was  still  contemplated  "  with  the  utmost  horror" 
almost  ten  years  after  the  Due  de  Choiseul  had  predicted 

1  Marshall,  Life  of  Washington,  ii.  397. 


64  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1774. 

the  Revolution  and  had  devised  a  plan  to  be  followed  by 
the  Government  of  France  at  the  moment  when  they 
should  declare  their  independence. 

It  was  in  this  connection  that,  as  we  have  seen,  M.  de 
Choiseul  sent  the  Baron  de  Kalb  to  America  in  1768. 
The  times,  however,  were  not  yet  ripe  for  action.  Kalb's 
mission  accomplished  nothing.  The  day  of  M.  de  Choi- 
seul's  power  at  Court  came  to  an  end,  and  his  plans  were 
laid  aside,  to  be  forgotten  for  the  moment,  though  they 
were  subsequently  to  be  recalled  to  mind.  The  agita 
tion  in  the  Colonies  had  not  as  yet  sufficiently  united  the 
American  people  in  one  common  interest  capable  of 
holding  them  together  in  solid  resistance,  on  the  one 
hand  ;  while,  on  the  other,  France  was  too  weak  to  go 
to  war  again  at  once,  and  England  was  too  strong  to  give 
any  one  reason  to  believe  that  she  could  be  successfully 
attacked. 

King  Louis  XV.  died  in  1774.  With  a  new  reign  came 
a  new  Cabinet  and  a  new  administration,  to  whom  were 
bequeathed  the  country  in  a  condition  of  despondency 
which,  it  was  afterward  said,  could  hardly  be  conceived, 
and  the  task  of  re-establishing  the  dignity  of  the  nation, 
of  strengthening  its  army,  of  building  up  its  navy,  and, 
whenever  it  was  possible,  of  damaging  England. 

The  new  King,  whose  misfortunes  and  sad  ending  must 
always  enlist  for  him  the  sympathy  of  mankind,  was 
young,  without  experience  in  governing,  and  timid  in  the 
management  of  affairs  of  state.  The  burden  of  the  realm 
rested  with  exceeding  heaviness  upon  his  shoulders  when 
he  was  suddenly  called,  by  the  death  of  his  grandfather, 
to  consider  subjects  and  to  decide  questions  which  he  did 
not  comprehend.  His  necessities  obliged  him  to  form  his 
decisions  largely  upon  the  opinions  of  other  men  whom  he 
called  about  him.  No  doubt  Louis  was  upright  and  con 
scientious  ;  he  inherited  an  absolute  authority  based  upon 
a  volcano  then  almost  ready  to  burst  out  and  destroy  it 


1774.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  65 

and  him,  but  he  loved  France  and  earnestly  longed  for  her 
glory,  he  desired  to  feel  a  fatherly  affection  for  his  people, 
whom  he  did  not  in  the  least  understand,  and  his  constant 
wish  was  to  do  what  was  just,  honorable,  and  right,  so  far 
as  his  lights  permitted  him  to  discern  it.  The  peculiar 
sadness  in  the  fate  of  Louis  XVI.  is  that  whilst,  as  a  man, 
he  was  one  of  the  best  of  the  French  kings,  circumstances 
made  him  the  representative  of,  and  forced  him  to  suffer 
for,  the  wrongs  and  abuses  of  all  his  predecessors.  He 
was  weak  at  a  time  when  it  is  exceedingly  doubtful  if  even 
the  strongest  of  men  could  have  withstood  the  fury  of  the 
storm  that  broke  over  him. 

King  Louis  XVI.  selected  his  Cabinet  in  July,  1774. 
He  placed  at  the  head  of  it  the  Comte  de  Maurepas,  a 
man  nearing  the  end  of  a  life  filled  with  reverses  and  dis 
appointments,  whose  strength  was  too  far  spent  for  the 
struggle  with  questions  of  public  business,  and  whose  repu 
tation  for  frivolity  has  made  it  difficult  to  decide  how  far 
he  directed  the  policy  of  the  Government  in  solving  the 
serious  problems  that  confronted  it  during  the  next  few 
years.  Nevertheless,  M.  de  Maurepas  had  rendered  good 
service  to  France  in  former  days,  especially  in  the  recon 
struction  of  the  navy ;  he  was  devoted  to  the  King,  he 
was  an  enemy  of  Great  Britain,  and  Louis  kept  him  near 
his  person,  so  that  he  might  advise  with  him  every  day 
before  taking  any  step.  The  famous  Turgot  was  made 
Controleur-General, — or  Minister  of  Finance, — M.  de 
Sartine  became  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  and  M.  de  Saint- 
Germain  Secretary  of  War.  But  the  man  who  shaped 
the  policy  of  France,  who  conceived  and  executed  her  diplo 
macy  in  the  varied  and  delicate  forms  of  her  relations 
with  the  Courts  of  Europe,  and  who  for  several  years 
in  one  sense  controlled  the  Government,  was  the  Secre 
tary  of  State,  or  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Charles 
Gravier,  Comte  de  Vergennes.  His  enormous  correspon 
dence,  still  preserved  in  the  French  Archives,  which  was 

VOL.  I.— 5 


66  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1774. 

prepared  by  his  own  hand,  scrupulously  corrected,  inter 
lined,  erased,  or  re-written, — letters  to  his  agents,  de 
spatches  to  the  Ambassadors,  propositions  submitted  to 
the  Cabinet,  memorials  to  the  King, — if  taken  together 
would  give  us  almost  by  itself  a  history  of  France  during 
the  early  years  of  Louis  XVI. 

The  Comte  de  Vergennes,  who  was  born  in  Burgundy, 
of  a  family  still  existing  there,  had  been  trained  to  the 
career  of  diplomacy  during  the  ministry  of  the  Due  de 
Choiseul  in  the  preceding  reign,  and,  having  been  fortunate 
enough  to  take  advantage  of  some  opportunities  which 
came  in  his  way,  had  distinguished  himself  abroad  and 
given  satisfaction  at  Court.  He  was  sent  as  Ambassador 
to  the  Turkish  Porte,  and  afterward  to  the  Court  of 
Sweden.  King  Louis  recalled  him  from  Stockholm  to 
confide  to  him  the  portfolio  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

The  talent  of  M.  de  Vergennes  was  that  of  an  extremely 
patient,  cautious,  and  painstaking  administrator,  rather 
than  of  a  leader  who  achieved  success  by  daring  and  en 
terprise  or  won  admiration  by  the  brilliancy  of  his  con 
ceptions.  But  he  had  one  idea  to  which  for  him  all  else 
in  the  world  was  to  be  subordinated,  and  that  was  the  glory 
of  France.  For  this  he  incessantly  thought  and  planned 
and  labored :  he  studied  the  chart  of  Europe  in  search  of 
alliances  to  help  her,  or  of  combinations  that  might  pro 
tect  her  from  injury ;  his  most  cherished  hope  was  that 
something  might  happen  to  weaken  her  enemies.  Upon 
entering  the  Cabinet,  M.  de  Vergennes  immediately  de 
fined  his  policy  in  a  memorial  to  the  King,  which,  reduced 
to  its  simplest  expression,  was,  to  strengthen  France  by  a 
close  alliance  with  Spain,  and  to  keep  a  watchful  eye  upon 
the  movements  of  England.  By  this  means  he  hoped  to 
make  France  respected  in  Europe.  To  be  respected,  he 
conceived,  is  to  supplement  the  strength  one  already  has 
by  adding  to  it  the  moral  influence  of  public  opinion, 
which  in  itself  is  strength. 


1774.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  67 

"  The  consideration  and  the  influence,"  he  declared,  "of  every 
Power  are  based  upon,  and  measured  by,  the  general  opinion  as  to 
its  intrinsic  force.  It  is,  therefore,  to  establish  this  opinion  and  to 
gain  the  greatest  advantage  from  it  that  all  our  foresight  should  be 
exerted.  Every  nation  is  respected  which  is  prepared  to  make  a 
vigorous  resistance.  .  .  .  Peace  has  lasted  now  for  twelve  years, 
which  is  a  great  prejudice  to  its  continued  stability.  Therefore 
we  shall  not  exceed  the  limit  of  reasonable  foresight  if  we  hold 
ourselves  in  readiness  for  whatever  may  come.  Besides,  the  best 
way  to  assure  the  duration  of  peace  is  not  to  fear  the  advent  of 
war.  .  .  .  We  have  close  by  us  a  restless  and  grasping  people, 
more  jealous  of  the  prosperity  of  their  neighbors  than  of  their 
own  welfare,  powerfully  armed,  and  ready  to  strike  at  a  moment's 
warning.  Let  us  not  deceive  ourselves,  for,  whatever  parade  the 
English  ministers  may  make  of  their  pacific  intentions,  we  cannot 
safely  rely  upon  them  except  so  long  as  their  domestic  troubles 
continue.  These  may  come  to  an  end,  or  they  may  increase  to  such 
an  extent  as  to  drive  the  Government  to  quiet  the  discontent  at 
home  by  directing  attention  to  new  enterprises  abroad.  Indeed, 
the  example  is  not  lacking  of  a  case  in  which  the  cry  of  war  against 
France  has  united  parties  in  Eugland^JLet  us  suppose  that  we 
should  find  ourselves  involved  in  a  naval  war,  even  contrary  to  the 
wishes  of  the  Court  of  London  as  well  as  to  our  own  ;  we  have  a 
treaty  with  Spain  which  makes  common  cause  with  her  in  all  our 
wars,  offensive  or  defensive.  .  .  .  The  engagement  is  a  burdensome 
one,  no  doubt ;  but,  in  spite  of  that,  it  is  probably  more  advan 
tageous  to  France  than  to  Spain.  The  commerce  which  England 
maintains  with  Spain,  in  whose  markets  she  finds  an  outlet  for  her 
manufactures  and  the  source  of  great  national  wealth,  makes  her 
less  anxious  to  seize  upon  territory  which,  after  all,  Spain  merely 
cultivates  for  others ;  but,  as  she  has,  on  the  other  hand,  nothing 
to  expect  from  France  through  legitimate  trade,  she  looks  with  a 
jealous  eye  both  upon  the  wonderful  development  of  our  planta 
tions  in  America  and  upon  our  industrial  prosperity  in  Europe. 
If  there  be  anything  that  will  impress  her  and  keep  her  in  check, 
it  is  the  spectacle  of  France  and  Spain  united,  and  the  certainty 
that  the  first  cannon  fired  by  her  against  either  will  be  replied  to 
immediately  by  both."  * 

Here  is  the  motive  in  French  politics  at  the  beginning 
of  the  reign  of  Louis  XVI., — to  wit,  the  belief  that  the 

1  Archives  of  France,  Me"moires  et  Documents,  t.  584,  No.  9  :  Doniol,  La 
Participation  de  la  France,  i.  li),  20. 


68  THE   HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1774. 

ascendency  of  England  was  a  menace  to  France.  Here  is 
]  also  the  starting-point  of  the  intervention  of  France  in 
the  American  Revolution.  If  civil  war  was  about  to  dis 
tract  the  British  Government,  and  if  England's  strength 
was  to  be  exhausted  by  internal  difficulties  which  would 
disturb  her  at  home  and  render  het  less  formidable  abroad, 
the  opportunity  of  aiming  a  blow  at  her  from  the  effects 
of  which  she  could  not  recover  her  former  advantage,  and 
which  would  force  her  to  deal  with  France  at  least  upon 
equal  terms,  was  likely  to  present  itself;  and  the  purpose 
of  striking  this  blow  was  never  lost  sight  of  by  the  Comte 
de  Vergennes. 

It  is  true  that  events  in  the  Colonies  had  hardly  devel 
oped  sufficiently  in  1774  to  foreshadow  the  definite  result, 
even  to  the  mind  of  the  Secretary  of  State,  who  did  not 
grasp  the  situation  at  once  with  the  quick  discernment  of 
the  Due  de  Choiseul,  and,  although  the  conclusion  was  not 
reached  until  after  a  most  complicated  series  of  intrigues 
and  a  long  course  of  dissimulation  under  which  prepara 
tions  for  war  were  masked  by  a  pretended  desire  for  peace, 
yet  its  logical  premises  were  stated  by  M.  de  Vergennes 
when  he  declared,  in  his  memoir  to  the  King,  that  a 
nation  which  could  free  itself  from  the  arrogance  of  a 
successful  rival,  that  is  to  say,  revenge  itself  for  former 
defeat,  was  bound  to  do  so.  This,  of  course,  meant  war ; 
but  the  Comte  de  Vergennes  never  concealed  the  fact  that, 
in  his  plan  of  government,  the  possibility  of  war  must 
always  be  kept  in  view  by  France. 

The  first  news  of  the  outbreak  in  North  America  was 
not  received  by  the  Cabinet  of  Louis  XVI.  with  the  feel 
ing  that  it  was  of  very  grave  consequence  ;  it  came  through 
English  channels,  and  when  it  was  reported  by  the  French 
diplomatic  representatives  in  London  it  bore  the  coloring 
of  English  opinion,  so  that  M.  de  Vergennes  had  the  im 
pression  that  the  revolt  would  soon  be  suppressed,  and  for 
the  moment  gave  it  no  serious  thought.  Possibly  he  was 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  69 

influenced  by  a  despatch  from  M.  de  Guines,  the  French 
Ambassador  in  England,  who  wrote  that  Lord  Rochford 
had  told  him  the  trouble  arose  from  a  lot  of  descendants 
of  Cromwell  who  had  settled  in  America  and  had  begun  a 
rebellion,  which  would,  of  course,  very  soon  be  put  down.1 
He  felt  also  that,  at  all  events,  England  was  not  likely  to 
carry  the  hostilities  with  her  subjects  to  the  extreme  limit, 
and  that  she  would  sacrifice  her  prestige,  in  case  her 
measures  were  not  successful,  and  seek  peace  with  them, 
rather  than  run  the  risk  of  losing  the  Colonies  and  of 
shaking  the  empire  to  its  foundations.2 

But  early  in  the  year  1775  the  shipments  of  troops  to 
the  Colonies,  and  the  extensive  preparations  for  carrying 
on  the  war,  attracted  his  attention  to  the  seriousness  of 
the  conflict,  and  he  immediately  directed  the  Embassy  in 
London  to  follow  events  as  closely  as  possible  and  to  report 
every  step  to  him.  He  was  suspicious  at  that  time  that  the 
massing  of  British  forces  upon  the  North  American  con 
tinent  might  conceal  some  ulterior  purpose  which  should 
threaten  danger  to  the  interests  of  France  or  her  colonies 
in  the  West  Indies,  and  he  determined  not  to  allow  him 
self  to  be  taken  by  surprise.  From  this  time,  M.  de  Ver- 
gennes  followed  the  course  of  the  American  struggle  with 
uninterrupted  watchfulness,  until  it  absorbed  his  attention! 
and  led  him,  three  years  later,  to  an  open  declaration  of ; 
war. 

His  first  step  now,  however,  was  toward  the  "  Family 
Compact,"  the  famous  offensive  and  defensive  alli&nce  be 
tween  the  houses  of  Bourbon  in  France  and  in  Spain, 
concluded  in  the  preceding  reign,  which  at  this  moment 
became  the  bulwark  to  which  France  might  fly  for  safety 
and  under  the  protection  of  which  she  might  recover  her 
strength  and  re-establish  her  integrity.  If  the  Spanish 
ships  could  be  united  to  those  of  France,  they  would 

1  Anj^leterre,  t.  510,  No.  112  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  39. 

2  AnglotLM-re,  t.  508,  No.  88  :  Doniol,  i.  42. 


70  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

make  an  array  formidable  enough  to  oppose  the  great 
naval  forces  across  the  British  Channel ;  and  to  attain 
this  unity  of  strength  was  especially  important,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Cabinet,  because  close  observers  of  political 
events  at  that  time  agreed  that  the  next  war  would  be  at 
sea.  With  France  and  Spain  united  and  ready  to  oper 
ate  together  for  their  common  interest,  as  described  by 
M.  de  Vergennes,  when  the  guns  of  both  should  answer 
immediately  a  shot  fired  at  either,  the  uprising  in  the 
American  Colonies  might  be  made  use  of.  He  dreamed 
of  a  war  upon  England  in  which  the  two  Bourbon  mon 
archies  should  join ;  and,  by  starting  with  the  trouble  be 
tween  the  Colonies  and  the  mother-country,  which  should 
be  fomented  in  every  possible  manner,  much  injury  might 
be  inflicted  upon  the  common  enemy  before  it  should 
become  necessary  to  declare  open  hostilities. 

To  accomplish  this  result,  he  set  before  himself  the  task 
of  bringing  to  his  view  the  King  and  Cabinet  of  Spain, 
of  inducing  Carlos  III.  to  look  with  increased  solicitude 
upon  the  dangers  which  beset  his  nephew  of  France,  and 
of  persuading  the  Spanish  Government  that  its  position 
in  Europe  and  its  colonies  in  the  West  Indies  made  its  in 
terests  identical  with  those  of  France,  especially  in  view 
of  the  ever-suspected  movements  and  intentions  of  Great 
Britain.  The  voluminous  correspondence  of  the  Secretary 
with  his  Ambassador  at  Madrid  and  with  other  persons  at 
the  Spanish  Court,  as  well  as  with  the  Embassy  at  London, 
shows  how  conscientiously  he  devoted  himself  to  the  ful 
filment  of  his  duty. 

The  Marquis  d'Ossun,  French  Ambassador  at  Madrid, 
was  directed  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Spanish  Court  to 
the  large  number  of  troops  then  being  sent  from  England 
to  America,  and  to  insist  that  although  this  was  ostensibly, 
and  perhaps  really,  for  the  subjection  of  the  Colonists, 
yet  their  presence  on  that  side  of  the  Atlantic  Ocean  was 
a  source  of  great  danger  to  the  West  Indies,  because  a 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  71 

change  might  take  place  in  the  policy  of  England  and  it 
was  impossible  to  tell  what  conquests  she  might  undertake 
next.  Her  invariable  system  theretofore,  said  M.  de  Ver- 
gennes,  had  been  based  upon  her  hatred  of  Spain  and 
France  and  upon  a  jealousy  which  impelled  her  to  injure 
them  whenever  she  could.  Although  at  that  moment  her 
expressions  were  pacific,  it  was  only  because  of  the  internal 
dissensions  which  occupied  her,  and  because  she  feared  that 
the  two  monarchies  would  unite,  and,  taking  advantage 
of  so  good  an  opportunity,  do  her  all  the  damage  which, 
if  she  were  able,  she  would  do  them.1  No  reliance  could 
be  placed  upon  any  protestation  from  England  as  to  the  pur 
pose  for  which  these  troops  were  to  be  employed,  nor  upon 
any  promise  to  withdraw  them  as  soon  as  they  should 
have  accomplished  what  they  were  sent  there  for  ;  because 
that  would  only  furnish  a  pretext,  under  the  pretence 
of  keeping  them  there  to  re-establish  order,  of  holding 
them  until  it  should  become  convenient  to  send  them  in 
another  direction,  that  is  to  say,  against  the  West  Indies. 
This  reasoning  won  the  approval  of  the  Spanish  Gov 
ernment.  It  convinced  the  King  and  his  Prime  Minister, 
the  Marques  de  Grimaldi,  as  well  as  the  Spanish  Ambas 
sador  at  Paris,  the  Conde  de  Aranda,  all  of  whom  were 
now  impressed  with  the  impending  danger  ;  and  it  gave  to 
M.  de  Vergennes  a  very  considerable  influence,  as  well  as 
an  immense  advantage,  in  the  purpose  he  had  of  uniting 
the  forces  of  the  two  countries.  It  accomplished  what  he 
was  most  anxious  for  the  moment  to  do,  in  convincing  the 
Spanish  Court  that  the  two  Governments  were  in  danger 
of  being  attacked  and  might  possibly  be  called  upon  to 
defend  themselves.  Strange  as  the  idea  appears  in  the 
light  of  subsequent  events,  there  is  every  reason  to  be 
lieve  that  M.  de  Vergennes  was  sincere  in  his  statement 
that  he  feared  an  attack  from  England  upon  the  French 


ne,  t.  570,  No.  20  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  51. 


72  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

}  and  Spanish  colonies  in  the  event  of  her  having  forces  in 
North  America  which  she  could  dispose  of  for  that  pur 
pose  ;  he  repeated  it  frequently,  and,  although  he  was  not 
sorry  to  use  it  as  a  means  to  his  end  in  giving  a  certain 
dramatic  effect  to  the  union  with  Spain,  yet  it  appears 
with  such  emphasis  in  his  correspondence  in  other  direc 
tions  as  to  have  the  stamp  of  genuine  feeling.  It  is  im 
portant  also  because  it  undoubtedly  influenced  him  in  his 
connection  with  the  United  States. 

The  English  Government  assisted  him  unconsciously  at 
that  juncture  by  its  conduct  toward  Spain.  King  Carlos 
III.  already  suspected  that  England  had  opposed  him  by 
comforting  his  enemy  in  a  recent  war  he  had  had  with 
Morocco ;  and  he  was  engaged  in  a  contest  with  Portugal 
then,  which  bordered  upon  war,  about  the  boundary-lines 
of  Paraguay  and  Buenos  Ayres,  in  which  the  boldness  of 
the  Portuguese  minister,  M.  de  Pombal,  was  so  extraordi 
nary  and  so  persistent  that  the  King  and  his  Cabinet  were 
convinced  that  his  attitude  could  have  resulted  only  from 
British  encouragement  and  the  assurance  of  British  aid. 
It  happened  in  addition  that  the  King  of  Spain  was  con- 

/  templating  an  attack  upon  the  pirates  of  Algiers,  who 
were  preying  upon  his  commerce  and  spreading  terror 
throughout  the  Mediterranean  ;  an  expedition  with  which 
he  hoped  to  distinguish  his  reign  and  to  strengthen  his 
influence  in  an  appeal  to  the  national  pride  of  his  sub 
jects  by  performing  a  service  which  would  be  received 
with  gratitude  by  the  world.  The  preparations  for  this 
campaign  were  carried  on  with  the  greatest  secrecy,  but 
the  watchful  agents  of  the  British  ministry  detected  un 
usual  activity  in  the  Spanish  ports  and  arsenals,  which 
they  reported  immediately ;  whereupon  England  made  a 
formal  demand  upon  the  Spanish  Court  to  explain  the 
purpose  of  these  extraordinary  measures.  Not  satisfied 

1  with  the  replies  that  were  made,  and  without  having  given 
the  Spaniards  notice,  the  British  Government  sent  a  fleet 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  73 

of  four  ships  of  the  line  and  two  frigates  to  the  Bay  of 
Biscay  to  watch  the  movements  of  Spanish  ships.  This 
proceeding  was  viewed  by  the  King  with  great  indignation. 
It  was  construed  to  mean  that  Great  Britain  was  acting  in 
concert  with  Portugal,  and  that  this  fleet  was  ready  to 
defend  Lisbon  against  possible  attack,  or  was  about  to 
take  part  in  an  enterprise  with  the  Portuguese  against  the 
Spanish  possessions  in  South  America.  It  confirmed  the 
belief  of  Carlos  III.  that  M.  de  Vergennes  was  right  in 
his  estimate  of  England,  and  it  visibly  increased  the  in 
fluence  which  that  minister  had  at  the  Spanish  Court, 

Thus,  by  the  middle  of  the  year  1775  the  Comte  de 
Vergennes  had  progressed  so  far  that  he  felt  he  could  rely 
upon  the  support  of  Spain  in  any  eventualities  that  were 
likely  to  occur.  The  tone  of  his  correspondence  with  his 
Ambassadors  shows  this,  especially  that  of  his  letters  to 
the  Comte  de  Guines  at  the  Court  of  St.  James.  From 
this  time  forward  the  affairs  of  the  American  Colonies 
assumed  greater  importance  in  all  his  calculations,  and  he 
began  to  consider  them  with  unremitting  watchfulness,— 
his  attitude  toward  England  being  always  carefully  sus 
tained  to  express  friendship  and  to  inspire  confidence  in 
the  good  intentions  of  France.  He  wrote  in  one  of  his  de 
spatches  to  the  Secretary  of  Legation  in  London,  "  Upon 
the  departure  of  Lord  Stormont  this  evening  for  England, 
whither  he  is  going  on  leave,  I  recalled  to  him  in  the 
most  positive  manner  the  sincere  and  constant  intention 
of  the  King  to  maintain  peace,  friendship,  and  neighborly 
relations  with  His  British  Majesty,  and  to  contribute  in 
every  way  to  perpetuate  the  good  understanding  which 
now  exists  between  the  two  countries.  I  assured  the 
Ambassador  that  we  have  no  possible  desire  to  profit  by 
their  present  embarrassment  to  give  them  additional  cause 
of  uneasiness."  1 

1  Angleterre,  t.  509,  No.  38  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  71. 


74  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

Whether  Lord  Stormont  was  impressed  by  this  assurance 
or  not,  we  do  not  know,  but  it  is  unlikely  that  he  allowed 
it  greatly  to  influence  his  feelings  ;  for  throughout  his  very 
active  subsequent  career  at  the  Court  of  Louis  XVI.,  in 
which  protestations  of  friendship  were  used  almost  daily 
to  cover  up  the  boldest  intrigues,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
he  served  his  country  well  and  never  for  an  instant  be 
lieved  anything  that  was  told  him  by  an  agent  of  the 
French  Government. 

So  far  as  it  was  possible  for  the  French  Cabinet  to  bear 
good  will  toward  any  English  ministry,  the  Government 
of  Louis  XVI.  hoped  for  the  continuance  in  office  of  Lord 
North ;  for  they  believed  that  during  his  administration 
the  political  troubles  at  home  and  the  revolt  in  the  Colonies 
would  keep  England  from  any  exterior  enterprise.  They 
were  in  momentary  fear  that  the  Opposition  would  come 
into  power  under  Lord  Chatham,  who  would  immediately 
make  peace  with  the  Colonies  and  then  turn,  with  un 
governable  hatred,  upon  France ;  in  which  event,  as  the 
charge-d' affaires  in  London  wrote,  the  troops  in  North 
America  would  be  "  like  a  naked  sword  in  the  hands  of  a 
madman.'7  Up  to  this  time  it  was  half  believed  in  France 
that  the  Opposition  party  in  Parliament  had  stirred  up 
the  discontent  in  America  merely  as  a  pretext  to  overthrow 
the  ministry  ;  having  succeeded  in  which,  they  would  im 
mediately  make  peace.  But  in  the  month  of  July,  1775, 
M.  de  Vergennes  changed  his  mind  as  to  that.  He  wrote 
to  M.  de  Guines,  "  Unless  I  am  mistaken  about  the  situa 
tion  of  affairs  in  America,  the  English  may  now  increase 
their  forces  as  much  as  they  choose,  they  will  never  again 
be  able  by  arms  to  reduce  that  great  continent  to  subjec 
tion  ;  and  I  doubt  if  they  will  succeed  better  by  negotia 
tions,  even  if  these  are  conducted  by  agents  most  accept 
able  to  the  Americans.  Those  people  Tiave  been  forced 
into  a  position  from  which  they  will  not  voluntarily  retire ; 
they  have  discovered  their  power,  and  they  see  how  help- 


1775.]  TOWARD   GREAT    BRITAIN.  75 

less  the  mother-country  is  to  control  them ;  the  bond  of 
their  union  has  been  formed.  The  Americans  may  here 
after  be  the  allies  of  England ;  but  I  doubt  very  much 
whether  they  will  ever  acknowledge  themselves  her  sub 
jects."  l  Yet  he  was  unable  to  free  his  mind  entirely  from 
the  constant  fear  that  beset  him  lest  some  act  on  the  part 
of  England  should  bode  ill  to  his  country,  remembering 
always  "  with  horror,"  as  he  said,  the  sudden  attack  which 
crippled  France  in  1755  ;  and  he  besought  the  Ambas 
sador  in  England  to  penetrate  the  secrets  of  the  Court,  to 
get  private  information  from  the  Opposition  in  Parliament, 
to  display  all  possible  zeal  in  every  direction,  in  order  to 
guard  against  "  another  similar  act  of  perfidy."  "  For, 
while  I  am  far  from  suspecting  the  English  ministry  of 
evil  intentions,"  said  he,  "  and  while  this  would  be  a  most 
unfavorable  moment  to  disturb  a  peace  which  is  necessary 
to  them,  yet  our  past  experience  should  make  us  wary, 
for  we  do  not  want  to  be  duped  a  second  time." 

Thus,  about  a  year  before  our  Declaration  of  Indepen 
dence,  the  Cabinet  of  France  began  seriously  to  consider 
the  likelihood  that  the  uprising  of  the  American  Colo 
nies  would  be  the  occasion  of  a  war  between  the  two 
Crowns  and  Great  Britain  ;  and  thenceforth  it  carried  on 
continuously  the  measures  which  were  declared  both  at 
Madrid  and  at  Versailles  to  be  "  for  the  preservation  of 
peace,"  yet  were,  none  the  less  for  this  mask  behind  which 
they  might  be  rendered  less  suspicious,  actually  prepa 
rations  for  an  attack  upon  England.  In  order  to  have  a 
fixed  understanding  with  the  Spanish  Court  upon  this 
point,  M.  de  Vergennes  sought  an  early  opportunity  to 
bring  the  subject  directly  before  King  Carlos  III.  himself, 
and  to  obtain  an  expression  from  him  as  to  his  own  feeling 
and  the  policy  which  Spain  might  be  relied  upon  to  adopt. 
The  occasion  offered  itself  when  Louis  XVI.  wrote  a 

1  An^leterre,  t.  511,  No.  21  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  89. 
'2  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  91. 


76  THE    HOSTILE    SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

formal  letter  to  his  uncle,  011  the  7th  of  August,  1775,  to 
announce  the  recent  birth  to  the  Comte  d'Artois  of  a  son, 
in  which,  by  a  clever  arrangement  upon  the  part  of  the 
Secretary  of  State,  was  introduced  a  reference  to  the  matter 
uppermost  in  the  latter's  mind.  King  Louis  was  made  to 
say,  "  I  take  advantage  of  this  occasion  to  present  to  Your 
Majesty  some  reflections  upon  the  present  state  of  affairs. 
I  know  the  aversion  which  Your  Majesty  has  to  war,  and 
I  agree  sincerely  with  you  in  this  sentiment.  Possibly 
there  never  was  a  time  when  a  war  with  England  seemed 
less  probable.  There  is  not  the  least  cause  of  dispute 
between  us ;  yet  the  unfortunate  policy  of  that  nation 
makes  it  impossible  for  us  to  count  upon  anything  in  re 
gard  to  it.  England  is  very  much  engaged  with  her 
Colonies  in  America,  and  although  I  greatly  doubt  if 
these  will  ever  again  submit  to  the  mother-country,  yet 
some  turn  of  politics  might  be  used  to  persuade  the  Eng 
lish  people  that  the  remedy  for  its  present  ills  lies  in  a 
war  with  us.  I  think,  therefore,  that  we  ought  to  direct 
our  attention  to  the  preparations  which  may  be  necessary, 
and  to  unite  in  taking  such  precautions  as  may  be  most 
effective  in  preventing  war.  .  .  .  Our  enemies  will  respect 
our  power  more,  the  more  they  see  us  united  and  ready  to 
act  in  concert.  Nevertheless,  I  believe  that  we  ought  not 
now  to  neglect  our  precautions.  I  have  therefore  given 
orders  to  M.  de  Vergennes  to  discuss  with  the  Marques  de 
Grimaldi  what  it  will  be  best  for  us  to  do.  I  trust  Your 
Majesty  will  approve  of  my  reflections." 

The  Spanish  expedition  against  Algiers  had  failed,  and 
Admiral  O'Reilly,  after  having  concentrated  his  attack 
upon  the  Algerine  fortress,  much  more  easily  defended 
than  taken,  had  returned  without  having  accomplished  the 
purpose  of  the  King,  with  a  diminution  of  prestige  most 
unacceptable  at  that  moment  to  the  French  Court,  who 

1  Archives  Nationales,  annee  1775,  No.  21 :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la 
France,  i.  131. 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  77 

were  indirectly  concerned,  and  to  the  disappointment  and 
chagrin  of  the  Spanish  Government.  Nevertheless,  M.  de 
Vergennes  faced  this  temporary  reverse  with  all  the  hope 
fulness  of  spirit  that  he  possessed ;  and,  while  he  openly 
expressed  his  regret  at  what  had  happened,  he  consoled 
himself  with  the  reflection  that,  after  all,  no  great  harm 
had  been  done ;  the  fleet  had  come  back  uninjured,  and, 
although  Spain  had  not  met  with  the  success  that  all  her 
friends  wished  for,  the  expedition  had  been  a  formidable 
one,  had  demonstrated  the  naval  strength  of  the  kingdom, 
and  by  this  armament  had  shown  the  King's  enemies 
what  he  wras  able  to  contribute  to  a  war  at  sea.  In  this 
tone  he  continued  his  friendly  relations  with  the  Court  at 
Madrid,  where  it  was  acceptable,  of  course,  not  only  to  the 
Cabinet  but  to  the  King. 

A  few  weeks  later,  he  was  rewarded  by  a  reply  from 
Carlos  III.  to  the  letter  of  his  nephew  upon  the  birth  of  a 
Bourbon  prince,  in  which,  after  expressing  the  joy  he  felt 
at  so  happy  an  event,  the  King  turned  directly  to  the  sub 
ject  of  concerted  action  by  the  two  Crowns.  "  Nothing 
could  be  wiser  than  the  reflections  of  Your  Majesty  upon 
our  attitude  toward  a  certain  ambitious  Power,  which  has 
no  other  views  upon  the  subject  of  peace  and  war  than 
those  presented  by  the  attainment  of  its  own  purposes 
or  its  own  private  interests.  Since  we  do  not  wish  to 
pursue  a  course  so  reprehensible  and  so  unjust,  which 
accords  neither  with  the  maxims  of  Your  Majesty  nor 
with  mine,  the  only  road  open  to  us  to  protect  ourselves 
and  to  defend  our  subjects,  toward  which  we  are  directed 
both  by  religion  and  honor,  is  to  act  together  in  order  that 
we  may  be  in  a  position  to  repel  force  by  force.  For  I 
am  convinced  that  if  the  English  were  to  see  that  we  are 
prepared  at  every  point  they  would  let  us  alone,  and  we 
should  still  enjoy  that  peace  which  we  are  anxious  to  pre 
serve  ;  but  the  chief  point  is,  to  place  ourselves  in  a  posi 
tion  to  impress  this  upon  our  enemies.  ...  As  the  ques- 


78  THE    HOSTILE    SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

tion  of  greatest  importance  for  us  in  relation  to  England 
is  that  of  the  navy,  I  think  we  should  give  the  greatest 
attention  at  present  to  that,  for  we  shall  need  time  to 
renew  it  and  to  increase  it.  Upon  this  subject,  and  upon 
such  other  measures  as  it  may  be  necessary  to  take,  we 
shall  consult  through  the  channel  of  our  ministers  and 
ambassadors,  and  Your  Majesty  may  rely  upon  my  punc 
tuality  in  carrying  out  all  my  engagements/7 1 

The  plans  of  M.  de  Vergennes  had  succeeded  thus  far 
quite  to  the  limit  of  his  hopes.  He  had  drawn  the  bonds 
of  the  alliance  more  closely  together,  by  taking  advantage 
of  recent  events  he  had  strengthened  France  with  the 
assurance  of  support  from  Spain,  and  he  had  interested 
Spain  in  the  plans  he  had  in  view  by  making  clever  rep 
resentations  of  the  danger  which  threatened  the  two 
Crowns  and  the  identity  of  the  interests  of  both  in  view 
of  the  attitude  of  Great  Britain.  He  never  allowed  this 
idea  to  be  lost  sight  of  in  his  communications  with  Madrid, 
and  he  grew  bolder  with  the  increased  feeling  of  security 
that  he  felt  from  his  present  situation,  in  his  suggestions 
as  to  united  action  against  England,  seeking  the  oppor 
tunity  to  introduce  a  proposition  that  the  war  in  America 
might  offer  a  basis  for  the  combined  operations  of  France 
and  Spain.  In  a  despatch  on  the  28th  of  July,  1775,  to 
his  Ambassador  at  Madrid,  the  Marquis  d'Ossun,  whom 
he  requested  to  regard  as  confidential  all  the  communica 
tions  he  was  about  to  make,  though  he  knew  from  the 
character  of  the  latter  and  from  his  extremely  intimate 
relations  at  the  Spanish  Court  that  what  he  was  about  to 
say  would  reach  the  ears  of  those  for  whom  it  was  intended, 
he  took  occasion  to  declare,  "The  English  have  incon 
siderately  embarked  in  a  war  with  their  Colonists  in 
America  which  up  to  this  time  has  cost  them  very  dear, 
and  is  likely  in  its  results  to  cost  them  a  part  of  their 

1  Archives  Nationales,  K  164,  No.  3,  anne"e  1775,  No.  23  :  Doniol,  La  Par 
ticipation  de  la  France,  i.  140. 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  79 

commercial  existence.  Their  weakness  which  will  follow 
as  a  necessary  consequence  will  afford  an  opportunity  to 
the  two  Crowns,  and  possibly  without  even  striking  a 
blow,  to  regain  that  superiority  of  consideration  and  in 
fluence  which  is  always  the  reward  of  a  wise  and  well- 
directed  administration."  l 

This  was  the  thin  end  of  the  wedge.  Almost  at  the 
same  moment  he  took  pains  to  have  sent  to  the  Spanish 
King  a  copy  of  a  letter  written  from  London  by  M.  de 
Guinea,  who  reported  that  he  had  had  a  long  and  intimate 
conversation,  the  day  before  he  wrote,  with  Lord  Rocli- 
ford,  and  that  the  latter  gentleman  had  told  him  that 
there  was  a  growing  sentiment  among  the  followers  of 
both  political  parties  in  England  that  the  only  way  to 
stop  the  war  in  America  was  to  declare  war  upon  France ; 
that  those  who  favored  this  idea  were  not  alarmed  by  the 
alliance  with  Spain,  because  they  remembered  that  Eng 
land  had  fought  both  France  and  Spain  at  the  end  of  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  and  they  asserted  that  she  could  do  it 
again,  especially  after  the  reverses  the  Spaniards  had  met 
with  in  the  expedition  to  Algiers,  which  had  had  a  very 
damaging  effect  upon  their  influence  at  the  English  Court ; 
also  that  the  idea  of  a  disastrous  war  waged  upon  Eng 
land  which  should  result  in  re-establishing  the  French 
in  Canada  with  their  distasteful  government  and  religion 
would  be  the  strongest  possible  incentive  to  the  Ameri 
cans,  who,  if  they  were  called  upon  thus  to  choose  between 
England  and  France,  would  certainly  cling  to  the  mother- 
country,  even  at  the  sacrifice  of  their  independence,  be 
cause  under  any  circumstances  they  would  rather  have 
the  English  than  the  French. 

This  last  assertion  touched  M.  de  Vergennes  upon  a 
tender  spot ;  it  wounded  his  national  pride,  whilst  it  in 
creased  his  bitterness  toward  England  and  filled  him  with 


1  Espagnc,  t.  576,  No.  173  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  115. 


80  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

alarm  for  the  success  of  his  favorite  plan.  It  had  the 
immediate  effect  of  drawing  him  nearer  to  the  position  of 
the  American  Colonies.  Taking  advantage  of  the  feelings 
which  he  knew  would  be  aroused  in  Spain  by  this  half- 
concealed  threat  of  Lord  Eochford,  he  went  a  step  further 
than  he  had  gone  as  yet,  and  suggested  to  the  Spanish 
Court  a  possible  support  of  the  American  Colonies  and  a 
friendly  understanding  with  them  in  their  struggle.  This 
was  the  first  direct  intimation  in  his  diplomatic  corre 
spondence  of  his  purpose  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  the 
American  people ;  it  appears  in  his  despatch  of  the  7th 
of  August,  1775,  to  the  Marquis  d'Ossun,  who  was  in 
structed  to  consult  with  the  Spanish  ministry  upon  the 
subject  and  to  take  measures  to  bring  it  to  the  notice  of 
the  King : 

"We  believe  here  that  upon  the  first  open  act  of  hostility  com 
mitted  by  England  we  should  no  longer  feel  called  upon  to  use 
moderation,  but  that  we  should  instantly  seize  upon  all  English 
ships  within  our  power  both  in  our  ports  and  upon  the  high  seas. 
This  would  deprive  England  of  a  certain  number  of  sailors,  which 
of  all  losses  is  the  most  damaging  to  her.  We  believe,  however, 
that  it  would  be  well  in  this  connection  to  except  all  such  vessels 
as  may  be  the  property  of,  or  be  chartered  by,  the  inhabitants  of 
North  America  ;  for  it  would  not  be  a  good  policy  to  throw  upon 
these  people  the  burden  of  a  war  of  which,  after  all,  they  would 
be  merely  the  innocent  cause,  or,  by  inflicting  upon  them  unneces 
sary  hardships,  to  drive  them  back  and  make  them  willing  to  bear 
again  a  yoke  which  they  are  now  endeavoring  to  throw  off.  It 
might  even  be  proper  for  us  to  issue  a  joint  declaration  which 
should  be  addressed  to  them  as  a  free  and  independent  people, 
inviting  them  to  make  use  of  our  respective  ports  and  assuring  to 
them  therein  the  freedom  and  the  privileges  of  commerce."  1 

Having  gone  thus  far  concerning  affairs  in  America,  M. 
de  Vergennes  began  to  feel  that  he  lacked  reliable  infor 
mation  as  to  what  was  taking  place  in  the  Colonies,  and 

1  Espagne,  t.  577,  'No.  15  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  126. 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  81 

that,  in  fact,  he  knew  little  or  nothing  about  the  Ameri 
cans  themselves,  what  manner  of  people  they  were,  or 
what  they  were  capable  of.  His  sources  of  knowledge 
were  almost  entirely  in  England,  and  he  began  to  discern 
that  what  came  from  there  was  not  correct ;  for  it  now  be 
came  evident  that  both  the  Government  and  the  people  of 
Great  Britain  had  been  mistaken  as  to  the  gravity  of  the 
contest  and  the  facility  with  which  it  could  be  decided. 
Men  began  to  feel  that  neither  Lord  Chatham  nor  any  one 
else  could  bring  the  Colonies  back  to  their  position  of  de 
pendence.  He  decided  to  send  an  agent  to  America  able 
to  form  an  estimate  of  the  country  and  its  resources,  of 
the  people,  of  their  character  and  their  military  strength; 
who  should  take  every  opportunity  of  a  vessel  returning 
to  France  to  make  a  detailed  report  of  what  he  saw,  in 
order  that  the  ministry  might  judge  of  the  situation  as 
affairs  developed,  and  directly  from  sources  of  their  own. 

A  person  of  this  description  was  found  in  London  by 
the  Ambassador,  M.  de  Guines,  who  described  him  as  "  a 
French  gentleman,  who  had  been  attached  to  the  regiment 
'  du  Cap,'  had  been  in  all  the  English  Colonies,  and,  in 
fact,  had  just  returned  from  there;  he  was  very  willing  to 
go  out  again,  and,  besides  the  interest  he  expressed  in  un 
dertaking  a  mission  of  this  character,  he  had  acquaint 
ances  in  Boston,  New  York,  Providence,  and  Philadelphia, 
through  whom  doubtless  he  would  be  enabled  to  obtain 
such  information  as  was  required."  His  name  was  Achard 
Bonvouloir  ;  he  was  first-cousin  to  the  Marquis  de  Lam 
bert.  The  Ambassador  undertook  to  arrange  with  him 
for  his  adventure  in  such  a  way  that  under  any  circum 
stances  M.  Bonvouloir  should  not  be  able  to  compromise 
any  one  but  himself;  he  should  have  nothing  to  show  by 
which,  in  case  of  his  capture  or  detection,  the  French 
Government  could  be  brought  into  connection  with  his 
undertaking ;  and  this  had  been  agreed  to  by  Bonvouloir 
at  the  outset.  The  price  of  his  services  was :  1st,  That 

VOL.  I.— G 


82  THE   HOSTILE    SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

he  should  receive  a  lieutenant's  commission  in  the  King's 
army,  in  order  that  he  might  be  entitled  to  proper  con 
sideration  in  America,  and,  if  it  became  necessary  in  the 
course  of  his  investigations,  that  he  might  the  more  readily 
enlist  in  the  army  of  the  "  rebels."  This  commission  was 
to  be  antedated,  because  when  he  had  been  in  America 
formerly  he  had  given  himself  out  as  a  French  officer, 
which  was  not  exactly  true,  although  he  had  been  attached 
as  a  volunteer  to  the  regiment  "  du  Cap,"  then  stationed 
in  the  West  Indies.  2d,  Two  hundred  louis  a  year,  out 
of  which  he  should  pay  all  his  expenses.  3d,  A  letter 
from  the  King  in  which  his  Majesty  should  express  his 
appreciation  of  M.  Bonvouloir's  zeal  in  the  interests  of 
France,  and  should  recognize  his  services  to  the  country  : 
this,  however,  was  not  to  be  given  to  him,  but  was  to  be 
read  to  him  and  retained  by  the  Ambassador. 

These  conditions  were  "  placed  under  the  eyes  of  the 
King"  by  M.  de  Vergennes,  who  announced  to  the  Am 
bassador  that  his  Majesty  approved  of  them,  as  well  as 
of  the  enterprise,  and  directed  M.  Bonvouloir  to  set  out 
immediately  for  America,  especial  regard  being  had, 
however,  to  the  fulfilment  of  that  part  of  the  contract 
which  made  it  impossible  for  Bonvouloir  to  involve  the 
Government,  and  it  being  understood  that  he  should  not 
look  for  protection  if  he  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  British. 
The  lieutenant's  commission  was  issued  from  the  War  De 
partment  by  command  of  the  King,  and  the  two  hundred 
louis  were  paid  to  him  by  the  Ambassador  out  of  moneys 
allowed  for  extraordinary  expenditures.  His  letters  were 
to  be  addressed  to  Antwerp  and  sent  under  double  en 
velope  to  a  correspondent  in  Calais,  who  should  not  for 
ward  them  to  Antwerp,  however,  but  should  deliver  them 
to  the  French  Ambassador  at  London.  Their  substance 
was  to  relate  exclusively  to  commercial  matters,  so  devised 
under  a  form  of  cipher  that,  while  they  should  convey  the 
intelligence  desired  by  the  Government,  they  should  not 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  83 

excite  suspicion  if  they  came  into  the  hands  of  those  for 
whom  they  were  not  intended. 

Thus  equipped,  M.  Bonvouloir  left  London  on  the  8th 
of  September,  1775,  which  fact  the  Ambassador  reported 
to  M.  de  Vergennes  the  same  day :  "  M.  de  Bonvouloir  is 
sent  off.  He  goes  aboard  a  vessel  this  evening  which  will 
sail  during  the  night  for  Philadelphia :  I  have  forbidden 
him  even  to  pronounce  the  word  Frenchman  or  to  enter 
into  any  discussion  as  to  our  disposition  toward  the  Amer 
icans.  His  mission  is  confined  to  the  duty  of  giving  us 
such  information  as  may  be  interesting  to  us ;  he  is  quite 
able  to  accomplish  this,  but  if  he  fails  we  shall  only  have 
risked  two  hundred  louis  in  a  matter  which  may  become 
very  important." 

The  most  important  part  of  the  mission  of  Bonvouloir, 
because  it  helps  materially  to  determine  the  attitude  of 
France  toward  the  end  of  the  year  1775,  and  shows  the 
already  fixed  determination  of  the  minister  to  approach 
the  American  Colonies  in  their  contest  with  England,  is 
the  special  instruction  sent  to  him  through  the  Ambassa 
dor  in  London  by  M.  de  Vergennes :  "  You  will  please 
reduce  his  instructions,  which  are  only  to  be  verbal,  to 
two  points  which  appear  to  me  to  be  the  most  essential : 
the  one  is,  to  render  you  a  faithful  account  of  events  and 
the  general  feeling  in  America ;  the  other,  to  reassure  the 
Americans  against  the  fright  which  it  has  been  sought  to 
stir  up  among  them  in  regard  to  us.  Canada  is  the  sensi 
tive  point  with  them :  let  him  give  them  to  understand 
that  we  have  no  thought  of  that  whatever,  but  that,  far 
from  envying  the  liberty  and  independence  which  they  are 
striving  to  secure,  we  admire  the  grandeur  and  the  noble 
ness  of  their  efforts,  that  we  have  no  interest  in  putting 
obstacles  in  their  way,  but,  on  the  contrary,  we  should  be 
glad  if  favorable  circumstances  enabled  them  to  make  use 

1  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  138. 


84  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

of  our  ports ;  the  facilities  for  their  commerce  which  they 
would  find  there  would  quickly  prove  the  esteem  we  have 
for  them."  l 

This  is  a  perfectly  clear  statement  of  the  intention  on 
the  part  of  the  Secretary  of  State  to  encourage  the  "  in 
surgents,"  and  it  is  probably  what  he  actually  meant; 
but  through  the  maze  of  diplomatic  intrigue  which  sur 
rounded  the  incidents  of  the  time  and  involved  his  corre 
spondence  in  apparently  irreconcilable  inconsistencies,  it 
is  difficult  to  determine  what  was  true  and  what  was  not : 
so  that  if  the  armed  intervention  of  France  had  never 
taken  place,  there  would  be  present  to  the  hand  of  the 
historian  an  abundance  of  documents  by  which  it  might 
be  made  to  appear  that  that  monarchy  never  had  any 
intention  of  participating  in  the  American  Revolution. 

Almost  at  the  very  moment  when  M.  de  Vergennes  was 
preparing  these  instructions  for  Bonvouloir  to  take  to 
America,  he  wrote  with  his  own  hand  to  the  Ambassador 
in  London,  in  reply  to  a  report  from  that  personage,  that 
he  had  done  well  in  his  interview  with  Lord  Suffolk  to 
insist  upon  the  friendly  intentions  of  France  toward 
England,  and  to  disabuse  his  lordship's  mind  of  any  fear 
which  he  might  have  conceived  that  the  French  Govern 
ment  would  think  of  giving  aid  to  the  American  Colonies. 
"  For  that  matter,"  he  wrote,  "  the  Colonies  may  say  what 
they  like,  the  principles  of  the  King  are  immutable,  and 
you  will  not  go  too  far  in  declaring  that,  even  if  His 
Majesty's  interest  lay  in  feeding  the  flame  of  rebellion  in 
America,  his  feeling  of  justice  would  forbid  him  to  do  so ; 
and  justice  is  the  strongest  impulse  of  his  nature." 2 

Thus  deliberately  was  the  policy  of  the  French  minister 
planned  and  carried  out,  and  as  deliberately  was  it  dis 
avowed  whenever  a  question  arose  as  to  his  friendship 

1  The  Comte  de  Vergennes  to  M.  de  Guines,  7th  August,  1775  :  Doniol,  La 
Participation  de  la  France,  i.  156. 

2  Angleterre,  t.  511,  No.  110  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  149. 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  85 

toward  England,  with  a  perfect  consistency  of  falsehood 
and  a  continued  duplicity  which  are  explicable  on  no  other 
ground  than  that  of  the  undoubted  fear  of  England  which 
existed  in  the  mind  of  M.  de  Vergennes,  and  his  perhaps 
inherited  belief  that  the  English,  as  a  nation,  were  to  be 
injured  whenever  an  occasion  offered,  lest  they  might  other 
wise  have  time  to  injure  their  neighbors,  and  that,  as 
individuals,  their  jealousy  and  love  of  conquest  made  it 
unsafe  ever  to  tell  them  the  truth.  All  the  associations  of 
his  life  were  connected  with  hatred  of  England ;  to  him, 
she  was  always  "  the  enemy ;"  and  he  treated  her  as  an 
enemy  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war. 

He  did  not  always  succeed  in  deceiving  her,  however, 
for  his  attitude  and  his  sentiments  were  perfectly  under 
stood  by  Lord  Stormont,  the  English  Ambassador,  who 
followed  closely  upon  his  footsteps  as  he  advanced  toward 
the  American  Colonies,  and  who,  watching  him  with  equal 
bitterness  and  distrust  on  his  side,  frequently  in  the  long 
chain  of  incidents  that  followed  detected  him  almost  at 
the  moment  when  he  put  forth  his  hand.  It  was  already 
suspected,  indeed,  in  London  that  an  alliance  was  under 
consideration  at  Versailles  and  Madrid  between  France 
and  Spain  and  the  Colonies,  and  M.  de  Vergennes  was 
called  upon  to  deny  it  on  the  very  day  when  Bonvouloir 
sailed  for  Philadelphia.  The  French  Ambassador  re 
ported  that  Lord  Rochford  had  presented  his  compliments 
to  him  to  announce  that  a  rumor  of  this  character  had 
recently  been  received  from  America,  and  that  the  British 
Government  would  feel  great  pleasure  in  being  able  to 
deny  it  upon  authority ;  to  which  again  M.  de  Vergennes 
replied  that  the  King's  spirit  of  justice  would  forever 
prevent  him  from  giving  encouragement  to  the  rebels : 
"  And  this,"  said  he,  "  is  a  truth  which  you  must  not 
hesitate  to  repeat  upon  every  occasion  when  you  can  do 
so  without  affectation.  We  do  not  know  what  hopes  the 
Americans  may  entertain,  or  upon  what  Power  they  may 


86  THE    HOSTILE   SENTIMENT   IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

rely ;  we  have  as  yet  had  no  appeal  from  them ;  but  if 
they  were  to  come  to  us,  we  should  very  properly  dismiss 
them,  although  we  should  guard  their  secret."  l 

It  was  perfectly  true  that  the  French  ministry  had  had 
no  direct  communication  up  to  that  time  with  the  Colonies 
in  America,  though  M.  de  Vergennes  knew  that  shipments 
of  munitions  of  war  were  being  made  from  French  ports, 
and  we  have  seen  that  he  was  himself  secretly  considering 
the  subject  of  supporting  the  Revolution.  But  he  treated 
the  communication  of  Lord  Rochford  as  a  fiction  intended 
to  draw  from  M.  de  Guines  a  declaration  which  he  might 
use  in  Parliament,  and  with  which  he  might  possibly  dis 
courage  the  Americans  if  they  entertained  a  hope  of  aid 
from  France,  although  Lord  Rochford  had  said  that  the 
information  came  to  General  Burgoyne  in  a  private  letter 
from  General  Lee,  who  had  given  his  word  of  honor  that 
the  Americans  were  certain  they  should  be  supported  by 
Spain  and  France.  This  letter,  however,  was  never  shown 
to  the  Ambassador.  M.  de  Vergennes  repeated  his  in 
structions  to  the  Ambassador  to  keep  a  watchful  eye  upon 
the  Colonies,  admitting  now  that  he  regarded  their  destiny 
as  of  very  great  importance :  "I  beg  of  you  to  continue 
to  inform  us  of  everything  that  you  hear  relating  to 
affairs  in  America.  That  is  at  present  the  object  of  our 
constant  attention." 2  It  continued  to  be  the  point  of 
greatest  interest,  for  he  still  expected  that  in  some  manner 
England  would  make  peace  with  her  Colonies,  and  he 
could  not  bring  himself  to  believe  that  either  the  English 
ministry  or  the  Opposition  in  Parliament  would  force  the 
issue  to  a  point  of  absolute  separation,  although  he  was 
convinced  they  could  never  be  brought  back  by  force  of 
arms,  and  only  with  great  difficulty  by  negotiation.  Not 
withstanding  very  great  preparations  were  being  made  in 
England  to  send  additional  forces  to  America,  to  increase 

1  Angleterre,  t.  511,  No.  160  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  150. 

2  Angleterre,  t.  511,  No.  44  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  171. 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  87 

the  number  of  regiments  employed  and  the  number  of 
companies  in  the  regiments,  for  carrying  on  the  campaign 
of  the  following  year,  he  wrote  to  M.  de  Guines  in 
August  that  this  seemed  to  him  like  a  vain  boast,  or  a 
threat  intended  to  impose  upon  the  Colonists ;  for  if  the 
Government  had  wished  to  wage  active  war  upon  them 
in  its  proper  sense,  and  destroy  them,  it  would  not  have 
waited  until  the  next  year  to  open  the  campaign,  giving 
the  Americans  notice  and  allowing  them,  of  course, 
time  to  prepare  also ;  it  would  have  surprised  them 
by  rapid  and  well-sustained  attacks  which  the  Colonists 
would  not  have  been  able  to  defend  themselves  against  or 
to  recover  from,  but  which  would  have  borne  them  down 
by  the  mere  weight  of  superior  numbers  and  equipment. 
Neither  did  he  believe  that  the  English  army  would  march 
inland  from  the  coast;  because,  if  it  did,  it  would  place 
itself  in  too  great  danger  of  being  cut  off  when  it  should 
try  to  go  back. 

But  upon  the  25th  of  the  same  month  the  Ambassador 
at  London  announced  that  the  English  Government  had 
issued  its  proclamation  of  "  Rebellion,"  which  startled  M. 
de  Vergennes  to  such  an  extent  that  he  freely  admitted 
that  it  "  changes  absolutely  the  order  of  our  combinations 
and  takes  away  beyond  recall  any  hope  of  conciliation  that 
might  yet  have  remained/' T  He  declared  that  the  procla 
mation  which  the  English  had  published  made  it  impos 
sible  for  them  then  to  turn  back  ;  that  the  issue  had  been 
joined,  and  that  either  America  must  succumb  or  the 
ministry  itself,  a  fact  the  consequences  of  which  Lord 
Rochford  had  probably  not  rightly  estimated  when  he 
boasted  that  he  had  advised  the  step  ;  and  it  seemed  to  the 
Ambassador,  indeed,  that,  as  things  were  going  then,  it  was 
not  unlikely  that  scaffolds  would  yet  be  erected  in  England. 

Nothing  could  have  been   more  gratifying  to  M.   de 

1  Letter  of  3d  September,  1775,  Angleterre,  t.  511,  No.  124  :    Doniol,  La 
Participation  dela  France,  i.  174. 


88  THE    HOSTILE    SENTIMENT    IN    FRANCE  [1775. 

Vergennes  than  the  increasing  embarrassments  in  Great 
Britain ;  with  intense  enjoyment  he  looked  on  at  what, 
to  him,  was  an  act  of  self-destruction,  so  opportune,  how 
ever,  in  the  policy  of  France  that  what  he  had  not  been 
able  to  do  against  England  for  lack  of  strength,  England 
was  doing  against  herself,  as  if  playing  directly  into  his 
hands.  To  the  Marquis  d'Ossun,  at  Madrid,  he  gave  open 
expression  of  his  delight :  "  If  the  English  are  foolish 
enough  to  destroy  their  force  by  their  own  force,  to  ex 
haust  their  finances  and  to  engulf  themselves  in  a  civil 
war,  why  should  we  interrupt  them  ?  Let  us  quietly  watch 
them  consume  themselves,  as  long  as  the  condition  of  things 
will  permit  them  to  do  it.  Even  if  we  do  not  acquire  by 
it  a  greater  amount  of  intrinsic  force,  our  relative  power 
is  bound  to  be  increased."  l  He  instantly  seized  upon  this 
opportunity  to  advance  a  step  further  upon  the  ground 
he  wished  to  occupy,  by  assuming  a  bolder  tone  in  his 
diplomatic  correspondence  with  Great  Britain,  making  use 
of  the  alliance  which  it  was  reported  King  George  was 
endeavoring  to  conclude  with  the  Empress  of  Russia.  M. 
de  Vergennes  did  not  believe  this  report  in  the  least ;  he 
had  given  excellent  reasons  against  its  authenticity  in  a 
very  clever  state  paper  which  had  elicited  from  the  King 
of  Spain  genuine  and  flattering  praise ;  but  with  him 
everything  was  an  instrument  that  came  to  his  hand  when 
he  could  turn  it  against  England,  and  this  news  was  cur 
rent,  therefore,  of  course,  he  was  privileged  to  use  it ;  and 
it  happened  to  furnish  him  an  occasion  which  up  to  that 
time  he  had  been  embarrassed  to  find,  namely,  that  of 
admitting  the  joint  armament  of  France  and  Spain  and 
giving  to  England  a  presentable  reason  for  it.  Therefore, 
with  much  assumed  apprehension,  he  instructed  the  Am 
bassador  in  London  to  intimate  to  the  British  Government 
that  the  Courts  of  France  and  Spain  looked  with  alarm 

1  Letter  of  21st  November,  1775,  Espagne,  t.  578,  No.  95  :  Doniol,  La  Par 
ticipation  de  la  France,  i.  204. 


1775.]  TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  89 

upon  the  introduction  of  Russia  into  the  quarrel  with  the 
Colonies ;  that  Russia  was  a  powerful  nation  both  on  land 
and  on  sea,  which  would  not  be  likely  to  enter  in  with 
England  unless  she  had  something  to  gain  besides  the 
miserable  subsidy  which  might  be  paid  for  her  troops ; 
that  no  doubt  she  had  in  this  matter  some  ulterior  pur 
pose  which  was  not  disclosed ;  that  it  was  not  likely  that 
this  purpose  was  in  any  wise  directed  against  the  posses 
sions  of  her  allies  in  America,  therefore  it  must  be  against 
the  West  Indies ;  in  fact,  that  Spain  and  France  were 
agreed  that  they  must  arm  themselves  in  order  to  defend 
their  colonies  and  that  they  might  be  ready  at  any  moment 
to  repel  attack.  The  word  was  spoken.  The  attitude  of 
the  two  Crowns  was  no  longer  to  be  merely  passive.  It 
took  only  a  few  days  to  dispose  of  the  rumors  of  a  Rus 
sian  alliance  ;  but  M.  de  Vergennes  had  gained  his  point. 
It  was,  after  all,  nothing  more  than  an  avowal  of  what 
the  English  Government  already  knew.  They  were  never 
blind  to  what  was  going  on  in  France.  Lord  Stormont 
had  begun  that  remarkable  surveillance  upon  the  actions 
of  the  ministry  which  he  carried  out  with  unremitting 
diligence  during  the  next  few  years,  performing  a  sort  of 
police  duty  the  aim  of  which  was  to  follow  every  step  that 
might  be  taken  by  which  France  as  a  neutral  Power 
should  go  beyond  the  limit  of  international  comity,  and 
to  prevent  any  attempt  at  giving  aid  or  encouragement  to 
the  revolted  Colonies,  with  such  success  that  for  a  tolerably 
long  period  he  was  the  most  hated  man,  and  perhaps  it 
would  not  be  going  too  far  to  say,  the  most  feared,  in 
France.  He  was  now  almost  daily  protesting  to  the  min 
istry  against  American  ships  loading  with  munitions  of 
war  in  French  ports,  against  contracts  being  made  for  the 
same  purpose  by  French  merchants,  to  whom  he  insisted 
that  prohibitions  should  issue,  and  obliging  the  Govern 
ment  at  least  to  promise  that  it  would  take  repressive 
measures,  or  to  profess  that  it  had  already  done  so.  The 


90  HOSTILITY    TOWARD    GREAT    BRITAIN.  [1775. 

French  began  to  think  that  he  knew  by  intuition  what 
they  were  doing.  The  first  question  asked,  after  they  de 
cided  in  any  case  what  they  themselves  would  do,  was, 
what  Lord  Stormont  was  likely  to  do ;  for  he  was  sure 
to  do  something.  Consequently  M.  de  Vergennes's  an 
nouncement  created  no  surprise  in  England,  and  pro 
duced  no  immediate  result  there.  It  aided  him,  however, 
by  keeping  alive  the  interest  which  he  had  created  at  the 
Spanish  Court,  where  he  availed  himself  of  every  occasion 
like  this  to  emphasize  the  community  of  purpose  in  the 
policy  of  the  two  Crowns.  The  Spanish  Government  in 
creased  its  garrisons  in  the  West  Indies,  and  M.  de  Gri- 
maldi  announced  that  he  was  convinced  that  this  great 
superiority  of  armed  forces  in  America  was  likely  to  tempt 
England  into  some  enterprise  against  the  French  and 
Spanish  colonies,  especially  against  the  former. 


1775.]         RELATIONS   OF    FRANCE    WITH   THE   COLONIES.        91 


CHAPTER    III. 

RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT    WITH    THE 
COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA. 

THE  Comte  de  Vergennes  had  now  substantially  reached 
the  point  where  the  Due  de  Choiseul  had  left  the  subject 
of  the  American  Colonies  several  years  before ;  he  was 
renewing  the  policy  of  that  statesman,  developing  it  in 
the  light  of  succeeding  events,  and  preparing  to  carry  it 
on  to  completion,  with  greatly  increased  likelihood  of  suc 
cess,  because  the  Revolution  had  fairly  begun  and  many 
of  the  results  which  the  former  minister  had  merely  pre 
dicted  had  now  actually  been  produced.  He  found  con 
siderable  divergence  of  opinion  in  France  as  to  the  policy 
of  encouraging  rebellion  directed  against  a  recognized  au 
thority,  and  there  was  a  fear  lest  this  example  might  even 
prove  dangerous  to  France  in  the  government  of  her  own 
colonies,  especially  if  the  Americans  should  establish  an 
independent  Power  in  such  close  proximity  to  them,  and 
that  Power  a  republic.  The  King  himself  had  no  sym 
pathy  with  the  "  insurgents,"  and  felt  no  disposition  to 
encourage  them.  But  the  great  incentive  which  the  min 
ister  dexterously  employed  was  the  belief  that  the  resto-% 
ration  of  the  glory  of  France  lay  in  the  success  of  they' 
American  Revolution.  That  overcame  all  objection,  and 
with  it  he  labored  to  create  sentiment  in  the  ministry. 
At  the  close  of  the  year  1775  he  prepared  a  series  of 
notes  in  which  he  stated  the  problem  as  he  understood  it, 
examined  it  in  its  bearings  upon  France,  and  explained 
in  such  detail  his  views  as  to  the  policy  to  be  pursued  by 
the  Government  that  they  form  a  most  valuable  document 


92  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1775. 

in  which  the  attitude  of  France  is  described  in  his  own 
language.  These  notes,  which  he  called  "  Reflexions," 
and  which  were  intended  only  for  the  eyes  of  the  King 
and  of  M.  de  Maurepas,  are  preserved  in  the  Archives 
of  France.1  They  present  the  subject  of  the  intervention 
of  France  in  the  American  Revolution,  as  follows  : 

"REFLEXIONS. 

"The  quarrel  which  is  now  going  on  between  England  and 
her  Colonies  is  one  of  those  events  of  extreme  importance  which 
deserve  the  attention  of  all  other  Powers,  by  reason  of  the  in 
fluence  which  it  may  have  upon  the  political  existence  of  Great 
Britain.  France  especially,  and  Spain,  have  an  immediate  interest 
in  following  its  details  and  its  progress,  and  in  forecasting  its 
probable  effect. 

"  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  object  of  the  Colonies  is  no 
longer  simply  to  redress  their  grievances,  but  that  they  have  come 
to  the  determination  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of  the  mother- country. 
England  openly  imputes  this  intention  to  them,  and  the  efforts 
she  is  making  to  overcome  it  prove  to  what  extent  she  feels  and 
fears  the  effects  which  would  result  from  its  execution. 

"If  the  Colonies  are  left  to  themselves,  it  is  probable  that 
Great  Britain  will  ultimately  conquer  and  subject  them  ;  and  in 
that  event  she  will  be  the  mistress  to  prescribe  for  them  such  laws 
as  she  may  see  fit.  The  result  of  this  forced  submission  will  be, 
indeed,  that  the  Court  of  London  will  be  driven  into  extraordi 
nary  and  ever- continuing  expenditures  in  order  to  restrain  and 
preserve  the  Colonies,  which  will  retain  a  perpetual  and  irre 
pressible  tendency  toward  independence  j  but,  on  the  other  hand, 
she  will  at  least  continue  to  hold  the  mercantile  advantages  which 
she  has  enjoyed  up  to  this  time  from  her  commerce  with  America, 
/and  she  will  consequently  be  able  to  support  her  manufactures 
and  her  shipping.  Above  all,  she  will  prevent  the  Colonies  from 
putting  into  the  balance  a  very  considerable  weight  in  favor  of 
any  other  Power,  as  they  would  do  if  they  were  independent. 
So  that,  by  whatever  means  Great  Britain  maintains  her  suprem 
acy  in  America,  we  may  fairly  say  that  it  will  result  in  very  con 
siderable  advantage  to  her ;  whereas,  if  she  lost  it,  she  would 
suffer  an  incalculable  injury,  as  we  shall  show  hereafter. 


1  £tats-Unis,  Me"moires  et  Documents  de  1765  a  1778,  t.  1,  No.  4  :  Doniol, 
La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  243. 


1775.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  93 

"This  twofold  truth  appears  naturally  to  indicate  the  part 
which  France  should  take  in  the  quarrel  now  existing  between 
England  and  her  Colonies. 

"England  is  the  natural  enemy  of  France.  She  is  an  enemy  at 
once  grasping,  ambitious,  unjust,  and  perfidious.  The  invariable 
and  most  cherished  purpose  in  her  politics  has  been,  if  not  the 
destruction  of  France,  at  least  her  overthrow,  her  humiliation, 
and  her  ruin.  This  is  the  real  motive  of  the  wars  which  for  a 
long  period  she  has  waged  against  us  ;  this  reason  of  state  always 
dominates  every  other  consideration  ;  and  when  it  speaks,  all 
means  are  just,  legitimate,  and  even  necessary,  provided  they  are 
efficient.  This  condition  of  things,  as  well  as  the  care  which 
France  is  bound  to  take  of  its  own  preservation,  authorizes  and 
even  invites  her  to  seize  every  possible  opportunity  to  reduce  the 
power  and  the  greatness  of  England  ;  whilst,  on  the  other  hand, 
our  policy  makes  it  a  duty  for  us  to  do  so.  Starting,  then,  with 
this  double  truth,  it  becomes  necessary  for  us  to  inquire  whether 
the  attitude  and  the  present  circumstances  of  the  Colonies  are 
such  as  to  lead  us  to  this  result.  They  are  at  open  war  with  the 
central  Government ;  their  purpose  is  to  throw  off  the  yoke  of 
domination  ;  they  appeal  to  us  to  give  them  aid  and  succor.  If 
we  accede  to  the  wishes  of  the  Colonies,  and  presupposing  that  we 
give  them  effective  assistance,  it  would  seem  that  the  following 
advantages  must  result  :  1st,  the  power  of  England  will  be  re 
duced,  and  our  own  increased  to  the  same  degree  ;  2d,  her  com 
merce  will  sutler  an  irreparable  loss,  whilst  ours  wTill  be  increased  ; 
3d,  it  is  very  probable  that,  in  the  coui-se  of  events,  we  should  be 
able  to  recover  a  part  of  our  possessions  in  America  which  the 
English  have  taken  away  from  us,  such  as  the  right  to  lish  on 
shore,  that  of  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  Isle  Royale,  etc.  AVe 
make  no  reference  to  Canada. 

"But  it  may  be  said  that  the  independence  of  the  English  Col 
onies  will  produce  a  revolution  in  the  New  World,  that  they  will 
scarcely  be  quiet  again  and  assured  of  their  liberty  before  they 
will  be  seized  with  a  desire  for  conquest,  whence  might  result  the 
invasion  of  our  colonies  and  of  the  rich  possessions  of  Spain  in 
South  America. 

"There  are  two  considerations,  however,  which  ought  to  re 
assure  those  who  fear  dangers  of  that  sort.  1st.  The  war  which 
the  Colonies  are  now  carrying  on  will  exhaust  and  impoverish 
them  to  such  an  extent  that  it  will  be  a  long  time  before  they  can 
think  of  taking  up  arms  to  attack  their  neighbors.  2d.  There  is 
every  reason  to  believe  that  if  the  Colonies  attain  their  purpose 


94  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1775. 

they  will  give  to  their  new  Government  the  form  of  a  Eepublic, 
and  it  is  generally  conceded,  as  the  result  of  experience,  that 
Eepublics  very  rarely  have  the  love  of  conquest,  and  those  about 
to  be  established  in  America  will  have  it  all  the  less  (for  it  is  un 
derstood  that  each  province  will  become  a  separate  Eepublic  and 
that  they  shall  have  no  relation  to  each  other  except  that  of  a 
political  confederation),  because  they  already  know  the  happiness 
and  the  advantages  of  commerce  $  they  need  industries,  and  con 
sequently  they  want  peace  in  order  to  procure  for  themselves  the 
commodities  of  life  as  well  as  a  great  number  of  things  of  prime 
necessity.  It  is  safe  to  say,  therefore,  that  the  fear  of  seeing  the 
Americans  undertake,  sooner  or  later,  the  invasion  of  their  neigh 
bors'  territory  is  without  even  a  seeming  foundation,  and  is  not 
worthy  to  be  taken  into  consideration.  Even  supposing  that  the 
Americans  should  overrun  the  Spanish  possessions,  it  is  by  no 
means  certain  that  such  a  revolution  would  be  prejudicial  to 
France  j  I  except,  of  course,  the  obligations  contained  in  the 
Family  Compact. 

"Admitting,  then,  the  interest  that  France  has  in  favoring  the 
independence  of  the  English  Colonies,  it  becomes  necessary  to 
examine  :  1st,  what  kind  of  assistance  she  can  give  them  ;  2d, 
when  this  assistance  can  best  be  brought  to  bear ;  3d,  what  is 
likely  to  be  the  result  of  it. 

"  FIRST   POINT. 

"  England  has  subsidized  seventeen  thousand  men  in  Germany, 
to  whom  she  adds  twenty- odd  thousand  national  troops  ;  she  will 
therefore  have  in  America  an  army  of  less  than  forty  thousand 
men.  The  Colonies,  on  their  side,  have  now  on  foot  fifty  thou 
sand  regular  troops,  well  clothed,  well  armed,  well  disciplined, 
and  well  commanded.  They  have  nearly  as  many  volunteers  who 
serve  without  pay  and  only  ask  to  fight,  and  they  will  have  by 
next  spring  more  than  thirty  vessels  at  sea,  of  from  twelve  to  forty 
guns.  Finally,  they  have  a  treaty  of  neutrality,  and,  in  case  of 
necessity,  of  alliance,  with  five  savage  nations  who  hate  the 
English.  But  they  are  in  need,  1st,  of  munitions  of  war  ;  2d,  of 
ready  money  ;  3d,  of  a  good  navy.  Therefore,  in  order  to  assist 
the  Americans  effectively,  we  should  have  to  provide  for  these 
three  necessities  if  we  concluded  at  any  time  to  respond  to  their 
appeal  for  help. 

"They  would  send  their  vessels  into  our  ports  laden  with 
products  and  take  a  return  cargo  of  arms  and  munitions,  pay 
ing  for  them,  not  in  ready  money,  but  in  products  to  be  deliv- 


1775.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  95 

ered  either  at  Santo  Domingo  or  at  one  of  our  ports  in  Europe. 
This  exchange  of  traffic  could  be  made  without  obliging  the 
Government  to  appear  in  any  way ;  we  should  only  need  a 
capable,  faithful,  and  discreet  agent  in  each  of  our  ports  where 
the  American  vessels  came  to  load  or  to  discharge.  This  agent 
would  deal  directly  with  the  captains  of  vessels,  and  they  would 
cover  up  their  transactions  so  as  to  escape  the  protests  of  the 
Court  of  London.  We  should  have  no  further  interest  in  these 
shipments,  which  would  be  made  for  the  account  and  risk  of  the 
Americans. 

"  As  to  the  demand  for  money,  that  presents  at  first  sight  some 
rather  serious  difficulties  :  while  it  seems  impossible  to  reject  it 
entirely,  we  should,  however,  be  obliged  to  modify  and  curtail  it. 
The  following  are  the  reflections  which  occur  to  me  upon  that 
subject.  The  Colonies  have  established  a  paper  currency  for 
their  domestic  necessities,  which  now  circulates  freely  and  appears 
likely  to  sustain  its  value ;  therefore  they  would  not  need  specie 
for  the  interior  of  the  provinces.  They  will  find  it  necessary 
merely  for  their  operations  abroad  ;  that  is  to  say,  in  paying  for 
their  purchases.  We  might,  therefore,  it  appears  to  me,  reduce 
their  expenditures  by  supplying  to  them,  so  far  as  possible,  the 
articles  which  they  are  obliged  to  buy  abroad,  taking  in  exchange 
their  products  and  furnishing  them,  beyond  this,  with  such  an 
amount  of  specie  as  might  be  found  necessary  in  order  to  keep 
their  affairs  in  good  condition. 

"The  subject  of  the  navy  cannot  be  so  easily  disposed  of  as 
the  two  former.  We  should  not  be  able  to  send  our  vessels  to 
sea  without  declaring  openly  in  favor  of  the  Colonies  and,  conse 
quently,  incurring  a  war  with  Great  Britain  ;  and  if  we  supplied 
them  clandestinely,  the  Court  of  London,  upon  discovering  it, 
would  justly  accuse  us  of  being  secret  abettors  of  the  rebellion  in 
its  Colonies.  The  result  of  these  observations  is  that  the  former 
of  these  alternatives  cannot  be  carried  out  until  such  time  as  we 
shall  be  obliged  by  circumstances  to  make  war  upon  the  English  ; 
and  the  latter  is  surrounded  by  very  great  difficulty  if  we  at 
tempt  to  conceal  it  from  the  Court  of  London.  But  there  is  still 
a  way  out.  We  could  send  to  Santo  Domingo,  or  some  other  point 
agreed  upon,  a  number  of  merchant-ships  suitable  for  war  ;  the 
Americans  would  go  there  and  receive  them  at  their  own  risk, 
making  fictitious  contracts  with  the  French  captains.  Thus 
the  '  insurgents'  would  be  enabled  to  increase  their  navy  with 
our  help,  without  our  appearing  in  any  manner  as  parties  to  the 
transaction. 


96  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1775. 

"  SECOND   POINT. 

1 1  As  to  the  time  at  which  France  should  openly  assist  the  Colonies. 

i  i  According  to  our  information,  the  '  insurgents'  are  at  present 
strong  enough  to  resist  the  forces  which  England  is  sending  to 
America ;  they  have  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  therefore  it 
would  not  be  necessary  to  supply  them  with  anything  now.  But 
it  is  to  be  feared  that  before  long  they  will  have  exhausted  their 
means,  so  that  the  difficulty  of  increasing  their  supplies,  and  the 
consequent  alarm,  may  weaken  their  courage  and  tempt  them  to 
abandon  their  undertaking,  by  submitting  before  they  are  forced 
by  impoverishment  to  do  so.  It  is,  therefore,  essential  that 
France  should  give  immediate  attention  to  this  point ;  she  must 
sustain  the  courage  and  the  perseverance  of  the  '  insurgents'  by 
nattering  them  with  the  hope  of  effective  aid  as  soon  as  cir 
cumstances  will  permit  it.  She  must  give  them  to  understand 
that  the  time  for  giving  this  aid  depends  upon  their  success  ;  and 
she  must  encourage  them  to  believe  that  the  date  may  be  fixed  at 
latest  at  the  end  of  the  next  campaign.  In  this  manner  France 
will  not  be  compromised  either  as  to  the  i  insurgents'  or  as  to  the 
Court  of  London,  and  she  will  be  getting  herself  ready  to  strike  a 
decisive  blow  as  soon  as  events  have  sufficiently  matured  to  admit 
of  it, 

"THIRD  POINT. 

i  i  What  will  be  the  effect  of  our  assistance  f 

1 '  Starting  with  the  principle  that  we  ought  to  favor  the  inde 
pendence  of  the  Colonies,  it  follows  necessarily  that  we  ought  to 
help  them  as  soon  as  we  believe  that  we  can  do  so  with  success  ; 
therefore  that  becomes  a  point  which  it  is  important  to  consider 
and  to  establish.  In  order  to  form  some  estimate  in  this  connec 
tion,  it  may  be  well  to  await  the  effect  produced  by  the  efforts 
which  the  Court  of  London  proposes  to  make  in  the  coming  spring  ; 
its  preparations  are  immense  ;  they  exhaust,  or  very  nearly  so,  the 
resources  of  Great  Britain.  If  the  Court  does  not  meet  at  once 
with  such  success  as  to  foreshadow  either  the  submission  or  the 
destruction  of  the  Colonies,  we  shall  conclude  that  Great  Britain 
has  not  sufficient  means  to  accomplish  that  undertaking,  and  then 
France  would  risk  so  much  less  in  coming  upon  the  scene,  that  is 
to  say,  in  declaring  war,  because  the  forces  of  the  Americans  will 
have  been  sufficient  to  arrest  the  British  armies,  and  by  joining 
with  them  we  shall  make  their  triumph  sure. 

"But,  laying  aside  this  plan  of  action,  and  supposing  that 
France  remains  absolutely  still,— that  is  to  say,  that  she  not  only 


1775.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  97 

does  not  aid  the  Colonies  openly,  but  does  not  even  give  them  the 
least  secret  encouragement :  will  such  a  course  protect  us  against 
war  f  Affairs  in  America  present  two  hypotheses :  upon  the 
first,  England  will  triumph  over  the  Americans  and  subjugate 
them  ;  upon  the  second,  that  Power  will  be  repelled  by  them  and 
forced  to  agree  to  their  independence.  In  the  one  case,  as  in  the 
other,  it  is  possible  that  the  Court  of  London  will  feel  obliged  to 
attack  our  colonies  :  in  the  former,  to  avenge  the  assistance  which 
she  will  suppose  we  have  given  to  her  Colonies  (for  she  will  suppose 
this  if  her  interests  and  her  views  demand  it,  however  passive  our 
conduct  may  have  been) ;  in  the  latter,  to  indemnify  herself  at 
our  expense,  and  at  the  expense  of  Spain,  for  the  immense  outlay 
incurred  by  her  in  bringing  the  Colonies  to  terms.  This  expe 
dition  will  appear  easy  to  the  English,  and  it  will  be  so  in  fact,  in 
view  of  the  forces  both  on  land  and  at  sea  which  they  will  have 
in  America ;  and,  besides,  it  will  appear  necessary  to  the  British 
ministers,  either  to  establish  their  reputation  and  to  win  glory,  or 
to  lessen  the  reproaches  which  the  nation  is  sure  to  cast  upon  them 
in  the  event  of  failure, — perhaps  even  to  save  their  heads  from 
the  scaffold. 

"  Consequently,  from  whatever  point  of  view  we  consider  the 
outcome  of  the  troubles  in  America,  and  whatever  our  conduct 
may  be  at  this  juncture,  it  will  not  assure  to  us  the  continuance  of 
peace ;  we  cannot  therefore  assume  its  preservation  as  the  basis 
of  our  policy,  and  since  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  from  what 
ever  point  of  view  we  consider  them,  appear  certain  to  lead  us 
into  war,  it  is  the  part  of  prudence  to  make  ready  in  advance  the 
means  which  will  enable  us  to  carry  it  on  with  advantage  and  suc 
cess.  We  venture  to  believe  that  the  most  effective  means  would 
be  to  make  sure  of  the  Colonies,  and,  in  case  of  necessity,  to  make 
common  cause  with  them." 

This  was  the  programme  of  the  French  Cabinet  just 
before  our  Declaration  of  Independence.  It  shows  an 
intercourse  with  the  agents  of  the  Colonies  quite  beyond 
what  the  official  correspondence  of  the  time  bears  witness 
to,  and  implies  the  study  of  details  which  we  have  no  longer 
before  us,  but  of  which  we  distinctly  see  the  traces.  It 
leaves  no  doubt  that  it  was  the  intention  of  France  to 
injure  Great  Britain  the  moment  an  opportunity  offered 
itself  in  any  part  of  the  world,  and  that,  in  the  opinion 

VOL.  I.— 7 


98  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1775. 

of  the  Secretary  of  State,  that  opportunity  was  at  hand 
in  the  quarrel  of  the  mother-country  with  her  American 
Colonies.  The  most  difficult  obstacle  for  M.  de  Vergennes 
at  the  moment  was  the  unwillingness  of  the  King,  who 
wavered  between  his  unquestioned  desire  on  the  one  hand 
to  do  right  at  all  times,  and  a  fear  on  the  other  hand  that 
in  some  way,  should  he  fail  to  listen  to  the  representations 
of  his  ministers  of  state,  who  had  long  experience  in 
affairs  and  whose  judgments  must  be  wise,  he  might  lose 
the  favorable  opportunity  to  re-establish  the  position  of 
France  and  thus  to  render  his  reign  illustrious  in  her 
annals.  His  hesitating  mind  was  influenced  also,  no 
doubt,  by  the  opposition  at  Court  on  the  part  of  the  per 
sonal  enemies  of  M.  de  Vergennes,  who  were  jealous  of 
his  position  in  the  Cabinet,  who  had  obtained  an  intima 
tion  of  his  policy,  and  who,  having  no  reason  to  regret 
its  possible  failure,  took  pains  that  it  should  be  spoken 
of  unfavorably  before  the  King.  For  a  time  its  progress 
was  absolutely  arrested. 

Meanwhile  the  versatile  and  indefatigable  Caron  de 
Beaumarchais,  afterward  made  famous  by  his  "  Marriage 
of  Figaro"  and  his  "  Barber  of  Seville,"  clever  alike  in 
intrigue,  in  commerce,  and  in  letters,  had  been  employed 
by  M.  de  Vergennes  as  a  secret  agent  in  London,  where 
his  talents  and  his  social  qualities  gave  him  admittance  to 
polite  society  and  furnished  him  an  opportunity  to  note 
what  took  place,  as  well  as  to  glean  information  from 
people  of  all  shades  of  political  belief.  Independent  of 
the  Ambassador,  and  without  official  credit,  Beaumarchais 
occupied  the  position  of  actual  representative  in  London, 
and  held  the  confidence  of  the  Cabinet  at  Versailles,  for 
the  moment,  to  a  greater  degree  than  M.  de  Guines  ;  and, 
whilst  he  ferreted  out  every  chance  for  intrigue  with 
people,  either  in  England  or  in  any  of  the  ports  of  France, 
who  were  willing  to  furnish  arms  or  munitions  of  war,  and 
let  slip  no  bit  of  news  upon  which  he  could  base  a  plan  or 


1775.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  99 

a  calculation  in  favor  of  the  Colonists  in  America,  his 
reports  were  received  with  intense  interest  at  home,  where 
they  not  only  exerted  the  strongest  influence  upon  the 
minds  of  M.  de  Yergennes  and  M.  de  Maurepas,  but  were 
instrumental  also  in  determining  the  King  to  yield. 

His  enthusiasm  and  his  patriotic  appeals  for  the  glory 
of  France,  his  assertion  that  this  was  the  moment  of  all 
others  to  assure  it,  which  he  repeated  with  increasing  fer 
vor,  his  ardent  representations  of  the  opposition  of  a  great 
part  of  the  English  people  to  the  policy  of  the  ministry,  and 
his  reiterated  statement  that  it  was  the  belief  of  all  wise 
men  that  this  uprising  in  the  Colonies  would  end  in  the 
destruction  of  the  British  Empire,  which  France  needed 
only  to  help  along  in  order  to  recover  her  honor,  her 
power,  and  her  lost  possessions,  that  patriotism  summoned 
her  to  do  this,  and  that  if  she  failed  to  listen  now  she 
would  stand  condemned  in  all  history,  undoubtedly  con 
tributed  largely  to  the  result. 

That  he  was  working  directly  to  influence  the  King,  we 
know  by  his  letter  to  M.  de  Vergennes  of  the  24th  of 
November,  1775,1  written  at  Versailles,  whither  he  had 
gone  from  London  : 

"MoxsiEUR  LE  COMTE, — Instead  of  waiting  for  the  King's 
reply,  which  will  doubtless  announce  his  decision,  should  you 
approve  of  writing  to  him  again  that  I  am  here,  that  you  have 
seen  me,  that  I  am  trembling  lest  in  a  matter  so  easy  and  so 
necessary,  perhaps  the  most  important  that  the  King  may  ever 
have  to  decide,  His  Majesty  may  choose  the  negative,  and  that, 
whatever  his  motives,  I  beg  him  in  mercy  not  to  decide  either 
way  without  having  first  allowed  me  to  plead  with  him  for  one 
quarter  of  an  hour,  respectfully  to  demonstrate  to  him  the  neces 
sity  of  undertaking,  the  facility  of  acting,  the  certainty  of  succeed 
ing,  and  the  immense  harvest  of  glory  and  repose  to  be  obtained 
for  his  reign  from  the  smallest  seed  planted  so  advantageously 
now  ?  May  the  guardian  angel  of  this  state  turn  favorably  the 
heart  of  the  King,  and  give  us  the  success  so  greatly  to  be  desired." 


1  Angleterre,  t.  513,  No.  3  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  251. 


100  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1776. 

During  this  indecision  the  new  year  of  1776  came  in. 
M.  de  Vergennes  was  still  surrounded  by  the  intrigues 
against  him  at  Court,  and  he  had  become  the  object  of 
very  serious  personal  attacks  which  obliged  him  to  sus 
pend  his  correspondence  with  Beaumarchais  arid  to  give 
attention  to  his  own  defence.  But  the  King's  confidence  in 
M.  de  Vergennes  and  his  attachment  for  him,  as  well  as  the 
persistent  efforts  of  Beaumarchais,  ultimately  won  the  day. 

Precisely  how  this  result  was  accomplished  we  cannot 
tell,  because  Beaumarchais  never  disclosed  his  relations 
with  the  ministry ;  and,  although  we  know  it  was  through 
a  communication  written  by  him  and  shown  to  the  King, 
the  document  itself  is  not  in  the  Archives,  nor  is  there 
anywhere  a  statement  of  what  it  contained.  The  only 
trace  of  it  is  in  the  following  letter  from  M.  de  Vergennes 
on  the  22d  of  January,  1776,  to  Louis  XVI. : l 

"  SIRE, — I  have  the  honor  to  hand  to  Your  Majesty  a  communi 
cation  from  the  Sr.  de  Beaumarchais,  without  excepting  anything, 
even  as  to  what  he  intended  to  say  to  me  alone.  If  I  had  felt  at  lib 
erty  to  suppress  any  part,  it  would  have  been  that  which  is  purely 
personal.  The  question  here  relates  to  facts  which  I  am  not  in  a 
position  to  verify,  and  of  which  the  proof  would  probably  be  very 
difficult  to  establish.  What  appears  to  me  to  be  the  most  impor 
tant  is  the  description  of  the  actual  condition  of  affairs  and  the 
consequences  which  may  possibly  result.  England  is  upon  the 
verge  of  despair.  I  readily  believe,  as  the  Sr.  de  Beaumarchais 
intimates,  that  the  change  of  ministry  may  not  be  far  off.  The 
ministers  have  perhaps  only  a  short  time  left  in  which  to  protect 
themselves  against  the  storm,  or  to  resort  to  desperate  measures 
to  ward  off  the  danger  which  threatens  their  heads.  This  predic 
tion  would  seem  to  call  for  the  most  careful  foresight  on  the  part  of 
Your  Majesty  ;  though  it  is  perhaps  easier  to  imagine  what  ought  to 
be  done  than  to  point  out  the  means  or  to  put  them  into  execution. 

' l  Since  I  shall  be  able  to  reply  to  the  Sr.  de  Beaumarchais  only 
after  having  heard  the  orders  of  Your  Majesty,  I  humbly  beg  you 
to  appoint  a  time  when  I  may  go  to  receive  them." 


1  Archives  Nationales,  aimee  1776  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France, 
i.  253. 


1776.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  101 

The  communication  from  Beaumarchais  which  accom 
panied  this  letter  appears  to  have  had  the  desired  result, 
and  to  have  affected  favorably  the  mind  of  the  King  to 
the  policy  to  be  pursued  toward  England  which  M.  de 
Vergennes  and  Beaumarchais  were  strenuously  laboring 
to  carry  out;  for  from  this  time  forward  the'  Secretary  'of 
State  appears  to  have  had  at  least  ihe  -roVal'  ''acquifsofcnce 
in  the  programme  generally  outlined  by  him  in  the  "  Re 
flexions"  quoted  above.  It  happened  also  in  this  connec 
tion  that  an  incident  at  the  Court  of  France  offered  him 
at  that  moment  an  opportunity  to  forward  his  purposes 
the  more  comfortably  to  himself  by  getting  rid  for  a  time 
of  the  oppressive  watchfulness  of  Lord  Stormont,  which 
he  took  advantage  of  immediately.  The  Comte  de 
Guines,  Ambassador  at  London,  whose  conduct  of  diplo 
matic  affairs  had  for  a  long  time  not  been  satisfactory  to 
M.  de  Vergennes,  had  now  fallen  into  disfavor  with  the 
King,  who  directed  him  to  be  recalled,  and  the  order 
was  sent  on  the  26th  of  January,  177(3.  Here  was  a 
chance  which  the  Secretary  of  State  could  not  have  pre 
pared  more  to  his  liking ;  because  if  the  Embassy  at  Lon 
don  were  left  vacant  by  the  French  Government,  King 
George  would  certainly  not  continue  his  Ambassador  at 
Paris  when  France  was  represented  only  by  a  charge-d'af- 
faires  in  England ;  whilst  if  an  English  charge  were  left 
in  Paris  he  would  be  much  more  easy  to  deal  with  than 
the  Ambassador,  whose  personal  distinction  and  social 
position  gave  him  a  far  wider  range  of  intercourse  and 
consequently  a  much  larger  field  of  observation  ;  and  when 
that  Ambassador  was  Lord  Stormont,  the  relief  at  being 
free  from  him  for  a  time  was  second  only  to  that,  which 
was  not  then  attainable,  of  getting  rid  of  him  altogether. 

Skilfully,  therefore,  M.  de  Vergennes  approached  the 
King  through  M.  de  Maurepas  in  this  delicate  matter ; 
for,  whilst  he  was  anxious  to  have  a  successor  appointed  in 
order  to  prevent  the  return  to  London  of  M.  de  Guines, 


102  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1776. 

in  whose  ability  he  had  no  confidence,  he  was  equally  anx 
ious  to  have  the  vacancy  continued  as  long  as  it  reason 
ably  could  be ;  and  in  this  double  purpose  he  succeeded 
admirably.  The  Marquis  de  Noailles  was  appointed  Am 
bassador  to, 'England,  but  with  instructions  to  go  to  his 
post  six  months  latex,  and,  as  was  expected,  the  English 
Cfo^r^meat-  gaye'*.L0fd  Stormont  a  leave  of  absence  on 
the  29th  of  March,  and  left  the  Embassy  with  a  charge- 
d'affaires.  The  French  representative  in  London  during 
the  interim  was  M.  Gamier,  an  old  employee  of  the 
Foreign  Office,  who  had  been  eight  years  in  London,  who 
was  in  perfect  accord  with  M.  de  Vergennes,  and  who 
could  be  implicitly  relied  upon  to  act  in  sympathy  with 
the  aims  and  purposes  of  the  "  Reflexions." 

Thus  we  find  M.  de  Vergennes,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year  1776,  determined  upon  war ;  not  avowedly  so  as  yet, 
except  to  the  King  and  to  the  head  of  the  Cabinet,  with 
whom  he  concerted  his  plans  and  discussed  the  advantages 
to  be  obtained  for  France  by  a  timely  intervention  in  the 
present  disturbances,  but  fully  persuaded,  nevertheless, 
that  circumstances  were  so  forming  themselves  that  the 
time  to  strike  was  close  at  hand ;  and  this  persuasion 
shaped  his  policy  from  that  time  forward.  He  never 
swerved  from  the  direction  he  had  thus  taken.  Indeed, 
to  all  intents  and  purposes,  so  far  as  secret  enmity  could 
carry  him,  and  a  fixed  purpose  not  only  to  foment  the  ex 
isting  embarrassments  by  encouraging  the  Revolution  in 
America,  but  to  lend  a  helping  hand  whenever  he  could 
do  so  without  being  obliged  to  declare  himself  openly,  he 
was  at  war  already  with  England. 

Beaumarchais  served  him  as  an  important  factor  in  this, 
both  at  London  and  in  France ;  his  diplomatic  corre 
spondence  with  Spain,  which  is  very  voluminous  at  this 
period,  was  skilfully  framed  to  keep  this  purpose  con 
stantly  before  the  Spanish  Court ;  and  he  now  had 
Bonvouloir  working  for  it  in  America.  In  December, 


1776.]         WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  103 

1775,  after  a  stormy  and  dangerous  voyage  of  one  hun 
dred  days,  Bonvouloir  had  reached  Philadelphia,  whence 
he  wrote  at  once,  though  his  communication  did  not  arrive, 
by  reason  of  delays  and  the  indirect  method  of  its  trans 
mission,  until  the  last  of  February,  1776.  He  reported 
that  he  found  the  country,  as  he  had  expected,  in  an  in 
conceivable  state  of  agitation  ;  that  the  confederates  were 
making  immense  preparations  for  the  campaign  of  the 
following  spring,  in  spite  of  the  rigor  of  the  climate, 
although  they  needed  three  important  things, — a  good 
navy,  ready  money,  and  provisions ;  but  that  it  must  be 
admitted  they  were  led  by  "  de  bonnes  tetes."  He  had 
succeeded  almost  immediately  in  forming  relations  with 
the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  to  whom  he  was 
introduced  as  a  private  individual  by  a  French  bookseller 
living  in  Philadelphia,  called  Daymons.  He  wrote  that 
he  was  kept  regularly  informed  as  to  their  deliberations 
and  fully  acquainted  with  what  took  place  even  in  the 
utmost  secrecy  ;  that  they  all  said  they  would  fight  for 
their  liberty,  and  would  be  free,  cost  what  it  might, 
though  they  knew  they  were  not  strong  enough  to  make 
war  at  sea,  and  that  they  looked  to  France  to  help  them 
in  this  respect  and  to  protect  their  commerce.  Bonvouloir 
protested  that  he  had  never  told  the  committee  anything 
that  could  indicate  a  connection  of  any  kind  with  the 
French  ministry ;  though  he  evidently  allowed  them  to 
draw  their  own  conclusions  as  to  that,  which  he  imagined 
they  had  done,  because,  he  said,  he  had  good  reason  to 
know  that  they  would  never  believe  he  had  come  across 
the  ocean  in  the  winter  without  some  very  good  reason  ; 
and  he  continued,— 

"I  have  made  them  no  offer,  absolutely  none,  but  have  only 
promised  to  render  them  every  service  in  my  poicer  without  com 
promising  myself  and  without  being  responsible  for  the  reunite  in 
any  way.  They  asked  me  if  France  would  help  them,  and  at  what 
price.  I  replied  that  I  believed  France  wished  them  well.  Whether 


104          RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1776. 

she  would  help  them  ?  That  that  might  very  well  be.  Upon  what 
basis?  That  I  did  not  know,  but  if  such  a  thing  happened  it 
would  no  doubt  be  upon  just  and  equitable  conditions,  and,  for 
that  matter,  if  they  thought  well  of  it,  they  should  make  their 
propositions  ;  that  I  had  some  good  acquaintances,  and  I  should 
undertake  to  present  their  demands,  without  anything  more. 

"They  asked  me  whether  I  thought  it  wise  for  them  to  send  a 
Deputy  Plenipotentiary  to  France.  I  answered  that  I  thought 
that  would  be  precipitate,  even  hazardous  5  that  everything  that 
took  place  in  London  was  known  in  France,  and  what  occurred  in 
France  was  known  in  London,  and  that  this  would  be  a  dangerous 
step,  in  the  very  face  of  the  English  ;  but  that  if  they  authorized 
me  to  do  so,  perhaps  I  should  be  able  to  get  a  reply  which  would 
direct  them  in  their  future  conduct ;  that  in  the  mean  time  I  could 
not  advise  them  one  way  or  the  other,  I  was  merely  a  private  per 
son,  an  inquisitive  traveller,  but  I  should  be  delighted  if  I  could 
be  of  any  service  to  them  through  my  acquaintances  ;  that  I  should 
not  expose  them,  or  myself,  or  anybody  ;  that  in  matters  of  such 
gravity  it  was  important  to  be  very  careful,  especially  as  I  had  no 
right  and  no  authority,  and  that  I  should  be  responsible  for  only  one 
thing,  namely,  not  to  betray  their  confidence." 

The  Committee  sent  to  Bonvouloir,  in  writing,  three 
questions,  to  which  they  asked  him  to  reply.  1st.  What 
was  the  disposition  of  the  French  Court  toward  the  North 
American  Colonies  ;  whether  it  was  friendly  ;  and  in  what 
way  they  might  have  authentic  assurance  of  it.  2d. 
Whether  the  Americans  could  obtain  two  good  engineers 
in  France,  well  recommended ;  and  if  so,  how  that  might 
be  accomplished.  3d.  Whether  the  Americans  could  ob 
tain  directly  from  France  arms  and  munitions  of  war  in 
exchange  for  the  products  of  the  Colonies ;  and  whether 
their  vessels  would  be  allowed  to  enter  and  clear  from 
French  ports.  To  these  questions  M.  Bonvouloir  replied 
as  follows  : 

"I  shall  reply,  gentlemen,  as  positively  as  I  can  to  the  questions 
you  have  done  me  the  honor  to  ask  me,  and  I  shall  inform  you  so 
far  as  a  private  man  can  be  informed  himself  who  has  no  connec 
tion  with  the  ministry  ;  but  I  shall  reply  according  to  my  con 
jectures,  to  public  opinion,  and  to  the  judgment  of  some  of  my 


1776.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  105 

friends.  1st.  You  ask  what  the  intention  of  France  is  as  to  the 
Colonies  of  North  America.  I  think  I  am  not  going  too  far  when 
I  say  that  she  wishes  you  well,  and  that  I  believe  she  has  never 
had  any  other  feeling  than  that  of  good  will  toward  you.  But,  in 
order  to  know  this  of  any  one  with  certainty,  the  way  is  to  address 
him  directly.  The  step  is  a  dangerous  one  in  this  case,  and  re 
quires  great  caution  ;  I  cannot  advise  you  for  it  or  against  it.  I 
shall  not  assume  it  myself ;  the  matter  is  too  delicate.  2d.  France 
is  quite  able  to  furnish  you  two  good  engineers,  and  even  more. 
The  only  way  is,  to  ask  for  them.  I  have  done  this  for  you,  gentle 
men,  without  becoming  responsible  for  its  success  ;  although  I 
hope  for  that,  because  I  have  some  good  correspondents.  3d. 
Whether  you  can  obtain  arms  and  other  munitions  directly  from 
France  in  exchange  for  your  products.  As  this  is  a  question  of 
one  merchant  with  another,  I  see  no  great  difficulty  as  for  as 
France  is  concerned.  I  shall  give  you  the  address  of  certain  good 
correspondents,  without,  however,  making  myself  liable  in  any 
way.  You  can  undertake  it  at  your  own  risk  and  peril,  for  it  is 
possible  that  England  may  not  let  you  alone,  and  you  cannot 
expect  to  be  protected  ;  and  I  should  not  advise  you  to  ship  every 
thing  to  a  single  port,  because  that  might  attract  attention.  I 
cannot  say  whether  you  will  be  allowed  to  enter  and  clear  from 
French  ports  ;  that  would  be  equal  to  an  open  declaration  in  your 
favor,  and  war  might  follow.  But  it  is  possible  that  the  Govern 
ment  might  close  its  eyes  to  it,  which  is  all  you  require.  I  have 
the  honor  to  repeat  to  you,  gentlemen,  that  I  am  not  at  all  respon 
sible.  I  am  of  very  small  consequence,  myself ;  I  have  some  good 
acquaintances,  that  is  all.  If  I  should  be  so  fortunate  as  to  suc 
ceed,  I  should  be  amply  repaid  by  the  honor  of  your  confidence 
and  the  pleasure  of  doing  you  a  service."  1 

The  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  which  con-\ 
sisted  of  Dr.  Franklin,  Mr.  Harrison,  Mr.  Johnson,  Mr^ 
Dickinson,  and   Mr.  Jay,  some  of  the  bonnes  teles  who 
impressed   Bonvouloir  with    being   able  to  take  care  of 
themselves,  evidently  understood  very  nearly,  if  not  quite, 
what  his  relation  was  to  the  Government  of  France,  and 
what  conclusions  to  draw  as  to  the  sentiment  entertained 
there  toward  the  Colonies,  as  well  as  the  probability  of 
a  favorable  reply  if  they  should  adopt  his  suggestion  and 

1  Quoted  by  M.  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  267. 


106  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FKENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1776. 

make  their  proposition  directly  to  the  Cabinet.  They 
concluded  to  do  this ;  and,  in  order  the  more  effectively  to 
accomplish  their  object,  they  determined  to  have  a  repre 
sentative  of  the  Congress  in  France.  For  that  purpose 
they  selected  Silas  Deane,  of  Connecticut,  on  the  3d  of 
March,  1776 ;  and  he  very  shortly  afterward  set  sail  for 
Europe. 

All  this  was  most  acceptable  to  M.  de  Vergennes ;  it 
confirmed  the  expectations  he  had  allowed  himself  to 
indulge  in,  and  it  encouraged  him  to  continue  his  under 
taking  with  renewed  vigor.  Up  to  that  time  he  had  dis 
closed  his  opinion  of  the  situation  only  to  the  King  and 
M.  de  Maurepas,  in  the  analysis  contained,  as  we  have 
seen,  in  the  "  Reflexions."  Now,  however,  it  became 
necessary  to  enlarge  his  audience,  and  to  secure,  if  possible, 
the  co-operation  of  the  other  members  of  the  King's 
Cabinet,  by  whom,  if  his  views  met  with  their  approval, 
they  should  be  officially  adopted  as  the  fixed  policy  of  the 
Government. 

Each  minister,  or  "  Secretary  of  State,"  as  he  was  called, 
was  absolute  in  the  decision  of  questions  relating  to  his  own 
department,  in  regard  to  which  he  was  responsible  only  to 
the  King.  But  it  was  customary,  whenever  a  matter  of 
very  grave  importance  presented  itself  to  either  of  the 
Secretaries,  to  go  to  the  King  and  ask  that  His  Majesty 
yehould  designate  a  Council  composed  of  such  other  of  the 
^Secretaries  as  he  might  name,  to  whom  the  subject-matter 
should  be  submitted ;  and,  after  a  full  discussion,  each  one 
present  was  usually  called  upon  to  hand  to  the  King, 
within  a  reasonable  time,  his  opinion  in  writing  as  to  the 
course  proper  to  be  pursued  by  the  Government. 

M.  de  Vergennes  adopted  this  method,  in  the  following 
letter  to  King  Louis : 

"SiRE, — As  it  is  possible  that  the  crisis  in  the  affairs  of  North 
America  may  extend  to  the  interests  of  France  and  Spain,  which 
Your  Majesty  has  with  superior  wisdom  already  pointed  out,  the 


1776.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  107 

most  enlightened  foresight  may  even  find  itself  embarrassed  to 
determine  what  it  would  be  most  advantageous  for  the  two  Powers 
to  do  under  such  extremely  delicate  circumstances.  Nevertheless, 
since  it  has  become  indispensable  for  us  to  reach  some  conclusion, 
I  have  brought  together  what  have  seemed  to  me  to  be  the  most 
important  considerations  to  serve  as  a  basis  of  deliberation.  I 
have  the  honor  to  transmit  them  to  Your  Majesty.  I  beg  you 
to  read  them  over,  and  if  you  consider  them  worthy  of  further 
attention  I  beg  Your  Majesty  to  allow  me  to  transmit  copies  of 
them  to  such  of  your  ministers  as  you  shall  think  proper  to  sum 
mon  to  the  discussion  of  so  grave  a  question.  I  shall  invite  each 
one  of  them  to  furnish,  as  soon  as  possible,  an  opinion  in  writing. 
Tiiis  union  of  sentiments  and  of  ideas  is,  perhaps,  the  most 
effective  method  by  which  to  obtain  a  satisfactory  light  upon  the 
subject"  l 

The  document  submitted  herewith  by  the  Secretary  of 
State  was  entitled  "  Considerations."  It  enlarged  the 
ideas  contained  in  the  "  Reflexions,"  modifying  somewhat 
their  too  bold  statements  as  to  the  purposes  and  ambi 
tion  of  France,  which  it  might  be  safe  to  express  in  the 
close  intimacy  of  the  King's  own  apartment,  but  would 
not  be  wise  to  declare  officially  as  the  policy  of  the  Gov 
ernment,  and  it  conveyed  their  meaning  in  cautious  and 
more  skilfully  devised  language,  intended  especially  to 
strengthen  the  interest  of  the  Spanish  Court  and  to  foster 
the  sentiment  that  the  unity  of  the  two  Crowns  was  the 
only  warrant  of  safety  for  either.  The  central  thought  is 
that  favorite  maxim  of  the  Comte  de  Vergeunes,  that 
France  and  Spain  were  threatened  with  war,  whatever 
might  be  the  outcome  of  the  American  Revolution  ;  be 
cause  in  the  event  either  of  success  or  of  defeat  Great 
Britain  would  have  a  pretext  for  attacking  them.  This 
reasoning  performed  conspicuous  service  in  sustaining  the 
theories  and  arguments  developed  by  him  in  the  "  Con 
siderations,"  which  are  as  follows  : 


1  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  271. 

2  It  is  not  dated,  but  was  probably  written  in  March,  1770. 


108  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1776. 

"  CONSIDERATIONS.1 

"The  attitude  of  England  toward  her  Colonies  of  North  Amer 
ica,  and  the  possible  and  probable  consequences  of  the  issue 
of  that  quarrel,  however  it  may  result,  undoubtedly  present  the 
weightiest  reasons  for  the  most  serious  attention  on  the  part  of 
France  and  Spain. 

1  i  The  political  calculations  which  we  are  able  to  base  upon  this 
great  crisis  are  of  such  a  nature  that  it  is  problematical  whether 
the  two  Powers  ought  rather  to  wish  for  the  subjection  or  the 
independence  of  the  Colonies,  and  that  in  the  one  case  as  in  the 
other  they  will  still  be  threatened  by  dangers  which  it  is  perhaps 
not  in  the  power  of  human  foresight  either  to  anticipate  or  to 
ward  off. 

"  We  shall  not  enter  into  the  discussion  which  a  development 
of  these  reflections  would  require,  but  shall  confine  ourselves  to 
their  demonstration  by  observing  that  if,  on  the  one  hand,  we  may 
regard  the  continuation  of  the  civil  war  as  of  infinite  advantage 
to  the  two  Crowns,  because  it  will  exhaust  both  the  conquerors 
and  the  conquered,  yet,  on  the  other  hand,  we  shall  still  have  to 
fear,  1st,  that  the  English  ministry,  finding  itself  unable  to  con 
tinue,  may  hold  out  its  hand  toward  a  reconciliation ;  2d,  that 
the  King  of  England,  by  conquering  British  America,  may  turn 
it  into  an  instrument  with  which  to  subjugate  European  England 
also ;  3d,  that  the  English  ministry,  defeated  upon  the  continent 
of  America,  may  seek  a  compensation  at  the  expense  of  France 
and  of  Spain,  which  would  free  them  from  their  disgrace  and 
afford  them  at  the  same  time  a  means  of  conciliation  with  the 
'insurgents,'  to  whom  they  would  open  the  markets  and  secure 
the  trade  of  the  Islands ;  4th,  that  the  Colonies,  once  having 
become  independent,  and  retaining  no  attachment  to  England, 
might  become  conquerors  by  necessity  ;  because,  being  overstocked 
with  their  own  products,  they  might  seek  by  force  an  outlet  in  the 
sugar  islands  and  in  Spanish  America,  which  would  destroy  the 
relations  of  our  colonies  to  the  central  Government. 

"  These  different  suppositions  may  point  with  almost  equal 
certainty  to  a  war,  more  or  less  remote,  with  France  and  Spain. 
The  first,  because  the  Court  of  London  might  be  tempted  to  employ 
the  forces  it  has  collected  together  in  the  too  easy  conquest  offered 
by  the  West  India  Islands.  The  second,  because  the  subjection 
of  the  home  Government  can  be  accomplished  only  by  fomenting 

1  Etats-Unis,  Memoires  et  Documents  de  1765  a  1778,  No.  8  :  Doniol,  La 
Participation  de  la  France,  i.  273. 


1776.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  109 

the  hatred  and  jealousy  of  the  nation  by  a  war  the  continuance 
of  which  would  accustom  it  to  the  yoke,  and  the  successful 
ending  of  which  would  make  it  certain.  The  third  and  last,  be 
cause  of  the  desperation  of  the  ministry  and  the  efforts  to  protect, 
perhaps,  not  only  the  heads  of  the  ministers  themselves,  but 
even  the  person  of  the  King,  against  the  rage  of  the  English 
people,  by  securing  a  conquest  as  useful  as  it  is  brilliant,  and  one 
through  which  they  may  escape  the  disgrace  of  a  peace  encum 
bered  by  the  indemnity  wrung  from  defeat,  or  by  offensive  terms 
of  reconciliation. 

"Such  is,  indeed,  the  actual  situation  of  the  Colonies  of  the 
two  nations  that,  with  the  exception  perhaps  of  the  Havana, 
none  of  them  is  strong  enough  to  resist  even  a  part  of  the  forces 
which  England  is  sending  to  America ;  and  the  physical  pos 
sibility  of  their  conquest  is  but  too  evident. 

"As  to  the  moral  likelihood  of  an  invasion  thus  made  without 
cause  and  contrary  to  the  obligations  both  of  public  faith  and 
of  existing  treaties,  we  should  strangely  deceive  ourselves  if  we 
believed  that  the  English  are  susceptible  to  the  influence  of  any 
such  considerations ;  neither  gratitude  nor  a  fair  return  for  past 
conduct  has  any  more  effect  upon  them  than  the  sacred  rules  of 
morality.  It  seems,  indeed,  as  if  they  applauded  our  moral  be 
havior  with  a  sort  of  contempt.  Experience  has  but  too  clearly 
shown  that  they  regard  as  honorable  and  just  everything  which 
they  consider  beneficial  to  themselves  and  damaging  to  their 
rivals.  The  maxims  of  the  greater  part  of  their  statesmen  are 
well  known  ;  they  do  not  consider  the  injury  which  France  actu 
ally  does  them,  but  rather  that  which  she  might  do  at  some  future 
time.  They  feel  that  if  England  exhausts  herself  by  the  present 
war,  and  if  France  and  Spain  take  such  measures  as  their  wisdom 
and  their  resources  dictate,  they  will  be  unable  at  the  end  of  the 
contest  to  resist  the  forces  of  the  two  Powers.  This  reflection  has 
already  been  made  ;  already  the  Opposition  seems  to  have  united 
upon  this  general  principle  with  the  party  of  the  present  ministry  ; 
already  there  is  reason  to  fear  that  the  ministerial  party,  recog 
nizing  their  weakness,  may  seize  the  only  means  left  to  disengage 
themselves  from  the  labyrinth  in  which  they  are  entangled,  by 
giving  up  the  reins  of  power  to  the  Opposition,  and  that  Lords 
Chatham,  Shelburne,  Weymouth,  Sandwich,  and  Richmond  may 
hope  in  the  same  manner  to  govern  and  to  preserve  their  popu 
larity  by  making  peace  with  America  and  by  using  the  enormous 
mass  of  forces  now  equipped  to  correct  the  stipulations  of  the  last 
treaty  of  peace,  which  they  have  never  ceased  to  attack  with  the 


110  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1776. 

utmost  fury.  The  English  of  all  political  parties  appear  to  agree 
in  the  belief  that  a  popular  war  with  France,  or  the  invasion 
of  Mexico,  would  end,  or  would  at  least  soften,  their  domestic 
contests  and  would  extinguish  their  national  debt. 

I  l  In  the  midst  of  so  many  perils,  the  recognized  desire  of  the 
King  of  France  and  the  King  of  Spain  for  the  continuance  of 
peace  warns  us  to  advance  with  most  careful  footsteps.     If  the 
dispositions  of  these  two  Princes  were  warlike,  if  they  chose  to 
give  way  to  the  dictates  of  their  own  interests  and  perhaps  to  the 
justice  of  their  cause,  which  is  that  of  humanity  so  often  offended 
by  England,  if  their  financial  and  military  resources  had  reached 
the  proper  point  of  development  and  energy  and  were  propor 
tioned  to  their  effective  power,  we  should  declare  to  them,  no 
doubt,  that  Providence  has  pointed  out  the  moment  for  the  hu 
miliation  of  England,  that  it  has  struck  her  with  blindness,  the 
certain  precursor  of  her  destruction,  and  that  it  is  now  time  to 
take  vengeance  upon  that  nation  for  the  menaces  it  has  made  ever 
since  the  beginning  of  this  century  against  those  who  have  unfor 
tunately  been  its  neighbors  and  its  rivals.     It  would  be  necessary 
in  that  case  to  neglect  no  opportunity  to  make  the  approaching 
campaign  as  active  as  possible,  or  to  secure  advantages  for  the 
Americans.     The  degree  of  fury  and  exhaustion  of  both  parties 
which  would  result  would  determine  the  instant  to  strike  such 
decisive  blows  as  to  force  England  into  the  position  of  a  second- 
rate  Power ;  to  snatch  from  her  the  empire  which  she  assumes 
to  exert  in  the  four  quarters  of  the  earth  with  equal  pride  and 
injustice ;  and  to  rid  the  universe  of  an  envious  tyrant  striving 
at  once  to  absorb  all  power  and  all  wealth. 

"  But  this  is  not  the  point  of  view  which  the  two  monarchs  are 
willing  to  take :  their  course  appears  at  this  juncture  to  be  to 
confine  themselves  to  a  watchfulness  which  shall  be  at  once  cir 
cumspect  and  active. 

' '  If  this  maxim  be  adopted,  it  will  remain  for  us  to  determine 
by  what  line  of  conduct  we  shall  best  attain  this  result. 

II  Before  concluding  definitively,   however,  we  are  now  in  a 
position  to  establish  certain  results  of  the  brief  examination  which 
has  just  been  made.    1st.  We  must  avoid  compromising  ourselves, 
and  we  must  not  arouse  those  evils  which  we  wish  to  avert.     2d. 
We  must  not  flatter  ourselves,  however,  that  inaction,  even  the 
most  absolute  and  the  most  rigorous,  will  protect  us  from  all  sus 
picion  ;  for  we  know  that  our  present  conduct  is  not  entirely  free 
from  it.     The  English,  accustomed  to  follow  the  direction  of  their 
own  interests  and  to  judge  other  people  by  themselves,  will  never 


1776.]         WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  Ill 

believe  that  we  shall  let  slip  so  good  an  opportunity  to  injure 
them ;  even  if  they  did  believe  it,  they  would  pretend  they  did 
not,  if  they  found  an  occasion  to  attack  us  ;  and  Europe  would  be 
persuaded  they  were  right,  however  we  might  deny  it.  3d.  The 
continuation  of  the  war,  at  least  for  another  year,  seems  desirable 
for  the  two  Crowns,  either  because  we  wish  the  forces  now  being 
sent  to  America  to  be  occupied  in  fighting  the  Colonists,  or  be 
cause  the  ministry  would  be  changed  of  necessity  if  peace  were  to 
be  declared  now,  or  because  the  English  army,  weakened  either 
by  its  victories  or  by  its  defeats,  would  thus  be  unable  to  under 
take  a  vigorous  enterprise,  or,  finally,  because  another  year  added 
to  our  measures  of  activity  and  watchfulness  may  in  very  many 
respects  change  the  position  of  affairs.  4th.  The  most  certain 
means  by  which  to  accomplish  this  result  would  be,  on  the  one 
hand,  to  encourage  the  English  ministry  in  the  belief  that  the 
intentions  of  France  and  Spain  are  pacific,  in  order  that  they  may 
not  hesitate  to  embark  in  an  active  and  expensive  campaign  ; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  we  should  sustain  the  courage  of  the 
Americans  by  certain  secret  favors  and  by  vague  hopes  which 
would  prevent  them  from  accepting  the  overtures  of  peace  now 
being  made  to  them,  and  which  would  contribute  to  ripen  the 
ideas  of  independence  which  up  to  this  time  have  only  begun  to 
germinate  among  them.  The  ills  which  the  English  oblige  them 
to  suffer  will  embitter  their  minds,  they  will  carry  on  the  war 
with  so  much  more  violence,  and,  in  case  the  central  Government 
should  be  victorious,  it  would  require  for  a  long  time  to  come 
all  the  forces  it  can  command  to  check  the  spirit  of  independence 
in  the  Americans,  and  it  would  not  dare  to  expose  itself  to  the 
efforts,  combined  with  those  of  some  foreign  enemy,  which  they 
would  make  to  recover  their  liberty. 

"If  we  decide  that  all  these  considerations  are  as  true  and  as 
substantial  as  they  are  probable,  the  natural  deductions  will  appear 
to  be  : 

"1st.  That  we  ought  to  continue  dexterously  to  encourage  the 
feeling  of  security  on  the  part  of  the  English  ministry  as  to  the 
intentions  of  France  and  Spain. 

"2d.  That  we  ought  to  give  to  the  insurgents  secret  aid  in 
the  way  of  munitions  of  war  and  money  ;  that  the  advantages 
which  we  have  already  presupposed  will  justify  this  slight  sacri 
fice  ;  and  that  no  consideration  of  dignity  or  of  equity  would 
forbid  it. 

"3d.  That  it  would  not  accord  with  the  dignity  of  the  King,  or 
with  his  interests,  to  make  a  treaty  with  the  insurgents  ;  and  this 


112  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1776. 

is  proved  by  taking  a  few  out  of  the  mass  of  arguments  which 
might  be  cited.  Such  a  treaty  would  at  best  be  valid  only  after 
they  had  secured  their  independence,  and  then  only  until  it  suited 
them  to  break  it ;  its  validity  would  also  be  limited  by  the  con 
tinuance  of  the  form  of  government  under  a  changing  and  neces 
sarily  stormy  administration  ;  and,  finally,  it  would  remain  in  force 
only  upon  condition  that  the  Navigation  Act  should  not  become 
the  basis  of  a  reunion  between  the  mother-country  and  the  Col 
onies.  An  alliance  of  that  kind  can  never  be  firmly  established 
except  upon  mutual  interest ;  and  it  seems  now  that  it  will  be 
time  enough  to  consider  the  question  when  the  liberty  of  British 
America  shall  have  attained  an  actual  existence. 

U4th.  That,  if  France  and  Spain  give  their  aid,  they  must  look 
for  their  reward  in  the  accomplishment  of  the  political  result 
which  for  the  moment  they  wish  to  secure,  except  so  far  as  this 
may  be  modified  by  subsequent  conditions  and  events. 

1  i  5th.  Perhaps  we  should  consider,  as  a  matter  of  good  politics, 
that  a  too  marked  apathy  upon  our  part  in  the  present  crisis  may 
be  interpreted  as  the  result  of  fear,  and  of  that  immoderate  love 
of  peace  which  during  the  last  few  years  has  been  the  cause  of  so 
many  evils  and  so  much  injustice  ;  and  that  England,  encouraged 
by  our  supposed  cowardice  on  the  one  hand  and  by  our  lack  of 
means  on  the  other,  may  become  more  exacting  even  than  she  is 
now,  and  may  dare  anything,  either  directly  and  openly,  or  by  the 
insolence  and  injustice  of  her  cruisers  and  her  claims  of  right 
to  search,  and  by  those  insults  which  she  never  can  and  never 
will  wish  to  atone  for,  and  which  we  never  can  and  never  will 
tolerate.  The  English  respect  those  only  who  are  strong  enough 
to  make  themselves  feared. 

"6th.  The  result  which  the  grouping  of  these  facts  and  sug 
gestions  presents  with  the  strongest  evidence  of  truth  is,  the 
necessity  of  our  putting  ourselves  into  such  a  position  that  we 
may  either  hold  the  English  within  bounds,  or  may  render  it 
unsafe  for  them  to  attack,  or  may  secure  for  ourselves  the  means 
to  punish  them.  Wisely  matured  plans  for  the  future  which 
raise  the  efficient  forces  of  the  two  monarchies  to  the  level  of 
their  real  power  are  at  all  times  useful  and  proper  j  but  when 
the  public  good  is  threatened  by  so  many  dangers  upon  all  sides, 
an  active  watchfulness  as  to  the  future  becomes  absolutely  neces 
sary.  It  presents  the  only  means  by  which  at  the  same  time 
to  guard  against  possible  evils  and  to  repair  the  injury  of  those 
which  we  have  not  been  able  to  avoid,  especially  since  of  all  the 
conjectures  that  we  are  able  to  form  as  to  the  probable  turn  of 


1776.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  113 

affairs,  the  one  which  is  the  least  supported  by  the  evidence 
of  present  facts  is  that  peace  can  be  preserved  whatever  may  be 
the  outcome  of  the  war  now  going  on  between  England  and  her 
Colonies. 

1  •  These  are  the  various  points  of  view  from  which  this  most 
important  question  has  appeared  susceptible  of  being  considered, 
which  it  has  been  intended  merely  to  indicate  here  to  the  wisdom 
and  penetration  of  the  King  and  his  Council." 

Stripped  of  its  covering  of  guarded  sentences  and  diplo 
matic  asseverations  as  to  the  intentions  of  the  two  Govern 
ments,  and  as  to  the  spirit  of  justice  and  love  of  peace 
which  resided  in  the  breasts  of  the  two  monarchs,  the 
intention  of  M.  de  Vergennes  is  plainly  to  be  seen  in  the 
substance  of  this  document.  He  needed  the  assistance  of 
Spain.  He  had  determined  that  France  should  make  war 
upon  England,  but  he  was  unwilling  to  undertake  that 
task,  even  during  England's  embarrassment  with  her  Colo 
nies,  unless  he  had  beside  him  the  soldiers  and  sailors 
of  the  King  of  Spain  and  could  draw  support  from  the 
great  resources  of  the  Spanish  realm.  King  Carlos  III. 
had  no  desire,  however,  to  make  war  upon  so  formidable 
an  enemy  without  very  great  cause,  or  unless  his  interests 
were  directly  attacked  ;  he  preferred  to  live  in  peace,  and 
his  desire  was  to  close  his  reign  in  tranquillity,  if  possible, 
for  he  was  no  longer  young  and  he  had  no  ambition  for 
conquest,  He  regarded  England  as  his  enemy,  because  he 
suspected  her  of  encouraging  people  with  whom  he  was  at 
war,  as  in  the  case  of  Portugal,  which  he  believed  to  be 
constantly  supported,  both  in  Europe  and  in  her  posses 
sions  upon  the  South  American  continent,  by  the  secret 
influence  of  the  British  Cabinet.  Yet  it  is  not  likely  that 
of  his  own  accord  he  would  have  conceived  the  idea  of 
fighting  England  for  that,  He  resented  the  attitude  of 
M.  de  Pombal  toward  Spain,  and  would  gladly  have  seen 
the  Portuguese  Cabinet  chastised  for  conduct  which  he 
regarded  as  offensive  and  insolent,  in  the  administering  of 

VOL.  I.— 8 


114  RELATIONS    OF    THE    FRENCH    GOVERNMENT         [1776. 

which  chastisement  he  might  even  have  risked  the  dis 
pleasure  of  Great  Britain  ;  because,  while  he  was  honestly 
inclined  toward  peace,  he  would  not  have  hesitated  from 
fear  of  war  to  defend  the  dignity  of  his  throne  or  the  honor 
of  his  people.  He  was  a  proud  king  and  intensely  jealous 
of  his  territorial  rights ;  he  had  said  upon  one  occasion, 
"  I  do  not  want  the  possessions  of  other  people,  I  am  only 
anxious  to  keep  what  belongs  to  me ;  but,  if  anybody 
wishes  to  see  me,  he  knows  where  I  am  to  be  found ;  and 
if  any  one  undertakes  to  attack  my  Islands,  he  will  find 
some  one  there  to  receive  him." 

That  sentiment  gave  the  cue  to  M.  de  Vergennes ;  the 
way  to  win  over  Spain  was  to  prove  that  the  Islands  were 
in  danger  of  attack  ;  and  upon  that  he  erected  the  extraor 
dinary  theory  that  England  intended  to  strike  at  the  pos 
sessions  of  the  two  monarchies  when  she  should  have 
finished  with  the  Colonies  in  America,  whatever  might  be 
the  result  of  that  conflict ;  because,  if  they  were  defeated 
there,  the  British  ministry  would  be  obliged,  in  their 
political  helplessness,  to  tear  from  France  and  Spain  a 
part  of  their  flourishing  provinces  and  throw  it  down  as  a 
bait  before  the  rage  and  fury  of  the  English  people,  in 
order  to  save  themselves  from  being  dragged  inconti 
nently  to  the  scaffold ;  or,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  war 
in  America  resulted  favorably  to  the  mother-country  and 
the  Colonies  were  subdued,  the  national  arrogance  of  the 
British  would  hold  unrestricted  sway,  and  they  would  turn 
the  victorious  hordes  of  North  America  against  the  tempt 
ing  islands  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  if  for  no  other  reason 
than  to  punish  France  and  Spain  for  the  help  they  would 
be  supposed  to  have  given  to  the  rebels.  No  plea  of  inno 
cence  could  save  the  two  Crowns ;  the  English  were  sure 
to  accuse  them,  and  no  possible  line  of  conduct  could  shield 
them  from  an  accusation  which,  although  the  English 
knew  it  to  be  unjust,  they  would  still  pretend  there  was 
cause  for.  Thus  war  must  come, — war  of  insult,  of  ag- 


1776.]        WITH    THE    COLONIES    OF    NORTH    AMERICA.  115 

gression,  of  wanton  cruelty,  of  inconceivable  baseness,  but 
yet  inevitable  war.  Nothing  remained  but  to  unite  the 
two  monarchies  as  closely  as  possible  under  the  Family 
Compact,  and  to  prepare  together  to  resist  its  dreaded 
outbreak. 

The  real  motive  in  all  this  argument  was  cunningly 
slipped  forward  under  the  insinuation  that  Providence  had 
pointed  out  the  moment  for  bringing  humiliation  upon 
the  English  people  and  for  reducing  their  Government 
from  its  present  supremacy  to  the  degraded  level  of  a 
second-rate  nation ;  and  there  is  not  much  doubt  that 
this  would  have  comprised  the  whole  substance  of  the 
document  if  M.  de  Vergennes  had  believed  that  the  dis 
position  of  the  Spanish  Court  would  justify  him  in  stating 
explicitly  what  he  intended  and  what  he  thought.  How 
much  of  all  this  reasoning  he  really  did  believe  it  is  im 
possible  at  this  distance  of  time  for  us  to  determine ;  but 
there  can  be  no  question  that,  in  his  desire  to  excite  the 
apprehension  of  the  Spanish  King,  he  greatly  overstated 
what  lie  considered  to  be  the  actual  danger  of  war  if 
France  and  Spain  should  remain  entirely  neutral  ;  his 
own  subsequent  despatches  prove  this ;  for  when  the 
Spaniards,  after  having  shown  a  sudden  and  unexpected 
willingness  to  brave  a  conflict  with  England  in  conse 
quence  of  the  attitude  of  Portugal,  were  in  danger  of 
anticipating  events  and  were  moving  faster  than  he  had 
intended,  he  showed  how  cleverly  he  could  argue  upon  the 
other  side  and  prove  that,  after  all,  if  a  war  with  England 
was  to  be  expected  at  some  future  time,  the  danger  of  it 
was  quite  remote ;  it  certainly  was  not  imminent. 

He  was  aiming  a  blow  at  England  in  connection  with 
which  he  wanted  the  support  of  Spain  ;  but  he  did  not 
intend  the  Spaniards  to  strike  the  blow  alone,  or  to  strike 
without  the  directing  hand  of  the  French  Cabinet,  or  at  a 
time  which  did  not  seem  to  France  the  moment  of  advan 
tage  ;  nor  did  he  desire  to  strike  through  the  medium  of 


116        KELATIONS    OF    FRANCE    WITH    THE   COLONIES.     [1776. 

Portugal  or  Brazil,  or  to  waste  substance  in  any  of  the 
petty  quarrels  in  which  Spain  was  here  and  there  in 
volved.  But  if  he  should  once  have  secured  the  co 
operation  of  the  Spanish  Crown,  so  that  he  could  count 
upon  it  beyond  a  question,  his  time  and  his  place  were 
already  selected :  the  time  was  that  moment  when  Eng 
land  should  be  most  embarrassed  by  the  perplexities  of 
her  civil  war  ;  and  the  place  was  in  the  British  Colonies 
of  North  America. 

This  became,  from  the  early  part  of  the  year  1776,  the 
settled  policy  of  the  Cabinet,  which  was  then  very  rapidly 
approaching  the  point  at  which  France  should  give  effect 
ive  aid  to  the  Colonists ;  the  Secretary  of  State  clearly 
denned  it  in  his  letter  to  the  Marques  de  Grimaldi,  on 
the  3d  of  May,  in  which  he  informed  him  that  up  to  that 
time  the  Government  had  had  no  understanding  with 
the  Americans,  directly  or  indirectly,  though  it  had 
"allowed  them  to  enjoy  all  the  facilities  of  trading  in 
its  ports  and  had  closed  its  eyes  to  the  sort  of  traffic 
which  they  had  been  able  to  carry  on  there,"  adding  to 
this,  however,  that,  as  affairs  in  England  were  now  draw 
ing  near  to  a  crisis,  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  Cabinet  of 
Versailles  that  something  more  ought  to  be  done  for  the 
Colonists  than  to  continue  to  hold  them  upon  the  footing 
of  mere  tolerance.1 


Espagne,  t.  580,  No.  70  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  374. 


1776.]  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE   AND    SPAIN.  117 


CHAPTER    IV. 

EFFORTS  OF  THE  COMTE   DE  VERGENNES   TO   UNITE   FRANCE 
AND    SPAIN    IN    THE    AMERICAN    WAR. 

IN  the  mean  time  the  "  Considerations"  had  been  sub 
mitted  on  the  12th  of  March,  by  command  of  the  King, 
to  a  Council  composed  of  the  following  ministers, — the 
Comte  de  Maurepas,  M.  Turgot,  the  Controleur-Gene- 
ral,  M.  de  Sartine,  and  the  Comte  de  Saint-Germain, 
each  of  whom  submitted  an  opinion  in  writing,  more  or 
less  closely  following  the  reasoning  of  M.  de  Vergennes, 
and  all  of  them  agreeing  with  him  in  his  conclusions, 
except  Turgot,  who  treated  the  subject  very  profoundly, 
but  who  objected  to  a  policy  which  was  likely  to  lead  the 
country  into  war,  principally  because  it  would  involve 
enormous  expenditures  of  money  and  would  require  the 
assumption  of  new  financial  burdens  quite  in  opposition 
to  his  plans  of  re-establishing  the  credit  of  the  kingdom 
by  careful  administration  and  rigid  economy. 

The  protection  of  the  French  colonies  did  not  appeal 
to  the  mind  of  M.  Turgot  as  a  subject  of  national  impor 
tance,  or  one  which  ought  to  call  forth  great  solicitude,  be 
cause  he  had  already  adopted  the  theory  that  no  country 
could  long  hope  to  retain  its  colonists  as  subjects,  the 
day  of  colonization  under  control  of  the  mother-country 
having  gone  by ;  that  the  Colonies  of  Great  Britain  were 
at  that  moment  breaking  away  from  her,  Spain  must  pre 
pare  herself  to  see  hers  follow  before  many  years,  and 
those  of  France  would  naturally  travel  in  the  same  direc 
tion.  Therefore  it  would  not  be  wise  to  engage  in  a  war 
to  protect  property  of  so  little  value,  and  if  England  did 


118  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE    AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

attack  the  French  colonies,  according  to  the  reasoning  of 
the  "  Considerations,"  and  should  even  take^fc^m  away, 
it  would  only  be  taking  from  France  what,  after  all,  she 
must  lose,  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances,  sooner 
or  later. 

Nevertheless,  the  general  opinion  of  the  Council  was  in 
favor  of  adopting  the  arguments  and  conclusions  of  the 
"  Considerations,"  the  other  ministers  agreeing  with  M. 
de  Vergennes,  all  of  them  ambitious  for  the  glory  of 
France,  all  actuated  by  a  hope  of  seeing  England's  power 
broken,  which  the  economics  and  political  philosophy  of 
Turgot  could  not  destroy.  The  King  consented  finally 
to  approve  the  policy  of  his  ministry  in  their  encourage 
ment  of  the  American  Colonists  to  rebel  against  England, 
to  permit  connivance  at  their  supplying  themselves  with 
munitions  of  war  in  French  ports,  and  to  allow  of  their 
obtaining  secret  but  substantial  aid  in  their  struggle  from 
the  Government  of  France  itself. 

Louis  XVI.  was  greatly  influenced  in  this  connection, 
no  doubt,  by  a  memoir  which  Beaumarchais,  who  was 
always  working  in  entire  accord  with  M.  de  Vergennes 
and  was  still  the  secret  agent  of  the  Cabinet  in  London, 
addressed  to  him  about  the  same  time,  under  the  title  of 
"  La  Paix  ou  la  Guerre  ;" l  which,  taken  in  connection 
with  the  "  Considerations,"  probably  achieved  the  success 
of  winning  over  the  King's  mind,  and  has  therefore  be 
come  for  us  an  important  document  in  connection  with  the 
participation  of  France  in  our  Revolution.  It  reads  as 

follows : 2 

"LA  PAIX   OU   LA   GUERRE. 

"For  the  King  alone. 

"  SIRE,  —The  famous  quarrel  between  America  and  England, 
which  is  about  to  divide  the  world  and  to  change  the  system  of 

1  It  bears  the  following  note,  in  the  hand  writing  of  Beaumarchais  :  "  Remis 
a  M.  le  Cte.  de  Vergennes,  cachet  volant,  le  29  Fevrier,  1776." 

*  The  text  is  printed  by  M.  Doniol  in  his  "Participation  de  la  France," 
i.  402. 


177(3.]  IN    THE    AMERICAN    WAR.  119 

Europe,  imposes  upon  each  Power  the  necessity  of  considering 
how  the  event  of  this  separation  may  influence  it  and  may  become 
either  a  benefit  or  an  injury. 

"But  certainly  the  most  interested  of  all  the  Powers  is  France, 
whose  sugar  islands  have  always  been  since  the  late  peace  the 
objects  of  the  regrets  and  the  hopes  of  the  English  j  desires  and 
regrets  which  will  infallibly  thrust  us  into  war  unless,  by  a  weak 
ness  which  it  is  impossible  to  imagine,  we  should  consent  to  sacri 
fice  our  rich  possessions  in  the  Gulf  to  the  chimera  of  a  shameful 
peace  more  destructive  than  the  very  war  we  so  greatly  fear. 

"In  a  former  memoir,  submitted  to  Your  Majesty  some  three 
months  ago  by  M.  de  Vergennes,  I  endeavored  firmly  to  establish 
that  Your  Majesty's  sense  of  justice  could  not  be  wounded  in 
taking  certain  wise  precautions  against  enemies  who  never  exhibit 
great  delicacy  in  those  which  they  take  against  us. 

"To-day,  when  the  moment  of  violent  crisis  is  rapidly  ap 
proaching,  I  am  forced  to  warn  Your  Majesty  that  the  preserva 
tion  of  our  possessions  in  America  and  the  peace  Your  Majesty 
appears  so  earnestly  to  desire  depend  upon  this  one  proposition  : 
We  must  help  the  Americans;  which  I  shall  now  proceed  to  de 
monstrate. 

"The  King  of  England,  the  Ministers,  the  Parliament,  the 
Opposition,  the  nation,  the  English  people,  and  the  parties  which 
are  distracting  the  State,  agree  that  they  can  no  longer  flatter 
themselves  with  the  hope  of  bringing  back  the  Americans,  or  that 
the  great  efforts  now  being  made  to  subjugate  them  will  mvrt 
with  success.  This  is  the  cause,  Sire,  of  those  violent  debates 
between  the  Ministry  and  the*  Opposition  ;  of  that  flow  and 
ebb  of  opinions  accepted  or  rejected,  which,  while  they  do  not 
help  their  business,  serve  to  put  the  question  in  a  clearer  light. 
Lord  North,  afraid  to  steer  alone  into  the  violence  of  such  a 
tempest,  has  just  taken  advantage  of  Lord  (iermaine  to  shift  the 
whole  burden  of  management  upon  his  ambitious  head. 

"Lord  Germaine,  stunned  by  the  outcries  and  lashed  by  the 
terrific  arguments  of  the  Opposition,  now  says  to  Lords  Shel- 
burnc  and  Rockingham,  party  leaders,  'In  the  present  state  of 
affairs,  gentlemen,  do  you  dare  to  say  to  the  nation  that  the 
Americans  will  accept  the  Navigation  Act  and  will  come  again 
under  the  yoke,  upon  the  sole  condition,  which  is  contained  in  Lord 
Shelburne's  plan,  that  they  shall  be  restored  to  the  position  they  occu 
pied  before  the  troubles  of  1763?  If  you  dare  to  say  this,  gentle 
men,  then  assume  the  ministry  and  make  yourselves  responsible 
for  the  safety  of  the  State,  at  your  own  risk.' 


120  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE    AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

"  The  Opposition,  although  inclined  to  take  the  minister  at  his 
word,  and  quite  ready  to  say  i  Yes/  is  deterred  only  by  the  fear 
that  the  Americans,  now  perhaps  encouraged  by  their  success  and 
emboldened  by  secret  treaties  with  Spain  and  France,  may  refuse 
those  very  conditions  which  they  begged  for  with  clasped  hands 
two  years  ago. 

'  *  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  L (M.  de  Vergennes  will  give  Your 

Majesty  his  name),1  the  secret  agent  of  the  Colonies  in  London, 
absolutely  discouraged  by  the  failure  of  the  attempts  he  has  made 
through  me  to  obtain  through  the  French  ministry  a  supply  of 
powder  and  munitions  of  war,  said  to  me  to-day,  '  For  the  last 
time,  then,  has  France  absolutely  decided  to  refuse  us  all  as 
sistance  and  to  make  herself  not  only  the  victim  of  England  but 
the  wonder  of  all  Europe  by  this  incredible  sluggishness?  I 
am  obliged  myself  to  answer  positively,  and  I  await  your  reply 
before  I  do  so.  We  offer  France,  as  the  price  of  her  secret  aid, 
a  secret  commercial  treaty  by  which  we  shall  turn  over  to  her,  for  a 
certain  number  of  years  after  the  declaration  of  peace,  all  the  ad 
vantages  by  which  we  have  enriched  England  for  a  century  past,  besides 
a  guarantee  as  to  her  possessions  to  the  extent  of  our  power.  Do  you 
not  want  it  I  I  only  ask  of  Lord  Shelburne  the  time  for  a  vessel 
to  take  to  Congress  the  propositions  of  England  and  to  return,  and 
I  can  tell  you  beforehand  what  the  decision  of  Congress  will  be  in 
regard  to  them.  They  will  issue  immediately  a  public  proclama 
tion  offering  to  all  the  nations  of  the  world,  in  return  for  their 
assistance,  the  same  conditions  that  I  now  offer  secretly  to  you. 
And,  in  order  to  retaliate  upon  France  and  to  force  her  to  make 
a  public  declaration  in  regard  to  them  which  will  commit  her  to 
the  extreme,  they  will  send  into  your  ports  the  first  prizes  which 
they  may  make  from  the  English  :  so  that,  whichever  way  you 
turn,  this  war  which  you  fear  so  much  and  from  which  you  seek 
to  escape  will  become  inevitable  to  you,  for  you  will  either  admit 
our  prizes  into  your  ports  or  you  will  forbid  them  to  enter  ;  if  you 
admit  them,  a  rupture  with  England  is  certain ;  if  you  forbid 
them,  Congress  will  instantly  accept  peace  upon  the  conditions 
proposed  by  the  central  Government,  and  the  outraged  Americans 
will  join  all  their  forces  with  those  of  England  to  fall  upon  your 
islands  and  prove  to  you  that  the  splendid  efforts  you  have  made 
to  defend  your  possessions  are  precisely  the  causes  which  will 
deprive  you  of  them  forever. 

1  i  i  Go,  sir,  back  to  France  and  present  there  this  picture  of 


1  Arthur  Lee. 


1776.]  IN    THE    AMERICAN    WAR.  121 

our  affairs.  I  shall  shut  myself  up  in  the  country  until  you  re 
turn,  in  order  not  to  be  forced  to  give  an  answer  before  I  shall 
have  received  yours.  Say  to  your  ministers  that  I  am  ready  to 
follow  you,  if  necessary,  to  confirm  these  statements ;  tell  them 
that  I  hear  that  Congress  has  sent  two  agents  to  the  Court  of  Madrid 
for  the  same  purpose,  and  I  may  add  also  that  they  have  received  a 
very  satisfactory  reply.  Shall  the  Council  of  France  to-day  enjoy 
the  famous  prerogative  of  being  alone  blinded  to  the  glory  of  the 
King  and  to  the  interests  of  his  kingdom!' 

"  This,  Sire,  is  the  striking  and  terrible  picture  of  our  situation. 
Your  Majesty  sincerely  desires  peace.  The  means  to  preserve  it, 
Sire,  will  form  the  subject  of  examination  in  this  memoir. 

"Let  us  admit  all  the  hypotheses  possible,  and  let  us  examine 
them. 

"What  follows  is  very  important. 

"Either  England  will  obtain  in  the  present  campaign  the  most 
complete  success  in  America  ; 

"Or  the  Americans  will  repel  the  English  with  loss ; 

"Or  England  will  take  the  course,  already  adopted  by  the  King, 
of  abandoning  the  Colonies  to  themselves  and  of  separating  from 
them  on  terms  of  friendship  ; 

"Or  the  Opposition  will  seize  the  ministry  and  will  answer  for 
the  submission  of  the  Colonies  upon  condition  of  their  being  re 
stored  to  their  position  in  17(53. 

"  Here  are  all  the  possible  events  grouped  together  :  is  there  a 
single  one  which  will  not  instantly  cause  the  very  war  which  you 
wish  to  avoid!  Sire,  for  God's  sake,  deign  to  consider  them  with 
me. 

"'1st.  If  England  triumphs  over  America,  it  can  only  be  at 
enormous  cost,  both  in  money  and  in  men.  Xow,  the  only  com 
pensation  which  the  English  have  in  view  for  so  great  a  loss  is,  to 
seize  in  turn  the  French  islands,  in  order  by  that  means  to  make 
themselves  the  exclusive  traders  in  the  precious  sugar  crop,  which 
alone  can  repair  the  damage  done  to  their  commerce  ;  and  this 
capture  will  also  make  them  forever  the  absolute  possessors  of  the 
benefits  arising  out  of  the  unauthorized  traffic  now  carried  on  by 
the  continent  with  these  same  islands. 

"In  that  event,  Sire,  it  would  only  remain  for  you  to  choose 
between  beginning  too  late  an  unproductive  war,  or  sacrificing  to 
the  most  shameful,  idle  peace  all  your  American  colonies  and  of 
losing  two  hundred  and  eighty  millions  of  capital  and  more  than 
thirty  millions  of  revenue. 

"2d.  If  the  Americans  win,  they  will  be  free  at  once  ;  and  the 


122  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE    AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

English,  made  desperate  at  the  sight  of  their  existence  reduced 
by  three-quarters,  will  be  all  the  more  ready  to  redeem  their  loss 
by  a  compensation  now  become  indispensable,  in  the  easy  capture 
of  our  American  possessions  ;  and  we  may  rest  assured  that  they 
will  not  fail  to  do  it. 

"3d.  If  the  English  think  themselves  obliged  to  abandon  the 
Colonies  to  themselves  without  striking  a  blow,  which  is  the  secret 
wish  of  the  King,  the  loss  will  be  the  same  to  their  existence,  and, 
their  trade  being  equally  damaged,  the  result  in  our  case  would 
be  similar  to  the  foregoing  j  except  that  in  this  event  the  English 
will  be  less  weakened  by  a  friendly  separation  than  they  would 
have  been  by  a  bloody  and  ruinous  campaign,  and  they  will  be  all 
the  more  prepared  both  in  means  and  in  facilities  to  seize  our 
islands,  which  they  will  then  not  be  able  to  do  without  if  they 
wish  to  keep  their  own  and  to  retain  a  foothold  in  America. 

"4th.  If  the  Opposition  should  come  into  power  and  should 
conclude  a  treaty  of  reunion  with  the  Colonies,  the  Americans, 
angered  against  France,  whose  refusal  alone  will  have  driven 
them  to  submit  to  the  central  Government,  threaten  even  now  to 
join  all  their  forces  with  those  of  England  to  seize  our  islands. 
They  will  indeed  unite  themselves  with  the  mother- country  only 
upon  that  condition  ;  and  God  knows  with  what  pleasure  the  min 
istry,  then  composed  of  Lords  Chatham,  Shelburne,  and  Rocking- 
ham,  whose  feelings  toward  us  are  notorious,  would  adopt  the 
resentment  of  the  Americans  and  without  hesitation  would  wage 
the  most  stubborn  and  cruel  war  against  you. 

"  What  is  to  be  done,  then,  in  this  extremity,  to  preserve  peace 
and  to  retain  our  islands  ? 

' '  You  will  preserve  the  peace  that  you  long  for,  Sire,  only  by 
preventing  at  all  hazards  a  peace  between  England  and  America 
and  by  preventing  the  complete  triumph  of  one  of  them  over  the 
other  ;  and  the  only  way  to  accomplish  this  is  to  give  such  aid  to 
the  Americans  as  will  make  their  forces  equal  to  those  of  the 
English,  but  nothing  more.  And  be  assured,  Sire,  that  the  saving 
now  of  a  few  millions  may  cost  France  before  long  much  blood 
and  much  money. 

"And  be  assured  above  all,  Sire,  that  the  necessary  prepara 
tions  for  the  first  campaign  alone  will  cost  you  more  than  all  the 
aid  they  ask  you  for  to-day,  and  that  the  miserable  economy  of 
two  or  three  millions  will  certainly  cause  you  to  lose  more  than 
three  hundred  millions  in  the  next  two  years. 

"If  it  be  said  that  we  shall  not  be  able  to  help  the  Americans 
without  offending  England  and  without  bringing  down  upon  our- 


1776.]  IN    THE    AMERICAN    WAR.  123 

selves  the  very  storm  which  I  wish  to  exorcise,  I  reply  that  we 
shall  run  no  such  risk  if  we  follow  the  plan  which  I  have  so  often 
proposed,  to  aid  the  Americans  secretly  without  compromising 
ourselves,  imposing  upon  them  as  the  first  condition  that  they 
shall  never  send  any  of  their  prizes  into  our  ports,  and  that  they 
shall  commit  no  act  likely  to  disclose  the  assistance  which  they 
would  be  sure  to  lose  instantly  upon  the  first  indiscretion  on  the 
part  of  the  Congress.  And  if  Your  Majesty  has  not  at  hand  a 
more  skilful  man  to  employ  in  this  service,  I  will  undertake  it ; 
and  I  answer  for  the  treaty  without  allowing  anybody  to  be  com 
promised,  believing  that  my  zeal  will  better  make  up  for  my  lack 
of  skill  than  another's  skill  could  make  good  the  loss  of  my  zeal. 

"Your  Majesty  will  readily  see  that  the  success  of  this  plan 
depends  wholly  upon  rapidity  and  secrecy  ;  but  one  thing  which 
has  an  extremely  important  bearing  upon  both  these  is,  if  possible, 
to  send  oil'  to  London  Lord  Stormont,  who,  by  the  advantage  of 
his  connections  in  France,  is  in  a  position  to  inform,  and  does 
daily  inform,  the  English  Government  of  everything  that  is  said, 
and  every  question  that  is  discussed,  in  Your  Majesty's  Council. 

"This  is  very  extraordinary,  but  it  is  true.  The  occasion  of 
the  recall  of  M.  de  Guines  is  most  favorable  to  us.1 

'•England  insists  absolutely  upon  having  an  Ambassador.  If 
Your  Majesty  were  in  no  hurry  to  appoint  a  successor  to  M.  de 
Guines,  but  were  to  send  to  England  a  charge- d'affaires  or  a  min 
ister  of  acknowledged  ability,  Lord  Stormont  would  immediately 
be  recalled,  and  it  would  take  a  long  time  for  any  minister  sent 
here  in  the  place  of  that  Ambassador  to  make  such  connections 
as  would  enable  him  to  injure  us  as  much  as  Lord  Stormont  is 
now  doing.  Once  the  crisis  is  over,  the  most  insignificant,  or 
the  most  distinguished,  of  our  noblemen  might  be  sent  without 
risk  as  Ambassador  to  London  ;  the  business  would  either  have 
been  accomplished  or  it  would  have  failed,  and  everything  else 
would  be  of  minor  importance. 

"Your  Majesty  may  judge  from  these  statements  whether  my 
zeal  is  as  wise  as  it  is  ardent  and  pure. 

"But  if  my  august  master,  forgetful  of  the  dangers  to  which  a 
single  word  escaping  from  his  lips  might  subject  a  faithful  servant 
who  recognizes  and  serves  only  him,  should  allow  it  to  be  known 
that  lie  obtains  his  secret  information  through  me,  scarcely  any 
power  could  then  save  me  from  ruin  ;  so  great  is  the  influence, 
Sire,  of  the  cabals  and  the  intrigues  in  the  midst  of  your  Court, 


1  Vide  supra  us  to  Lord  Stormont' s  recall. 


124  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE   AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

which  aim  to  cripple  and  defeat  the  most  important  undertakings. 
Your  Majesty  knows  better  than  any  one  that  secrecy  is  the  soul 
of  business,  and  that  in  politics  a  project  once  disclosed  is  a 
project  doomed  to  failure. 

"Ever  since  I  have  entered  your  service,  Sire,  I  have  never 
asked  a  favor  from  you,  and  I  never  shall  ask  for  anything. 
Make  it  impossible,  O  my  master,  for  others  to  deprive  me  of  the 
power  to  labor  to  serve  you,  and  my  whole  existence  shall  be  con 
secrated  to  you. 

DE  BEAUMAECHAIS." 


Louis  XVI.  was  driven  as  with  a  lash  into  consent  to 
the  plans  of  his  Cabinet  and  to  its  policy  toward  England. 
Whichever  way  he  turned,  the  door  was  shut  and  there 
was  no  escape  for  him  ;  he  was  threatened  with  war,  cruel 
and  relentless,  no  matter  what  his  peaceful  intentions 
were,  no  matter  what  his  political  conduct  might  be.  If 
he  remained  neutral  between  England  and  the  Colonies, 
he  should  still  have  to  fight  just  as  if  he  had  openly  taken 
part  in  the  struggle  ;  and  he  should  be  attacked  in  any 
event,  whether  England  won  or  lost  in  America.  Unable 
to  judge  for  himself  through  lack  of  experience,  the  King 
was  overborne  by  the  burden  of  government  which  he 
had  assumed  with  fear  upon  his  accession  to  the  throne, 
and  which  he  now  carried  with  many  misgivings  as  to  the 
direction  in  which  he  should  turn  his  steps  ;  and,  sur 
rounded  as  he  was  by  counsellors  who  united  in  represent 
ing  to  him  that  the  safety  of  France  was  involved  in  the 
American  war,  he  did  not  dare  to  reject  their  advice, 
although  Turgot  had  strongly  protested. 

That  it  would  be  time  enough  for  France  to  act  when 
she  should  see  some  distinct  sign  of  hostility  against  her 
on  the  part  of  Great  Britain  escaped  the  attention  of  his 
wavering  mind,  and  he  accepted  as  truth  the  sophisms 
and  the  inconsistencies  of  the  "Considerations"  and  of 
"  La  Paix  ou  la  Guerre." 

Possibly  it  was  natural  for  him  to  do  this  ;  he  had  no 
sources  of  information  by  which  he  could  obtain  other 


1776.]  IN    THE    AMERICAN    WAR.  125 

reports  to  test  these  arguments,  or  upon  which  to  base  a 
theory  of  his  own  in  connection  with  them,  even  if  he  had 
been  a  statesman  capable  of  using  such  materials  when 
he  had  them  to  his  hand.  He  did  not  discern,  or  was  not 
warned  by,  the  deliberate  self-contradiction  with  which 
Beaumarchais  in  one  sentence  presented  the  American 
Colonies  as  ready  to  offer  to  all  the  nations  of  the  world 
the  same  price  of  help  that  they  first  offered  secretly  to 
France,  if  she  should  decline  to  aid  them,  and  in  another 
declared  that  they  could  look  to  France  alone  for  the  assist 
ance  they  needed,  and  that  if  she  failed  them  they  would 
be  driven  to  submit  to  the  mother-country.  The  King 
appears  not  to  have  reflected  that,  in  any  event,  France 
was  in  no  wise  responsible  for  the  American  Revolution, 
and  that  she  was  under  no  obligation  to  help  the  Colonists 
against  the  King  of  England,  with  whom  he  was  at  peace ; 
or  that  the  proposition  was  monstrous  that  the  Colonies, 
angered  at  France,  should  make  peace  with  England  in 
vengeance  upon  her,  and  upon  the  condition  of  being 
allowed  to  seize  the  French  colonies  in  the  West  Indies. 
Equally  outrageous  was  the  supposed  threat  of  the  Ameri 
cans  to  send  their  prizes  into  French  ports  in  order  to 
commit  France  either  to  help  them  or  to  reject  them  ;  for, 
as  they  had  no  possible  claim  upon  France,  such  a  threat 
must  have  been,  in  view  of  her  acknowledged  treaty  obli 
gations,  as  idle  as  it  was  presumptuous. 

Besides,  all  these  specious  arguments  as  to  the  danger 
of  war  might  perfectly  well  have  been  inverted  upon  the 
same  premises  and  presented  with  equal  reason  upon  the 
other  side.  Thus,  France  would  escape  war  with  certainty, 
whatever  might  be  the  outcome  of  the  American  Revo 
lution  ;  for  if  England  subdued  the  Colonies  it  would  only 
be  after  enormous  expenditure  both  in  men  and  in  money, 
by  which  she  would  have  been  so  far  exhausted  that  it 
would  require  all  her  remaining  strength  to  govern  them  ; 
and,  more  than  that,  as  she  would  then  have  recovered 


126  EFFORTS    TO   UNITE    FRANCE    AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

her  possessions,  she  would  have  no  ambition  to  go  to  war 
again  to  despoil  her  neighbors  of  property  to  which  she 
had  no  claim.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  England  lost  her 
American  Colonies,  she  must  have  been  crippled  to  that 
extent,  and  in  her  weakened  condition  she  would  not 
have  been  able  to  attack  France ;  but,  if  she  did  so, 
France  had  the  Family  Compact  to  rely  upon,  which 
enabled  her  at  once,  in  such  a  case,  to  join  her  own 
forces  with  those  of  Spain,  and  thus  place  herself  beyond 
the  danger  of  conquest. 

It  is  fortunate  for  the  United  States  of  America  that 
the  King  pursued  at  that  moment  the  course  he  did  ;  for 
the  assistance  of  France  in  our  Revolution  was  of  in 
estimable  value  to  us,  which  no  American  should  ever 
forget  nor  can  ever  depreciate ;  because  there  is  every 
reason  to  believe  that  if  it  had  not  been  for  the  timely 
intervention  of  France  the  Colonies  must  finally  have 
been  overcome  by  the  superior  force  of  Great  Britain. 
Yet  the  idea  is  irresistible  that  if  the  event  had  occurred 
at  a  time  when  the  French  throne  was  occupied  by  an 
experienced  statesman,  either  the  American  Colonies 
would  have  had  to  do  without  the  aid  of  France,  or  the 
reasons  for  her  participation  in  the  struggle  must  have 
been  very  different  from  those  offered,  as  we  have  just 
seen,  to  King  Louis  XVI. ;  for  it  is  hard  to  conceive 
one  of  the  great  monarchs  who  have  made  the  history  of 
France  carried  along  against  his  inclination  by  the  sort 
of  argument  presented  in  the  "  Consider ations"  of  the 
Comte  de  Vergennes,  or  that  set  forth  in  M.  de  Beau- 
marchais's  memoir,  "  La  Paix  ou  la  Guerre.'7 

The  truth  is  that  Beaumarchais  knew,  and  the  Cabinet 
knew,  that  they  were  then  intriguing  against  England 
with  the  Colonies,  and  that  the  French  Government  was 
already  inviting  war  by  its  acts  of  encouragement  toward 
the  revolted  subjects  of  King  George.  Their  conduct  was 
perfectly  consistent,  because  their  definite  purpose  was  war, 


1776.]  IN   THE    AMERICAN    WAR.  127 

and  they  never  wavered  from  the  course  which  ultimately 
led  them  into  it ;  but  when  they  made  their  addresses  to 
the  King  they  did  not  tell  him  plainly  what  they  must 
have  admitted  to  themselves,  that  their  motive  was  not  so 
much  the  love  of  the  French  West  Indies,  or  the  fear  of 
losing  them,  as  it  was  the  hatred  of  England  and  the  hope 
that  by  taking  advantage  of  the  American  Revolution 
they  might  cripple  her  influence  and  reduce  her  to  the 
condition  of  a  second-rate  Power. 

The  person  referred  to  by  Beaumarchais  in  his  memoir 
to  the  King  as  Mr.  L.,  whose  full  name  M.  de  Yergennes 
would  disclose  to  his  Majesty,  \vas  Arthur  Lee,  of  Vir 
ginia.  He  was  studying  law  in  London  when  Dr.  Frank 
lin  had  been  there  as  the  representative  of  the  Colonies  a 
short  time  before  ;  and  upon  Franklin's  return  to  America 
he  had  intrusted  to  Lee  the  task  of  negotiating  for  arms 
and  munitions  of  war  in  the  English  ports  as  well  as  in 
France.  In  this  connection  Beaumarchais  had  fallen  in 
with  him  almost  immediately  upon  his  arrival  in  Eng 
land  as  the  secret  agent  of  the  French  Cabinet,  Mr.  Lee's 
solicitations  of  aid  from  France  were  already  becoming 
extremely  urgent  to  Beaumarchais,  and  he  had  offered 
through  that  gentleman  to  go  to  Paris  and  present  the 
case  to  the  ministry  himself, — an  offer  which  was  imme 
diately  declined,  however,  by  M.  de  Vergennes,  because  of 
the  attention  such  a  visit  would  have  been  sure  to  attract 
from  the  British  Embassy,  and  its  likelihood  to  lead  to 
complications  with  England.  His  requests  were  conveyed 
to  the  Government  through  the  correspondence  of  Beau 
marchais,  and  by  the  latter  also,  in  a  more  or  less  exag 
gerated  form,  directly  to  the  King,  as  we  have  seen.  The 
statement  made  upon  the  authority  of  Mr.  Lee,  that  two 
official  agents  had  already  been  sent  upon  the  same  mission 
to  Madrid,  and  that  they  had  received  very  satisfactory 
replies  from  the  Spanish  Government,  aroused  in  M.  de 
Vergennes  feelings  of  disappointment  and  alarm  lest  so 


128  EFFORTS   TO    UNITE    FRANCE   AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

unexpected  and  undesirable  an  occurrence  should  forestall 
his  own  purpose  and  disarrange  the  plans  he  had  already 
made  for  approaching  the  Spanish  Court,  and  he  com 
municated  immediately  with  the  Marques  de  Grimaldi,  at 
Madrid,  to  learn  whether  it  were  true,  and,  if  so,  to  what 
extent  the  negotiation  had  proceeded  between  the  Court 
of  Carlos  III.  and  the  Americans.  M.  de  Grimaldi  an 
swered,  on  the  14th  of  March,1  "  Nobody  has  applied  to 
us  to  furnish  aid  to  the  revolted  Colonies ;  consequently 
it  is  not  a  fact  that  we  have  given  them  aid ;  we  have  not 
even  had  occasion  to  consider  what  we  should  do ;"  which 
satisfied  the  French  Secretary  of  State,  who  wrote  at  once 
to  Beaumarchais  that  the  statement  was  untrue.  Whether 
Mr.  Lee  was  deceived  or  not  into  believing  what  he  had 
asserted,  is  somewhat  doubtful  from  the  correspondence ; 
M.  Doniol  thinks  that  in  this  case  he  drew  from  his  imagi 
nation  ; 2  although  Beaumarchais  wrote  from  London,  after 
telling  Lee  of  the  denial  of  the  Spanish  Court,  that  "  the 
man  was  rather  stupefied  than  astonished"  at  hearing  this 
news,  and  that  "  he  cannot  imagine  how  the  error  could 
have  occurred."  3 

The  King's  assent  having  thus  been  obtained,  or  to  such 
an  extent,  at  least,  as  to  admit  of  the  further  development 
of  the  Comte  de  Vergennes's  project  in  regard  to  the 
Colonies,  Beaumarchais  returned  to  London,  where  we 
find  him  in  April,  1776,  intriguing  with  Arthur  Lee  and 
other  friends  of  America,  establishing  relations  with  all 
kinds  of  people  willing  to  aid  in  forwarding  supplies  to 
the  Colonists,  especially  arms  and  other  munitions  of  war, 
and  writing  to  the  Secretary  of  State  the  most  earnest  ap 
peals  in  behalf  of  their  cause  and  for  the  open  declaration 
of  amity  and  common  interest  with  them  by  France.  As 
Beaumarchais  had  attracted  the  suspicion  of  the  Foreign 

1  Espagne,  t.  579,  No.  114  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  370. 

2  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  370. 

3  Angleterre,  t.  515,  No.  36  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  413. 


1776.]  IN    THE    AMERICAN    WAR.  129 

Office  in  London  upon  his  former  visit,  he  took  the  pre 
caution  in  returning  there  now  of  providing  himself  with 
at  least  a  show  of  occupation  to  account  for  his  move 
ments,  and  for  that  purpose  he  had  obtained  from  M.  de 
Sartine,  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  a  commission  which 
authorized  him  to  buy  for  the  Government  piasters  of 
Portuguese  coinage,  to  be  used  in  the  French  West  India 
Islands  ;  which  proved,  indeed,  a  wise  step,  because  he  was 
upon  one  occasion  closely  questioned  by  Lord  Rochford, 
to  whom  he  showed  his  commission,  and  he  learned  sub 
sequently  that  the  English  Government  had  made  inqui 
ries  about  him  from  some  of  the  bankers  at  the  Exchange 
with  whom  he  had  been  clever  enough  to  open  some  real 
transactions  upon  the  subject  of  piasters,  although  that 
coin  had  been  out  of  circulation  in  England  for  several 
years. 

The  British  Government  long  suspected  the  secret  traffic 
that  was  being  carried  on  between  France  and  the  Colo 
nies,  and  events  were  now  progressing  so  rapidly  that  of 
necessity  it  could  not  be  a  great  while  before  the  hostility 
of  the  French  Cabinet  must  be  either  discovered  or  openly 
avowed.  A  vessel  called  the  Dickinson,  which  had  cleared 
from  Philadelphia  for  Nantes,  was  taken  into  the  port  of 
Bristol  by  the  captain,  an  Englishman,  who  felt  it  his 
duty  to  deliver  up  his  ship  rather  than  to  help  the  enemies 
of  the  Government ;  and  upon  examination  of  its  papers 
it  was  found  that  the  cargo  was  consigned  to  the  house 
of  Montaudom  Frcres  &  Cie.,  of  Nantes,  to  be  sold  by  them 
in  exchange  for  a  return  cargo  of  munitions  of  war.  The 
British  Government  immediately  called  the  attention  of 
the  French  Cabinet  to  this  incident,  without  forcing  an 
open  rupture,  and  a  long  correspondence  followed,  in  which 
the  French  disavowed  any  acquaintance  with  the  trans 
action  ;  though  the  moment  had  come  when  dissimu 
lation  of  that  character  was  scarcely  expected  any  longer 
to  deceive. 

VOL.  I.— 9 


130  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE   AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

The  house  of  Montaudoin  Freres  were  merchants,  at 
Nantes,  with  whom  Dr.  Franklin  had  opened  negotiations, 
two  years  before,  as  agents  through  whom  to  send  forward 
such  arms  and  equipments  as  he  might  be  able  to  obtain 
in  France  for  the  Americans,  either  by  consent  of  the 
Government  or  under  its  connivance  at  his  schemes.  One 
of  the  members  of  the  family  of  Montaudoin  was  a  corre 
spondent  of  the  Royal  Academy  of  Sciences, — which  cir 
cumstance,  no  doubt,  was  instrumental  in  leading  to  his 
acquaintance  with  Dr.  Franklin.  Another  intermediary 
employed  by  Franklin  was  a  physician  of  Paris,  called  Dr. 
Barbeu-Dubourg,  to  whom  the  great  American  appears  to 
have  had  a  strong  attachment,  and  whom  he  called  his 
"  dear  good  friend."  This  Dr.  Dubourg  dealt  directly 
with  the  manufacturers,  made  the  contracts  with  them, 
and  bought  the  cargoes,  which  were  then  shipped  to 
Nantes  and  forwarded  by  the  "  Montaudoin  Freres"  to 
their  destination  in  America.  Since  the  year  1775  the 
shipments  had  continued  with  great  activity,  under  the 
connivance  of  high  authority ;  but  latterly  the  house 
of  Montaudoin  had  very  much  enlarged  their  trade 
under  the  actual  protection  of  the  ministry ;  for  M.  de 
Vergennes  had  adopted  the  machinery  that  had  been 
formerly  employed  by  Dr.  Franklin,  and  was  using  it 
as  a  part  of  his  plan  against  Great  Britain  by  strength 
ening  the  actual  forces  and  maintaining  the  courage  of 
the  "insurgents."  The  Montaudoins  knew,  of  course, 
although  the  connection  was  not  avowed,  what  strong 
hand  it  was  which  not  only  enabled  them  to  continue 
their  traffic  with  America,  but  even  assured  it  to  them 
and  permitted  them  greatly  to  increase  its  volume,  in 
spite  of  protests  from  the  British  Embassy  which  flowed 
in  a  continuous  stream  of  complaint,  always  turned  aside 
by  evasive  replies  and  ingeniously  polite  disavowals  from 
the  Secretary  of  State. 

Beaumarchais  struck  this  note  in  England,  in  replying 


1776.]  IN   THE   AMERICAN    WAR.  131 

to  a  demand  of  Lord  Rochford  that  the  Cabinet  should 
issue  orders  against  this  trade  in  the  French  ports,  and 
that  the  merchants  of  Nantes  should  be  punished  for  the 
part  they  had  taken  in  it.  "  Why,  my  lord,"  said  he, 
"upon  what  ground  should  our  Government  find  fault 
with  the  merchants  of  Nantes  ?  Are  we  at  war  with  any 
one  ?  On  the  contrary,  in  our  present  state  of  peace  are 
not  our  ports  open  to  all  the  traders  of  the  world  ?  Before 
calling  upon  France,  my  lord,  to  explain  the  negotiations 
at  Nantes,  we  should  have  to  put  a  rather  extraordinary 
preliminary  question,  which  is  this :  '  Has  England  the 
right  to  restrict  our  trade  on  account  of  a  purely  personal 
quarrel  in  which  we  neither  are,  nor  wish  to  be,  concerned  ?' 
And  what  treaties  oblige  us  to  open  or  to  close  our  ports 
to  merchant-ships  according  to  the  will  of  the  British 
people  ?"  If  England  thought  the  Americans  were  rebels, 
he  continued,  she  was  right  in  fighting  them  wherever  she 
encountered  them,  always  out  of  France,  of  course ;  she 
might  run  them  down  at  sea,  she  might  capture  them  and 
destroy  them ;  "  pardieu,  my  lord,"  that  was  nothing  to 
France ;  but  to  ask  that  France  should  interfere  with  her 
own  merchants  who  were  carrying  on  their  traffic  with 
people  at  peace  with  the  country,  whether  that  people 
were  to  be  considered  the  subjects  of  England  or  whether 
they  were  a  free  and  independent  nation,  and  to  restrain 
French  traders  from  having  natural  and  proper  intercourse 
with  them, — the  idea  was  too  much  ;  in  speaking  of  it 
Beaumarchais  became  "  rouge  de  colere." 

The  clever  Frenchman  could  write  good  plays,  and 
he  could  act  as  well  when  it  was  necessary  to  do  so ;  in 
this  case  he  evidently  felt  that  he  was  acting  a  comedy, 
in  which  possibly  he  did  not  even  expect  to  be  taken  too 
seriously,  although  he  went  into  it  with  all  his  ingenuity 
and  wit ;  but  he  argued  his  case  with  so  much  assumed 
earnestness  that  Lord  Rochford  either  believed  him  or 
pretended  to  believe  him,  and  Beaumarchais  wrote  to 


132  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE   AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

Paris,  "  Cette  declaration  nous  a  tout-a-fait  raccommodes, 
le  Lord  et  moi."  * 

The  French  Cabinet  was  now  at  a  point  where,  having 
decided  that  its  policy  was  definitively  to  aid  the  Ameri 
cans,  the  next  step  to  be  taken  was  to  advance  beyond 
the  stage  of  mere  connivance  into  the  limit  of  actual 
effective  support.  This  step  was  immediately  taken,  in 
the  following  letter  from  M.  de  Vergennes  to  the  King, 
dated  2d  May,  1776.  It  is  the  first  official  act  of 
France  in  her  participation  in  the  American  War : 

"SiRE, — I  have  the  honor  to  lay  at  Your  Majesty's  feet  the 
document  which  will  authorize  nie  to  furnish  a  million  of  livres 
for  the  use  of  the  English  colonies,  if  you  deign  to  affix  to  it  your 
'approuveV  I  join  with  it  also,  Sire,  the  reply  which  I  propose 
to  make  to  the  Sr.  de  Beaumarchais.  If  Your  Majesty  approves 
of  this,  I  beg  of  you  to  return  it  to  me  immediately.  It  will  be 
sent  without  being  written  in  my  hand  or  that  of  any  of  my  clerks 
or  my  secretary.  I  shall  use  for  this  purpose  the  handwriting  of 
my  son,  which  cannot  be  recognized,  for  whose  discretion  I  can 
answer  affirmatively,  although  he  is  only  in  his  fifteenth  year. 

1  i  Since  it  is  important  that  this  transaction  should  not  be  dis 
covered,  or  at  least  imputed  to  the  Government,  I  intend,  if  Your 
Majesty  will  allow  me,  to  send  for  the  Sr.  Montaudoin.  The  pre 
text  I  shall  give  will  be  to  call  him  to  account  for  his  correspond 
ence  with  the  Americans,  but  the  real  purpose  is  to  employ  him 
in  forwarding  to  them  the  moneys  which  Your  Majesty  is  pleased 
to  grant  them  ;  and  I  shall  charge  him,  at  the  same  time,  to  take 
all  the  precautions  which  he  would  take  if  he  were  making  the 
advance  upon  his  own  account.  Upon  this  I  take  the  further 
liberty  most  humbly  to  ask  for  the  instructions  of  Your  Majesty. 
This  done,  I  shall  write  to  the  Marquis  de  Grimaldi,  I  shall  ex 
plain  our  transactions  to  him  in  detail,  and  I  shall  ask  him  to 
duplicate  it."  * 

The  King  gave  his  approval  to  this  proposition,  and  the 
Secretary  of  State  wrote,  on  the  following  day,  the  3d  of 

1  Beaumarchais  to  the  Comte  de  Vergennes,  12th  April,  1776,  Angleterre, 
t.  515,  No.  76  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  407. 

2  Archives  Nationales,  K  164,  No.  3,  annee  1776  :  Doniol,  La  Participation 
de  la  France,  i.  372. 


1776.]  IX    THE    AMERICAN    WAR.  133 

May,  to  the  Marques  de  Grimaldi,  the  chief  minister  of 
Carlos  III.  of  Spain,  informing  him  that  France  had  de 
cided  now  to  take  decisive  action  in  regard  to  America, 
but  that,  of  course,  whatever  were  done  must  be  done 
secretly,  in  order  not  to  alarm  Great  Britain  and  endanger 
the  continuance  of  peace  : 

"As  our  two  august  masters  do  not  wish  to  come  into  collision 
with  the  King  of  England,  with  whom  they  desire  to  maintain 
peace  and  that  sort  of  intercourse  which  is  possible  with  a  nation 
to  whom  nothing  is  sacred  but  its  momentary  interests,  we  should 
depart  from  our  object  and  expose  ourselves  too  openly  if  we  fur 
nished  the  insurgents  with  arms,  with  powder,  and  with  other 
munitions  of  war,  from  our  own  magazines.  But,  since  they  will 
have  no  trouble  in  obtaining  these  things  through  the  avenues  of 
trade,  if  they  are  able  to  pay  for  them,  the  King  prefers  to  supply 
them  the  means  to  giving  them  anything  in  kind.  Therefore  His 
Majesty  has  decided  to  advance  to  them,  as  a  loan,  one  million  of 
our  livres.  The  Government  will  not  appear  in  this  matter  in  any 
way,  but  the  business  will  be  transacted  by  a  trading  company 
managed  by  a  merchant  in  one  of  our  seaboard  towns,  who  will 
demand  security,  not  indeed  of  much  value  as  an  obligation,  but 
sufficient  to  give  color  to  the  reasonable  enterprise  of  a  merchant 
striving  to  win  for  himself  the  largest  portion  of  the  commissions 
in  American  commerce  as  soon  as  the  Colonial  trade  shall  be 
thrown  open  by  the  declaration  of  their  independence.  We  hope, 
sir,  that  this  unexpected  aid,  coming  to  them  at  a  time  when  per 
haps  the  bravest  among  them  are  shaken  by  the  arrival  of  the 
enormous  forces  that  England  is  sending  out  against  them,  may 
have  the  effect  of  encouraging  them,  and  may  make  them  more 
tenacious  of  the  resolution  they  appear  to  have  adopted  not  to 
submit  to  the  yoke.  These  people  are  sagacious  enough  to  per 
ceive  that  aid  of  this  description  cannot  have  come  from  any  ordi 
nary  hand.  .  .  .  Your  Excellency  has  already  intimated  to  us  that 
The  Catholic  King  would  willingly  join  in  any  expenses  that  we 
might  incur  in  sending  aid  to  the  Americans.  The  King  could  not 
consent  that  the  King  his  uncle  should  contribute  toward  the 
million  which  he  intends  to  devote  to  this  purpose  ;  but,  if  His 
Catholic  Majesty  were  himself  inclined  to  treat  them  with  liber 
ality,  and  if  he  thought  that  our  means  of  forwarding  a  present 
to  its  destination  are  less  likely  to  arouse  suspicion  than  those 
which  he  might  obtain  in  his  own  realm,  Your  Excellency  will 


134  EFFORTS   TO   UNITE   FRANCE   AND   SPAIN  [1776. 

find  me  at  your  service  in  any  matter  which  it  may  please  the 
King,  your  master,  to  decide  upon.1 

In  the  mean  time,  upon  information  received  from  Lon 
don  that  the  English  Government  had  ordered  its  vessels 
of  war  to  cruise  in  the  Channel  and  out  to  sea  in  order  to 
intercept  American  ships  seeking  the  ports  of  France  or 
Spain,  instructions  were  given  to  the  French  squadron 
of  evolution  to  hold  itself  between  Capes  La  Hague  and 
Finisterre,  instead  of  sailing  to  the  southward  as  it  would 
otherwise  have  done  to  'carry  out  its  manoeuvres,  so  that 
by  this  means  the  English  might  be  kept  farther  off  the 
coast  and  ships  from  the  Colonies  might  have  a  better 
chance  to  run  in ;  and  M.  de  Vergennes  sent  a  request  to 
the  Spanish  ministry  that  the  King  should  also  send  his 
vessels  to  cruise  for  the  same  purpose  between  Ferrol  and 
Cadiz,  "  acts  merely  of  additional  precaution,"  as  it  was  an 
nounced,  which  were  intended  only  to  protect  the  dignity 
of  the  two  Crowns  and  to  assure  their  subjects  in  the 
enjoyment  of  their  rights. 

The  Cabinet  denied  any  hostile  purpose  in  this  toward 
England,  but  reiterated  the  right  of  American  ships  to 
trade  with  France ;  and  M.  de  Vergennes  defended  that 
position  by  asserting  that,  while  the  King  had  issued  a 
prohibition  in  all  the  French  ports  as  to  furnishing  the 
Colonists  with  munitions  of  war,  yet  in  regard  to  fire-arms 
and  powder,  while  they  might  be  considered  as  contra 
band  articles  in  Great  Britain,  they  were  articles  of  trade 
in  France  and  nothing  more.  The  Secretary  of  State 
used  every  possible  color  of  excuse  under  which  the 
Cabinet  might  still  permit  the  "  commerce  deguise"  to  be 
carried  on  with  the  Colonies  and  yet  not  openly  offend 
England ;  for,  he  said,  "  Let  us  not  turn  the  attention  of 
the  English  from  their  own  matters  in  North  America; 
this  is  certainly  the  least  that  we  can  do  for  them  in  return 

1  Espagne,  t.  580,  No.  70  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  375-6. 


1776.]  IN   THE   AMERICAN    WAR.  135 


for  the  generous  care  they  have  taken  to  do  themselves  all 
the  injury  that  we  could  possibly  wish."  l 

Still  following  the  current  which  was  drifting  them  into 
war,  the  French  Government  issued  orders  in  April,  with 
the  approval  of  the  King,  that  the  naval  forces  should  be 
put  in  readiness  to  answer  any  call  that  might  be  made 
upon  them,  and  that,  while  four  frigates  and  three  cor 
vettes  should  be  sent  into  American  waters,  a  fleet  of 
twelve  vessels  of  the  line,  with  the  corresponding  number 
of  frigates,  should  be  held  ready  in  the  port  of  Brest,  with 
eight  vessels  of  the  line  and  the  accompanying  frigates 
to  be  kept  in  Toulon  ready  for  immediate  service  in  case 
of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  and  the  possible  blockade  of 
Brest.  Armaments  so  important  as  these  very  naturally 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  British  Government,  who 
immediately  addressed  inquiries  to  Versailles  in  regard  to 
them ;  the  British  representative  went  personally  to  see 
M.  de  Vergennes,  although,  with  proper  discretion,  he 
made  no  direct  assertion  of  the  right  of  his  Government 
to  demand  an  explanation.  M.  de  Vergennes  had  no  in 
tention  of  allowing  himself  to  be  caught  without  an 
answer  to  inquiries  which  he  naturally  expected,  and  he 
was  ready  upon  this  occasion,  as  he  always  was,  to  assert 
the  justice  of  the  step  which  had  been  taken  by  the  King's 
order,  and  the  innocence  of  the  motive  which  actuated 
his  Cabinet ;  always  ingenious  in  devising  an  evasive  ex 
cuse,  his  reply  in  this  case  was  particularly  so,  in  shifting 
the  burden  of  responsibility  from  his  own  shoulders  to 
those  of  the  British  Government,  who  might,  as  he  said, 
render  these  preparations  on  the  part  of  France  entirely 
harmless  by  maintaining  peace  and  strictly  prohibiting 
any  of  its  officers  from  making  a  wanton  attack  upon 
France.  He  asserted  that  the  arming  of  these  ships  was 
undertaken  only  because  the  French  Cabinet  was  afraid 

1  Comte  de  VergennoH  to  M.   (itirnier,   11   May,  1776,   Angletenv,   t.  516, 
No.  30  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  465. 


136  EFFOKTS    TO    UNITE    FEANCE   AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

that  some  English  commander  might  break  away  from 
all  control  and  make  war  against  France  in  spite  of  his 
Government,  and  that  in  such  an  event  France  ought 
to  be  ready. 

However  improbable  it  may  seem  that  a  statement  of 
this  kind  could  have  been  seriously  made  by  one  states 
man  to  another,  and  however  unlikely  to  invite  the  least 
faith  or  confidence  in  explanation  of  the  motives  of  a 
Government  bearing  the  relations  to  another  that  France 
bore  at  this  time  to  England,  yet  it  is  what  the  Comte 
de  Vergennes  actually  said  to  the  British  minister,  and 
what  he  afterward  referred  to  as  thoroughly  justifiable. 
"  For,"  said  he,  "  my  reply  was  frank  and  honest ;  I  re 
assured  him  in  regard  to  the  armaments  ;  I  renewed  the 
declaration  of  the  King's  intention,  whose  sincere  desire 
is  to  maintain  the  peace  and  good  understanding  which 
now  subsist  between  the  two  Crowns  ;  though  I  added  that 
while  we  have  entire  confidence  in  the  assurances  of  reci 
procity  given  us  by  his  British  Majesty,  yet,  as  we  know 
that  he  may  be  carried  forward  against  his  will,  and  that 
some  of  his  subalterns  may,  perhaps,  when  he  least  ex 
pects  it,  make  engagements  which  it  may  not  be  in  his 
power  to  break,  the  recollection  of  what  happened  upon  a 
former  occasion  makes  us  more  vigilant  to  hold  ourselves 
so  that  we  may  not  be  attacked  unexpectedly,  and  that  this 
is  the  cause  of  the  activity  which  may  have  been  noticed 
in  our  seaports,  but  which  it  is  in  the  power  of  England 
to  make  unfruitful,  because  upon  her  conduct  will  depend 
everything."  1 

The  boldness  of  this  statement  made  by  the  usually 
cautious  minister  suggests  the  feeling  of  almost  reckless 
ness  with  which  the  French  Cabinet  now  regarded  the 
likelihood  of  war  with  England ;  for  no  one  could  cer 
tainly  care  very  much  what  the  effect  would  be  of  his 

1  Comte  de  Vergennes  to  Marquis  d'Ossun,  14  May,  1776,  Espagnc,  t.  580, 
No.  95  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  465. 


1776.1  IS   THE   AMERICAN    WAR.  137 

words  who  should  openly  declare  to  a  king  like  George 
III.  that  France  was  arming  because  she  was  suspicious 
of  the  movements  of  some  of  his  subjects,  whose  actions 
she  knew  he  could  not  always  control,  but  for  which  he 
might  have  to  be  held  responsible  in  open  war  before 
long ;  and,  in  fact,  M.  de  Vergennes  really  cared  less, 
because  he  thought  that  England  was  growing  weak 
enough  to  be  disregarded  and  France  strong  enough  to 
avow  its  true  attitude  toward  the  Colonies. 

No  doubt  it  left  the  British  Cabinet  free  to  take  this  as 
an  indignity  or  not,  and  it  marked  the  advanced  attitude 
of  France  at  this  time ;  there  was,  indeed,  but  one  step 
from  that  point  to  the  tone  of  defiance  with  which  M.  de 
Vergennes  declared  to  the  charge-d'affaires  at  London,  in 
reply  to  some  rather  menacing  comments  made  in  England 
upon  the  presence  in  Paris  of  Silas  Deane,  that  certainly 
the  English  Cabinet  must  know  "  that  the  King  is  master 
in  his  own  house ;  he  has  no  intention  of  accounting  to 
anybody  for  the  foreigners  whom  he  may  see  fit  to  admit 
into  his  kingdom,  and  His  Majesty  is  doing  now  all  that 
Great  Britain  could  ask  him  to  do  as  an  act  of  grace, 
when  he  declines  to  receive  openly  a  representative  of  the 
English  Colonies." 1  The  truth  is  that  the  Comte  de 
Vergennes  thought  the  moment  was  then  very  near  when 
he  should  be  ready  to  declare  war. 

In  the  mean  time,  King  Carlos  III.  and  his  minister, 
the  Marques  de  Grimaldi,  had  been  brought  by  a  long 
course  of  argument  and  persuasion  to  share  to  a  certain 
degree,  at  least,  the  views  of  the  French  Cabinet  in  re 
gard  to  the  encouragement  of  the  American  Colonies, 
sufficiently,  indeed,  to  induce  them  to  unite  with  France 
in  making  the  proposed  loan  of  two  millions  of  livres ; 
although  they  arrived  at  that  conclusion  by  a  different 
course  of  reasoning,  and  were  impelled  by  different  mo- 

1  Comte  cle  Vergennes  to  M.  Gamier,  31st  August,  1776,  Angleterre,  t.  517, 
No.  15G :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  583. 


138  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE   AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

tives,  from  those  of  M.  de  Vergennes  and  his  colleagues. 
The  chief  interest  of  Spain  lay  in  her  hostility  to  Portu 
gal,  with  whom  her  relations  had  been  strained  to  a  dan 
gerous  tension  by  recent  collisions  between  their  respective 
forces  in  South  America  and  by  the  irritating  policy  of 
M.  de  Pombal,  which,  as  has  been  already  intimated, 
there  was  good  reason  to  suspect  was  secretly  fomented 
by  Great  Britain.  This  was  followed  by  still  greater  dis 
trust  of  and  enmity  toward  England,  which  had  become 
extremely  acute  at  the  moment  when  the  French  ministry 
was  discussing  the  question  of  its  policy  and  the  likeli 
hood  of  an  attack  upon  the  West  Indies,  as  set  forth  in 
the  arguments  of  the  Comte  de  Vergennes  in  his  "  Consi 
derations,"  a  copy  of  which  had  been  duly  communicated 
to  Madrid. 

It  is  very  probable  that  this  view  of  the  situation  was 
emphasized  by  the  despatches  of  the  Conde  de  Aranda, 
Spanish  Ambassador  at  Versailles,  whose  residence  in 
France  brought  him  into  constant  communication  with 
the  Secretary  of  State  during  the  period  when  the  subject 
of  war  with  England  was  being  agitated,  and,  as  it  was  of 
considerable  importance  that  he  should  be  made  to  reflect 
the  sentiments  with  which  it  was  intended  to  influence  his 
country  toward  an  alliance  with  France  in  an  aggressive 
war  against  Great  Britain  when  the  favorable  moment 
should  arrive,  it  is  perhaps  reasonable  to  believe  that  he 
had  in  a  measure  entered  into  the  spirit  of  those  about 
him.  At  all  events,  the  arguments  of  the  Comte  de  Ver 
gennes  were  duly  considered  by  the  Cabinet  of  Madrid  in 
,  the  presence  of  the  King,  before  whom  the  subject  of  the 
American  war  was  fully  discussed  and  the  danger  from  an 
attack  upon  the  Spanish  West  Indies  carefully  investi 
gated,  with  proper  attention  to  the  statement  that  war  was 
inevitable  whichever  way  the  troubles  between  England 
and  her  Colonists  should  eventuate,  and  that  the  only 
hope  of  safety  was  to  be  found  in  the  joint  action  of  the 


1776.]  IN   THE   AMERICAN    WAR.  139 

two  Crowns,  by  which  the  coming  attack  might  be  antici 
pated. 

The  Spanish  Government  accepted  the  view  that  war 
was  imminent  and  that  danger  was  to  be  feared  from  Eng 
land  in  consequence  of  her  present  troubles,  but  their  con 
clusion  led  them  to  an  unexpected  result  and  one  most 
unacceptable  to  M.  de  Vergennes :  they  decided  not  to 
make  war  upon  England,  but  to  attack  Portugal  and  to 
annex  it  to  Spain.  The  opportunity  was  too  tempting 
both  to  the  ministry  and  to  the  nation  ;  the  people  loudly 
demanded  the  conquest  of  that  kingdom,  which  they  felt 
ought  to  belong  to  the  Spanish  dominion  in  order  that  its 
boundaries  should  include  the  whole  Peninsula.  While 
the  King  was  willing  to  gratify  his  subjects  and  at  the 
same  time  to  redress  the  personal  grievances  under  which 
he  was  smarting,  the  Marques  de  Grimaldi,  a  foreign 
favorite,  unpopular  at  the  Court  and  hated  by  the  people, 
who  sustained  himself  in  the  ministry  with  difficulty 
under  protection  of  the  King,  hoped  to  employ  the  glory 
of  this  conquest  to  the  advantage  of  his  administration 
and  by  it  to  win  his  way  to  the  heart  of  the  nation  which 
he  had  never  been  able  to  reach.  He  sent  a  formal  reply 
to  the  French  ministry,  in  which  he  proposed  that  Louis 
XVI.  should  join  with  Spain  by  furnishing  twenty  or 
thirty  thousand  men  in  the  immediate  conquest  of  Por 
tugal,  and  that,  in  return  for  the  risks  and  expenditures 
of  that  undertaking,  France  should  indemnify  herself  by 
seizing  Brazil,  in  which  she  should  be  strengthened  by 
the  assistance  of  Spain.1 

This  was  not  what  had  been  sought  by  France ;  in 
deed,  it  gave  rise  to  great  disappointment  and  discomfort 
in  the  Cabinet ;  for,  aside  from  the  fact  that  France  had 
no  interest  in  Brazil  and  did  not  wish  to  occupy  that 
country,  the  idea  that  Spain  should  add  to  her  possessions 

1  M.  de  Grimaldi  to  the  Conde  de  Aranda,  18th  October,  1775,  Kspagne,  t. 
578,  No.  31  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  305. 


140  EFFORTS    TO    UNITE    FRANCE   AND    SPAIN  [1776. 

in  Europe  was  not  an  agreeable  one ;  but,  above  all,  the 
proposition  must  be  rejected  because  it  would  divert  the 
attention  of  England  from  America  to  the  affairs  of  the 
Continent ;  it  would  probably  result  in  a  European  war, 
and  would  be  fatal  to  the  plans  of  M.  de  Vergennes  in 
America. 

In  a  situation,  therefore,  which  was  intensely  embar 
rassing,  the  French  Secretary  of  State  found  himself 
obliged  to  reply  to  this  proposal  which  was  based  upon 
the  acceptance  of  his  own  suggestions,  and  to  perform  the 
extremely  delicate  operation  of  modifying  his  own  position 
without  wounding  the  pride  of  the  Spanish  monarch, 
whilst  he  retained  his  ground  sufficiently  to  enable  him 
still  to  have  a  basis  for  further  negotiations  in  the  de 
velopment  of  his  policy,  from  which  he  did  not  wish  to 
recede.  Whilst  his  reply  was  very  like  an  effort  to 
parry  a  blow  delivered  from  one's  own  side,  it  was  most 
skilfully  prepared,  and  it  effected  the  purpose  which  for 
the  moment  he  had  in  view :  it  evaded  participation  in 
the  conquest  of  Portugal  and  left  undisturbed  the  cordial 
relations  with  Spain.1 

A  voluminous  correspondence  between  the  two  countries 
immediately  followed,  which  for  the  purpose  of  this  nar 
rative  it  is  necessary  only  to  mention,  during  the  whole  of 
which  M.  de  Vergennes  was  cautiously  returning  to  the 
point  he  had  left ;  and,  after  six  months  of  patience  and 
industry,  he  certainly  achieved  a  diplomatic  triumph  when 
he  was  able  to  write  his  despatch  of  the  3d  of  May,  1776, 
to  M.  de  Grimaldi  proposing  that  Spain  should  advance 
to  the  American  Colonies  a  loan  of  a  million  of  livres.  It 
is  true  that  he  was  never  able  to  overcome  entirely  the  ob 
stacle  to  the  complete  unity  of  the  two  Crowns  presented 
by  the  radical  divergence  of  the  purposes  which  they  had 
in  view ;  for,  while  he  succeeded  in  bringing  Spain  into 

1  Comte  de  Vergennes  to  M.  de  Aranda,  25th  November,  1775,  Espagne,  t. 
578,  No.  104  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  306. 


1776.]  IN   THE   AMERICAN    WAR.  141 

an  attitude  of  hostility  toward  England,  it  was  only 
through  the  avenue  of  conflict  with  Portugal,  and  not 
through  the  desire  for  revenge  for  past  injury  which  was 
the  motive  power  in  France.  Yet,  in  spite  of  this,  he 
succeeded  in  obtaining  the  tacit  recognition  by  Spain  of 
the  American  Colonies,  and  the  advance  to  them  which 
he  sought.  The  Spanish  letter  of  credit  was  sent  to 
the  Conde  de  Aranda  enclosed  in  the  following  letter 
from  M.  de  Grimaldi,  dated  the  27th  of  June,  1776,  at 
Madrid,  in  which,  after  acknowledging  the  receipt  of  a 
letter  in  which  M.  de  Aranda  had  informed  the  minis 
ter  of  the  relief  which  M.  de  Vergennes  proposed  to  send 
to  the  revolted  Colonies,  M.  de  Grimaldi  continued : 

"  That  wise  minister  attains  by  this  menus  the  politic  result  of 
contributing  to  weaken  both  the  English  in  order  to  destroy  them 
and  the  Colonists  in  order  to  bring  them  to  reason  the  moment 
they  become  independent. 

"His  Majesty  applauds  these  measures  of  the  Court  of  France, 
which  he  regards  as  quite  in  accord  with  the  views  that  France 
and  Spain  should  always  hold  ;  and,  as  this  interest  is  a  common 
one  between  the  two  monarchies,  the  King  feels  that  the  step 
which  is  now  about  to  be  taken  toward  sustaining  the  insurgents 
in  their  state  of  resistance  should  be  common  also.  Therefore  the 
King  directs  me  to  send  you  the  enclosed  letter  of  credit  for  one 
million  livres  tournois,  to  be  employed  for  the  same  purpose. 
We  have  not  the  means  for  carrying  this  out  directly  and  with 
sufficient  secrecy,  but  Your  Excellency  will  agree  with  the  Comte 
de  Vergennes  as  to  the  kind  of  aid  to  which  it  will  be  best  to 
devote  this  sum  and  as  to  the  means  by  which  it  may  reach  its 
destination,  either  by  following  the  channel  already  opened  by 
France,  or  by  some  other  shorter  one,  as  Your  Excellency  and 
M.  de  Vergennes  shall  decide  to  be  most  suitable. 

"  In  order  to  avoid  comment  and  not  to  excite  suspicion  of  any 
kind,  I  have  let  it  be  understood  at  the  Treasury  that  this  sum  is 
intended  for  a  purchase  which  Your  Excellency  is  directed  to 
make  by  order  of  the  King,  and  I  have  written  this  despatch 
entirely  with  my  own  hand,  in  order  that  the  secret  may  not 
be  disclosed  to  anybody."  l 

,  t.  580,  No.  193  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  485. 


142  BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 


CHAPTEK    V. 

BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS   BETWEEN  FRANCE 
AND    THE   UNITED    STATES. 

WHILST  these  events  were  taking  place,  Silas  Deane,  the 
American  Commissioner  appointed  by  the  Committee  of 
Secret  Correspondence,  had  arrived  in  France.  Having 
left  America  in  March,  1776,  and  gone  by  way  of  Ber 
muda  and  Spain,  in  order  to  escape  detection  and  arrest 
by  the  British  cruisers,  he  had  arrived  in  June  at  Bor 
deaux,  where  he  spent  a  week  in  making  negotiations 
which  should  enable  him  to  carry  out  the  purpose  of  his 
mission ;  and,  after  stopping  for  a  day,  en  route,  at  An- 
gouleme  to  visit  the  establishments  where  at  that  time 
the  greater  part  of  the  cannon  used  in  France  were  made, 
he  reached  Paris  on  the  5th  of  July.  The  instructions 
given  to  Mr.  Deane  by  the  Committee  of  Secret  Corre 
spondence,  on  the  3d  of  March,  at  Philadelphia,  pre 
pared,  no  doubt,  by  Dr.  Franklin,  directed  him  to  assume 
the  character,  upon  his  arrival  in  France,  of  a  merchant 
engaged  in  providing  goods  for  the  Indian  trade,  since  it 
was  not  probable  that  the  Court  of  France  would  choose 
to  have  it  known  that  an  agent  from  the  Colonies  was 
in  that  country  j1  also  that  in  Paris  it  would  scarcely  be 
necessary  for  him  "to  pretend  any  other  business  than 
the  gratifying  of  that  curiosity  which  draws  numbers 
thither  yearly  merely  to  see  so  famous  a  city." 

He  had  letters  to  M.  Leray  de  Chaumont,  at  the  Louvre, 
Intendant  for  supplying  the  French  army  with  clothing, 
etc.,  and  to  Dr.  Barbeu-Dubourg,  the  latter  of  whom  was 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  78. 


1776.]       BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         143 

especially  recommended  to  him  as  "  a  man  prudent,  faith 
ful,  secret,  intelligent  in  affairs,  and  capable  of  giving  you 
very  sage  advice."  And,  while  his  conversation  with  these 
gentlemen  might  be  expected  to  furnish  him  "  a  good  op 
portunity  of  acquiring  Parisian  French,"  Dr.  Dubourg 
would  also  aid  him  in  presenting  himself  to  M.  de  Ver- 
gennes,  with  whom  he  was  instructed  to  seek  an  audience 
as  soon  after  his  arrival  as  he  could  do  so,  "  acquainting 
him  that  he  was  in  France  upon  business  of  the  American 
Congress  in  the  character  of  a  merchant  having  some 
thing  to  communicate  to  him  that  might  be  mutually 
beneficial  to  France  and  the  North  American  Colonies." 
He  was  further  to  say  to  M.  de  Vergennes  that  the  Con 
gress  was  unable  to  obtain  through  the  ordinary  avenues 
of  commerce  the  quantity  of  arms  and  ammunition  needed 
by  the  Colonies  for  their  defence,  and  that,  having  deter 
mined  to  apply  to  some  European  Power  for  a  supply,  he 
had  been  sent  out  with  authority  to  apply  first  to  France, 
because  of  the  opinion  that  if  the  Colonies  should  come 
to  a  total  separation  from  Great  Britain,  France  would  be 
looked  upon  as  the  Power  whose  friendship  it  would  be 
fittest  for  them  to  obtain  and  to  cultivate ;  and  that  there 
upon  he  should  ask  of  M.  de  Vergennes,  on  behalf  of  the 
Colonies,  clothing  and  arms  for  twenty-five  thousand  men, 
with  a  suitable  quantity  of  ammunition  and  one  hundred 
field-pieces. 

When  Mr.  Deane  arrived  in  France  he  found  that, 
while  Dr.  Dubourg  had  been  and  was  still  very  energetic 
and  faithful  in  the  cause  of  America,  circumstances  had 
somewhat  changed  since  Dr.  Franklin  had  gone  home. 
M.  de  Vergennes  had  employed  Dr.  Dubourg  and  his  con 
nections  to  a  certain  extent  until  the  fixed  determination 
was  reached  by  the  ministry  that  France  should  aid  the 
Colonies  systematically,  when  it  became  necessary  that  the 
Cabinet  should  employ  its  own  machinery  with  its  own 
system  of  communication  ;  and,  in  order  that  this  should 


144  BEGINNING    OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

be  established  upon  a  basis  which  would  secure  efficient 
service,  preserve  the  secrecy  of  its  actions,  and  centralize 
the  whole  business  of  credits,  purchases,  agreements,  and 
shipments,  it  was  obliged  to  have  its  own  man  in  charge. 
That  man  was  Beaumarchais.  It  was  not  very  long  before 
Mr.  Deane  discovered  that,  whilst  he  was  likely  to  obtain 
in  France  all  the  munitions  and  supplies  that  he  was 
authorized  to  contract  for,  the  influence  at  Court  of  Dr. 
Dubourg  and  his  people  had  been  superseded  by  that  of 
Beaumarchais.  He  quickly  decided,  therefore,  that  in 
order  to  succeed  he  must  deal  with  him,  because  in  deal 
ing  with  Beaumarchais  he  would  be  practically  dealing 
with  the  Government.  In  the  mean  time,  however,  he 
persuaded  Dr.  Dubourg  to  write  to  the  Comte  de  Ver- 
gennes  and  beg  for  an  interview  upon  a  certain  day,  upon 
which  he  went  to  Versailles  with  him ;  and,  although  M. 
Dubourg's  letter  had  not  been  received  by  the  Secretary 
of  State,  that  gentleman  gave  them  immediate  reception, 
on  the  17th  of  July,  1776. 

The  Comte  de  Vergennes  knew  already  that  Mr.  Deane 
was  in  Paris,  and  he  had  his  own  reasons  for  receiving 
him.  This  audience  was  the  first  occasion  upon  which 
the  American  people  treated  as  an  independent  nation 
with  a  foreign  Power. 

The  Comte  de  Vergennes  did  not  speak  English,  but 
the  interview  was  conducted  by  his  chief  secretary,  M. 
Gerard,  who  understood  it  and  spoke  it  well ;  and  by  this 
means,  Mr.  Deane  said,1 — 

"I  had  an  opportunity  of  conversing  freely  with  him  on  the 
subject  of  my  commission  for  two  hours,  and  was  attentively  and 
favorably  heard  by  him,  and  was  asked  many  questions,  which 
shows  that  the  American  disputes  had  been,  and  still  were,  a  prin 
cipal  object  of  attention.  I  pursued  nearly  the  line  marked  out 
by  my  instructions,  stating  the  importance  of  the  American  com- 

1  Silas  Deane  to  the  Committee  of  Secret   Correspondence,  18th  August, 
1776  :  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  112. 


1776.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE   AND    THE   UNITED    STATES.        145 

merce,  and  the  advantages  Great  Britain  had  received  from  a 
monopoly  of  it.  That,  all  intercourse  ceasing  between  the  two 
countries,  the  Colonies  had  considered  where  they  might  dispose 
of  that  produce,  which  they  necessarily  had  so  large  a  surplus  of, 
and  receive  for  their  raw  or  first  materials  the  various  manufac 
tures  they  wanted.  That  they  first  turned  their  eyes  on  France, 
as  the  best  country  in  Europe  for  them  to  be  connected  with  in 
commerce.  That  I  was  purchasing  a  large  quantity  of  manufac 
tures,  for  which  I  expected  to  pay  the  money,  and  that  I  should 
want  a  quantity  of  military  stores,  for  which  remittances  would 
be  made.  That  I  doubted  not  the  Colonies  had  before  this  de 
clared  independency,  and  that  I  should  soon  receive  instructions, 
in  consequence,  more  full  and  explicit ;  that  in  the  mean  time 
they  were  very  anxious  to  know  how  such  a  declaration  would  be 
received  by  the  Powers  in  Europe,  particularly  by  France,  and 
whether,  in  such  a  case,  an  ambassador  would  be  received  from 
them,  etc.  ? 

"To  which  he  replied  that  the  importance  of  the  American 
commerce  was  well  known,  and  that  no  country  could  so  well 
supply  the  Colonies,  and  in  turn  receive  their  produce,  as 
France ;  it  was,  therefore,  the  interest  of  both  to  have  the  most 
free  and  uninterrupted  intercourse,  for  which  reason  the  Court 
had  ordered  their  ports  to  be  kept  open  and  equally  free  to 
America  as  to  Britain.  That,  considering  the  good  understand 
ing  between  the  two  Courts  of  Versailles  and  London,  they  could 
not  openly  encourage  the  shipping  of  warlike  stores,  but  no  ob 
struction  of  any  kind  would  be  given ;  if  there  should,  as  the 
custom-houses  were  not  fully  in  their  secrets  in  this  matter,  such 
obstructions  should  be  removed  on  the  first  application.  That  I 
must  consider  myself  perfectly  free  to  carry  on  any  kind  of  com 
merce  in  the  kingdom  which  any  subject  of  any  other  State  in 
the  world  might,  as  the  Court  had  resolved  their  ports  should  be 
equally  free  to  both  parties.  That  I  was  under  his  immediate 
protection,  and  should  I  meet  with  any  difficulty,  either  from 
their  police,  with  the  rules  of  which  he  supposed  me  unacquainted, 
or  from  any  other  quarter,  I  had  but  to  apply  to  him  and  every 
thing  should  be  settled.  That  as  to  independency,  it  was  an  event 
in  the  womb  of  time,  and  it  would  be  highly  improper  for  him  to 
say  anything  on  that  subject  until  it  had  actually  taken  place ; 
meantime,  he  informed  me  that  the  British  Ambassador  knew  of 
my  arrival,  and  therefore  advised  me  not  to  associate  with  English 
men  more  than  I  was  from  necessity  obliged,  as  he  doubted  not  I 
should  have  many  spies  on  my  conduct.  .  .  .  He  then  asked  me 
VOL.  I.— 10 


146  BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

many  questions  with  respect  to  the  Colonies  ;  but  what  he  seemed 
most  to  want  to  be  assured  of  was  their  ability  to  subsist  without 
their  fisheries  and  under  the  interruption  of  their  commerce.  .  .  . 
After  many  questions  on  this  subject,  he  put  this,  in  which  I 
thought  he  seemed  interested, — whether,  if  the  Colonies  declare 
an  independency,  they  would  not  differ  among  themselves  ?  To 
this  I  replied  that  the  greatest  harmony  had  as  yet  subsisted,  and 
that  I  had  no  grounds  to  doubt  it  in  future ;  that  the  common 
danger  which  first  drove  them  into  measures  which  must  end  in 
such  a  declaration  would  subsist,  and  that  alone  was  sufficient  to 
insure  their  union. 

1  i  He  then  desired  me  to  give  his  Secretary  my  address,  and  said, 
though  he  should  be  glad  to  see  me  often,  yet,  as  matters  were  cir 
cumstanced,  his  house  was  too  public  a  place,  but  that  I  might  put 
the  same  confidence  in  his  Secretary  as  in  himself,  to  whom  I  might 
apply  for  advice  and  direction ;  but  that  whenever  anything  of 
importance  occurred  I  need  but  inform  him,  and  he  would  see  me  ; 
but  on  common  occasions  I  must  address  the  Secretary,  which 
would  be  everyway  more  convenient,  as  he  understood  the  English 
language  well,  and  was  a  person  in  whom  the  greatest  confidence 
could  be  placed.  Having  settled  the  mode  of  intercourse,  I  ex 
pressed  the  sense  I  had  of  his  Excellency's  politeness,  and  the 
generous  protection  he  had  given  me,  and  on  parting  said,  if  my 
commission,  or  the  mode  of  introducing  the  subject,  were  out  of 
the  usual  course,  I  must  rely  on  his  goodness  to  make  allowances 
for  a  new-formed  people,  in  circumstances  altogether  unprece 
dented,  and  for  their  agent,  wholly  unacquainted  with  Courts.  To 
which  he  replied  that  the  people  and  their  cause  were  very  re 
spectable  in  the  eyes  of  all  disinterested  persons,  and  that  the 
interview  had  been  agreeable." 

Whilst  Silas  Deane  was  thus  with  diffidence  presenting 
the  interests  of  his  people  at  the  Court  of  France,  the 
Comte  de  Vergennes,  who  was  glad  of  this  opportunity  to 
discuss  the  affairs  of  America  with  a  person  whose  opinions 
might  be  worthy  of  consideration  through  his  acquaint 
ance  with  the  country,  dexterously  led  the  conversation 
toward  the  two  subjects  which  were  uppermost  in  his 
mind  and  in  regard  to  which,  as  we  know,  he  wished  to 
satisfy  himself;  namely,  whether  the  Colonies  would  be 
able  to  subsist  if  they  were  reduced  to  their  own  resources, 


1770.]       BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         147 

and  whether,  when  once  they  were  independent  of  Great 
Britain,  they  were  likely  to  weaken  themselves  by  sever 
ing  into  disconnected  states,  or  might  be  counted  upon  to 
act  as  one  united  nation, — inquiries  to  which  Mr.  Deane 
gave  satisfactory  replies ;  though,  whilst  they  attracted  his 
attention,  they  did  not  impress  him  with  their  real  im 
portance,  because  he  did  not  suspect — indeed,  he  could 
not,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  suspect — how  exceedingly 
near  France  was  at  that  moment  to  taking  sides  with  the 
Americans  and  assuming  an  active  share  in  the  war. 

At  all  events,  M.  de  Vergennes  was  encouraged  by  the 
information  he  had  obtained  in  this  interview.  He  saw 
Mr.  Deane  again  a  few  days  later,  and  gave  that  gentle 
man  "  fresh  assurances  of  the  utmost  freedom  and  protec 
tion  in  their  ports  and  on  their  coasts,"  and,  as  Mr.  Deane 
reported  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence, 
"  that,  in  one  word,  I  might  rely  on  whatever  MOILS. 
Beaumarchais  should  engage  in  the  commercial  way  of 
supplies,  which,  indeed,  was  all  I  wished  for,  as  I  was  on 
the  safe  side  of  the  question,  viz.,  on  the  receiving  part." 
Although  this  was  toward  the  end  of  July,  it  was  not  as 
yet  known  in  France  that  the  Colonies  had  declared  their 
independence ;  that  information  did  not  reach  Paris  until 
nearly  a  month  later,  in  the  first  half  of  August,  1770. 
This  much  had  been  accomplished,  however,  that  the 
United  Colonies  had  directly  applied  to  France  first  of 
all  foreign  nations  for  assistance,  and  that  they  were  now 
carrying  out  an  understanding  which  had  been  reached 
by  their  representative  and  the  French  Government. 

There  were  abundant  means  at  hand  for  supplying  the 
demands  which  Mr.  Deane  was  authorized  to  present ;  for 
the  arsenals  of  France  contained  immense  quantities  of 
stores,  and,  in  consequence  of  an  improvement  in  their 
fire-arms  which  had  recently  been  adopted  by  the  Ministry 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  112. 


148  BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

of  War,  there  were  some  seventy  thousand  muskets  of  the 
old  and  heavier  pattern  lying  unused  in  the  magazines, 
many  of  them  as  good  as  new,  with  other  military  stores 
in  proportion.  The  summer  of  1776  was  employed  by 
Mr.  Deane  in  negotiating  through  Beaumarchais  for  the 
collecting  of  such  part  of  this  equipment  as  was  required 
by  the  Colonies,  its  purchase  from  the  Government,  and 
its  shipment  to  America;  in  which  matter,  as  he  had 
the  full  countenance  of  the  ministry,  he  received  valuable 
aid  from  M.  Leray  de  Chaumont,  the  Intendant,  and  was 
enabled  through  Beaumarchais  to  deal  directly  with  the 
Departments  of  War  and  the  Navy. 

The  two  millions  of  livres  advanced  by  the  Courts  of 
France  and  Spain  to  aid  the  Colonies  were  given  to  Beau 
marchais,  who  devised  a  plan  by  which  all  their  business 
in  France  might  be  transacted  and  all  their  interests  pro 
tected.  He  established  a  fictitious  trading  house,  under 
the  name  of  B,oderique  Hortales  et  Cie.,  which  purported  to 
be  the  agent  of  the  Colonies  in  France,  and  which  was,  in 
fact,  the  intermediary  between  the  American  Congress  and 
the  French  Government.  He  wrote  to  the  Committee  of 
Secret  Correspondence,  on  the  18th  of  August,  1776,  an 
nouncing  that  he  had  established  an  extensive  commercial 
house,  solely  for  the  purpose  of  serving  them  in  Europe 
and  of  supplying  them  expeditiously  and  certainly  with 
clothes,  linens,  powder,  ammunition,  muskets,  cannon,  or 
even  gold  for  the  payment  of  troops,  "  and  in  general 
everything  that  can  be  useful  for  the  honorable  war  in 
which  you  are  engaged,"  adding  that  he  had  already  pro 
cured  for  them  two  hundred  pieces  of  brass  cannon  (four- 
pounders),  two  hundred  thousand  pounds  of  cannon-pow 
der,  twenty  thousand  excellent  fusils,  some  brass  mortars, 
bombs,  cannon-balls,  bayonets,  platines,  clothes,  linens,  etc., 
for  the  clothing  of  the  troops,  and  lead  for  musket-balls.1 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  129. 


1776.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE   AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         149 

He  had  correspondents  in  all  the  ports  of  France,  who 
were  always  ready  upon  the  arrival  of  American  vessels 
to  call  upon  the  captains,  to  perform  services  for  them, 
to  receive  their  letters  and  bills  of  lading  and  forward 
them  to  Hortales  et  Cie.,  who  either  took  the  cargo  in 
exchange  for  arms  and  munitions  of  war,  or  else  facili 
tated  the  sale  and  disposal  of  it  otherwise.  The  articles 
particularly  sought  for  from  America  were  tobacco,  rice, 
indigo,  and  wheat  or  flour, — especially  tobacco.  The 
business  was  transacted  entirely  in  Europe,  and  it  was 
understood  that  all  risks  of  loss  or  seizure  were  to  be 
borne  by  the  Colonies.  In  this  manner  great  quantities 
of  materials  of  war  were  collected  to  aid  the  insurgents 
and  were  shipped  to  America. 

All  these  transactions  of  Silas  Deane  in  France  were 
immediately  reported  with  tolerable  accuracy  and  minute 
ness  of  detail  by  the  agents  of  the  British  Government  to 
the  Embassy  at  Paris  and  to  the  ministry  at  home ;  and, 
in  consequence,  the  facility  of  giving  evasive  answers 
which  M.  de  Vergennes  had  developed  by  frequent  usage 
was  severely  strained  by  the  protests  and  representations 
that  followed  on  the  part  of  England,  and  there  was  no 
longer  any  doubt  that  the  attitude  of  France  was  well 
understood  on  the  other  side  of  the  Channel.  M.  Gar- 
nier,  the  French  charge-d' affaires  in  London,  sent  home 
a  copy  of  a  remarkable  document  at  that  time  reported  to 
have  been  prepared  upon  this  subject  by  Lord  Chatham, 
which,  although  strongly  partisan,  and  whether  entirely 
authentic  or  not,  illustrates  in  an  interesting  manner  the 
feeling  in  England,  wrhere  the  question  was,  of  course, 
freely  discussed,  and  shows  that  the  position  of  the 
French  Cabinet  in  relation  to  the  Colonies  was  almost  as 
well  understood  by  English  statesmen  at  the  close  of  the 
year  1776  as  if  they  had  actually  been  in  the  counsels 
of  Louis  XVI.  and  his  ministers. 

M.  Gamier  reported  that  Lord  Chatham  had  said  "  that 


150  BEGINNING    OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

he  retained  the  same  sentiments  which  he  had  always  had 
in  regard  to  America,  and  of  that  he  had  given  proof  by 
the  Provisional  Act  which  he  had  presented  to  the  House 
of  Lords.  That,  relying  upon  the  friendship  of  Doctor 
Adington  (his  physician) ,  he  begged  him  to  preserve  this 
writing,  in  testimony  of  what  he  said,  in  order  that  in  the 
event  of  his  succumbing  to  the  long  illness  with  which  he 
was  afflicted,  the  doctor  should  do  him  the  justice  to  show 
that  he  had  remained  constantly  of  the  same  opinion.  He 
added  that  unless  effectual  measures  were  promptly  taken 
to  reconcile  the  Colonies,  he  was  fully  convinced  that  in  a 
few  years  France  would  have  one  foot  in  England.  That 
at  the  present  moment  the  policy  of  France  was,  very 
probably,  to  wait  some  time  longer  before  declaring  war 
openly,  in  order  to  permit  England  to  involve  herself  still 
further  in  the  ruinous  war  which  she  was  waging  against 
herself  in  America,  and  to  see  how  far  the  Americans, 
secretly  encouraged,  would  be  able  to  offer  resistance." 
This  is  almost  an  echo  of  the  language  used  by  the  Comte 
de  Vergennes  in  his  despatches  to  explain  the  policy  of 
France. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  politics  when  the  news  ar 
rived  that  the  American  Colonies  had  declared  their  inde 
pendence.  For  the  moment,  that  very  important  event 
excited  no  especial  interest  beyond  the  fact  that  it  was 
what  had  been  more  or  less  confidently  expected.  The 
tone  of  the  Declaration  itself,  and  the  enunciation  of  prin 
ciples  which  it  contains,  were  passed  over  for  the  most  part 
with  the  casual  notice  conceded  to  an  instrument  which 
was  regarded  merely  as  marking  another  incident  in  the 
conflict  between  the  mother-country  and  the  Colonists. 

The  announcement  was  made  to  M.  de  Vergennes  on 
the  13th  of  August,  by  the  charge-d'affaires  at  London, 
as  follows  :  "  General  Howe  announces  that  the  Congress 


1  M.  Gamier  to  the  Comte  de  Vergennes,  6th  December,  1776,  Angleterre, 
t.  517,  No.  85  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  504. 


1770.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE   AND    THE   UNITED   STATES.        151 

has  declared  the  independence  of  the  United  Colonies. 
It  is  also  known  that  the  Congress  has  formally  declared 
war  against  Great  Britain,  and  that  this  declaration  is  set 
forth  in  twenty-three  articles  in  which  it  explains  the 
causes  which  have  determined  it  to  take  this  measure. 
But  the  Government  has  not  thought  it  necessary  to  take 
notice  of  this,  and  in  fact  I  do  not  see,  myself,  that  this 
raising  of  the  bucklers  is  likely  to  produce  any  new 
sensation  here."  Gamier,  the  charge-d'affaires,  was  a 
friend  of  the  Colonies ;  his  sympathies  were  with  them  in 
any  event  that  was  likely  to  be  of  advantage  to  them ;  he 
simply  reflected  in  this  despatch  the  opinions  that  he 
heard  expressed  in  England,  and  he  failed  to  detect  any 
signs  of  the  great  change  that  was  to  be  wrought  in  the 
world  by  that  momentous  act  of  the  4th  of  July. 

Not  so,  however,  the  Comte  de  Vergennes.  To  him 
it  announced  his  opportunity.  It  was  the  opened  door 
to  all  the  hopes  of  his  administration ;  to  the  occasion  he 
had  sought  for  years ;  to  the  great  ambition  of  his  life ; 
to  the  returning  glory  of  France.  He  grasped  the  situ 
ation  instantly  and  made  up  his  mind  to  act.  He  was 
convinced  by  what  had  now  taken  place  that  the  Colonists 
intended  to  continue  the  fight.  In  his  reply  to  Garnier's 
communication,  he  remarked  that  "  this  declaration  of 
their  independence,  directly  in  the  face  of  Lord  Howe, 
did  not  look  very  much  as  if  terror  were  about  to  take 
possession  of  their  souls,"  and  before  the  end  of  the  month 
he  had  formally  proposed  that  France  and  Spain  should 
begin  the  war. 

Having  asked  the  King  to  appoint  a  "  Committee"  of 
the  Cabinet  for  the  purpose  of  considering  the  political 
situation  and  the  measures  to  be  taken  in  view  of  the 
circumstances,  he  prepared  a  minute,  which,  although 
very  long,  was  written  entirely  in  his  own  hand, — an 

1  Angleterrc,  t.  517,  No.  116  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  561. 


152  BEGINNING   OF   DIPLOMATIC   KELATIONS  [1776. 

indication  of  the  intense  interest  he  took  in  the  subject 
and  the  scrupulous  care  with  which  he  treated  it.  This 
statement  was  to  be  read  to  the  committee  for  their 
opinion,  and  if  it  were  duly  approved  was  then  to  be 
communicated  to  the  Spanish  Court.  The  committee 
consisted  of  the  same  counsellors  of  the  King  as  had 
previously  deliberated  upon  the  policy  of  the  two  Crowns, 
— namely,  M.  de  Maurepas,  M.  de  Sartine,  M.  de  St.-Ger- 
main,  and  M.  de  Clugny,  the  successor  of  Turgot  as  Con- 
troleur-General.  It  met  on  the  31st  of  August,  in  the 
presence  of  the  King,  to  whom  M.  de  Vergennes  read  his 
minute,  which  was,  so  far  as  there  is  any  evidence  in  the 
Archives,  unanimously  approved. 

Although  this  document  repeats  to  some  extent  the 
arguments  which  had  been  offered  on  former  occasions  in 
treating  of  the  subject  of  Great  Britain  in  her  relations 
to  the  American  Colonies  and  her  attitude  of  possible 
danger  toward  the  two  Crowns,  it  is  historically  impor 
tant  in  its  bearing  upon  our  Revolution,  because,  at  a 
moment  when  the  two  monarchies  were  willing  to  enter 
into  the  contest,  it  presents  a  full  statement  of  the  case 
on  the  part  of  France.1 

This  was  the  climax  of  the  Comte  de  Vergennes's 
diplomacy  between  the  Courts  of  Versailles  and  Madrid. 
It  was  a  distinct  proposition  to  Spain  to  make  war  upon 
Great  Britain  by  taking  advantage  of  its  embarrassment 
in  the  North  American  Colonies.  The  Conde  de  Aranda, 
the  Spanish  Ambassador,  who  was  in  close  intimacy  and 
entire  accord  with  the  Secretary  of  State,  went  to  his 
house  on  the  day  when  the  King's  Council  met,  and  re 
ceived  from  him  there  a  detailed  account  of  the  contents 
of  this  memoir ;  and  in  the  following  week,  on  the  7th  of 
September,  he  transmitted  by  courier  an  official  copy  of  it 
to  the  Marques  de  Grimaldi,  at  Madrid.  The  Spanish 

1  See  Appendix  A. 


1776].      BETWEEN    FRANCE   AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.        153 

Court,  thus  summoned  to  decide  finally  what  course  it 
would  pursue  in  so  grave  a  matter,  received  this  com 
munication  with  some  surprise,  but  gave  to  it  the  serious 
consideration  required  by  a  subject  which  involved  a  dis 
cussion  of  the  whole  policy  of  the  Cabinet  and  an  exami 
nation  of  all  the  material  resources  of  the  kingdom.  The 
Spaniards  had  their  own  grounds  for  complaint  against 
England,  as  we  have  seen,  and  these  they  might  stretch 
to  the  importance  of  a  casus  belli^  if  they  saw  fit  to  do  so ; 
they  still  retained  the  old  enmity  toward  Portugal,  and 
the  temptation  to  capture  that  kingdom  once  and  for  all, 
and  to  annex  it  to  Spanish  territory,  made  them  all  the 
more  inclined  to  encourage  a  war  which  was  likely  to 
offer  them  a  chance  to  satisfy  their  ambition.  Besides 
this,  the  resources  of  Spain  were  in  excellent  condition, 
so  that  she  need  fear  nothing  on  that  score,  even  in  a 
war  against  Great  Britain ;  for,  in  spite  of  the  unceasing 
activity  with  which  the  Government  had  during  the  past 
year  been  increasing  the  navy  and  strengthening  the  land 
forces,  which  had  called  for  immense  expenditures  of 
money,  the  taxes  had  not  been  increased,  and  the  King 
had  declared  that  it  would  not  be  necessary  to  make  new 
levies  then  even  in  case  of  actual  war. 

Therefore,  after  a  very  careful  examination  of  the  prop 
osition  of  M.  de  Vergennes,  the  Spanish  Cabinet  made  a 
reply,  at  the  end  of  about  a  month  from  the  time  it  had 
received  the  despatch,  which  was,  upon  the  whole,  favora 
ble  to  the  plan,  and  stated  clearly  the  conditions  upon 
which  Spain  would  agree  to  join  in  the  war;  this  reply 
was  contained  in  a  letter  written  by  the  Spanish  Premier, 
from  San  Ildefonso,  on  the  8th  of  October,  1776,  to  the 
Conde  de  Aranda,  at  Versailles,  to  be  laid  by  him  before 
the  Court  of  Louis  XVI. 

The  chief,  and  by  far  the  most  important,  condition 
made  by  Spain  was  that  it  should  be  allowed  at  once  to 
invade  the  kingdom  of  Portugal,  to  conquer  it,  and  to 


154  BEGINNING    OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

attach  it  permanently  to  the  Spanish  Crown,  "for  the 
general  satisfaction  of  the  nation"  and  because  it  prop 
erly  "  belonged  to  Spain  by  right  of  inheritance."  This 
being  agreed  to,  the  Spanish  Court  was  willing  to  unite 
with  France,  to  determine  when  the  war  should  be  openly 
declared,  how  it  should  be  carried  on,  and  what  part 
should  be  assigned  in  it  to  each  of  the  two  monarchies ;  it 
conceded  that  war  was  inevitable,  that  it  would  be  just  to 
declare  it,  that  it  would  be  wise  to  attack  England  whilst 
she  was  engaged  with  her  Colonies,  that  it  might  be  well 
to  foment  a  rebellion  in  Ireland,  in  which  Spain  was  ready 
to  assist,  and,  finally,  that  as  soon  as  France  should  have 
shown  herself  ready  to  make  the  attack  and  to  sustain  the 
campaign,  Spain  would  follow ;  and  although,  in  calcu 
lating  the  results,  Spain  ran  much  the  greater  risk  in  case 
of  failure,  she  would  adopt  whatever  measures  France 
considered  best  to  be  carried  out.1 

The  announcement  at  Versailles  of  this  decision  marks 
one  of  those  turning-points  in  the  world's  progress  at 
which  the  course  of  events  leads  into  an  unexpected 
direction  and  changes  the  whole  narrative  of  subsequent 
history  from  what  the  promise  of  it  had  been  but  a  mo 
ment  before.  The  Comte  de  Vergennes  had  gained  the 
purpose  to  which  he  had  devoted  such  incessant  and 
patient  labor,  and  had  won  a  triumph  for  his  diplo 
macy  with  the  Court  of  Spain.  If  he  had  continued  as 
everything  seemed  to  promise,  the  whole  history  of  the 
American  Revolution  would  likely  have  been  different ; 
the  history  of  Europe  at  that  period  would  not  have 
been  what  it  is.  We  should  probably  have  had,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  year  1777,  the  powerful  aid  of  both 
France  and  Spain  in  our  struggle  for  independence, 
against  which  Great  Britain  would  have  been  unable  to 
contend.  It  is  likely  that  Spain  would  have  taken  Por- 

1  M.  de  Grimaldi  to  the  Conde  de  Aranda,  8th  October,  1776,  Espagne, 
t.  582,  No.  21  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  i.  603. 


1776.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.        155 

tugal,  which  nothing  could  have  prevented  if  she  had 
made  a  sudden  attack  upon  that  kingdom  with  the  supe 
rior  forces  which  she  then  had  at  command.  As  a  result, 
it  is  conceivable  that  a  European  war  would  have  followed 
in  which  there  would  have  been  engaged  a  number  of 
Powers  which  continued,  as  events  turned  out,  for  many 
years  afterward  to  live  in  peace. 

At  the  very  moment,  however,  when  M.  de  Vergennes 
was  about  to  stretch  out  his  hand  to  take  advantage  of  the 
success  he  had  won  at  the  Spanish  Court,  news  came  to 
him  of  the  defeat  upon  Long  Island.  This  unexpected 
announcement  dashed  his  hopes  and  completely  disar 
ranged  his  plans.  It  came  from  M.  Gamier,  the  charge- 
d'affaires  at  London,  in  a  letter  dated  the  llth  of  Octo 
ber,  which,  derived  as  it  was  from  English  sources,  and 
necessarily  affected  by  the  exultation  with  which  the  vic 
tory  of  General  Howe  was  everywhere  received  in  Great 
Britain,  exaggerated  the  case  far  beyond  what  the  cir 
cumstances  warranted.  It  represented  the  Americans 
as  having  been  overwhelmed  by  a  disaster  which  had 
not  only  broken  their  resistance,  but  had  brought  them 
hopelessly  under  the  control  of  the  English  and  was 
likely  to  force  them  to  lay  down  their  arms  upon  the  fall 
of  New  York,  which  was  predicted  as  sure  to  follow  very 
soon. 

Although  M.  Gamier  endeavored  to  offer  some  morsels 
of  consolation  in  his  letter,  derived  from  the  opinions  of 
the  Opposition  party  in  England,  this  news  from  America 
was  a  heavy  blow  to  the  Comte  de  Vergennes,  who  re 
ceived  it  with  bitter  disappointment.  It  swept  away  in 
an  instant  all  the  hopes  he  had  built  upon  the  successful 
resistance  of  the  Americans  to  the  mother-country ;  it 
destroyed  the  foundations  of  his  policy  of  immediate  war 
upon  England  ;  and  it  made  it  impossible  for  him  to  use 
the  alliance  with  Spain,  whose  consent  it  had  been  so 
hard  to  obtain,  now  that  ho  had  it  ready  to  his  hand.  If 


156  BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

the  American  Colonists  were  substantially  conquered,  as 
the  English  reports  asserted,  it  was  an  end  to  the  entire 
policy  of  his  administration  in  regard  to  England.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  they  were  only  temporarily  crippled,  even 
that  modified  his  plans  very  seriously,  at  least  for  the 
present.  In  either  event,  he  could  no  longer  think  of 
war.  With  mortification  he  recognized  that,  while  the 
international  relations  between  England  and  France  were 
the  same  as  before,  he  should  now  be  forced  to  present 
them  differently,  and  that  out  of  the  same  set  of  circum 
stances  from  which  yesterday  he  had  drawn  the  reasons 
for  his  glowing  appeal  to  arms  he  must  find  arguments 
to-day  for  maintaining  the  peace.  The  Court  was  at  Fon- 
tainebleau,  whither  he  also  had  gone  in  attendance  upon 
the  King,  and  it  was  there  that  he  received  from  the 
Spanish  Ambassador  the  answer  of  Carlos  III. 

Having  broken  the  seals,  he  immediately  called  the  at 
tention  of  Louis  XVI.  to  the  document,  on  the  17th  of 
October,  accompanying  it  with  a  short  note  which  was 
entirely  free  from  his  former  enthusiasm,  plainly  indi 
cating  his  change  of  attitude,  and  in  which  he  contented 
himself  with  a  summary  discussion  of  its  contents,  saying 
in  conclusion  that,  after  all,  "  there  was  now  no  hurry  for 
these  matters."  On  the  following  day  the  King  signi 
fied  his  accord  with  this  view  of  his  Secretary  of  State 
and  agreed  with  him  upon  the  terms  of  the  reply  to  be 
sent  to  the  Court  of  Spain,  which  terms  were  commu 
nicated  at  once  to  the  Conde  de  Aranda,  in  anticipation 
of  the  formal  declaration  which  M.  de  Vergennes  should 
transmit  to  his  sovereign  as  soon  as  it  could  be  drawn  up. 
One  week  later  that  document  was  duly  prepared,  and  in 
submitting  it  to  the  King,  on  the  26th  of  October,  1776, 
for  his  final  approval,  M.  de  Vergennes  attached  to  it  the 
following  note,  which  indicates  in  a  few  words,  quite  as 

1  Archives  Nationales,   K  164,   No.  3,  annee  1776,  No.   16 :    Doniol,   La 
Participation  de  la  France,  i.  618. 


1776.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.        157 

well,  perhaps,  as  a  much  longer  explanation  would  have 
done,  the  difference  in  the  attitude  of  the  French  Court 
as  it  was  when  it  adopted  the  resolution  of  the  31st  of 
August  in  favor  of  war,  and  as  it  had  subsequently  re 
adjusted  itself  upon  the  announcement  of  General  Wash 
ington's  retreat  from  Long  Island : 

"SiRE, — I  have  the  honor  to  submit  to  Your  Majesty  the  docu 
ment  which  I  have  prepared  in  reply  to  the  despatch  of  the 
Marquis  de  Grimaldi  to  the  Comte  d'Aranda.  I  have  used  as 
the  basis  of  my  argument  the  views  and  principles  which  Your 
Majesty  was  pleased  to  communicate  to  me  in  your  letter  of  the 
18th  inst.  I  trust,  Sire,  that  I  have  conformed  to  your  intentions. 
I  have  proposed  no  active  measures,  and  in  this  I  believe  that  I 
am  not  far  from  the  intentions  of  the  Court  of  Spain,  which  appear 
to  me  to  be  not  so  warlike  as  its  Ambassador  supposes.  This  gen 
tleman  would  have  an  immediate  declaration.  But  that  is  now 
very  much  less  pressing  than  it  might  have  appeared  two  months 
ago  ;  and  all  that  present  circumstances  seem  to  demand  of  the 
watchfulness  of  Your  Majesty  and  of  that  of  the  Catholic  King  is 
to  see  that  the  Americans  do  not  succumb  for  want  of  means  to 
continue  their  resistance."  1 

In  a  word,  France  had  fallen  back  to  the  position  of 
secret  encouragement  and  passive  indulgence  which  it  had 
occupied  in  regard  to  the  Colonies  for  more  than  a  year. 
It  returned  to  its  connivance  at  the  acts  of  Colonial  agents 
and  the  loading  of  Colonial  vessels  in  French  ports ;  to 
the  regime  of  Beaumarchais,  of  Silas  Deane,  and  of  dis 
simulation  before  Lord  Stormont.  In  this  the  policy  of 
the  Cabinet  had  not  been  changed,  but  the  development 
of  its  policy  was  checked  and  active  measures  were  for  the 
time  indefinitely  postponed. 

The  Court  of  Spain  accepted  the  reasons  given  for  what 
they  were  worth,  not  greatly  disappointed,  perhaps,  at 
finding  an  opportunity  to  avoid  a  difficulty  that  was  not 
of  its  own  creation ;  and,  without  making  serious  objec- 

1  Archives  Nationales,  K  104,  No.  3,  ann£e  1776,  No.  17  :  Doniol,  La 
Participation  de  la  France,  i.  620. 


158  BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

tion  to  the  change,  it  held  itself  as  notified  that  for  the 
present,  at  least,  there  would  be  no  war.  But  M.  de  Ver- 
gennes  lost  ground  then  which  he  was  not  able  to  recover ; 
he  never  induced  Spain  afterward  to  accept  his  views  as 
completely  as  he  had  done  upon  this  occasion.  The 
administration  of  the  Marques  de  Grimaldi  had  been 
friendly,  even  cordial,  in  its  relations  to  France ;  and  it 
was  no  doubt  owing  to  this  that  M.  de  Vergennes  had 
succeeded  in  creating  the  sentiment  at  Madrid  against 
Great  Britain  which  he  had  fomented,  as  we  have  seen, 
until  he  almost  persuaded  the  Spanish  Court  that  the 
interests  of  the  two  Crowns  were  identical  and  could 
best  be  advanced  by  the  policy  which  he  had  outlined 
in  connection  with  the  American  War. 

There  came  now,  however,  a  strong  revulsion  of  feeling, 
which  drove  M.  de  Grimaldi  from  office  and  altered  defi 
nitively  the  subsequent  relations  of  the  monarchies ;  for 
the  note  of  the  French  Secretary  of  State  by  which  he  re 
ceded  from  his  position  after  obtaining  the  Spanish  King's 
consent  to  war  was  received  with  a  storm  of  indignation  in 
Spain.  The  strong  political  party  (the  Aragoneses)  led 
by  the  Prince  of  Asturias  seized  this  occasion  to  heap  in 
dignities  upon  the  Premier,  whom  they  had  never  liked, 
and  whom  they  now  accused  as  a  foreigner  of  having  ex 
posed  the  honor  of  Spain  to  insult  and  disgrace ;  they  had 
reproached  him  formerly  for  the  failure  of  the  expedition 
against  Algiers,  they  now  upbraided  him  for  the  loss  of 
Portugal  and  for  having  allowed  M.  de  Vergennes  to  trifle 
with  the  dignity  of  the  Crown.  M.  de  Grimaldi  was 
weary  of  a  position  which  had  to  be  constantly  sustained 
against  these  bitter  attacks,  and  he  begged  the  King 
to  allow  him  to  resign.  His  request  was  granted,  and  at 
the  same  time  the  great  wish  of  his  life  was  gratified,  when 
his  master  appointed  him,  in  November,  1776,  his  Am 
bassador  at  Rome.  The  new  administration  was  formed 
under  the  Premiership  of  the  Conde  de  Floridablanca,  a 


1776.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         159 

Spaniard  by  birth,  by  education,  and  by  intensity  of  pa 
triotism.  His  impulses  were  strongly  national,  as  was  also 
his  ambition,  and,  with  the  example  of  the  Marques  de 
Grimaldi  fresh  before  him,  it  was  but  natural  that  he 
should  assume  a  different  and  a  much  more  independent 
position  in  his  relations  with  France. 

At  the  close  of  the  year  1776,  and  in  the  early  part  of 
1777,  a  decided  relaxation  had  taken  place,  therefore,  in 
the  bonds  which  united  the  two  Crowns  upon  the  subject 
of  Great  Britain ;  the  Comte  de  Vergennes  continued  in 
his  despatches  to  assume  that  they  were  acting  together, 
but  it  soon  became  evident  that  his  influence  was  broken  ; 
and,  while  the  feeling  of  the  Spanish  Cabinet  toward 
the  American  Colonies  was  one  of  kindness,  as  was 
shown  by  its  friendly  treatment  of  American  vessels  at 
this  time  in  the  ports  of  Spain,  in  spite  of  the  protests 
of  the  English  agents,  there  was  no  disposition  to  treat 
directly  with  the  representatives  of  Congress  or  to  make 
use  of  the  American  Revolution  as  a  pretext  for  war. 

Between  England  and  France  the  situation  was  ex 
tremely  delicate.  The  language  of  the  Comte  de  Ver 
gennes  had  been  greatly  modified  in  his  despatches  to 
London  after  the  battle  of  Long  Island,  and  he  had  re 
peated  to  Lord  Stormont,  at  Versailles,  the  usual  as 
surances  of  his  desire  for  peace  and  of  good  will  toward 
England,  yet  it  was  well  known  in  London  that  he  was 
secretly  treating  with  the  Commissioners  of  the  United 
States  and  that  the  French  Government  was  continuing 
with  all  possible  vigor  to  strengthen  its  armament  and  to 
increase  its  land  and  naval  forces.  On  the  other  hand, 
England  was  increasing  the  number  of  her  war-ships  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  cause  considerable  alarm  upon  that 
subject  in  France.  The  attitude  of  the  two  countries  at 
this  time,  therefore,  although  the  amicable  relations  be 
tween  the  Courts  continued  uninterrupted,  was  decidedly 
one  of  mutual  watchfulness  and  suspicion. 


160  BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

Lord  Stormont,  who  had  now  returned  to  France,  com 
municated  to  the  Cabinet  of  Versailles  with  triumphant 
satisfaction  the  success  of  the  British  arms  in  America, 
which  certainly  was  as  unpalatable  as  any  announcement 
he  could  have  made  that  did  not  directly  threaten  the 
welfare  of  the  kingdom ;  and  the  reply  of  M.  de  Ver- 
gennes  taxed  the  resources  of  diplomatic  courtesy  to 
their  utmost  limit  not  to  be  outdone  by  his  wary  oppo 
nent.  It  illustrates  the  French  minister's  intense  anxiety 
to  keep  on  friendly  terms  at  this  period  with  the  English 
Court.  It  is,  perhaps,  all  things  considered,  his  master 
piece  in  dissimulation : 

"VERSAILLES,  the  21st  of  December,  1776. 

"  To  MD  STORMONT.  SIR, — I  am  deeply  touched  by  the  atten 
tion  of  Your  Excellency  in  permitting  me  to  share  with  you  the 
joy  you  feel  at  the  happy  news  of  the  successes  of  the  British 
arms  in  Connecticut  and  in  New  York.  I  beg  Your  Excellency  to 
accept  my  hearty  thanks  for  this  proof  of  friendship,  and  my  sin 
cere  congratulations  upon  an  event  so  likely  to  contribute  toward 
the  re-establishment  of  peace  in  that  quarter  of  the  globe.  I  shall 
report  to  the  King  the  communication  which  Your  Excellency  has 
been  kind  enough  to  address  to  me,  and  I  take  it  upon  myself  to 
say  that  His  Majesty  will  always  hear  with  pleasure  of  anything 
that  can  contribute  to  the  happiness  or  glory  of  the  King,  your 
master.  I  have  the  honor,  etc. 

"DE  VERGENNES."  l 

This  letter  is  interesting,  aside  from  the  political  events 
that  we  have  just  been  discussing,  in  connection  with  the 
history  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  because  it  illus 
trates  the  sensitive  condition  of  the  intercourse  between 
France  and  Great  Britain  at  the  time  when  that  gentle 
man  was  planning  to  set  out  for  America,  and  the  fixed 
determination  of  the  French  Cabinet  to  allow  nothing 
to  occur  openly  that  might  disturb  the  show  of  cordial 


1  Angleterre,  t.  519,  No.   106  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii. 
107,  note. 


1776.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         161 

understanding,  which,  superficial  and  uncertain  of  dura 
tion  though  it  was,  had  become  an  important  factor  in 
the  policy  of  waiting  and  watching  recently  adopted  by 
the  Comte  de  Vergennes.  It  was  only  a  few  months  later 
that  La  Fayette  left  Paris  to  join  his  vessel  at  Bordeaux, 
an  event  which  was  noised  about  at  once  by  the  conversa 
tion  of  his  intimate  friends  and  was  made  a  subject  of 
notoriety  by  the  opposing  measures  of  his  father-in-law. 
The  Due  d'Ayen's  angry  protests  and  his  appeal  to  the 
Government  quickly  attracted  the  attention  of  the  Eng 
lish  Embassy,  both  on  account  of  his  distinction  at  the 
French  Court  and  of  the  position  of  La  Fayette  him 
self.  When  the  fact  was  publicly  stated  that  a  man  of 
La  Fayette's  rank  and  high  connection,  an  officer  at  the 
same  time  in  the  King's  army,  was  about  to  proceed 
to  America  to  join  the  Colonists  in  their  present  strug 
gle,  it  became  necessary  for  the  French  Cabinet  either 
to  use  its  authority  to  forbid  his  departure,  or  tacitly  to 
avow,  in  the  face  of  Great  Britain,  its  assent  to  and 
approval  of  his  action.  This  is  why  the  lettre-de-cachet 
was  issued  by  command  of  the  King  for  the  immediate 
arrest  of  La  Fayette,  with  orders  to  him  to  proceed  to 
Marseilles;  this  also  is  why  the  Government  did  not 
connive  at  his  leaving  France,  and  why  the  obstacles 
were  thrown  in  his  path  against  which  we  have  seen  him 
bravely  struggling  from  the  time  he  left  Paris  until  he 
finally  set  sail  from  Los  Pasajes. 

The  affairs  of  the  American  Colonies  continued,  how 
ever,  to  make  favorable  progress  in  France  under  the 
secret  protection  of  the  Government,  and  the  collection 
and  shipment  of  arms  and  munitions  of  war  were  steadily 
going  on,  under  the  management  of  Beaumarchais  and 
the  general  direction  of  Silas  Deane,  whose  operations 
were  not  restricted  by  the  changed  attitude  of  the  Comte 
de  Vergennes,  except  upon  occasions  when  the  protests 
from  England  became  too  threatening  and  it  was  found 

VOL.  1.— 11 


162  BEGINNING    OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776, 

necessary  to  keep  up  appearances  by  a  temporary  cessa 
tion.  Congress  determined  to  replace  Mr.  Deane,  as  agent 
of  the  Colonies,  by  Commissioners  who  should  be  sent  to 
Paris  clothed  with  authority  as  representatives  of  the  inde 
pendent  nation,  authorized  to  solicit  the  formal  recognition 
of  the  King,  and  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  commerce  with 
France  if  that  measure  could  be  effected ;  and  on  the  26th 
of  September,  1776,  it  appointed  as  such  Commissioners 
Benjamin  Franklin,  Thomas  Jefferson,  and  Silas  Deane. 
Mr.  Jefferson,  who  was  then  in  Virginia,  declined  the 
appointment,  and  Arthur  Lee  was  selected,  on  the  22d  of 
October,  to  take  his  place. 

Dr.  Franklin,  the  only  member  of  the  Commission  in 
America,  for  Mr.  Deane  was  still  in  Paris  and  Mr.  Lee  in 
London,  made  preparations  to  sail  for  France  immediately, 
with  rare  patriotism  devoting  his  wisdom  and  experience 
to  the  service  of  his  country,  and  facing  the  hardships  of 
an  autumn  passage  across  the  Atlantic,  although  he  was 
at  this  time  seventy-one  years  of  age. 

He  set  out  from  Philadelphia  on  the  26th  of  October, 
1776,  in  the  war-vessel  The  Eeprisal,  commanded  by 
Captain  Wickes,  and  arrived  in  Quiberon  Bay  after  a 
stormy  voyage,  though  what  was  then  a  short  one,  of 
thirty  days,  the  ship  having  on  her  way  taken  as  prizes 
two  British  brigantines,  which  she  brought  into  the  French 
port.  After  remaining  on  board  four  days  to  recover 
from  the  effects  of  the  voyage,  which  had  considerably 
reduced  his  strength,  Dr.  Franklin  went  ashore  at  Auray, 
in  Brittany,  whence  he  wrote  to  Silas  Deane,  on  the  4th 
of  December,  to  announce  his  coming  and  to  inform  him 
of  the  appointment  of  the  Commissioners,  requesting  him 
at  the  same  time  to  notify  Mr.  Arthur  Lee  and  to  ask 
him  to  come  to  Paris  to  meet  them.1  From  Auray  he  pro 
ceeded  to  Nantes,  where  he  learned  for  the  first  time,  and 


Diplomatic  Correspondence,  AVharton,  ii.  216. 


1770.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         163 

with  great  satisfaction,  of  the  kind  treatment  which  had 
been  accorded  to  Mr.  Deane  in  France  and  of  the  very 
promising  condition  in  which  the  business  of  the  Colonies 
was  at  that  time  in  regard  to  the  procuring  of  arms  and 
equipments  for  war.  But,  with  due  caution,  he  remained 
a  few  days  at  Nantes  before  going  to  Paris,  in  order  to 
ascertain  more  fully  what  the  feeling  of  the  French  Gov 
ernment  might  be  toward  him  and  the  other  Commis 
sioners  when  they  should  announce  themselves  in  the 
official  capacity  which  they  were  authorized  to  assume, 
unwilling  as  he  was,  on  the  one  hand,  to  embarrass  the 
ministry  by  his  presence  if  it  were  not  acceptable,  and 
sensitive,  upon  the  other,  lest  as  representatives  of  the 
infant  Republic  they  might  meet  with  a  rebuff. 

"  Our  friends  in  France,"  he  wrote  to  John  Hancock  on 
the  8th  of  December,  "  have  been  a  good  deal  dejected 
with  the  gazette  accounts  of  advantages  obtained  against 
us  by  the  British  troops.  I  have  helped  them  here  to  re 
cover  their  spirits  a  little,  by  assuring  them  that  we  still 
face  the  enemy,  and  were  under  no  apprehension  of  their 
armies  being  able  to  complete  their  junction.  .  .  .  Our 
voyage,  though  not  long,  was  rough,  and  I  feel  myself 
weakened  by  it,  but  I  now  recover  strength  daily,  and 
in  a  few  days  shall  be  able  to  undertake  the  journey  to 
Paris.  I  have  not  yet  taken  any  public  character,  think 
ing  it  prudent  first  to  know  whether  the  Court  is  ready 
and  willing  to  receive  ministers  publicly  from  Congress, 
that  we  may  neither  embarrass  her  on  the  one  hand,  nor 
subject  ourselves  to  the  hazard  of  a  disgraceful  refusal  on 
the  other.  I  have  dispatched  an  express  to  Mr.  Deane, 
with  the  letters  that  I  had  for  him  from  the  Committee, 
and  a  copy  of  our  commission,  that  he  may  immediately 
make  the  proper  inquiries  and  give  me  information.  In 
the  mean  time,  I  find  it  generally  supposed  here  that  I  am 
sent  to  negotiate,  and  that  opinion  appears  to  give  great 
pleasure,  if  I  can  judge  by  the  extreme  civilities  I  meet 


164  BEGINNING    OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1776. 

with  from  numbers  of  the  principal  people,  who  have  done 
me  the  honor  to  visit  me." l 

The  arrival  of  Franklin  in  Paris,  on  the  18th  of  De 
cember,  excited  at  once  the  greatest  interest  in  the  Ameri 
can  cause ;  his  character  and  widely  extended  reputation 
made  him  the  centre  of  observation  at  the  capital,  and 
aroused  the  liveliest  expectation  in  men's  minds  as  to  the 
purpose  of  his  coming  and  the  probable  effect  of  his  mis 
sion  upon  the  actions  of  the  ministry.  It  became  "the 
common  topic  of  conversation,  and  gave  birth  to  a  thou 
sand  conjectures  and  reports"  among  all  classes  of  French 
society,  even  before  he  had  reached  the  city.2  The  Decla 
ration  of  Independence  had  found  an  echo  of  sympathy 
among  the  French  people,  who  watched  with  admiration 
the  brave  efforts  of  a  struggling  nation  to  be  free,  and 
in  the  thought  of  liberty  they  had  already  planted  the 
seed  of  friendship  which  was  ready  to  burst  forth  in  open 
welcome  to  this  messenger  from  the  American  people, 
coming  to  them  first  of  all  nations  for  encouragement  and 
support. 

Franklin  found  this  to  be  so  even  at  Nantes,  as  we 
have  seen ;  it  was  emphatically  so  at  Paris,  where  he  was 
loaded  with  every  possible  evidence  of  consideration  and 
respect,  notwithstanding  the  insinuations  that  were  in 
dustriously  disseminated  about  him  by  the  jealousy  of  the 
English  Embassy.  "It  is  very  generally  believed  here," 
said  Lord  Stormont,  "  that  he  comes  in  the  double  capacity 
of  a  negotiator  and  a  fugitive ;  this  suspicion,  joined  to  the 
knowledge  of  his  former  character  and  to  that  reputation 
of  duplicity  which  he  has  so  justly  acquired,  will,  I  hope, 
throw  many  difficulties  in  his  way ;  yet  there  is  certainly 
some  danger  to  be  apprehended  from  the  general  partiality 
of  the  people  of  this  country  to  the  American  cause  and 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  221. 

2  S.  Deane  to  Gerard,    18th  December,    1776,  Etats-Unis,  t,   1,  No.  99 : 
Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  102. 


1776.]      BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         165 

from  the  tempting  offers  which  he  is  probably  authorized 
to  make." l 

In  the  mean  time,  M.  de  Vergennes  was  anxious  to 
meet  and  converse  with  him ;  and  Franklin  found  that, 
although  the  ministry  was  not  prepared  to  receive  him 
openly  as  a  "  Plenipotentiary,"  it  would  not  deny  an 
audience  to  him  and  his  colleagues.  He  therefore  pro 
ceeded  to  ask  for  this,  on  the  23d  of  December,  five  days 
after  his  arrival,  addressing  the  Comte  de  Vergeunes  as 
follows : 

"SiR, — We  beg  leave  to  acquaint  Your  Excellency  that  we  are 
appointed  and  fully  empowered  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  of  America  to  propose  and  negotiate  a  treaty  of  ainity  and 
commerce  between  France  and  the  United  States.  The  just  and 
generous  treatment  their  trading  ships  have  received,  by  a  free 
admission  into  the  ports  of  this  kingdom,  with  other  considera 
tions  of  respect,  has  induced  the  Congress  to  make  this  offer  first 
to  France.  We  request  an  audience  of  Your  Excellency  wherein 
we  may  have  an  opportunity  of  presenting  our  credentials  ;  and 
we  flatter  ourselves  that  the  propositions  we  are  authorized  to 
make  are  such  as  will  not  be  found  unacceptable. 

1  i  With  the  greatest  regard,  we  have  the  honour  to  be 
"  Your  Excellency's  most  obedient  and  most  humble  servants. 
"B.  FRANKLIN,  SILAS  DEANE,  ARTHUR  LEE." 

This  request  was  complied  with  after  a  very  short  delay  ; 
though  the  Secretary  of  State,  who  was  under  the  strict 
surveillance  in  these  matters  of  Lord  Stormont  and  the 
agents  of  the  British  Government,  and  was  constrained 
to  be  more  circumspect  than  he  would  doubtless  have  felt 
it  necessary  to  be  a  few  months  before,  did  not  invite  the 
Commissioners  to  Versailles,  but  appointed  an  audience 
in  the  city  of  Paris,  where  he  met  them  secretly  on  the 
28th  of  December.  After  having  listened  courteously 
and  attentively  to  their  propositions,  and  having  assured 


1  (irantham  Papers,  fol.  177. 

2  Diplomatic'  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  239. 


166  BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1777. 

them  of  his  good  will,  he  made  a  report  of  the  interview 
almost  immediately  to  the  Court  of  Spain.1 

The  times  were  difficult  and  dangerous  for  the  negotia 
tions  which  Dr.  Franklin  had  come  to  Europe  to  under 
take,  and  this  he  saw  at  a  glance,  knowing  that  he  must 
make  his  way  carefully  if  he  wished  to  succeed  at  all ; 
for  he  felt  immediately  from  this  interview  and  from  the 
intercourse  he  had  with  people  whose  opinion  he  valued 
in  France,  that  for  some  reason,  while  the  nation  was 
favorably  inclined  to  the  encouragement  of  the  Colonies, 
"  the  Court  viewed  an  approaching  war  with  reluctance." 
Yet  affairs  at  home  were  pressing,  and  impelled  him 
to  use  the  utmost  diligence  in  obtaining  assistance  from 
a  powerful  nation  whose  recognition  of  the  Colonies 
would  produce  at  once  an  immense  result  in  its  moral 
effect  upon  the  people,  as  well  as  upon  foreign  countries, 
and  would  furnish  to  the  army  and  the  navy  those  ma 
terials  of  which  they  stood  so  sadly  in  need. 

Urged  forward,  therefore,  by  the  consciousness  of  the 
responsibility  resting  upon  him,  dissatisfied  also  at  having 
been  merely  admitted  to  a  secret  conference  with  the  Sec 
retary  of  State  when  he  had  announced  himself  and  his 
colleagues  as  representatives  authorized  to  treat  for  an 
independent  people  in  the  formation  of  an  alliance  of 
friendship  and  commerce,  he  determined  to  make  a  fur 
ther  attempt.  Taking  Mr.  Deane  and  Mr.  Lee  with  him, 
somewhat  in  disregard,  perhaps,  of  the  traditional  methods 
of  diplomatic  procedure  in  the  older  Courts  of  Europe, 
but  undoubtedly  justified  by  the  circumstances  of  the 
case  and  by  the  assurances  of  good  will  given  him  at 
the  first  interview,  he  went  with  them  from  Paris  to 
Versailles,  where  they  addressed  the  following  note  to 
M.  de  Vergennes : 

1  Comte  de  Vergennes  to  Marquis  d'Ossun,  4th  January,  1777,  Espagne, 
t.  583,  No.  6  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  113.  See  Diplomatic 
Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  248. 


1777.]       BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         167 

"Dr.  Franklin,  Mr.  Deane,  and  Mr.  Lee  present  their  most 
respectful  coinpliints.  to  the  Count  de  Vergennes,  and  request  an 
audience  of  his  Excellency,  to-morrow  morning,  at  such  hour  as 
he  shall  be  pleased  to  appoint. 

"VERSAILLES,  Jany.  5th,  1777,  6  o'clock   in  the  evening."  l 

Tliis  was  upon  a  Sunday,  and  the  interview  asked  for 
was,  consequently,  to  be  upon  the  following  Monday 
morning.  M.  de  Vergennes  could  not  grant  it,  for  abun 
dant  reasons ;  since  to  have  received  the  Commissioners  at 
the  Court  in  Versailles,  as  they  requested,  would  have 
been  tantamount  to  the  formal  recognition  of  the  United 
States  by  France,  which  was  above  all  things  what  he 
wished  at  that  moment  to  avoid,  and  which,  if  he  had 
then  permitted  it,  would  have  been  an  immediate  cause 
for  war  with  Great  Britain.  He  referred  them,  therefore, 
to  his  chief  secretary,  M.  Gerard,  to  whom  he  wrote  the 
same  evening,  that  he  wished  him  to  say  to  the  American 
gentlemen  that  he  should  not  be  at  liberty  the  following 
day  nor  upon  Tuesday;  but  he  directed  M.  Gerard  to 
meet  them  on  the  latter  day  at  some  place  in  Paris  and 
learn  from  them  the  nature  of  the  communication  which 
they  wished  to  make.2  Dr.  Franklin  and  his  colleagues 
would  not  leave  Versailles,  however,  without  some  sort  of 
direct  communication  with  the  Secretary  of  State.  They 
prepared  a  memorial3  which  they  left  for  him  before  they 
came  away.  The  most  important  part  of  this  document 
was  a  formal  demand  for  eight  ships  of  the  line  com 
pletely  equipped,  to  be  paid  for  by  the  United  States ; 
for,  said  the  Commissioners,  since  other  European  princes 
lent  or  hired  their  troops  to  England  to  be  used  against 
America,  it  would  seem  just  that  France  should  give  the 
same  sort  of  assistance  to  the  United  States  if  she  saw  fit 
to  do  so ;  that  England  ought  not  to  take  offence  at  this, 


1  Etats-Unis,  t.  2,  No.  8  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  117,  note. 

2  Ktats-Hnis,  t.  2,  No.  9  :  Doniol,  ii.  117,  note. 

3  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  245. 


168  BEGINNING   OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS  [1777. 

but  that,  if  she  did,  the  combined  forces  of  France,  Spain, 
and  the  United  States  would  be  able  to  take  away  her 
West  India  islands  and  to  destroy  her  commerce,  thus 
reducing  her  to  weakness  and  humiliation.  To  this  the 
Commissioners  added  a  request  for  arms  and  munitions 
of  war,  and  made  offers  of  union  and  friendship,  with  the 
advantage  to  accrue,  if  these  were  accepted,  from  the  par 
ticipation  in  that  commerce  which  had  been  so  fruitful  a 
source  of  wealth  to  Great  Britain,  and  which  was  now 
about  to  be  taken  away  from  her  forever. 

This  document  was  signed  by  Benjamin  Franklin,  Silas 
Deane,  and  Arthur  Lee.1  The  Comte  de  Vergennes  com 
municated  it  at  once  to  M.  de  Maurepas,  and  the  Premier 
laid  it  before  the  King,  for  the  purpose  of  receiving  his 
orders  before  agreeing  to  a  reply  to  it  from  the  Cabinet. 
Four  days  later,  on  the  9th  of  January,  1777,  the  formal 
answer  of  the  Government  was  prepared,  and  duly  sub 
mitted  to  the  King,  who  approved  it,  thus  establishing 
definitively  the  relations  between  France  and  the  United 
States  as  they  were  to  continue  for  a  considerable  time  to 
come.  The  request  for  vessels  of  war  was  declined,  upon 
the  ground  that  although  the  King  would  gladly  give 
them  without  compensation,  in  accordance  with  the  dig 
nity  of  his  Crown,  if  circumstances  were  such  that  he 
could  properly  do  so,  yet  in  the  present  exigency  the  in 
terests  of  the  kingdom  required  him  to  add  to  his  forces 
rather  than  to  take  away  from  what  he  already  had; 
besides,  the  sending  of  a  few  vessels  of  war  to  America 
would  not  produce  the  result  desired,  for  they  would 
immediately  be  followed  by  a  greater  number  of  English 
vessels,  and,  no  matter  under  what  flag  they  sailed, 
a  masked  squadron  would  be  a  legitimate  cause  for  war 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  245.  This  document,  in  the 
Diplomatic  Correspondence,  is  dated  at  Paris  ;  but  in  the  French  translation, 
Etats-Unis,  t.  2,  No.  11,  cited  by  M.  Doniol  in  La  Participation  de  la  France, 
ii.  118,  the  date  is  ''Versailles,  5  janv.  1777." 


1777.]       BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.         169 

with  any  Power  which  should  undertake  to  send  it,  and 
the  same  reasons  would  prevent  France  from  sending  her 
ships  of  war  as  convoys  for  American  merchantmen,  but 
that  the  interests  of  France  and  the  Colonies,  being 
identical,  must  draw  the  two  countries  together  when 
the  right  moment  should  arrive,  and  that  while  it  was 
not  practicable  to  force  the  events  which  were  to  pro 
duce  that  union  between  them  in  the  future,  the  Ameri 
cans  might  feel  certain  of  the  friendship  and  sympathy 
of  France.  The  note  closed  with  this  assurance :  "  The 
King  has  no  wish  to  disturb  the  Americans  in  the  pro 
curement  of  such  materials  as  they  may  be  able  to  find 
in  the  course  of  trade  within  his  kingdom,  persuaded  that 
they  will  strictly  conform  in  their  dealings  to  the  express 
obligation  of  his  treaties ;  and,  without  entering  into  the 
question  as  to  what  kinds  of  supplies  the  Americans  may 
chance  to  need,  His  Majesty  has  decided  to  establish  for 
them  secretly  certain  resources  from  which  they  may 
obtain  the  means  to  strengthen  their  credit  and  to  increase 
the  number  of  their  purchases." 

This  reply  was  read  to  the  Commissioners  by  M.  Gerard, 
under  the  instructions  of  the  Comte  de  Vergennes,  who 
wished  the  Americans  to  understand  the  friendly  attitude 
of  France,  but  who,  in  the  critical  condition  of  political 
relations  with  England,  could  not  permit  anything  of 
this  character  in  writing  to  go  beyond  the  control  of  the 
Department.  The  Commissioners  expressed  their  grati 
fication  to  M.  Gerard  after  having  heard  it  read. 

They  had  every  reason  to  be  grateful  to  France.  They 
had  been  assured  again  of  her  sympathy  and  friendship ; 
they  had  been  given  permission  to  obtain  in  France  what 
ever  supplies  they  needed,  so  long  as  they  did  not  com 
promise  the  Government ;  and,  without  their  solicitation, 
the  King  had  given  them  also  a  large  sum  of  money  to 


Etata-Unis,  t.  2,  No.  13  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  120. 


170  BEGINNING    OF    DIPLOMATIC    RELATIONS.  [1777. 

help  them  buy  what  they  required.  The  last  paragraph 
of  the  reply  of  the  Government  refers  to  an  amount  of 
two  millions  of  livres  which  King  Louis  XVI.  had 
directed  to  be  placed  to  their  credit.  In  a  subsequent 
report  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence,  the 
Commissioners  wrote  that  they  were  informed  that  a  grant 
had  been  made  to  them  of  two  millions  of  livres  from  the 
Crown,  of  which  five  hundred  thousand  were  ready  to  be 
paid  down,  and  an  equal  sum  was  to  be  paid  at  the  begin 
ning  of  April,  July,  and  October ;  "  that  such  was  the 
King's  generosity,  he  exacted  no  conditions  or  promise  of 
repayment,  he  only  required  that  we  should  not  speak  to 
any  one  of  our  having  received  this  aid.  We  have  ac 
cordingly  observed  strictly  this  injunction,  deviating  only 
in  this  information  to  you,  which  we  think  necessary  for 
your  satisfaction,  but  earnestly  requesting  that  you  would 
not  suffer  it  to  be  made  public."  l 

Such,  in  the  early  part  of  the  year  1777,  was  the  posi 
tion  of  affairs  in  France,  England,  Spain,  and  the  United 
States  in  connection  with  the  American  Revolution ;  and 
it  was  in  the  midst  of  this  complicated  working  of  various 
political  interests  and  diplomatic  negotiations  that  the 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  moved  by  his  own  inspiration 
to  help  the  struggling  Colonists  win  their  liberty,  brave 
and  earnest,  of  noble  mind  and  generous  heart,  set  out 
from  France  to  go  to  North  America. 


1  B.  Franklin  and  Silas  Deane  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence, 
12th  March,  1777  :  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Sparks,  i.  200. 


1777.]  PROGRESS   OF   THE   WAR    IN    AMERICA.  171 


CHAPTER    VI. 

PROGRESS   OF   THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA    UPON    THE   ARRIVAL 
OF    LA    FAYETTE. 

LA  FAYETTE'S  vessel,  the  Victoire,  reached  America 
after  a  voyage  of  fifty-four  days,  having  sailed  from  Los 
Pasajes,  as  we  have  already  seen,  on  the  20th  of  April, 
1777.  It  landed  at  South  Inlet,  near  Georgetown,  in 
South  Carolina,  on  the  13th  of  June,  the  last  part  of  the 
long  and  tedious  voyage  having  been  enlivened,  a  short 
time  before  they  saw  the  coast,  by  the  approach  of  an 
armed  vessel  which  the  followers  of  the  Marquis  mistook 
for  an  English  man-of-war,  but  which  proved  to  be  an 
American,  with  whom  the  Victoire  vainly  endeavored  to 
keep  up,  and  also  by  the  presence,  off  shore,  of  two 
British  frigates  known  to  be  cruising  there,  into  whose 
grasp  there  was  very  serious  danger  that  they  might  now 
fall  after  all  their  hardships  and  privations  on  the  sea.1 
But,  fortunately  for  them,  a  strong  northerly  wind  was 
blowing,  which,  while  it  helped  them  to  reach  their  desti 
nation,  carried  the  cruisers  toward  the  south  and  gave  the 
Victoire  an  opportunity  to  run  in, — not  the  only  time  in 
his  life,  La  Fayette  said  many  years  afterward,  that  the 
elements  conspired  in  his  favor. 

The  exact  place  of  their  landing  is  described  by  the 
Baron  de  Kalb,  in  a  letter  written  two  days  later  to 
his  wife,  as  "  at  North  Island,  at  the  entrance  to  the 
Bay  of  Georgetown,  fifteen  miles  from  that  town,  in  the 
port  called  South  Inlet,  in  Carolina."  He  says  that,  as 
the  wind  was  unfavorable  to  them  in  their  efforts  to  reach 

1  Momoireti  de  ma  Main,  i.  16. 


172  PROGRESS   OF   THE   WAR   IN   AMERICA  [1777. 

Charleston,  where  they  intended  to  disembark,  and  as  no 
one  aboard  the  ship  was  sufficiently  acquainted  with  the 
coast  to  tell  where  they  were,  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
took  Kalb,  Mr.  Price,  the  Chevalier  du  Buysson,  and  some 
of  the  other  officers1  with  him  in  the  ship's  yawl,  and, 
with  the  lieutenant  and  seven  men  to  row,  went  ashore 
to  make  inquiries,  and  to  see  if  they  could  pick  up  a  pilot. 
Starting  from  the  ship  at  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of 
Friday,  the  13th  of  June,  1777,  they  rowed  up  the  North 
Inlet  until  ten  at  night  without  meeting  any  one  except 
some  negroes  who  were  fishing  for  oysters :  these  men 
could  give  them  very  little  information,  however,  in  reply 
to  their  inquiries,  beyond  the  fact  that  they  belonged  to  an 
officer  in  the  American  army  and  that  there  was  a  pilot  at 
the  upper  end  of  the  island ;  they  offered  to  guide  the 
strangers  to  the  pilot  and  afterward  to  take  them  to  their 
master's  house.  As  the  tide  had  now  gone  down  and  the 
Marquis  could  make  no  further  headway  in  the  yawl,  he 
determined  to  leave  it  behind  and  to  go  on  with  two 
companions  in  the  negroes'  oyster-boat,  in  the  hope  of 
obtaining  a  pilot.  About  midnight  they  were  set  on  shore 
by  their  conductors,  and,  seeing  a  light  in  the  distance, 
they  made  their  way  in  its  direction.  When  they  ap 
proached  the  house  from  which  the  light  proceeded,  the 
dogs  began  to  bark,  and  the  inmates  supposed  this  to 
signal  the  approach  of  a  band  of  marauders  from  some 
of  the  enemy's  ships.  A  voice  called  out  in  the  darkness 
demanding  who  they  were  and  what  they  wanted,  to 
which  Kalb,  who  spoke  English,  replied  that  they  were 
French  officers  who  had  just  come  ashore  to  serve  in  the 
Continental  army,  that  their  ship  was  at  the  mouth  of 
the  inlet,  that  they  were  seeking  a  pilot  to  bring  her  in, 
and  that  they  asked  shelter  for  the  night  for  themselves.2 

1  This  name  appears  in  Kalb's  letters  as  Brice  ;  though  the  name  signed  to 
the  certificate  at  Bordeaux,  above  referred  to,  is  written  "  Price." 

2  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  450. 


1777.]  UPOX    THE   ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  173 

Thereupon  they  were  immediately  invited  to  come  into 
the  house,  when  upon  inquiry  and  explanation  they  found 
they  were  in  the  summer  residence  of  Major  Benjamin 
Huger,  a  highly  respected  citizen  of  South  Carolina,  who 
received  the  strangers  "  with  a  cordial  welcome  and  a 
generous  hospitality."  Having  decided  that  the  water  in 
Georgetown  Bay  was  too  shallow  to  admit  the  Victoire, 
La  Fayette  sent  a  pilot  to  her  with  orders  to  go  into 
Charleston  harbor  with  the  cargo  and  those  of  the  officers 
who  had  remained  on  board,  while  Major  Huger  arranged 
to  carry  the  Marquis,  with  Kalb  and  Mr.  Price,  thither 
by  land. 

The  warmth  and  heartiness  of  this  reception  in  America 
delighted  La  Fayette ;  it  fulfilled  his  ideal  of  the  people 
and  the  country  he  had  been  seeking,  in  whose  interest 
he  had  left  his  own  home  and  friends  and  for  whom 
he  had  already  undergone  considerable  anxiety  and  dis 
comfort.  The  attractive  surroundings  of  the  place,  the 
kind  faces  and  friendly  voices  about  him,  filled  him  with 
tender  feelings,  and  the  peace  and  domestic  comfort  of  a 
gentleman's  house  after  the  long  weeks  spent  in  the  cabin 
of  his  ship  made  it  seem  like  enchantment  to  him.  He 
told  Mr.  Sparks  that  he  had  "  retired  to  rest  rejoiced  that 
he  had  at  last  attained  the  haven  of  his  wishes  and  was 
safely  landed  in  America  beyond  the  reach  of  his  pur 
suers.  The  next  morning  was  beautiful.  The  novelty 
of  everything  around  him,  the  room,  the  bed  with  mos 
quito-curtains,  the  black  servants  who  came  to  ascertain 
his  wants,  the  beauty  and  strange  appearance  of  the 
country  as  he  saw  it  from  his  window,  clothed  in  luxu 
riant  verdure,  all  conspired  to  produce  a  magical  effect, 
and  to  impress  him  with  indescribable  sensations." 

In  the  mean  time  the  Vicomte  de  Mauroy  and  six  other 
officers  who  had  remained  on  board  the  Victoire  set  sail 
for  Charleston,  where  they  arrived  a  few  days  later,  with 
out  having  met  any  of  the  enemy's  cruisers,  although  M. 


174  PROGRESS    OF    THE   WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1777. 

de  La  Fayette  was  so  anxious  for  the  fate  of  his  vessel 
and  his  companions,  from  what  he  had  heard  after  he 
reached  Major  Huger's  house  as  to  the  constant  presence 
along  the  coast  of  British  men-of-war,  that  he  hastily 
sent  orders  after  the  captain,  both  by  land  and  by  sea, 
to  set  the  officers  and  crew  ashore  and  to  burn  the  ship ; 1 
but,  as  he  said,  "  through  some  inconceivable  good  luck, 
the  wind  drove  off  the  frigates  for  a  short  time,  and  my 
vessel  came  into  port  in  broad  daylight  without  seeing 
either  friends  or  enemies."  The  Marquis  set  out  on  horse 
back  for  Charleston  in  company  with  Kalb,  they  having 
been  furnished  with  horses  by  the  kindness  of  Major 
Huger ;  and  the  other  officers,  for  whom  no  conveyances 
could  be  procured  in  that  remote  district,  made  the 
journey  on  foot.  These  latter  arrived  there  in  a  sad 
condition  of  clothing  and  general  appearance ;  but  as 
soon  as  it  became  known  in  the  town  who  the  party 
were,  and  what  was  their  errand,  they  were  treated  with 
the  greatest  courtesy :  the  Marquis,  in  particular,  as  one 
of  them  wrote,  had  shown  to  him  "  all  the  honors  due  to 
a  marshal  of  France." 2  Governor  Rutledge,  General 
Howe,  and  General  Moultrie  called  upon  him,  and, 
besides  receiving  him  most  cordially,  showed  him  the 
fortifications  in  the  harbor  and  entertained  him  and  his 
companions  in  Charleston,  "that  charming  city,"  which 
La  Fayette  described  as  "worthy  of  its  inhabitants," 
and  where  "  everything  attested  the  presence  of  cultivation 
and  ease."  He  wrote  to  Mme.  de  La  Fayette,  on  the  19th 
of  June,  1777,3  from  Charleston,  that  everybody  whom  he 
met  there  sought  to  show  him  some  politeness  or  atten 
tion,  and  that  he  had  reason  to  feel  highly  gratified  at  his 
reception,  although  he  had  not  as  yet  explained  his  plans 


1  La  Fayette,  Correspondance,  i.  92. 

2  Journal  of  the  Chevalier  du  Bnysson,  Etats-Unis,  t.  4,  No.  152 :  Doniol, 
La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  215. 

3  Correspondance,  i.  93. 


1777.]  UPON    THE    ARRIVAL    OF    LA    FAYETTE.  175 

to  any  one  in  detail ;  for  he  judged  it  better  to  wait  until 
he  should  present  himself  to  Congress  before  making  a 
full  statement  as  to  the  projects  he  had  in  view.  He  told 
her  that  the  people  were  as  agreeable  as  his  enthusiasm 
had  represented  them. 

"A  simplicity  of  manners,  a  desire  to  please,  the  love  of 
country  and  of  liberty,  and  a  pleasing  equality,  are  to  be  found 
everywhere  among  them.  The  richest  man  and  the  poorest  are 
upon  the  same  social  level,  and,  although  there  are  some  great 
fortunes  in  this  country,  I  defy  any  one  to  discover  the  least 
difference  in  the  bearing  of  one  man  to  another.  I  began  with 
life  in  the  country  at  the  house  of  Major  Huger  ;  now  I  am  here 
in  the  city.  Everything  recalls  more  or  less  the  English  customs, 
though  there  is  more  of  simplicity  here  than  in  England.  The  city 
of  Charlestown  [Charleston]  is  one  of  the  most  attractive,  the  best 
built,  and  inhabited  by  the  most  agreeable  people,  that  I  have  ever 
seen.  The  American  women  are  very  beautiful,  unaffected  in  man 
ner,  and  of  a  charming  neatness,  which  prevails  everywhere  in 
this  country  and  receives  the  greatest  attention,  much  more  so 
even  than  in  England.  What  delights  me  most  is,  that  all  the  citi 
zens  are  brothers.  There  are  no  poor  people  in  America,  not  even 
what  may  be  called  peasants.  Every  man  has  his  own  property, 
and  each  has  the  same  rights  with  the  greatest  land-owner  in  the 
country.  The  inns  are  quite  different  from  those  in  Europe  ;  the 
proprietor  and  his  wife  sit  down  with  you  to  the  meals  and  do  the 
honors  of  the  table  ;  and  when  you  leave,  you  pay  without  haggling 
over  your  bill.  If  you  do  not  wish  to  go  to  an  inn,  there  are 
country  houses  where  any  one  who  is  a  good  American  will  be 
admitted  and  entertained  as  kindly  as  we  receive  our  friends  in 
Europe. 

"As  to  myself,  I  have  been  welcomed  in  the  most  agreeable 
manner  possible  by  everybody  here.  I  have  just  this  moment 
returned  from  a  grand  dinner  that  lasted  five  hours,  given  by  a 
gentleman  of  this  city  in  my  honor.  General  Howe  and  General 
Moultrie  were  there,  and  several  of  the  officers  of  my  caravan. 
We  drank  many  healths  and  spoke  very  bad  English,  which  lan 
guage,  by  the  way,  I  am  beginning  now  to  use  a  little.  To-morrow 
I  shall  go  to  return  my  visit.  I  shall  take  the  gentlemen  who  ac 
company  me  to  call  upon  the  Governor,  and  then  I  shall  make  my 
preparations  to  leave." 

The  cargo  of  the  Victoire  could  have  been  promptly 


176  PROGRESS    OF    THE   WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1777. 

disposed  of  to  advantage,  but  La  Fayette  discovered  at 
Charleston  that  the  captain  had  with  him  a  note  for  forty 
thousand  livres  which  the  Marquis  had  made  in  Bordeaux 
in  favor  of  the  merchants  from  whom  he  had  bought  the 
ship,  and  that  in  his  haste  to  escape  from  France  he  had 
signed  an  agreement,  without  fully  understanding  it,  by 
which  his  vessel  and  cargo  were  to  return  there  to  be  sold, 
with  the  condition  attached  that  the  note  for  forty  thou 
sand  livres  representing  his  unpaid  balance  of  the  pur 
chase-money  should  then  be  first  paid  out  of  the  proceeds 
of  the  sale,  and  also  the  additional  amount  of  thirty-five 
per  cent., — twenty-five  per  cent,  for  insurance  and  ten  per 
cent,  commission.1  This  discovery  caused  him  and  his 
companions  great  disappointment,  for  they  had  expected 
to  obtain  money  enough  from  the  cargo  to  make  them  all 
comfortable,  and  the  Marquis  had  promised  to  provide 
for  everybody ;  whereas  they  found  themselves  now  in 
the  embarrassing  position  of  not  having  the  means  to 
defray  the  expenses  of  the  long  journey  that  confronted 
them  before  they  could  join  the  army.  After  considerable 
difficulty,  however,  La  Fayette  succeeded  in  negotiating  a 
loan  at  Charleston  of  about  seven  thousand  dollars  with 
which  to  equip  his  expedition.  The  Victoire  soon  after 
ward  set  sail  for  France,  but  in  going  out  of  Charles 
ton  harbor  it  struck  upon  the  bar  and  was  wrecked.2 

After  having  bought  such  horses  and  conveyances  as 
they  could  obtain,  and  having  taken  leave  of  their 
friends  in  Charleston,  the  little  company  set  out  upon 
their  journey  toward  Philadelphia,  on  the  25th  of  June ; 
a  journey  full  of  incident,  as  it  proved,  and  not  free  from 
very  considerable  hardships,  owing  to  the  bad  roads  over 
which  they  travelled,  the  breaking  down  of  their  vehicles 
and  the  giving  out  of  their  horses,  and  the  intense  heat 
of  the  weather,  from  which  all  suffered  and  several  fell 

1  Journal  of  Du  Buysson.  2  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  17. 


1777.]  UPON   THE   ARRIVAL   OF   LA   FAYETTE.  177 

ill.  The  Chevalier  du  Buysson,  who  travelled  with  La 
Fayette,  and  who  afterward  entered  the  Continental  army 
as  aide-de-camp  to  the  Baron  de  Kalb,  at  whose  side  he 
was  when  that  brave  soldier  died  at  the  battle  of  Camden, 
wrote  in  his  Journal  an  interesting  account  of  the  visit  to 
Charleston  and  the  subsequent  events  of  this  journey  and 
of  the  arrival  at  Philadelphia.  He  says, — 

"We  divided  ourselves  into  three  parties.  La  Fayette,  the 
Baron  de  Kalb,  and  those  of  us  who  came  ashore  with  them  hired 
four  carriages  to  take  us  and  our  luggage.  The  aide-de-camp  of 
the  Marquis  undertook  to  be  our  guide,  although  he  had  no  pos 
sible  idea  of  the  country.  This  was  our  marching  order  as  we 
came  out  of  Charleston.  The  procession  was  headed  by  one  of 
the  Marquis's  people  in  a  hussar's  uniform.  The  Marquis's 
carriage  was  a  sort  of  uncovered  sofa  [sofa  d£couvcrt~]  upon  four 
springs,  with  a  fore-carriage.  At  the  side  of  his  carriage  he 
had  one  of  his  servants  on  horseback,  who  acted  as  his  squire. 
The  Baron  de  Kalb  was  in  the  same  carriage.  The  two  colonels, 
La  Fayette' s  counsellors,  followed  in  a  second  carriage  with  two 
wheels.  The  third  was  for  the  aides-de-camp,  the  fourth  for  the 
luggage,  and  the  rear  was  brought  up  by  a  negro  on  horseback. 

"Four  days  later,  some  of  our  carriages  were  reduced  to 
splinters ;  several  of  the  horses,  which  were  old  and  unsteadj', 
were  either  worn  out  or  lame,  and  we  were  obliged  to  buy  others 
along  the  road.  This  outlay  took  all  our  money.  We  had  to 
leave  behind  us  a  part  of  our  luggage,  and  part  of  it  was  stolen. 
We  travelled  a  great  part  of  the  way  on  foot,  often  sleeping  in 
the  woods,  almost  dead  with  hunger,  exhausted  by  the  heat, 
several  of  us  suffer  ing  from  fever  and  from  dysentery.  At  last, 
after  thirty-two  days  of  inarching,  we  arrived  at  Philadelphia  in 
a  more  pitiable  condition  even  than  when  we  first  came  into 
Charleston  [i.e.,  those  who  had  gone  from  Major  Huger's  on  foot]. 
I  think  I  am  safe  in  saying  that  in  Europe  no  campaign  would  be 
harder  to  go  through  than  was  this  journey  ;  for  there  the  hard 
ships  are  not  continuous,  they  are  even  compensated  for  by  fre 
quent  pleasures  ;  but  here  our  troubles  increased  with  every  day, 
and  they  gave  us  no  consolation  but  the  hope  of  arriving  at  Phil 
adelphia.  We  were  encouraged  by  the  bright  prospect  of  the 
reception  we  counted  upon  from  the  people  there,  and  I  can  say 
with  truth  that  this  thought  would  have  induced  us  to  undergo 
much  greater  hardships  with  the  same  willingness  and  the  same 
VOL.  I.— 12 


178  PROGRESS   OF   THE   WAR   IN   AMERICA  [1777. 

lightness  of  heart  that  I  felt  after  once  I  had  made  up  my  mind. 
We  were  all  animated  by  the  same  spirit.  The  enthusiasm  of  La 
Fayette  would  have  incited  all  the  rest  of  us,  if  any  one  had  been 
less  courageous  than  he." 

It  is,  indeed,  remarkable  that  throughout  La  Fayette's 
career  in  America  his  letters  invariably  express  friendship, 
attachment,  and  warmth  of  heart  toward  the  people  whose 
cause  he  adopted ;  the  fatigues  and  hardships  he  endured 
never  wore  out  his  patience ;  the  heat  of  summer  and  the 
cold  of  winter  found  him  ever  cheerful  and  ready ;  his 
criticisms  are  those  of  a  friend  and  a  lover,  and  wherever 
he  went  he  strove  to  see,  and  did  see,  something  good  and 
something  kind  in  the  world  about  him.  This  high- 
minded  devotion  won  the  hearts  of  those  with  whom  he 
came  in  contact ;  it  endeared  him  to  Washington,  to  the 
officers  and  soldiers  of  the  Continental  army,  and  to  the 
Colonists  of  a  hundred  years  ago ;  it  has  established  his 
memory  in  the  affection  of  the  American  people  to-day 
and  for  all  time  to  come. 

During  his  journey  to  Philadelphia,  he  wrote  to  Mme. 
de  La  Fayette,  on  the  17th  of  July,  1777,  from  Peters 
burg,  "  You  have  probably  [by  his  former  letters]  heard 
of  the  beginning  of  my  journey  and  how  brilliantly  I 
started  out  in  a  carriage.  I  have  to  inform  you  that  we 
are  now  on  horseback,  after  having  broken  the  wagons  in 
my  usual  praiseworthy  fashion,  and  I  expect  to  write  you 
before  long  that  we  have  reached  our  destination  on  foot. 
There  have  been  some  fatigues,  but,  although  a  few  of 
my  companions  have  suffered  from  them,  I  have  scarcely 
noticed  them." l  And  in  his  Memoires  he  said,2  "  M.  de 
La  Fayette  travelled  nearly  nine  hundred  miles  on  horse 
back  to  present  himself  to  Congress;  passing  through 
the  two  Carolinas,  Virginia,  and  the  States  of  Maryland 
and  Delaware,  he  reached  the  capital  of  Pennsylvania. 

1  Correspondance,  i.  98.  2  Vol.  i.  p.  17. \ 


1777.]  UPON   THE   ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  179 

Whilst  he  studied  the  language  and  the  people,  he  saw 
also  agriculture  and  products  that  were  entirely  new  to 
him  ;  the  vast  forests,  the  great  rivers,  everything,  indeed, 
in  this  country,  give  to  nature  an  appearance  of  youth 
and  of  majesty." 

La  Fayette  arrived  in  Philadelphia  with  his  little 
troop  on  the  27th  of  July.  They  went  at  once  to  present 
themselves  to  Congress,  with  the  papers  which  they  had 
brought  with  them  from  France,  and  also  the  contract 
entered  into  by  them  with  Mr.  Deane.  It  happened, 
however,  to  their  disappointment,  that  they  were  not  the 
only  foreign  officers  who  had  come  to  serve  in  the  Ameri 
can  army,  large  numbers  of  adventurers  and  others  having 
flocked  to  the  Colonies  upon  the  outbreak  of  the  war, 
chiefly  from  the  West  India  islands,  to  offer  their  services, 
which  were  accompanied  usually  by  such  exorbitant  de 
mands  as  to  rank  and  privilege  that  they  could  not  be 
complied  with ;  and  in  several  instances  where  these  men 
had  been  granted  commissions  in  the  army  the  feeling  was 
very  strong,  both  among  the  Continental  officers  and  in 
Congress  itself,  that  the  confidence  reposed  in  them  had 
been  misplaced ;  so  that  everybody  connected  with  the 
Government  had  become  exceedingly  sensitive  upon  the 
subject  of  foreigners  who  asked  for  commissions  in  the 
army.  Therefore  the  arrival  of  this  new  set  of  strangers, 
who  presented  the  usual  demands  for  appointment  in  the 
army,  and  showed  the  usual  expectation  of  obtaining  high 
rank,  fell  at  an  unfortunate  moment  for  them.  They  were 
not  at  first  distinguished  from  others  who  had  preceded 
them  upon  the  same  errand,  but  were  looked  upon 
as  foreigners  whom  nobody  wanted,  and  their  welcome 
was  consequently  not  so  cordial  as  they  had  pictured  it  to 
themselves  whilst  they  were  plodding  from  Charleston 
toward  Philadelphia.  The  Chevalier  du  Buysson  says, — 

"We  arrived  on  the  27th  of  July,  in  the  morning.  After 
having  brushed  ourselves  up  a  little,  we  went  to  see  the  President 


180  PROGRESS   OF  THE   WAR   IN   AMERICA  [1777. 

of  Congress,  to  whom  we  presented  our  letters  of  recommendation 
and  also  our  contracts.  He  sent  us  to  see  M.  Moose  [Morris  (?)], 
a  member  of  the  Congress,  who  made  an  appointment  to  meet  us 
on  the  following  day  at  the  door  of  the  Congress  ;  and  in  the  mean 
time  our  papers  were  read  and  examined.  The  next  day  we  were 
punctual  in  keeping  our  appointment,  but  we  were  made  to  wait 
a  long  time.  Finally  M.  Moose  appeared,  with  another  member, 
and  said  to  us,  '  This  gentleman  speaks  French  very  well,  and  he 
is  intrusted  with  the  matters  that  concern  people  of  your  nation 
ality  ;  hereafter  your  communications  will  all  be  with  him.'  He 

then  went  in,  and  the  other  member,  M. [Mr.  Lovell],  talked 

with  us  in  the  street,  where  he  left  us,  after  having  treated  us,  in 
excellent  French,  like  a  set  of  adventurers.  He  ended  his  speech 
by  saying,  '  Gentlemen,  have  you  any  authority  from  Mr.  Deane  f 
We  authorized  him  to  send  us  four  French  engineers  ;  but,  instead 
of  that,  he  has  sent  us  Mr.  du  Coudray  and  some  men  who  pretend 
to  be  engineers  but  are  not,  and  some  artillerists  who  have  never 
seen  service.  We  then  instructed  Mr.  Franklin  to  send  us  four 
engineers,  and  they  have  come.  It  seems  that  French  officers 
have  a  great  fancy  to  enter  our  service  without  being  invited.  It 
is  true  we  were  in  need  of  officers  last  year,  but  now  we  have 
experienced  men  and  plenty  of  them.' 

"This  was  our  first  reception  by  the  Congress,  and  we  did  not 
know  what  to  think  of  it ;  indeed,  it  would  be  impossible  for 
any  one  to  be  more  stupefied  than  we  were.  Would  it  have  been 
possible  for  M.  de  La  Fayette,  M.  de  Kalb,  and  M.  de  Mauroy, 
followed  by  ten  officers  recommended  as  we  had  been,  and  secretly 
approved,  if  not  openly  avowed,  by  the  Government  of  France, 
to  expect  such  a  reception  as  this  ? 

"We  determined  to  wait  and  to  discover  the  cause  of  this 
affront,  if  possible,  before  making  any  complaint.  We  attributed 
it,  and  rightly,  to  the  misconduct  of  certain  of  our  compatriots 
who  had  preceded  us  ;  for  we  soon  heard  of  the  bad  behavior  of 
several  of  them,  and  the  discredit  which  their  actions  had  thrown 
upon  letters  of  recommendation  brought  by  them  from  our  colo 
nies,  and  we  discovered  that  certain  other  things  also  had  had  an 
influence  in  this  connection." 

This  was  true;  the  foreign  officers  had  given  serious 
cause  for  disappointment  both  in  the  army  and  in  the 
country,  and  they  had  been  for  a  long  time  the  source 
of  embarrassment  to  the  Commander-in-Chief.  General 
Washington,  who  had  no  prejudice  whatever  against  men 


1777.]  UPOX   THE    ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  181 

from  other  countries,  provided  they  were  men  of  merit, 
saw  the  impossibility  of  satisfying  the  ambition  of  most 
of  them,  and,  what  was  a  great  deal  more  serious,  the 
injustice  of  putting  foreigners  into  the  army  with  rank 
superior  to  our  own  people  who  were  making  sacrifices  for 
the  country,  and  who  in  many  cases  had  recruited  the 
men  whom  they  now  commanded.  He  wrote  early  in  the 
year  1777,  long  before  La  Fayette's  arrival,1 — 

"I  have  often  mentioned  to  you  the  distress  I  am  every  now 
and  then  laid  under  by  the  application  of  French  officers  for 
commissions  in  our  service.  This  evil,  if  I  may  call  it  so,  is  a 
growing  one ;  for,  from  what  I  learn,  they  are  coming  in  swarms 
from  old  France  and  the  Islands.  There  will  therefore  be  a  ne 
cessity  of  providing  for  them  or  discountenancing  them.  To  do 
the  first  is  difficult ;  and  the  last  disagreeable,  and  perhaps  im 
politic,  if  they  are  men  of  merit ;  and  it  is  impossible  to  distin 
guish  these  from  mere  adventurers,  of  whom  I  am  convinced  there 
is  the  greater  number.  They  seldom  bring  more  than  a  com 
mission  and  a  passport,  which,  we  know,  may  belong  to  a  bad  as 
well  as  a  good  officer.  Their  ignorance  of  our  language  and  their 
inability  to  recruit  men  are  insurmountable  obstacles  to  their 
being  ingrafted  into  our  Continental  battalions  ;  for  our  officers, 
who  have  raised  their  men,  and  have  served  through  the  war 
upon  pay  that  has  hitherto  not  borne  their  expenses,  would  be 
disgusted  if  foreigners  were  put  over  their  heads ;  and,  I  assure 
you,  few  or  none  of  these  gentlemen  look  lower  than  field-officers7 
commissions.  To  give  them  all  brevets,  by  which  they  have  rank 
and  draw  pay  without  doing  any  service,  is  saddling  the  Conti 
nent  with  vast  expense ;  and  to  form  them  into  corps  would  be 
only  establishing  corps  of  officers ;  for,  as  I  said  before,  they 
cannot  possibly  raise  any  men." 

And  to  Richard  Henry  Lee,  in  Congress,  he  wrote,2 — 

"Under  the  privilege  of  friendship,  I  take  the  liberty  to  ask 
you  what  Congress  expect  I  am  to  do  with  the  many  foreigners 
they  have  at  different  times  promoted  to  the  rank  of  field-officers, 
and,  by  the  last  resolve,  two  to  that  of  colonels!  In  making 

1  To  the  President  of  Congress,  20th  February,  1777  :  Sparks,  Writings  of 
Washington,  iv.  327. 

2  17th  May,  1777  :  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  iv.  423. 


182  PROGKESS   OF   THE   WAR   IN   AMERICA  [1777. 

these  appointments,  it  is  much  to  be  feared  that  all  the  attending 
circumstances  are  not  taken  into  consideration.  To  oblige  the 
adventurers  of  a  nation  which  we  want  to  interest  in  our  cause, 
may  be  one  inducement ;  and  to  get  rid  of  their  importunity,  an 
other  ;  but  this  is  viewing  the  matter  by  halves,  or  on  one  side 
only.  These  men  have  no  attachment  nor  ties  to  the  country, 
further  than  interest  binds  them  ;  they  have  no  influence,  and  are 
ignorant  of  the  language  they  are  to  receive  and  give  orders  in  ; 
consequently  great  trouble  or  much  confusion  must  follow.  But 
this  is  not  the  worst ;  they  have  not  the  smallest  chance  to  recruit 
others  ;  and  our  officers  think  it  exceedingly  hard,  after  they  have 
toiled  in  this  service,  and  probably  have  sustained  many  losses, 
to  have  strangers  put  over  them,  whose  merit  perhaps  is  not  equal 
to  their  own,  but  whose  effrontery  will  take  no  denial. 

"The  management  of  this  matter,  give  me  leave  to  add,  sir,  is 
a  delicate  point ;  for,  although  no  one  will  dispute  the  right  of 
Congress  to  make  appointments,  every  person  will  assume  the 
privilege  of  judging  of  the  propriety  of  them  ;  and  good  policy, 
in  my  opinion,  forbids  the  disgusting  of  a  whole  corps  to  gratify 
the  pride  of  an  individual ;  for  it  is  by  the  zeal  and  activity  of 
our  own  people  that  the  cause  must  be  supported,  and  not  by 
a  few  hungry  adventurers.  Besides,  the  error  of  these  appoint 
ments  is  now  clear  and  manifest,  and  the  views  of  Congress  evi 
dently  defeated  ;  for  by  giving  rank  to  people  of  no  reputation  or 
service,  you  have  disgusted  their  own  countrymen,  or,  in  other 
words,  raised  their  expectations  to  an  insatiable  pitch.  For  the 
man  who  was  a  captain  in  France,  finding  another  who  was  only 
a  subaltern  there,  or  perhaps  nothing,  appointed  to  a  majority 
with  us,  extends  his  views  instantly  to  a  regiment ;  in  like  manner, 
the  field-officer  can  accept  nothing  less  than  a  brigade,  and  so  on, 
by  which  means  the  man  of  real  rank  and  merit  must  be  ex 
cluded,  or  perhaps  your  whole  military  system  disordered.  In 
the  mean  while  I  am  haunted  and  teased  to  death  by  the  impor 
tunity  of  some,  and  dissatisfaction  of  others."  * 

It  is  not  strange  that  in  this  condition  of  public  feeling 
in  America  the  arrival  of  a  new  contingent  of  French 
officers  did  not  excite  great  pleasure,  or  that  their  recep 
tion  in  Philadelphia  was,  as  La  Fayette  said,  "  more  like 

1  See,  also,  letters  to  Major  Colerus,  19th  May,  1777  :  Sparks,  Writings  of 
Washington,  iv.  429  ;  to  the  President  of  Congress,  6th  June,  1777  :  ibid., 
450  ;  to  Benjamin  Franklin,  17th  August,  1777  :  ibid.,  v.  32. 


1777.J  UPON    THE   ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  183 

a  dismissal  than  a  welcome."  l  Having  run  the  risk,  how 
ever,  of  leaving  France  against  the  King's  orders,  and 
having  displayed  an  indomitable  energy  in  beating  down 
all  obstacles,  in  crossing  the  ocean  and  in  the  fatigues  of 
the  long  journey  from  Charleston,  La  Fayette  was  not 
willing  to  accept  this  as  final,  or  to  turn  back  because  a 
gentleman  had  met  him  in  the  street  and  told  him  that  no 
more  French  officers  were  wanted  in  America.  He  de 
termined  to  present  himself  to  Congress  directly,  at  all 
events,  and  to  be  heard.  He  prepared  an  address  to  it 
which  he  succeeded  in  having  read,  setting  forth  his  cir 
cumstances  and  the  reasons  of  his  being  there,  in  the 
course  of  which  he  said,  "  After  the  sacrifices  that  I  have 
made  in  this  cause,  I  have  the  right  to  ask  two  favors  at 
your  hands :  the  one  is,  to  serve  without  pay,  at  my  own 
expense ;  and  the  other,  that  I  be  allowed  to  serve  at  first 
as  a  volunteer." 

An  appeal  of  this  kind,  so  different  in  tone  from  the 
exactions  of  other  foreign  officers  with  whom  the  Ameri 
can  Congress  had  come  in  contact,  attracted  immediate 
attention  ;  as  did,  no  doubt,  the  extreme  youth  of  the  Mar 
quis,  the  letters  he  brought  with  him,  his  unquestioned 
rank  and  influence  in  France,  and  the  enthusiasm  displayed 
by  him  for  the  American  cause.  The  Chevalier  du  Buysson 
says  that  Mr.  Lovell  ("  le  meme  qui  nous  avoit  si  mal 
reyus")  was  sent  to  confer  with  them  again,  "  accompanied 
this  time  by  another  member,  who  was  more  skilful,  as 
well  as  more  polite"  to  them,  and  that  these  gentlemen  then 
made  a  sort  of  apology  to  La  Fayette.  The  second  mem 
ber  appears  to  have  been  sent  to  sound  the  Marquis,  and 
in  a  private  interview  he  promised  him  anything  and 
everything  in  order  to  draw  him  out.  Evidently  satis 
fied  with  the  result  of  this  conference,  the  member  of 
Congress  had  a  second  conference  with  him,  in  which  he 

1  M6moires  de  ma  Main,  i.  18.  2  Ibid.,  i.  19. 


184  PEOGRESS   OF   THE   WAR   IN   AMERICA  [1777. 

arranged  that  La  Fayette  should  accept  from  Congress  the 
rank  of  major-general,  but  to  date  only  from  that  time, 
without  regard  to  his  contract  with  Mr.  Deane,  and  also 
without  pay  or  other  compensation  and  without  any  com 
mand  or  the  promise  of  one.  This  conclusion  having 
been  reached,  Congress  passed  the  following  Resolution, 
on  the  31st  of  July,  1777  : l 

u  Whereas  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  out  of  his  great  zeal  to 
the  cause  of  liberty,  in  which  the  United  States  are  engaged,  has 
left  his  family  and  connections,  and  at  his  own  expence  conie  over 
to  offer  his  services  to  the  United  States  without  pension  or  par 
ticular  allowance,  and  is  anxious  to  risque  his  life  in  our  cause — 
Eesolved,  That  his  service  be  accepted,  and  that  in  consideration 
of  his  zeal,  illustrious  family  and  connections  he  have  rank  and 
commission  of  Major  General  in  the  Army  of  the  United  States. " 

La  Fayette's  commission  was  immediately  sent  to  him. 
It  appears2  that  the  French  Court  had  insisted  that  the 
American  Commissioners  should  write  to  Congress  re 
questing  that  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  should  not  be 
employed  in  the  Continental  service ;  but  the  Commis 
sioners  made  no  great  haste  to  comply  with  this,  and 
when  the  request  finally  reached  America  it  was  too  late  : 
La  Fayette  was  already  in  the  army  and  had  begun  to  be 
favorably  known. 

Upon  receiving  his  commission  as  major-general,  La 
Fayette  wrote  to  Congress  the  following  letter,  the  original 
of  which  is  still  preserved  in  the  Archives  of  the  Depart 
ment  of  State  at  Washington  : 3 

"To  THE  HONORABLE  MR  HANCOK,  PRESIDENT  OF  CONGRESS, 

PHILADELPHIA. 

"  the  13  august  1777 
"SIR 

"I  beg  that  you  will  receive  yourself  and  present  to  Congress 
my  thanks  for  the  Commission  of  Major  General  in  the  Army  of 

1  Journals  of  Congress,  iii.  303. 

2  M6moires  de  La  Fayette,  Fragment  B,  i.  72. 

3  Papers  of  the  Old  Congress. 


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1777.]  UPON   THE    ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  185 

the  United  States  of  America  which  I  have  been  honor' d  with  in 
their  name  the  feelings  of  my  heart,  long  before  it  became  my 
duty,  engaged  me  in  the  love  of  the  American  cause.  I  not  only 
considered  it  as  the  cause  of  Honor,  Virtue,  and  universal  Hap- 
pinness,  but  felt  myself  einpressed  with  the  warmest  affection  for 
a  Xation  who  exhibited  by  their  resistance  so  fine  an  exemple  of 
Justice  and  Courage  to  the  Universe. 

"I  schall  neglect  nothing  on  my  part  to  justify  the  confidence 
which  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  has  been  pleased  to 
repose  in  me  as  my  highest  ambition  has  ever  been  to  do  every 
thing  only  for  the  best  of  the  cause  in  which  I  am  engaged.  I  wish 
to  serve  near  the  person  of  General  Washington  till  such  time  as 
he  may  think  proper  to  entrust  me  with  a  division  of  the  Army. 

"it  is  now  as  an  american  that  PI  mention  every  day  to  con 
gress  the  officers  who  came  over  with  me,  whose  interests  are  for 
me  as  my  own,  and  the  consideration  which  they  deserve  by  their 
merits  their  ranks,  their  state  and  reputation  in  france. 

"I  am  sir  with  the  sentiments  which  every  good  american 
owe  to  you 

"  Your  most  obedient 

"servant    the  mqis  de  lafayette." 

La  Fayette  was  not  unmindful,  in  the  fulness  of  his 
own  success,  of  the  French  officers  who  had  come  with 
him,  and  whose  expectations  were  in  several  cases  destined 
to  be  sadly  disappointed.  Some  of  these  men  were  in 
timate  friends  whom  he  had  known  at  home  and  whose 
interests  he  had  close  at  heart,  like  the  Vicomte  de 
Mauroy  and  the  Baron  de  Kalb,  who  still  stood  waiting 
for  an  answer  from  Congress  to  their  request  for  employ 
ment  in  the  army,  while  others  had  been  entire  strangers 
to  him  up  to  the  time  when  he  met  them  on  his  vessel  at 
Bordeaux.1  But  he  generously  exerted  himself  in  favor 
of  all,  using  what  little  influence  he  could  bring  to  bear 
under  circumstances  that  at  best  offered  extremely  slender 
hope  of  a  favorable  result.  The  Chevalier  du  Buysson 
said,  "  He  did  everything  that  was  possible  for  our  ap 
pointment,  but  in  vain,  for  he  had  no  influence.  But  if 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  19. 


186  PROGRESS    OF   THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1777. 

he  had  had  his  way,  de  Kalb  would  have  been  major- 
general  and  we  should  all  have  had  places." 

The  Baron  de  Kalb,  especially,  felt  the  mortification 
of  this  apparent  neglect  upon  the  part  of  Congress,  after 
having  been  assured  of  a  command  by  Mr.  Deane  before 
leaving  France,  and  in  view  of  the  appointment  of  a  man 
so  much  younger  than  he,  and  one  who  had  seen  so  much 
less  service,  as  La  Fayette.  The  idea  stung  him,  that  he 
should  have  to  return  to  France  in  the  position  of  having 
been  rejected  after  a  personal  offer  of  his  services  to  an 
army  of  so  little  prestige  as  that  of  the  Colonial  "  insur 
gents"  in  North  America,  and  he  could  not  face  the  loss 
of  influence  and  support  that  he  was  sure  to  suffer  with 
the  Comte  de  Broglie  if,  instead  of  having  succeeded  in 
the  ambitious  plan  of  the  "  Stathouderat,"  for  which  he 
had  come,  he  should  have  been  dismissed  by  the  Congress 
without  even  a  hearing.  He  wrote  an  appeal  to  the  Presi 
dent  of  Congress,  in  which  the  bitterness  of  his  disap 
pointment  is  distinctly  visible  in  the  sharp  criticisms  upon 
the  action  of  Mr.  Silas  Deane  in  making  an  engagement 
with  him  which  he  had  no  power  to  carry  out,  and  in  the 
emphatic  statement  of  his  own  case  in  view  of  the  circum 
stances  that  brought  him  to  America ;  and,  not  without 
some  show  of  irritation,  he  asked  that  he  should  either 
receive  the  appointment  in  the  army  which  had  been 
agreed  upon,  or,  if  he  were  obliged  to  return  to  France, 
that  he  should  be  reimbursed  for  his  outlay  in  coming 
to  America  and  the  very  considerable  expense  he  had 
been  put  to  after  arriving  here.1  "  I  do  not  think  that 
either  my  name,  my  services,  or  my  person  are  proper 
objects  to  be  trifled  with  or  laughed  at.  I  cannot  tell  you, 
sir,  how  deeply  I  feel  the  injury  done  to  me,  and  how 
ridiculous  it  seems  to  me  to  make  people  leave  their  homes, 
families,  and  affairs  to  cross  the  sea  under  a  thousand  dif- 

1  Kapp's  Kalb,  p.  116. 


1777.]  UPON   THE   AKKIVAL   OF    LA   FAYETTE.  187 

ferent  dangers,  to  be  received  and  to  be  looked  at  with 
contempt  by  those  from  whom  you  were  to  expect  but 
warm  thanks.  ...  I  should  be  sorry  to  be  compelled  to 
carry  my  case  against  Mr.  Deane  or  his  successors  for 
damages.  And  such  an  action  would  injure  his  credit 
and  negotiations,  and  those  of  the  state  at  Court." 

It  was  a  difficult  case,  for,  certainly,  Congress  had  not 
been  instrumental  in  making  these  gentlemen  leave  their 
homes  to  come  across  the  sea ;  on  the  contrary,  it  was 
greatly  embarrassed  by  their  presence,  as  was  also  the 
Commander-in-Chief ;  and  yet  they  had  come  bearing  a 
formal  agreement  entered  into  by  them  with  Mr.  Deane, 
the  agent  of  the  American  Congress.  Mr.  Deaue  had 
exceeded  his  authority ;  and  therein  lay  the  cause  of  this 
difficulty. 

In  reply  to  the  demands  of  the  Baron  de  Kalb,  M.  de 
Mauroy,  and  others  of  their  following,  Congress  took  the 
definite  course  of  disavowing  Mr.  Deane's  appointments ; 
but,  since  these  gentlemen  were  undoubtedly  entitled  to 
some  recognition  and  proper  consideration,  it  thanked 
them  officially  for  having  come  to  America,  and  decided 
to  defray  their  expenses  both  in  coming  here  and  in 
returning  to  France,  by  a  resolution  adopted  on  the  8th 
of  September,  1777,1  as  follows : 

t i  Congress  took  into  consideration  the  report  of  the  Committee 
on  foreign  applications,  wherein  they  set  forth,  That  besides  a 
number  of  officers  who  are  come  from  Europe  and  the  West 
Indies  of  their  own  accord  to  solicit  for  rank  and  employment  in 
the  American  Army,  there  are  others  who  have  proceeded  upon 
the  encouragement  of  conventions  made  and  signed  at  Paris  by 
Silas  Deane,  esquire,  as  agent  for  the  United  States  of  Korth 
America ;  that  Mr.  Deane  had  no  authority  to  make  such  con 
vent  ions,  and  that  Congress  therefore  are  not  bound  to  ratify  or 
fulfil  them. 

* i  Your  Committee  further  report,  that  the  baron  de  Kalb  and 
the  viscount  de  Mauroy,  with  a  number  of  officers  who  came  with 

1  Journals  of  Congress,  iii.  377. 


188  PROGRESS   OF   THE   WAR   IN   AMERICA  [1777. 

them  from  France,  have  offered  their  service,  provided  their  en 
gagements  with  Mr.  Deane,  in  respect  to  rank,  are  fulfilled  ;  but 
that  the  American  Army  having  been  arranged  before  the  ar 
rival  of  these  gentlemen  in  America,  their  expectations  cannot 
be  complied  with  without  deranging  it  and  thereby  injuring  at 
so  critical  a  juncture  the  American  cause ;  that  the  zeal  how 
ever  of  these  gentlemen  and  their  consequent  expences  merit 
the  attention  of  Congress ;  wherefore  your  Committee  report 
the  following  resolve : 

"Resolved,  That  the  thanks  of  Congress  be  given  to  the  baron 
de  Kalb  and  the  viscount  de  Mauroy,  with  the  officers  who  ac 
company  them,  for  their  zeal  in  passing  over  to  America  to  offer 
their  service  to  these  United  States,  and  that  their  expences  to 
this  Continent  and  on  their  return  to  France  be  paid. 

"Resolved,  That  Congress  agree  to  the  said  report  and  resolve. 

"  Ordered,  That  the  baron  de  Kalb  and  the  viscount  de  Mauroy 
be  furnished  with  a  copy  of  the  foregoing  report  and  resolution, 
attested  by  the  secretary ;  also  that  any  of  the  officers  accom 
panying  them,  who  may  desire  it,  be  furnished  with  such  a  copy.77 

Thereupon  the  Baron  de  Kalb  and  his  followers  pre 
pared  immediately  for  their  return,  Kalb  having  received 
from  Congress  the  sum  of  money  due  to  them  and  having 
distributed  it  among  his  companions,  and  most  of  them 
actually  returned  to  France.  The  party  left  Philadelphia 
on  the  15th  of  September.  The  Baron  de  Kalb,  with 
Messrs,  de  Lesser,  de  Valfort,  and  du  Buysson,  concluded 
to  take  the  Southern  route,  in  the  hope  of  an  opportunity 
to  embark  from  one  of  the  Southern  ports  ;  while  Messrs. 
de  Mauroy,  de  Fayolles,  de  Franval,  de  Vrigny,  Dubois- 
Martin,  and  Candon  set  out  for  New  England,  with  the 
purpose  of  sailing  either  from  Boston  or  from  Ports 
mouth.  M.  de  Gimat  and  M.  de  la  Colombe  remained  as 
aides-de-camp  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  and  M.  de 
Bedaulx  was  made  captain  by  brevet  by  act  of  Con 
gress.1  M.  Capitaine  du  Chesnoy,  a  skilful  draughtsman 
and  topographical  engineer,  remained,  and  became  also 
aide-de-camp  to  General  de  La  Fayette. 

1  Journals  of  Congress,  15th  September,  1777,  iii.  394. 


1777.]  UPON   THE  ARRIVAL   OF   LA    FAYETTE.  189 

But  it  was  not  the  destiny  of  the  Baron  de  Kalb  ever 
to  see  France  again :  he  had  proceeded  only  as  far  as 
Bethlehem  upon  his  return,  when  he  was  overtaken  by  a 
messenger  who  announced  to  him  that  Congress  had  given 
him  a  commission  as  major-general,1  for  on  the  15th  of 
September,  1777,  in  the  session  of  Congress,  it  was 
"Resolved,  that  another  Major-General  be  appointed  in 
the  army  of  the  United  States — The  ballots  being  taken, 
baron  de  Kalb  was  elected ; " 2  and  this  commission  was 
shortly  afterward  "  dated  the  same  day  with  that  of 
the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  agreeable  to  the  baron's 
request." 

Thus,  while  Kalb  found  that  he  must  give  up  all 
hope  of  serving  his  patron,  the  Comte  de  Broglie,  in  the 
design  of  making  that  nobleman  Generalissimo  of  the 
American  armies,  he  decided  to  accept  the  offer  of  Con 
gress,  and,  remaining  in  America,  to  enter  the  army  as 
a  Continental  officer.  He  saw  at  a  glance  that  a  people 
who  were  willing  to  endure  the  privations  and  hardships 
of  the  campaign  of  the  preceding  year,  and  the  sufferings 
of  the  winter  of  1776-77,  who  had  a  Commander-in- 
Chief  like  General  Washington,  able  to  encourage  his 
countrymen  in  the  darkest  hour  of  their  adversity  by  the 
example  of  his  own  devotion  and  bravery,  and  who  could 
hold  them  together  in  the  face  of  the  vastly  superior 
British  forces  triumphantly  advancing  through  New 
Jersey,  and  lead  them  to  the  attack  at  Trenton  and  at 
Princeton  when  in  point  of  fact  he  was  defeated  and 
almost  exhausted,  did  not  need  the  aid  of  a  foreign  noble 
man  either  to  inspire  them  in  the  interest  of  their  cause 
or  to  direct  them  against  the  enemy.  It  taxes  the  imagi 
nation  at  this  day  to  conceive  that  any  one  had  ever 
thought  seriously  of  such  a  thing.  And  yet  the  Comte 

1  Kapp's  Kalb,  118. 

2  Journals  of  Congress,  iii.  395. 

3  Ibid.,  410. 


190  PEOGEESS   OF   THE   WAE   IN   AMEEICA  [1777. 

de  Broglie's  idea  had  nothing  in  it  that  was  unreasonable 
from  his  point  of  view :  the  difficulty  was  that  it  was 
based  upon  premises  that  were  wrong  because  he  did  not 
know  the  character  of  the  people  with  whom  he  was  deal 
ing.  The  "  Stathouderat"  was  intended  to  be  both  ser 
viceable  and  beneficent  in  the  struggle  for  independence 
of  a  remote  and  helpless  people ;  but,  while  the  American 
Colonists  were  remote,  they  were  not  helpless.  Kalb  wrote 
to  his  patron  that  "  it  is  impossible  to  execute  the  great 
design  I  have  so  gladly  come  to  subserve,"  for,  he  said, 
it  would  be  regarded  no  less  as  an  act  of  shameful  injus 
tice  to  Washington  than  as  an  outrage  upon  the  honor 
of  the  country.1  The  subsequent  career  of  the  Baron 
de  Kalb  is  well  known  and  rightly  appreciated  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States :  he  died  like  a  hero  on 
the  19th  of  August,  1780,  in  defence  of  the  American 
flag. 

The  situation  in  America  was  not  very  attractive  nor 
the  cause  of  liberty  very  enticing  to  one  who  was  not 
firmly  bound  by  honor  and  patriotism  to  a  struggle  which 
called  for  the  sacrifice  of  everything  that  men  hold  dear, 
in  this  determined  effort  to  be  free,  at  the  moment  when 
the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  thus  presented  himself  to 
Congress  and  devoted  his  energy  and  zeal  to  the  interests 
of  the  people.  An  army  composed  of  men  hastily  drawn 
from  the  pursuits  of  domestic  life,  for  short  terms  of 
service  which  did  not  enable  them  to  grow  accustomed 
to  the  discipline  of  the  camp  before  it  became  neces 
sary  to  allow  them  to  go  home,  and  to  fill  their  places  by 
others  equally  unprepared,  commanded  by  officers  whose 
nominations  had  frequently  been  controlled  by  political 
considerations,  "  of  whom  nearly  all  were  inexperienced, 
many  unteachable,  and  some  of  untried  courage/' 2  with 
out  equipment  in  arms,  without  tents  or  ammunition, 

1  Kapp's  Kalb,  127. 

2  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States,  ix.  389. 


1777.]  UPON   THE   ARRIVAL   OF    LA   FAYETTE.  191 

many  even  without  clothing,  and  exhausted  by  the  hard 
ships  of  exposure  and  defeat, — this  was  the  spectacle 
presented  during  the  campaign  of  the  end  of  the  year 
1776  and  the  first  half  of  1777,  by  the  defenders  of  the 
independence  of  the  United  States  of  America.  The  war 
had  broken  out  at  a  time  when  the  whole  country  did  not 
contain  supplies  of  arms,  ammunition,  and  military  equip 
ment  enough  for  even  a  moderate  body  of  men  ;  there  had 
been  no  means  of  buying  these  in  other  countries,  because 
the  Government  had  no  money  ;  no  revenues  were  coming 
in  through  the  channels  of  trade,  because  they  were  closed  ; 
and  there  was  no  power  to  raise  the  necessary  means  by 
taxation  on  the  part  of  Congress.  Besides  this,  the 
population  of  the  Middle  States,  which  were  at  that  time 
the  seat  of  hostilities,  was  largely  disaffected  toward  the 
American  cause :  wearied  by  the  long  duration  of  the 
contest  which  they  had  not  expected,  and  having  lost 
something  of  the  enthusiasm  that  followed  immediately 
upon  the  opposition  to  Great  Britain,  many  of  the  in 
habitants  of  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  and  New  Jersey 
openly  accepted  the  offers  of  the  British  Commissioners 
and  returned  to  their  allegiance,  while  of  those  who  re 
mained  there  were  numbers  who  could  not  at  most  be 
called  more  than  half-hearted  friends. 

The  incidents  of  the  last  campaign,  in  New  York  and 
New  Jersey,  had  been  accompanied  by  such  a  combina 
tion  of  reverses  and  disappointments  that  there  was  little 
room  for  encouragement  amid  the  gloom  in  America, 

Almost  at  the  very  moment  of  the  publishing  of  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  in  Philadelphia,  General 
Howe  returned  from  Halifax,  whither  he  had  gone  upon 
the  evacuation  of  Boston,  and  with  an  army  of  veteran 
troops  thoroughly  disciplined  and  splendidly  equipped 
with  arms  and  artillery,  accompanied  by  skilful  engineers 
and  reinforced  by  the  recent  accession  of  the  subsidized 
Hessians  and  Waldeckers,  came  into  New  York  harbor 


192  PROGRESS   OF   THE   WAR   IN   AMERICA  [1776. 

and  landed  on  Staten  Island  on  the  3d  and  4th  of  July, 
1776.  His  purpose  was  to  gain  possession  of  the  Hudson 
River,  and,  once  strongly  intrenched  there,  to  cut  off 
communications  between  New  England  and  the  Middle 
States,  whilst  the  strength  of  his  position  would  enable 
him,  as  occasion  might  require,  to  attack  the  State  of 
New  York  on  the  north,  to  send  his  troops  eastward  into 
Connecticut,  or  to  conduct  operations  against  New  Jersey 
and  Pennsylvania,  and  he  would  thus  at  the  same  time 
keep  open  the  most  direct  communication  with  Canada. 
He  was  supported  in  this  plan  of  operations  by  a  strong 
naval  force  commanded  by  his  brother,  Admiral  Lord 
Howe,  who  arrived  in  American  waters  and  took  up  his 
position  near  Staten  Island  very  shortly  afterward,  on 
the  12th  of  July. 

The  campaign  was  well  arranged  to  succeed ;  it  had  all 
the  advantages  that  military  organization  could  give  it  to 
insure  success ;  the  army  and  navy  had  prestige  as  well 
as  strength,  and  it  was  not  without  reason  that  the  British 
ministers  confidently  expected  that  this  year  would  end 
the  war.  At  the  very  outset,  indeed,  the  superiority  of 
this  armament  seemed  to  the  British  Government  about 
to  inflict  the  punishment  of  an  offended  King  upon  his 
rebellious  subjects  who  had  refused  his  clemency  and  who 
even  now  continued  to  bear  arms  in  defiance  of  the  offers 
of  pardon  and  forgiveness  which  Admiral  Howe  and  his 
brother  were  instructed  to  make  to  those  who  would  sub 
mit.  But  it  was  not  alone  the  weakened  and  tattered 
forces  of  the  Colonists  that  this  splendid  array  was  to 
contend  with  in  the  campaign  which  followed,  with  dis 
aster  to  the  British  arms ;  there  was  also  to  be  reckoned 
the  spirit  which  animated  them  in  a  struggle  against 
wrong  done  to  what  they  held  to  be  sacred  and  their  own. 
General  Washington  replied  to  Sir  William  Howe's  mes 
senger,  sent  to  offer  the  royal  favor,  that  "those  who 
had  committed  no  fault  wanted  no  pardon,  and  that  the 


1776.]  UPON    THE   ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  193 

Americans  were  only  defending  what  they  deemed  their 
indubitable  rights."  l 

It  was  this  spirit,  supported  by  the  patience,  the  en 
durance,  and  the  noble  courage  of  Washington  himself, 
that  decided  the  event.  General  Howe  was  of  a  sluggish 
nature,  fond  of  ease,  self-indulgent,  cautious  to  the  point 
of  neglecting  opportunities,  with  no  great  heartiness  for 
his  task  of  subduing  a  people  whom  he  does  not  appear 
to  have  hated  ;  he  kept  a  good  table,  and  loved  to  pass 
an  evening  with  his  mistress  or  his  officers  at  a  game  of 
cards  in  a  comfortable  house,  forgetful  of  danger.  He 
had  opposed  to  him  in  the  American  commander  an 
austere  man,  the  story  of  whose  life  is  filled  with  acts 
of  self-denial  that  excite  the  admiration  of  the  hearer, 
and  whose  very  soul  was  devoted  to  the  cause  of  liberty 
in  which  he  was  then  engaged ;  always  alert  to  impend 
ing  danger,  never  regardless  of  the  slightest  opportunity 
to  take  advantage  of  circumstances,  brave  to  the  extent 
of  almost  unreasonable  exposure  in  battle,  sharing  the 
extremities  of  a  winter  campaign  in  common  with  his 
soldiers, — a  bold  fighter  who  astonished  the  enemy  by 
turning  upon  them  to  strike  a  blow  when  they  had 
thought  him  so  far  reduced  as  to  be  unable  to  move. 

The  first  operations  of  the  campaign  were  very  dis 
astrous  to  the  Americans.  The  troops  concentrated  by 
General  Howe  in  the  vicinity  of  New  York  were  esti 
mated  at  twenty-four  thousand  men,  and  reinforcements 
were  expected  still  further  to  increase  their  number. 
Those  of  General  Washington  consisted  of  ten  thousand 
men,  which  number  was  enlarged  to  seventeen  thousand, 
of  whom  nearly  four  thousand  were  sick  from  exposure  to 
which  they  were  not  accustomed  ;  and  with  this  inade 
quate  force  he  was  in  danger  of  sudden  attack,  whilst  it 
was  necessarv  for  him  at  the  same  time  to  defend  New 


1  Marshall,  Life  of  Washington,  ii.  423. 
VOL.  1.— 13 


194  PROGRESS   OF   THE   WAR   IN   AMERICA  [1776. 

4 

York,  Governor's  Island,  Long  Island,  and  Paulus  Hook, 
dividing  his  forces  in  the  defence  of  posts  some  of  which 
were  fifteen  miles  distant  from  others,  with  navigable 
waters  between  them.  "  These  things,"  said  Washington, 
"  are  melancholy,  but  they  are  nevertheless  true."  Yet 
he  added  that  the  superiority  of  the  enemy  and  the  ex 
pected  attack  did  not  seem  to  have  depressed  the  spirits 
of  his  men,  and  that,  "  under  every  disadvantage,  my 
utmost  exertions  shall  be  employed  to  bring  about  the 
great  end  we  have  in  view ;  though  the  appeal  may  not 
terminate  so  happily  as  I  could  wish,  yet  the  enemy  will 
not  succeed  in  their  views  without  considerable  loss.  Any 
advantage  they  may  gain,  I  trust  Avill  cost  them  dear." 

The  attack  soon  followed.  In  August,  1776,  General 
Howe  made  a  landing  upon  Long  Island,  where  he  had 
on  the  25th  of  the  month  a  force  of  twenty  thousand  men, 
which  has  been  since  described  as  the  most  perfect  army 
of  that  day  in  the  world,  for  experience,  discipline,  equip 
ments,  and  artillery,  and  was  supported  by  more  than  four 
hundred  ships  and  transports  in  the  bay,  besides  ten  ships 
of  the  line  and  twenty  frigates.2  On  the  27th  of  August 
occurred  the  battle  of  Long  Island,  which  resulted  in  dis 
aster  to  the  Americans  and  the  retreat  of  their  army,  three 
days  later,  across  the  East  River  to  New  York.  Thither 
they  were  pursued  by  the  overwhelmingly  superior  forces 
of  the  British  general,  who  came  on  with  resistless  power, 
and  before  whom  they  yielded  step  by  step  the  ground 
which  they  were  unable  longer  to  defend.  New  York 
City  was  soon  entirely  in  possession  of  the  British,  and 
the  army  of  Washington  lay  upon  the  heights  of  Har 
lem,  worn  out,  broken,  wet  from  the  driving  rain  to 
which  they  were  now  exposed  through  loss  of  blankets, 
camp-equipage,  and  tents,  almost  exhausted  by  the  heavy 
burden  of  their  adversity. 

1  Marshall,  Life  of  Washington,  ii.  429. 

2  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States,  ix.  85. 


1776.]  UPON    THE    ARRIVAL    OF    LA    FAYETTE.  195 

This  was  the  situation  at  the  middle  of  September,  a 
little  more  than  two  months  from  the  time  when  the 
British  force  made  its  appearance  in  New  York  harbor. 
The  American  position  at  Harlem  was  sufficiently  strong, 
protected  as  it  was  by  an  intrenched  camp,  to  relieve  it 
for  the  moment  from  the  danger  of  an  attack,  the  pur 
pose  of  General  Howe  being  rather  to  draw  the  Continen 
tals  into  an  engagement  in  the  open  country,  where  they 
would  fight  under  very  great  disadvantage  and  would  be 
in  extreme  danger  of  annihilation, — a  purpose,  however, 
which  was  perfectly  understood  by  General  Washington, 
and  which  he  was  careful  to  frustrate.  For  a  short  time 
in  the  early  part  of  October  the  two  armies  lay  opposite 
each  other ;  that  of  Washington  preparing,  as  far  as  its 
resources  would  permit,  to  regain  its  strength  and  repair 
its  losses  in  anticipation  of  a  further  conflict  which  it 
was  evident  could  not  be  long  delayed  ;  that  of  General 
Howe  waiting  quietly  for  more  artillery  and  military 
stores  which  had  been  ordered  forward  from  Statcn  Island, 
and  for  reinforcements  under  General  Knyphausen,  who 
joined  him  shortly  afterward  with  the  second  division 
of  the  German  troops. 

It  soon  became  evident  to  General  Washington  that 
the  effort  of  the  British  now  was  to  gain  the  rear  of  his 
camp,  north  of  Harlem,  if  possible,  and  thus  to  force  him 
from  his  present  position  or  to  surround  him  and  cut  him 
off  entirely  from  communication  with  the  country  ;  of 
which,  indeed,  there  was  grave  danger,  for  three  British 
frigates  had  passed  up  the  Hudson  River,  in  spite  of  the 
obstructions  intended  to  prevent  them,  and  quite  undis 
turbed  by  the  fire  from  Forts  Washington  and  Lee,  on 
either  bank,  while  General  Howe  had  already  begun  to 
move  his  army  through  Hell  Gate  into  Long  Island 
Sound,  where  they  had  disembarked  at  Frog's  Point  and 
Pell's  Point,  and  were  moving  by  the  way  of  Pelliam 
Manor  in  the  direction  of  New^  Rochelle.  At  a  council 


196  PROGRESS    OF    THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA  tl776. 

of  the  American  general  officers,  on  the  16th  of  October,  it 
was  decided  that,  in  view  of  their  exposure  to  being  com 
pletely  cut  off  and  forced  to  surrender,  a  change  of  posi 
tion  must  be  made  and  York  Island  must  be  abandoned ; 
with  the  exception,  however,  of  Fort  Washington,  in 
deference  to  the  expressed  wish  of  Congress  that  the 
navigation  of  the  Hudson  River  should  be  obstructed 
at  all  hazards,  and  because  of  a  lingering  hope  that  in 
some  way  the  British  ships  might  still  be  prevented 
from  passing  up. 

Immediately  upon  this  decision,  the  American  army 
began  a  further  retreat  toward  the  north,  extending  its 
line  in  a  series  of  intrenched  camps  for  a  distance  of  some 
twelve  miles  beyond  King's  Bridge,  and  retiring  cautiously 
until  the  26th  of  October,  when  General  Washington  took 
up  a  strong  position  in  the  high  ground  at  White  Plains, 
his  right  wing  protected  by  the  Bronx,  upon  which  it 
rested,  whilst  his  left  extended  northward  into  the  hills 
behind,  holding  the  advantage  of  position  there  and  keep 
ing  open  a  line  of  retreat  should  that  become  necessary. 
Up  to  this  time  the  American  army  had  continued  to  retire 
before  the  advancing  enemy,  and  at  every  point  the  su 
periority  of  General  Howe's  forces  had  made  itself  felt. 
Long  Island  was  his ;  York  Island  was  under  his  control, 
for  the  single  garrison  at  Fort  Washington,  although  it 
still  held  out  in  its  hopeless  attempt  to  protect  the  Hud 
son  River,  was  within  his  easy  reach  at  any  moment  that 
he  should  decide  to  invest  it ;  and  the  British  war-ships 
now  ascended  the  stream  in  order  to  cover  his  flank  upon 
that  side  and  to  lend  additional  strength  to  his  position  as 
he  advanced  toward  the  north  ;  yet,  in  point  of  fact,  he 
had  made  extremely  little  progress  toward  the  subjection 
of  the  Colonists  or  the  termination  of  the  war,  if  we  con 
sider  what  had  been  expected  of  him,  and  what  with 
reason  he  might  himself  have  expected  from  the  splendid 
armament  under  his  command,  with  all  its  advantages  of 


1776.]  UPON   THE   ARRIVAL    OF    LA    FAYETTE.  197 

munitions,  of  training,  and  of  numbers.  He  had  suc 
ceeded  only  in  making  a  lodgement  in  the  country,  and 
the  very  fact  that  he  had  not  done  more  began  to  have 
its  effect  upon  his  antagonists,  whose  spirits  revived  and 
whose  courage  to  resist  him  was  daily  increased.  He  had 
failed  in  his  effort  to  surprise  the  American  commander 
and  to  draw  him  into  an  unequal  contest  in  the  plain  ; 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  his  own  time  was  being  skilfully 
wasted  by  the  movements  of  his  adversary  in  a  season  when 
the  weather  was  growing  unsuitable  to  military  operations, 
and  when  it  would  soon  be  necessary  to  close  the  campaign 
and  to  go  into  winter  quarters ;  to  do  which,  however, 
with  nothing  more  gained  than  at  present,  would  be  dis 
grace.  He  had  forced  Washington  into  a  position,  at 
last,  among  the  hills  where  the  advantages  were  somewhat 
more  equally  divided  with  the  Continental  army  ;  for  now 
the  number  of  the  American  troops  was  about  thirteen 
thousand,  equal  to  those  opposing  them  under  General 
Howe ;  and  the  encampment  at  White  Plains  was  so 
strongly  defended  that  it  seemed  to  the  British  general 
very  dangerous  to  attack.  Nevertheless  it  was  necessary 
to  do  something  to  prevent  further  loss  of  time.  He 
decided  to  give  battle.  Therefore,  on  the  morning  of  the 
28th  of  October  he  led  his  army  out  in  two  columns  to 
the  assault  of  Washington's  position,  until  within  three- 
quarters  of  a  mile  of  it,  when  the  Americans  were  seen 
drawn  up  in  order  of  battle,  confident  of  the  result  and 
well  intrenched  upon  hilly  ground.  Even  then  General 
Howe  was  unwilling  to  risk  the  event  of  a  general  en 
gagement,  and,  deciding  not  to  attack  General  Washing 
ton's  centre,  the  point  nearest  to  him  and  most  exposed, 
he  consumed  the  day  in  the  investment  of  a  piece  of 
high  ground,  called  Chatterton's  Hill,  something  less 
than  a  mile  southwest  of  Washington's  camp,  Avhich 
was  occupied  by  a  small  body  of  Americans.  In  this 
encounter,  which  is  known  as  the  battle  of  White  Plains, 


198  PROGRESS    OF    THE   WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1776, 

he  employed  some  four  thousand  of  his  men,  the  rest  of 
the  army  having  seated  themselves  on  the  ground  to  wit 
ness  the  spectacle. 

At  the  end  of  the  day,  General  Howe  had  taken  Chat- 
terton's  Hill,  but  nothing  else ;  while  Washington  was 
preparing  for  a  further  resistance,  by  sending  his  sick 
and  his  stores  to  the  rear  of  his  camp  and  by  throwing 
up  additional  works  to  strengthen  his  position.  The 
two  armies  stood  thus  opposite  to  each  other  on  the 
two  following  days,  the  29th  and  30th  of  October, — the 
British  waiting  for  reinforcements  which  had  been  sent 
for  from  York  Island  and  from  Mamaroneck,  and  which 
were  now  expected  to  come  up,  in  order  that  the  assault 
might  be  renewed  upon  the  31st.  But  in  the  mean  time 
a  violent  rain-storm  had  set  in,  which  prevented  the  ful 
filment  of  this  intention,  and  on  the  1st  of  November 
General  Howe  decided  to  abandon  his  attempt  at  White 
Plains  and  to  change  altogether  the  plan  of  his  operations, 
hoping  to  gain  the  advantage  over  Washington  which  he 
had  thus  far  failed  to  attain,  by  a  sudden  diversion  across 
the  Hudson  River  and  an  inroad  into  the  country  of  New 
Jersey.  He  withdrew  his  army,  therefore,  from  its  camp 
at  White  Plains  to  Dobbs's  Ferry,  and  thence  retired,  a 
few  days  later,  slowly  down  the  river  to  King's  Bridge. 

General  Washington  was  immediately  aware  of  this 
purpose,  and  he  rightly  conjectured  from  the  enemy's 
movements  that  his  first  step  would  be  the  reduction  of 
Fort  Washington,  in  order  to  secure  undisturbed  possession 
of  York  Island  before  crossing  the  river  to  open  a  cam 
paign  on  the  west  bank.  In  order  to  counteract  this  pur 
pose  as  far  as  possible,  and  with  a  reasonable  expectation 
of  checking  the  British  advance  into  New  Jersey,  Wash 
ington  directed  the  evacuation  of  Fort  Washington,  with 
the  view  of  saving  his  men  in  the  garrison  there  and 
of  securing  the  artillery  and  stores ;  and,  having  left  a 
sufficient  body  of  troops  to  protect  the  country  to  the 


1776.]  UPON   THE   ARRIVAL    OF    LA    FAYETTE.  199 

north  of  White  Plains,  he  proceeded  to  Peekskill  and 
crossed  the  Hudson  River  with  a  part  of  his  force  on  the 
13th  of  November,  to  join  General  Greene,  who  was  then 
in  command  in  New  Jersey,  near  Fort  Lee.  Unfortu 
nately,  this  well-conceived  plan  of  General  Washington's 
was  not  supported  by  his  subordinate  officers.  He  found, 
to  his  great  disappointment,  that  Fort  Washington  was 
still  held,  by  order  of  General  Greene,  and  that  arrange 
ments  were  making  to  repel  the  threatened  attack. 
Late  though  it  was  for  him  to  take  any  steps,  under  this 
unexpected  condition  of  affairs,  he  made  hasty  prepara 
tions  to  save  the  garrison,  but  this  proved  to  be  impos 
sible  ;  the  position  was  assaulted  on  the  16th  of  Novem 
ber  by  the  British  in  great  force,  and,  in  spite  of  a  gallant 
resistance,  the  fort  was  captured  and  the  garrison  were 
made  prisoners  of  war.  This  was  the  heaviest  loss  the 
American  army  had  ever  suffered  ;  it  was  disastrous  at 
that  moment  especially,  when  all  its  resources  were  ter 
ribly  reduced  and  when  General  Washington  was  not  in 
a  position  to  spare  a  single  man  from  his  ranks.  It 
deprived  him  at  one  stroke  of  twenty-six  hundred  ex 
cellent  troops,  with  all  their  equipment,  and  led  to  the 
surprise  of  General  Greene  by  the  British,  four  days 
later,  at  Fort  Lee,  on  the  narrow  strip  of  high  land 
between  the  Hudson  River  and  the  Hackensack,  whence 
that  general  was  enabled  only  by  a  precipitate  retreat 
to  save  his  men,  at  the  expense  of  their  blankets  and 
baggage,  a  great  store  of  provisions,  their  tents  left 
standing  in  the  hurry  to  get  away,  and  nearly  all  his 
cannon. 

At  this  point  began  General  Washington's  memorable 
retreat  through  New  Jersey.  Immediately  after  the  cap 
ture  of  Fort  Lee,  his  army  was  drawn  up  between  the 
Hackensack  River  and  the  Passaic,  where  he  was  unable 
to  dispute  his  ground  or  to  protect  himself  against  the 
extreme  dangers  which  threatened  him.  He  was  in  a 


200  PROGRESS    OF   THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1776. 

level  country,  without  an  intrenching  tool  of  any  kind, 
at  the  head  of  a  body  of  about  three  thousand  effective 
men,  who  had  no  tents  to  protect  them  against  the  rigors 
of  the  winter  season  now  coming  on,  and  in  a  section 
whose  inhabitants  were  not  only  not  friendly  to  him,  but 
many  of  them  actually  hostile.  Added  to  the  other  diffi 
culties  that  were  increasing  about  him  to  make  his  situa 
tion  desperate,  was  the  lamentable  result  of  short  enlist 
ments,  of  the  militia  as  well  as  of  the  Continental  troops, 
which  made  itself  felt  in  the  steady  melting  away  of  his 
forces ;  the  men  returned  home  as  their  terms  expired, 
sometimes  even  without  waiting  to  be  mustered  out,  while, 
of  the  few  not  yet  absolutely  entitled  to  retire  from  the 
field,  a  large  proportion  had  been  engaged  to  stay  only 
until  the  1st  of  January,  and  there  was  no  hope  of  re 
taining  them  in  the  service  after  that. 

In  the  mean  time  Lord  Cornwallis  had  been  ordered  to 
the  command  of  the  British  forces  about  to  undertake  the 
invasion  of  New  Jersey,  and  he  was  now  moving  upon 
Washington  in  a  direction  which  threatened  to  cut  the 
latter  off  between  the  two  rivers.  General  Washington 
retired  across  the  Passaic  on  the  21st  of  November,  being 
totally  unable  to  defend  himself,  and  took  up  a  position 
at  Newark,  his  rear-guard  having  destroyed  the  bridge 
just  as  the  head  of  Cornwallis's  dragoons  and  grenadiers 
came  up.  From  Newark  General  Washington  sent  an 
earnest  appeal  to  Congress  and  to  the  State  of  Pennsyl 
vania,  as  well  as  to  the  Governor  of  New  Jersey,  setting 
forth  the  dire  necessities  of  the  country  and  begging 
them  to  support  him  by  new  enlistments  and  by  call 
ing  out  the  militia,  in  order  to  prevent  the  enemy 
from  overrunning  New  Jersey  and  advancing  immedi 
ately  to  the  investment  of  Philadelphia.  Then,  after 
having  maintained  himself  for  five  days  in  Newark,  he 
retreated  still  farther,  in  the  face  of  Lord  Cornwallis's 
army,  which  was  crossing  the  Passaic  River,  and  took 


1776.]  UPOtf    THE    AKRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  201 

up  his  post  upon  the  Raritan,  at  Brunswick,  on  the  28th 
of  November. 

Whilst  Washington  was  sharply  censured  in  the  criti 
cisms  of  the  time  for  not  checking  the  enemy  and  for 
not  doing  what  it  would  have  been  difficult  to  do  even  if 
he  had  commanded  a  well-equipped  and  well-disciplined 
force,  his  present  weakness  was  constantly  increasing,  and 
he  had  the  mortification,  on  the  30th  of  November,  of 
seeing  a  large  part  of  his  remaining  army,  then  en 
titled  to  discharge,  abandon  him  almost  in  the  very  face 
of  the  advancing  enemy.1  He  had  written,  a  few  days 
before  this,  to  his  brother,  in  bitter  distress,  "  I  am 
wearied  almost  to  death  with  the  retrograde  motion  of 
things."  Yet  the  courage  of  this  extraordinary  man 
never  wavered ;  his  mind  possessed  an  elasticity  which 
enabled  him  to  adjust  it  to  the  immediate  comprehension 
of  almost  any  conceivable  set  of  circumstances ;  and, 
whilst  his  soldiers  about  him  saw  nothing  but  the  se 
rene  countenance  to  which  they  were  accustomed,  he 
kept  his  few  troops  in  motion  in  order  to  conceal  his 
weakness  from  the  enemy,  he  devised  the  plans  that 
were  necessary  for  his  future  operations,  and,  with  entire 
self-possession,  he  wrote  communications  to  his  general 
officers,  to  the  Governors  and  Legislatures  of  several 
States,  and  to  Congress.3 

At  Brunswick  he  kept  up  the  appearance  of  military 
strength  as  long  as  he  was  able,  always  with  the  pur 
pose  of  delaying  the  enemy  and  wasting  their  time,  until 
the  advance-guard  of  Cornwallis  actually  came  in  view 
and  forced  him  from  the  town.  Continuing  his  retreat, 
in  the  same  general  direction,  along  the  route  of  the  great 


1  Marshall,  Life  of  Washington,  ii.  523. 

2  To  John  Augustine  Washington,  19th  November,  1776  :  Sparks,  Writings 
of  Washington,  iv.  182. 

3  See  Washington's    Letters,   November    and    December,    1776 :    Sparks, 
Writings  of  Washington,  vol.  iv. 


202  PROGRESS    OF   THE    WAR    IN   AMERICA  [1776. 

modern  avenue  of  traffic  to-day  between  the  cities  of 
New  York  and  Philadelphia,  Washington  retired  from 
Brunswick  on  the  1st  of  December,  with  less  than  three 
thousand  half-clothed  men,  to  Princeton,  and  thence  to 
Trenton,  where  he  arrived  on  the  2d  of  the  month.  At 
this  moment  Lord  Howe  and  his  brother  the  general, 
as  commissioners  of  the  Crown,  issued  a  proclamation 
commanding  all  persons  assembled  in  arms  against  His 
Majesty  to  disband,  and  offering  a  full  pardon  to  every 
person  who  should  submit  and  claim  the  benefits  of  the 
proclamation  within  sixty  days ;  and  great  numbers  of 
people  flocked  in  every  day  to  make  their  peace  and  to 
claim  protection.  Indeed,  "  the  contrast  between  the 
splendid  appearance  of  the  pursuing  army,  and  that 
made  by  the  ragged  Americans  who  were  flying  before 
them,  diminished  in  numbers,  and  destitute  of  almost 
every  necessary,  could  not  fail  to  contribute  to  the  gen 
eral  opinion  that  the  contest  was  approaching  its  termi 
nation."  * 

General  Washington  had  left  a  detachment  at  Prince 
ton,  to  make  head  against  the  enemy,  with  the  inten 
tion,  after  having  transferred  his  baggage  and  stores 
across  the  Delaware  at  Trenton,  of  going  back  to  Prince 
ton  and  offering  such  resistance  as  he  could.  But  upon 
his  way  thither  he  met  his  troops  retiring  before  the 
superior  force  of  Cornwallis,  who,  as  if  not  already  suffi 
ciently  strong  to  crush  the  small  remnant  fleeing  before 
him,  had  been  reinforced  by  a  brigade  of  fresh  troops  and 
was  joined  by  General  Howe  himself.  Washington  has 
tened  back,  therefore,  with  his  whole  army,  to  Trenton, 
and  there  crossed  the  Delaware  River,  on  the  8th  of  De 
cember.  "  Who  can  tell  what  might  have  happened," 
says  the  historian,2  "  if  Howe  had  pushed  forward  four 
thousand  men  by  a  forced  march  in  pursuit  of  the  Amer- 

1  Marshall,  Life  of  Washington,  ii.  526. 

2  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States,  ix.  202. 


1776.]  UPON    THE   ARRIVAL    OF    LA    FAYETTE.  203 

leans  ?"  It  is  perhaps  not  impossible  to  imagine  what 
would  have  happened.  There  was  very  little  strength 
left  to  resist  him  if  he  had  done  so.  The  wonder  is 
that  he  did  not.  This  was  the  lowest  ebb  of  American 
independence.  Nevertheless,  those  weary,  ragged,  bare 
footed,  strong-hearted  men  were  destined  to  preserve  the 
liberty  of  their  country. 

Before  retiring  across  the  Delaware,  General  Washing 
ton  had  destroyed  all  the  bridges  along  the  country 
roads  in  the  neighborhood  of  Trenton,  and  had  collected, 
in  security  from  the  enemy,  all  the  boats  within  a  distance 
of  seventy  miles  up  and  down  the  stream  ;  in  addition 
to  this,  he  posted  his  troops  in  such  a  manner  as  to  guard 
as  well  as  he  could  the  different  points  at  which  it  was 
fordable.  As  his  rear-guard  crossed  the  river,  the  van 
of  the  British  army  came  in  sight,  the  main  body  of 
the  enemy  taking  up  its  position  at  Trenton.  But,  sin 
gularly  enough,  at  this  point,  when  the  Americans  were 
driven  almost  to  desperation  and  were  upon  the  verge  of 
total  defeat,  the  British  commander  distributed  his  army, 
part  along  the  Delaware  from  Trenton  to  Bordentown 
and  Burlington,  and  the  remainder  at  different  points  to 
the  eastward  in  New  Jersey,  with  the  determination  of 
closing  the  campaign  by  going  into  winter  quarters. 
Misled  by  his  expectation  that  the  American  army  would 
dwindle  away  through  the  expiration  of  the  limited 
terms  of  enlistment,  well  known  to  be  now  drawing  to 
their  close,  General  Howe  considered  it  unnecessary  to 
endure  any  longer  the  exposure  to  the  rigors  of  the  season, 
which  were  growing  daily  more  severe,  and  indulged  him 
self  in  the  belief  that  it  wrould  be  a  comparatively  easy 
matter  to  put  an  end  to  the  war  by  a  short  campaign 
early  in  the  following  spring. 

Lord  Corn  wall  is  returned  to  New  York,  where  he  was 
about  to  go  aboard  the  packet  which  was  to  take  him  to 
England  upon  leave.  General  Howe  was  preparing  to 


204  PROGRESS    OF   THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1776. 

celebrate  with  splendid  festivities  the  honors  conferred 
upon  him  by  King  George,  and  his  investiture  with  the 
Order  of  the  Bath  as  a  reward  for  his  victory  upon  Long 
Island.  On  the  opposite  side  of  the  Delaware,  Washing 
ton,  to  whom  all  this  seemed  incomprehensible,  did  not  at 
first  believe  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  British  to 
close  the  campaign,  in  view  of  the  advantages  they  already 
held  and  of  his  own  enfeebled  condition,  but  suspected  it 
to  be  merely  a  mask  to  conceal  a  purpose  on  the  part  of 
General  Howe  to  wait  a  short  time  until  the  Delaware 
should  be  frozen  over,  when  he  could  cross  his  army  upon 
the  ice  and  proceed  at  once  to  Philadelphia.  Fearing 
the  effect  upon  the  country  of  further  reverses  to  the 
American  arms  and  the  discouragement  that  must  fol 
low  from  the  loss  of  so  important  a  city  as  Philadelphia, 
General  Washington  redoubled  his  appeals,  especially  to 
Pennsylvania  and  to  Congress,  for  more  men ;  and  he 
employed  every  possible  means  to  strengthen  himself, 
not  only  in  readiness  to  repel  an  attack,  but  even  to 
prepare  for  offensive  operations.  His  solemn  words  of 
warning  aroused  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  to  a  supreme 
effort,  and  fifteen  hundred  men  marched  to  his  relief 
from  Philadelphia  to  Trenton,  in  addition  to  a  German 
battalion  ordered  thither  by  Congress ;  with  whom,  and 
with  all  the  New  England  troops  who  could  be  spared 
from  the  defence  of  the  north  to  join  him  in  this  extremity 
he  had  concentrated  along  the  Delaware  something  like 
five  thousand  men,  to  guard  the  crossings  and  to  harass 
the  enemy  by  small  parties  whenever  an  opportunity 
should  occur. 

The  protection  of  Philadelphia  became  now  a  subject 
of  the  greatest  importance,  to  which  all  else  was  neces 
sarily  subordinated, — not  so  much  because  of  the  intrinsic 
value  of  the  city  in  a  military  sense,  as  because  Congress 
was  on  the  point  of  recruiting  an  army  upon  a  firmer 
footing  and  for  a  longer  term  than  heretofore,  and  the 


1776.]  UPON    THE    ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  205 

loss  of  Philadelphia  was  greatly  dreaded,  "  when  that 
army  was  to  be  recruited  on  which  the  future  hopes  of 
America  were  to  rest,  and  which  was  to  decide  her  destiny. 
It  was  feared,  and  with  much  reason,  that  this  event  would 
make  so  unfavorable  an  impression  on  the  public  mind  as 
to  deter  the  American  youth  from  engaging  in  a  contest 
becoming  so  desperate/'  The  genius  of  Washington 
rendered  a  service  to  the  country  at  that  moment  quite 
as  great  as  that  of  any  single  act  he  performed  during 
the  war,  and  it  produced  a  result  the  importance  of  which, 
in  its  immediate  effect  upon  the  American  cause  and  its 
bearing  upon  the  ultimate  achievement  of  the  indepen 
dence  of  the  United  States,  can  scarcely  be  overestimated. 
He  conceived  the  daring  plan  of  surprising  the  British 
and  of  attacking  them  in  their  camps  at  Trenton  and  along 
the  Delaware,  by  a  concerted  action  in  which  the  several 
detachments  of  his  army  were  to  cross  unobserved  and 
make  an  assault  upon  the  different  posts  at  the  same 
instant. 

The  cold  was  intense,  and  it  was  snowing,  on  the  night 
of  Christmas,  which  was  selected  as  the  time  for  this 
movement;  the  river  was  so  full  of  ice  that  it  was  ex 
tremely  difficult  to  cross ;  and  to  take  the  artillery  over 
required  the  utmost  labor.  Nevertheless,  Washington  did 
not  hesitate.  The  attack  upon  the  post  at  Trenton  was 
to  be  made  by  a  body  of  a  little  over  two  thousand  men, 
all  he  could  muster  from  his  weakened  following,  and  this 
was  to  be  led  by  the  General  himself.  Starting  out  in  the 
afternoon  of  the  25th,  he  proceeded,  according  to  the  plan 
agreed  upon,  to  MacKonkey's  Ferry,  now  called  Wash 
ington's  Crossing,  where  it  was  expected  to  transfer  the 
men  and  the  cannon  by  midnight,  after  which  they  were 
to  proceed  upon  their  march  of  nine  miles  to  Trenton  and 
attack  the  garrison  early  in  the  morning.  It  was  about 


Marshall,  Life  of  Washington,  ii.  540. 


206  PROGRESS    OF   THE    WAR    IN   AMERICA  [1776. 

three  o'clock  in  the  morning  before  they  were  all  over, 
and  it  took  them  some  time  to  form  on  the  other  bank ; 
after  which  they  set  out  for  their  destination  in  a  furious 
gale  of  wind  and  snow,  to  assault  at  the  end  of  a  long 
march  an  enemy  who  were  fresh  and  well  equipped  for  a 

fight. 

General  Washington  placed  himself  at  the  head  of  his 
men,  and  they  all  pushed  on  in  the  teeth  of  the  storm, 
until  they  were  well  in  the  town  of  Trenton  at  daylight. 
The  garrison  was  composed  of  a  detachment  of  Hessians, 
under  Colonel  Rail.  They  were  completely  surprised : 
in  the  midst  of  a  furious  attack  made  upon  them  by 
Washington  before  they  had  time  to  form  themselves, 
their  commander  was  mortally  wounded  ;  and  in  less  than 
forty  minutes  from  the  first  alarm  they  were  overcome  and 
forced  to  surrender.  Nine  hundred  and  forty-six  men 
gave  themselves  up  as  prisoners  of  war  to  General  Wash 
ington,  who  captured  with  them  twelve  hundred  small- 
arms,  six  cannon,  and  all  the  standards  of  the  brigade. 
He  had  been  entirely  successful  in  carrying  out  his  part 
of  the  attack  ;  and,  although  the  other  detachments  which 
were  to  operate  with  him  failed  of  their  purpose  by  reason 
of  the  heavy  flow  of  ice  in  the  river,  which  made  it  im 
possible  for  them  to  cross,  Washington  had  gained  his 
point.  He  had  taken  a  step  which  not  only  revived  the 
drooping  courage  of  the  people  about  him,  whose  country 
had  been  overrun  by  a  victorious  enemy  and  was  now 
held  apparently  without  hope  of  release,  but  also  taught 
the  lesson  that  the  American  army,  destitute  though  it  was, 
could  still  make  head  against  its  adversary,  in  the  cause 
of  freedom ;  and  it  renewed  confidence  throughout  the 
United  States  both  in  their  General  and  in  the  ultimate 
result  of  their  struggle.  There  was  yet  much  hardship, 
there  were  many  bitter  trials,  in  store  for  the  Americans, 
before  the  war  should  be  ended,  but  this  little  battle  had 
turned  the  ebbing  tide. 


1776.]  UPON    THE   ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  207 

If  the  whole  of  the  concerted  plan  had  been  carried 
out,  and  the  rest  of  his  troops  had  been  able  to  join  him 
at  Trenton,  as  he  had  expected,  General  Washington 
would  have  moved  at  once  against  the  enemy,  in  the 
hope  of  breaking  all  their  posts,  and  of  afterward  main 
taining  his  position  once  more  in  New  Jersey.  But  this 
now  was  impossible,  and  he  hastened,  before  the  British 
could  be  massed  against  him,  to  recross  the  Delaware 
River.  Encumbered  as  he  was  with  nearly  a  thousand 
prisoners  and  with  all  the  captured  baggage  and  equipment, 
he  marched  back  to  the  ferry  on  the  26th  of  December, 
in  the  driving  storm  which  still  continued,  and  safely 
transferred  his  tired  and  almost  frozen  men  to  the  Penn 
sylvania  side. 

The  news  of  the  battle  of  Trenton  was  received  with 
amazement  by  the  British  leaders.  General  Howe  deter 
mined  to  resume  active  operations,  in  spite  of  the  winter 
season  ;  and  Lord  Cornwallis,  having  abandoned  his  visit 
to  England,  returned  to  the  army  in  New  Jersey,  and 
concentrated  a  very  large  force  at  Princeton,  where  he 
protected  himself  by  hastily  constructed  works.  On  the 
2d  of  January,  Cornwallis  advanced  from  Princeton 
against  the  army  of  Washington,  who  had  again  crossed 
the  Delaware,  on  the  30th  of  December,  and  had  taken 
a  position  at  Trenton.  The  superior  force  of  the  British 
at  this  moment  threatened  the  destruction  of  the  Ameri 
cans  and  placed  General  Washington  in  an  extremely 
critical  situation.  Another  retreat  across  the  Delaware, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  difficulties  attending  such  a  move 
ment,  by  reason  of  the  ice, — which  formed  an  almost 
impassable  barrier  but  was  at  no  place  strong  enough 
to  bear  the  weight  of  marching  upon  it, — would  have 
been  tantamount  to  the  evacuation  of  New  Jersey,  and 
such  an  acknowledgment  of  defeat  as  would  have  de 
stroyed  the  influence  upon  the  country  of  the  victory 
just  gained  at  Trenton  ;  and  yet  to  hold  out  in  the 


208  PROGRESS    OF   THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1776. 

face  of  Cornwallis  with  the  hastily  collected  body  of 
five  thousand  men,  most  of  them  totally  unacquainted 
with  war,  of  whom  Washington  was  now  able  to  dis 
pose,  would  have  been  certain  ruin.  But  here  again 
the  fortitude  of  Washington  seems  only  to  have  been 
increased  by  the  presence  of  imminent  danger,  and  with 
mature  wisdom  and  unerring  judgment  he  determined 
upon  the  course  he  was  to  pursue.  The  very  bold 
ness  of  his  decision  enabled  him  to  carry  it  out ;  for, 
although  he  had  surpassed  all  imagination  by  his  attack 
upon  Trenton  and  had  shown  the  British  that  he  was  a 
desperate  fighter  who  was  never  beaten  whilst  he  had  a 
single  resource,  surely,  under  his  present  circumstances, 
there  was  nothing  to  lead  Lord  Cornwallis  to  expect  from 
him  any  further  offensive  operations,  when  it  was  not 
even  likely  that  he  would  be  able  to  sustain  himself  until 
the  following  day.  And  yet,  in  spite  of  this  discouraging 
situation,  Washington  succeeded  in  making  another  daring 
attack  upon  the  British.  He  had  drawn  up  his  army 
along  the  Assanpink,  a  small  creek  which  ran  through 
the  town  of  Trenton,  where  he  was  awaiting  the  advance 
of  Cornwallis,  who  now  approached  in  force,  but  who 
was  not  likely  to  cross  the  creek  immediately,  because 
the  Americans  had  so  disposed  themselves  that  all  the 
fords  were  guarded.  This  gave  Washington  an  opportu 
nity  to  prepare  the  movement  which  he  subsequently  car 
ried  out,  for  the  British,  after  having  made  one  or  two 
ineffectual  attempts  to  cross  the  Assanpink  Creek,  sat 
down  for  the  night  and  lighted  their  camp-fires, — the  fires 
of  the  Americans  burning  brightly,  in  the  mean  time, 
upon  the  other  side. 

The  plan  conceived  by  General  Washington  was  to  slip 
away  quietly  at  night  from  the  front  of  Cornwallis,  and, 
by  a  rapid  movement,  to  gain  his  rear  and  assault  the 
garrison  at  Princeton,  which  he  knew  to  be  held  by  a 
small  detachment  of  the  enemy,  the  main  forces  having 


1776.]  UPON   THE   ARRIVAL    OF    LA    FAYETTE.  209 

been  concentrated  in  the  advance  upon  Trenton ;  and,  if 
lie  were  successful  in  this  first  attempt,  then  to  push  on 
quickly  to  Brunswick,  where  the  principal  magazines  and 
the  treasure-box  lay,  under  a  weak  guard,  and  to  make 
an  attack  upon  that  post.  If  he  succeeded  in  this  he 
would  call  back  Cornwallis  to  his  own  defence  in  the 
rear,  Philadelphia  would  be  relieved  from  danger,  for 
the  present  at  least,  and  nearly  all  of  New  Jersey  would 
be  recovered  from  the  enemy.  If  he  failed,  the  worst 
that  could  happen  was  that  Philadelphia  would  fall  into 
the  hands  of  Cornwallis,  which  it  was  sure  to  do  at  all 
events  if  the  American  army  were  forced  to  retreat  farther 
inland  before  him. 

The  enemy  was  completely  deceived  by  the  apparent 
quiet  in  the  American  camp,  and  the  British  officers, 
having  placed  their  sentries  as  usual,  lay  down  to  sleep, 
confident  that  upon  the  next  day  they  should  bear  down 
upon  Washington  with  such  superior  weight  that  he  must 
necessarily  succumb,  and  hoping  by  this  move  to  close 
the  war.  But  the  situation  was  very  different  in  Wash 
ington's  camp.  As  soon  as  it  grew  dark  he  began  to 
remove  his  baggage  to  a  place  of  security,  and  about 
midnight  he  moved  away  with  his  soldiers  so  secretly 
that  the  British  outposts  saw  nothing  and  heard  nothing ; 
the  American  camp-fires  were  burning  all  night  along 
the  Assanpink,  because  Washington  had  left  a  few  men 
behind  to  put  wood  upon  them  and  to  keep  them  bright, 
and  the  British  sentries  were  sure  that  all  was  right 
because  they  saw  American  sentries  moving  up  and  down 
throughout  the  watches  of  the  night  and  early  morning. 

In  the  mean  time,  Washington  was  well  on  his  way. 
He  had  taken  a  roundabout  road  to  pass  beyond  the 
British  flank,  and  by  sunrise  on  the  3d  of  January  was 
at  Princeton,  where  he  immediately  began  an  attack  upon 
the  British  regiments  in  the  garrison,  which  resulted,  after 
a  very  short  engagement,  in  the  retreat  of  the  enemy, 

VOL.  I.— 14 


210  PROGRESS    OF   THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1777. 

leaving  him  in  possession  of  the  town  with  nearly  three 
hundred  prisoners  of  war.  At  Trenton,  Lord  Cornwallis 
was  astonished  in  the  morning  to  see  nothing  of  the 
Americans,  but  very  soon  the  sound  of  their  cannon  came 
from  the  direction  of  Princeton  to  indicate  to  him  where 
they  had  gone ;  and  in  an  instant  the  movement  flashed 
upon  his  mind,  filling  him  with  consternation  lest  he 
should  have  been  outdone  and  the  extremely  valuable 
magazines  at  Brunswick  should  be  captured.  He  broke 
up  his  camp  with  all  possible  speed,  and  started  for  Bruns 
wick  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  that  post  if  it  were  not 
already  too  late.  He  accomplished  that  object,  because 
General  Washington  had  not  been  able  with  his  exhausted 
troops  to  carry  out  the  whole  of  his  plan,  many  of  his 
soldiers  being  without  shoes  and  stockings,  most  of  them 
wretchedly  clad,  and  all  having  been  exposed  without 
shelter  to  the  winter  weather  during  his  recent  fatiguing 
movements  in  New  Jersey.  Therefore,  just  as  the  British 
were  coming  in  sight  of  Princeton,  Washington  moved 
out  of  the  town,  and,  breaking  down  the  bridges  over 
the  small  streams  which  he  crossed  upon  his  way,  turned 
toward  the  wooded  country  and  the  highlands,  where  his 
men  found  temporary  shelter,  and  on  the  5th  of  the 
month  he  took  up  his  head-quarters  at  Morristown. 

The  fighting  was  now  over  for  the  winter.  The  cause 
of  Independence  was  still  alive.  What  the  following  cam 
paign  should  bring  could  not  be  foretold ;  the  prospect 
was  gloomy  enough ;  but  the  valor  of  General  Washing 
ton  awakened  new  hope  throughout  the  land,  his  splendid 
leadership  had  driven  the  enemy  back,  and  on  the  side 
of  the  British  the  results  of  this  year's  campaign  were 
practically  nothing.  They  held  posts  in  New  Jersey 
at  Amboy  and  Brunswick  and  at  Paulus  Hook,  but  the 
greater  part  of  the  State  was  free.  New  England  was 
intact  except  the  little  island  of  Rhode  Island  ;  the  great 
territory  of  New  York  State,  except  Fort  Niagara,  was 


1777.]  UPON   THE   ARRIVAL   OF    LA    FAYETTE.  211 

out  of  their  control ;  and  they  had  no  footing  in  the 
whole  of  the  Southern  States  from  Delaware  to  Florida, 
Sir  William  Howe  retired  to  his  quarters  in  New  York 
City,  where  and  in  the  adjacent  islands  his  authority  still 
was  undisputed,  to  pass  his  time  agreeably,  to  wait  for  the 
pleasant  weather  of  spring,  and  to  add  to  his  troops  by  the 
reinforcements  which  he  had  asked  for  from  England,  and 
which  the  Government  was  making  strenuous  efforts  to  get 
ready  for  him.  Although  it  began  to  be  felt  in  England, 
after  the  incidents  at  Trenton  and  at  Princeton,  that  Sir 
William  Howe  was  not  prosecuting  the  war  with  the 
energy  that  had  been  expected  of  him,  and  that  he  ought 
to  be  replaced  by  a  more  enterprising  commander,  lie 
was  protected  against  this  criticism  by  the  favor  of  the 
King,  who  would  not  assent  to  his  removal,  and  he  was 
left  in  New  York  to  waste  his  time  and  to  give  the 
Americans  an  opportunity  to  prepare  for  the  campaign 
of  the  following  year.  He  was  not  granted  all  the  rein 
forcements  that  he  had  asked  for  at  the  close  of  hostilities, 
but  his  already  superior  army  was  further  strengthened  by 
the  addition  of  new  levies  in  England  and  Ireland  and 
new  purchases  of  troops  in  Germany,  to  the  extent  of  some 
three  thousand  men.  The  ministry  insisted  that  he  would 
be  able  to  end  the  war  in  a  year  with  what  lie  had  ;  and 
with  exceeding  bitterness  of  spirit  against  the  Ameri 
cans,  Lord  George  Germain  wrote  to  Lord  Howe  and  to 
Sir  William  Howe,  "  It  will  be  incumbent  upon  you  to 
use  the  powers  with  which  you  are  intrusted  in  such  a 
manner  that  those  persons  who  shall  have  shown  them 
selves  undeserving  of  the  royal  mercy  may  not  escape 
that  punishment  which  is  due  to  their  crimes,  and  which 
it  will  be  expedient  to  inflict  for  the  sake  of  example  to 
futurity." 

Washington  was  still  holding  his  position  in  New  Jersey 
with  a  force  of  which  the  whole  number  fit  for  duty  did 
not  exceed  three  thousand  men.  Many  of  these  were  en- 


212  PROGRESS    OF    THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1777. 

gaged  for  only  a  few  months.  The  treasury  was  empty, 
the  government  of  Congress  was  lamentably  deficient,  the 
recruiting  service  brought  in  soldiers  very  slowly  in  spite 
of  stupendous  efforts  on  the  part  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  and  the  critical  condition  of  the  country's  affairs. 
No  adversary  could  have  presented  a  more  slender  de 
fence  at  that  moment,  if  the  British  had  seized  the  oppor 
tunity  so  plainly  offered  by  this  inherent  weakness.  It  was 
not  a  campaign  of  British  energy,  however,  fortunately 
for  the  American  cause.  Sir  William  Howe  virtually 
did  nothing  until  the  middle  of  the  following  summer, 
that  of  1777  ;  and  he  then  changed  his  plan  of  campaign 
once  more  by  deciding  to  give  up  the  attempt  in  New 
Jersey  and  to  proceed  against  Philadelphia  by  sea. 

General  Washington  remained  at  Morristown,  practi 
cally  undisturbed,  until  the  end  of  May,  when  he  moved 
his  army,  now  increased  to  between  seven  and  eight  thou 
sand  men,  to  the  higher  ground  and  more  advantageous 
position  of  Middlebrook,  on  the  north  side  of  the  Raritan, 
in  New  Jersey,  about  fifteen  miles  north  of  Princeton  and 
some  nine  miles  from  Brunswick.  Toward  the  middle 
of  June  the  British  again  made  a  demonstration  in  New 
Jersey,  proceeding  to  Brunswick  with  a  splendidly  dis 
ciplined  and  perfectly  equipped  army  of  seventeen  thou 
sand  men,  the  like  of  which  the  veteran  officers,  both 
German  and  English,  declared  they  had  never  seen  be 
fore.  Since  they  were  furnished  with  boats  and  pontoon 
bridges,  it  seemed  evident  that  General  Howe's  intention 
was  to  cut  Washington  off  from  Princeton  by  a  rapid 
march  and  to  cross  the  Delaware  River.  Washington 
disposed  his  troops,  as  well  as  his  resources  would  allow 
him,  to  prevent  this  movement,  and  on  the  14th  of  June 
the  two  armies  confronted  each  other.  But  General  Howe 
could  not  decide  even  then  to  make  an  attack,  in  spite  of 
his  superiority  of  two  to  one ;  and  a  few  days  later,  on  the, 
19th,  he  retired  with  the  whole  British  force  to  Brunswick, 


1777.]  UPON    THE    ARRIVAL    OF    LA    FAYETTE.  213 

and  afterward  to  Amboy.  After  some  desultory  move 
ments  which  produced  no  result,  on  the  30th  of  June  he 
evacuated  New  Jersey,  which  he  never  saw  again.  One 
is  led  almost  irresistibly  to  the  belief  that  General  Howe 
was  absolutely  indifferent  to  his  success  in  this  war.  His 
efforts  never  went  beyond  the  point  of  moderate  diffi 
culty  ;  he  sacrificed  his  military  prestige  in  a  series  of 
unmanly  failures,  which  nothing  could  have  accounted 
for  in  the  case  of  a  soldier  interested  in  his  work. 

Instead  of  seizing  now  an  opportunity  to  move  up  the 
Hudson  River  in  force  and  to  occupy  the  highlands,  so  as 
to  be  in  readiness  to  support  General  Burgoyne,  who  was 
marching  southward  from  Canada  for  the  purpose  of 
capturing  Albany  and  uniting  the  British  armies  in  a 
continuous  line  north  and  south  so  as  to  cut  off  New  Eng 
land  from  the  Middle  States,  Sir  William  Howe  embarked 
his  whole  army  in  the  harbor  of  New  York,  except  such 
troops  as  were  immediately  necessary  to  defend  the  posts, 
and,  with  a  fleet  of  nearly  three  hundred  vessels,  dropped 
down  to  Sandy  Hook  on  the  23d  of  July,  and  sailed  away. 

But  the  sei/Aire  of  the  highlands  in  New  York,  with  the 
consequent  control  of  the  Hudson  River,  was  so  much  in 
the  mind  of  General  Washington,  this  having  been  the 
one  movement  of  the  British  which  he  had  feared  the 
most,  that  it  seemed  improbable  to  him  that  Sir  William 
Howe  would  abandon  it  at  this  moment,  or  that,  especially 
in  view  of  the  continued  approach  of  General  Burgoyne 
from  the  north,  the  British  commander  would  turn  away 
from  a  course  for  which  the  military  reasons  were  at  that 
time  so  obvious.  He  feared  that  the  fleet  had  put  out  to 
sea  only  in  order  to  mislead  him,  that  if  he  moved  from 
his  strong  position  at  Middlebrook  he  should  expose  him 
self  to  an  attack  in  case  it  suddenly  returned,  and  that 
this  was  a  feint  intended  to  dislodge  him,  in  order  that, 
being  set  upon  by  a  vastly  superior  force,  he  might  be 
destroyed. 


214  PROGRESS    OF   THE    WAR    IN    AMERICA  [1777. 

In  perfect  self-possession,  Washington  held  his  camp  at 
Middlebrook,  whilst  he  took  the  necessary  steps  to  watch 
the  movements  of  the  enemy,  to  throw  his  forces  against 
them  on  the  Hudson  if  they  reappeared,  or  to  move 
toward  the  south  if  their  designs  lay  in  that  direction. 

His  anxiety  was  finally  relieved  by  the  news  that  the 
British  fleet  had  appeared  off  the  capes  of  the  Delaware 
on  the  30th  of  July.  He  then  formed  his  army  into  two 
columns  and  marched  to  Philadelphia. 

It  was  at  this  time  that  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
had  arrived  in  America  and  was  making  his  way  north 
ward  to  present  himself  to  Congress  and  to  enter  the 
Continental  army.  Having  set  out  from  Charleston,  as 
we  have  already  seen,  on  the  25th  of  June,  he  had  reached 
Philadelphia  on  the  27th  of  July,  only  a  few  days  before 
the  British  fleet  appeared  in  the  Delaware  and  the  Ameri 
can  commander  moved  his  army  into  Pennsylvania.  It 
was  whilst  La  Fayette  was  in  Philadelphia  that  he  saw 
for  the  first  time  General  Washington,  for  whom  he  con 
ceived  at  once  an  attachment  which  was  returned  by  the 
General  in  the  most  kindly  expressions  of  sympathy 
and  good  will,  and  this  meeting  gave  rise  to  a  friend 
ship  that  united  them  in  affectionate  intercourse  during 
the  remainder  of  their  lives.  General  Washington  was 
at  a  dinner  in  Philadelphia,  when  the  young  Marquis, 
who  was  also  a  guest,  first  caught  sight  of  him,  "  and, 
though  he  was  surrounded  by  officers  and  private  citi 
zens,  the  majesty  of  his  countenance  and  of  his  figure 
made  it  impossible  not  to  recognize  him  ;  he  was  especially 
distinguished  also  by  the  affability  of  his  manners  and 
the  dignity  with  which  he  addressed  those  about  him." 
When  they  were  about  to  separate,  Washington  took  La 
Fayette  aside,  spoke  to  him  very  kindly,  complimented 
him  upon  the  noble  spirit  he  had  shown  and  the  sacrifices 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  20. 


1777.]  UPON   THE   ARRIVAL    OF    LA    FAYETTE.  215 

he  had  made  in  favor  of  the  American  cause,  and  then 
told  him  that  he  should  be  pleased  if  he  would  make  the 
quarters  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  his  home,  establish 
himself  there  whenever  he  thought  proper,  and  consider 
himself  at  all  times  as  one  of  his  family  ;  adding,  in  a  tone 
of  pleasantry,  that  he  could  not  promise  him  the  luxuries 
of  a  court,  or  even  the  conveniences  which  his  former 
habits  might  have  rendered  essential  to  his  comfort,  but 
that,  since  he  had  become  an  American  soldier,  he  would 
doubtless  contrive  to  accommodate  himself  to  the  charac 
ter  he  had  assumed,  and  would  submit  with  a  good  grace 
to  the  customs,  manners,  and  privations  of  a  republican 
army.  La  Fayette's  joy  at  his  success  with  Congress 
was  redoubled  by  this  flattering  proof  of  friendship  and 
regard  on  the  part  of  the  Commander-in-Chief.  His 
horses  and  equipage  were  immediately  sent  to  camp,  and 
ever  afterward,  even  when  he  had  the  command  of  a 
division,  he  kept  up  his  intimacy  at  head-quarters,  and 
enjoyed  all  the  advantages  of  a  member  of  the  General's 
family.  The  day  after  the  dinner,  Washington  inspected 
the  fortifications  in  the  Delaware  River,  and  invited  La 
Fayette  to  accompany  him.1 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  454. 


216        FIRST   SERVICE   IN   THE   CONTINENTAL    ARMY.      [1777. 


CHAPTEE    VII. 

LA  FAYETTE'S  FIRST  SERVICE  IN  THE  CONTINENTAL  ARMY 

— BRANDYWINE   AND    GLOUCESTER. 

WHEN  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  first  saw  General 
Washington,  in  Philadelphia,  about  the  1st  of  August, 
1777,  the  American  army  was  encamped  some  five  miles 
north  of  the  city,  between  Germantown  and  the  Schuyl- 
kill  River,  upon  an  eminence  not  far  from  the  intersec 
tion  of  School  House  Lane  with  the  Township  Line, — the 
present  Wissahickon  Avenue.1  The  British  fleet  having 
withdrawn  from  the  capes  of  the  Delaware  and  having 
put  to  sea  again  shortly  after  its  appearance  there  upon 
the  30th  of  July,  because,  as  it  afterward  proved,  the 
admiral  concluded  that  he  should  not  be  able  to  pass  the 
obstructions  in  the  Delaware  River  so  as  to  approach 
Philadelphia,  General  Washington  was  left  in  very  serious 
doubt  as  to  the  course  he  should  pursue.  His  uncertainty 
was  greatly  increased,  and  his  anxiety  aroused,  as  day 
after  day  passed  and  nothing  was  heard  of  General  Howe. 
At  the  end  of  the  first  week  in  August,  whilst  he  was  "  yet 
entirely  in  the  dark  as  to  the  destination  of  the  enemy,"  2 
and  time  enough  having  elapsed  for  the  fleet  to  make  its 
appearance  in  Chesapeake  Bay,  if  that  were  its  destina 
tion,  or  to  return  to  New  York,  the  Commander-in-Chief 
began  to  fear  that  the  purpose  of  the  British  lay  to  the 
eastward ;  and  he  decided  to  prepare  for  their  appearance 
in  that  direction  by  moving  his  troops  toward  New  Jer- 

1  Baker,  The  Camp  by  Schuylkill  Falls,  p.  1 . 

2  Washington  to  General  Putnam,  7th  August,  1777 :  Sparks,  Writings  of 
Washington,  v.  23. 


1777.]      FIRST    SERVICE    IN    THE   CONTINENTAL    ARMY.        217 

sey  and  by  crossing  the  Delaware  again,1  with  the  view 
of  approaching  the  country  of  the  Hudson  River.  He 
set  out,  therefore,  on  the  8th  of  August ;  but  two  days 
later  he  was  overtaken  by  an  express  from  Philadelphia 
announcing  that  the  British  fleet  had  been  seen,  on  the  7th 
of  the  month,  off  Sinepuxent  Inlet,  to  the  southward  of 
the  capes  of  the  Delaware.  He  halted  immediately, 
and  went  into  camp  on  the  Old  York  Road,  near  the 
Neshaminy  Creek,  about  half  a  mile  above  the  present 
village  of  Hartsville,  in  Bucks  County,  Pennsylvania.2 

It  was  there  that  La  Fayette  joined  the  army,  as  a  vol 
unteer,  in  the  month  of  August,  about  a  week  after  he 
had  written  his  letter  of  thanks  to  Congress  for  the  com 
mission  they  had  granted  him,  which  we  have  seen  above. 
What  he  saw  there,  upon  his  arrival  at  head-quarters,  is 
thus  described  by  him  in  referring  to  it  long  afterward : 3 
"  About  eleven  thousand  men  rather  poorly  armed,  and 
much  worse  clad,  presented  a  singular  appearance.  In 
the  midst  of  a  great  variety  of  clothing,  sometimes  even 
of  nakedness,  the  best  garments  were  a  sort  of  hunting- 
shirts,  loose  jackets  made  of  gray  linen,  very  common  in 
Carolina.  As  for  their  tactics,  it  is  enough  to  say  that 
when  in  the  line  of  battle  it  became  necessary  for  a  regi 
ment  to  assume  a  position  to  the  right  without  breaking 
ranks,  instead  of  filing  simply  to  the  right,  the  left  began 
a  never-ending  countermarch.  They  wrere  always  drawn 
up  in  two  ranks,  the  small  men  in  the  front ;  but  with 
this  exception  there  was  no  distinction  made  as  to  size. 
In  spite  of  these  disadvantages,  however,  they  were  fine 
soldiers  and  led  by  zealous  officers.  Bravery  took  the 
place  with  them  of  science,  and  every  day  improved  their 
experience  and  their  discipline."  Upon  the  arrival  in 


1  To  General  Putnam,  llth  August,  1777:  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washing 
ton,  v.  2(>. 

a  Baker,  The  Camp  by  Schuylkill  Falls,  p.  10. 
8  Me'moires  de  ma  Main,  i.  20. 


218        FIRST    SERVICE    IN    THE   CONTINENTAL    ARMY.       [1777. 

camp  of  this  spirited  young  foreign  soldier,  Washington 
said,  by  way  of  compliment,  "  It  is  somewhat  embarrassing 
to  us  to  show  ourselves  to  an  officer  who  has  just  come 
from  the  army  of  France,"  to  which  La  Fayette  quickly 
replied,  "  I  am  here  to  learn,  and  not  to  teach ;"  an  answer 
so  different  in  tone  from  what  was  usual  among  the  Eu 
ropeans  then  in  the  American  army  that  it  gave  general 
satisfaction  and  made  friends  for  him  at  once.1 

While  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  had  obtained  a  com 
mission  from  Congress  as  major-general,  with  the  under 
standing  that  he  should  serve  for  the  present,  at  least, 
as  a  volunteer  and  without  command,  his  ambition  was 
very  strong,  no  doubt,  to  attain  and  to  deserve  the  full 
authority  of  an  officer  in  accordance  with  his  rank.  He 
appears  to  have  understood  perfectly  his  relations  at  that 
time  to  the  service,  yet  in  his  eagerness  to  make  him 
self  in  every  respect  an  American  soldier  and  to  identify 
himself  as  such  with  the  Continental  army  it  is  likely 
that  he  expressed  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who, 
though  favorably  impressed  by  his  manners  in  Phila 
delphia,  knew  him  then  but  very  slightly,  such  hopeful 
ness  as  to  his  future  as  to  leave  a  doubt  in  the  mind 
of  Washington  what  Congress  intended  him  to  do  in 
the  case  of  La  Fayette  in  the  matter  of  an  active  com 
mand,  when  the  latter  should  join  the  army.  Upon  the 
very  delicate  subject  of  foreign  officers  in  America,  which 
had  already  given  rise  to  serious  difficulties,  General 
Washington  had  expressed  much  solicitude  in  his  letters 
to  Congress,  as  we  have  seen  ;  and  now  the  expected  ar 
rival  at  his  head-quarters  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
appears  to  have  caused  him  some  apprehension  lest  it 
might  lead  to  further  embarrassment.  He  wrote,  there 
fore,  in  this  connection  to  a  gentleman  in  Congress,2 — 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  21. 

2  To  Benjamin  Harrison,  from  Neshaminy  Bridge,  19th  August,   1777  : 
Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  35. 


1777.]       FIRST    SERVICE    IN    THE    CONTINENTAL    ARMY.         219 

"  If  I  did  not  misunderstand  what  you  or  some  other  member 
of  Congress  said  to  me,  respecting  the  appointment  of  the  Mar 
quis  de  Lafayette,  he  has  misconceived  the  design  of  his  ap 
pointment,  or  Congress  did  not  understand  the  extent  of  his 
views ;  for  certain  it  is,  that  I  understood  him,  that  he  does  not 
conceive  his  commission  is  merely  honorary,  but  given  with  a 
view  to  command  a  division  of  this  army.  It  is  true  he  has  said, 
that  he  is  young  and  inexperienced,  but  at  the  same  time  has 
always  accompanied  it  with  a  hint,  that,  so  soon  as  I  shall  think 
him  fit  for  the  command  of  a  division,  he  shall  be  ready  to  enter 
upon  the  duties  of  it,  and  in  the  mean  time  has  offered  his  service 
for  a  smaller  command.  What  the  designs  of  Congress  respecting 
this  gentleman  were,  and  what  line  of  conduct  I  am  to  pursue  to 
comply  with  their  design  and  his  expectations,  I  know  not,  and 
beg  to  be  instructed.  If  Congress  meant,  that  his  rank  should  be 
unaccompanied  by  command,  I  wish  it  had  been  sufficiently  ex 
plained  to  him.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  was  intended  to  invest 
him  with  all  the  powers  of  a  major-general,  why  have  I  been  led 
into  a  contrary  belief,  and  left  in  the  dark  with  respect  to  my  own 
conduct  towards  him?  .  .  . 

ul  was  going  to  address  Congress  for  instructions  in  the  case 
of  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette,  but  upon  second  thought  concluded 
to  ask  some  direction  of  my  conduct  in  this  matter  through  a 
member,  and  therefore  have  imposed  this  task  upon  you.  Let  me 
beseech  you  then,  my  good  Sir,  to  give  me  the  sentiments  of 
Congress  on  this  matter,  that  I  may  endeavour,  as  far  as  it  is  in 
my  power,  to  comply  with  them.  .  .  .  The  Marquis  is  now  in 
Philadelphia,  but  expected  up  this  day  or  to-morrow." 

Mr.  Harrison's  reply  to  this  letter  gave  the  General  to 
understand  that  the  appointment  was  merely  an  honorary 
one  for  the  present,  and  that  he  was  not  bound  by  the 
tenor  of  the  commission  to  give  him  a  command,  but  was 
to  follow  his  own  judgment  and  discretion  in  the  matter. 
The  question  was  one  which  very  quickly  freed  itself  from 
difficulty  in  the  sequel ;  for,  during  the  campaign  which 
was  then  just  opening,  La  Fayette  won  favor  in  the  army 
by  distinguished  bravery  and  by  the  display  of  very 
considerable  military  skill,  so  that  before  the  end  of  it 
General  Washington  assigned  to  him,  with  the  approval 
of  Congress,  the  division  he  so  greatly  longed  for. 


220        FIRST    SERVICE    IN    THE   CONTINENTAL    ARMY.       [1777. 

La  Fayette  arrived  at  the  Neshaminy  camp  the  day 
after  General  Washington  had  written  to  Mr.  Harrison, 
and  upon  the  following  day,  the  21st  of  August,  he  was 
present  at  the  council  of  war  which  had  been  summoned 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  discuss  the  situation  and 
to  consider  the  advisability  of  moving  the  troops.  This 
was  the  first  council  of  war  that  La  Fayette  attended  in 
America,  and  upon  this  occasion  he  bore  the  rank  of 
major-general  in  the  service  of  the  United  States.1 

In  the  absence  of  information  as  to  the  whereabouts 
of  the  British  fleet,  the  council  of  war  decided,  as  the 
unanimous  opinion  of  the  general  officers  present,  that 
the  enemy  must  have  sailed  for  Charleston ;  for  if  they 
had  gone  to  Chesapeake  Bay  they  would  have  been  there 
long  since  and  the  fact  would  have  been  well  established ; 
besides,  there  was  no  place  short  of  Charleston  of  suffi 
cient  importance  to  engage  their  attention.  In  view  of 
this  conclusion,  since  it  was  not  deemed  expedient  to 
transport  the  army  to  so  distant  a  point  as  South  Caro 
lina,  where  it  could  not  hope  to  arrive  in  time  to  perform 
any  service,  the  decision  was  taken  to  advance  immedi 
ately  toward  the  Hudson  River.  But,  news  having  been 
received  by  Congress  that  the  fleet  had  reappeared,  Presi 
dent  Hancock  wrote,  on  the  22d  of  August,  to  General 
Washington,  "  This  moment  an  express  arrived  from 
Maryland  with  an  account  of  near  two  hundred  sail  of 
General  Howe's  fleet  being  at  anchor  in  the  Chesapeake 
Bay.  In  consequence  of  this  advice,  Congress  have 
ordered  the  immediate  removal  of  the  stores  and  pris 
oners  from  Lancaster  and  York  in  this  State  to  places 
of  greater  safety." 

This  fixed  at  once  the  purpose  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief.  Upon  the  following  day  he  turned  his  army 
toward  Philadelphia,  and,  marching  down  the  Old  York 

1  Washington's  letter  to  the  President  of  Congress :  Sparks,  Writings  of 
Washington,  v.  38,  and  note  on  page  41. 


1777.]      FIRST    SERVICE    IN    THE    CONTINENTAL    ARMY.        221 

Road,  encamped  a  few  miles  north  of  the  city,  near  Ger- 
mantown,  he  himself  occupying  with  his  staff,  as  his 
head-quarters  for  the  night,  "  Stenton,"  the  fine  old  seat 
of  the  Logan  family,  which  is  still  standing.  From  this 
point  he  made  preparations  to  pass  through  the  city  the 
next  morning,  the  24th  of  August ;  for  he  had  in  mind 
the  purpose  of  showing  his  troops  to  the  people  there,  in 
order  to  encourage  the  friends  of  liberty  by  the  spirit  and 
bearing  of  its  defenders,  and  to  counteract  any  feeling  of 
disaffection  that  might  have  arisen  from  the  near  approach 
of  the  enemy's  threatening  force.1  From  Stenton  he  issued 
the  general  order  that 

"The  army  is  to  march  in  one  column  through  the  city  of 
Philadelphia,  going  in  at  and  marching  down  Front  Street  to 
Chestnut,  and  up  Chestnut  to  the  Common.  A  small  halt  is  to 
be  made  about  a  mile  this  side  of  the  city  until  the  rear  is  clear 
up  and  the  line  in  proper  order.  .  .  .  The  drums  and  fifes  of  each 
brigade  are  to  be  collected  in  the  centre  of  it,  and  a  tune  for  the 
quick-step  played,  but  with  such  moderation  that  the  men  may 
step  to  it  with  ease,  and  without  dancing  along,  or  totally  disre 
garding  the  music,  as  has  been  too  often  the  case." 

La  Fayette,  who  rode  by  the  side  of  Washington  through 
the  city,  says  that  the  General  was  very  handsome  at  the 
head  of  his  troops,  and  that  with  sprigs  of  green  in  their 
hats,  stepping  to  the  music  of  the  fife  and  the  drum,  in 
the  presence  of  all  the  citizens,  these  soldiers,  in  spite  of 
their  nakedness,  presented  a  creditable  appearance.3  After 
passing  through  Philadelphia  the  army  advanced  without 
delay  to  Chester. 

In  the  mean  while,  the  British  commander  was  ap 
proaching  from  the  south  through  Chesapeake  Bay ; 
having  met  with  no  opposition,  he  sailed  up  to  the  Elk 

1  Washington  to  the  President  of  Congress,  23d  August,  1777  :  Sparks, 
Writings  of  Washington,  v.  43. 

s  Saffell,  Records  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  pp.  333-336. 
3  Memoires  de  ina  Main,  i.  21. 


222        FIRST    SERVICE    IN    THE   CONTINENTAL   ARMY.       [1777. 

River,  at  the  extreme  northern  end  of  the  Chesapeake, 
and  made  a  landing  on  the  25th  of  August,  near  "  the 
Head  of  Elk,"  now  Elkton,  in  Maryland,  upon  the  present 
line  of  the  Philadelphia,  Wilmington  and  Baltimore  Rail 
way.  He  was  at  the  head  of  an  army  of  eighteen  thou 
sand  veteran  troops,  who  landed  from  their  voyage  in 
excellent  condition,  who  were  thoroughly  supplied  with 
all  the  best  equipments  of  war  known  at  that  day,  and 
who  were  commanded,  under  him,  by  Lieutenant-General 
the  Earl  Cornwallis  and  Lieutenant-General  Knyphausen, 
officers  of  long  experience  and  of  unquestioned  military 
skill.  His  attitude  was  at  that  moment  extremely  threat 
ening.  He  was  but  about  fifty  miles  from  Philadelphia, 
the  objective  point  of  his  expedition,  in  a  country  which 
presented  no  serious  natural  obstructions  to  his  progress, 
and  which  was  not  intersected  by  any  streams  that  were 
not  easily  passable. 

The  American  army  was  in  front  of  him  to  dispute  his 
passage.  But  the  contest  was  an  unequal  one.  General 
Washington's  forces  had  been  increased  by  the  militia 
of  Pennsylvania,  by  volunteers,  and  by  the  division  of 
General  Sullivan,  who  had  recently  joined  him,  to  some 
fifteen  thousand  men ;  though  of  these,  by  reason  of  ill 
ness,  lack  of  clothing,  and  very  defective  arms,  the  number 
of  really  serviceable  troops  was  only  between  eleven  and 
twelve  thousand. 

Determined,  however,  to  make  a  stand  against  the 
enemy,  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  advanced  to  the 
hills  beyond  Wilmington,  when,  on  the  3d  of  Septem 
ber,  the  British  army  began  its  march  toward  Philadel 
phia.  After  one  or  two  skirmishes  between  the  head  of 
the  British  columns  and  the  advanced  posts  of  the  Amer 
ican  army,  Washington's  main  body  lay,  on  the  7th  of 
September,  at  a  little  village  called  Newport,  in  Delaware,1 

1  Washington  to  General  Heath,  7th  September,  1777  :  Sparks,  Writings 
of  Washington,  v.  55. 


>c  / 


PLAN   OK  TIIK 

JUTTLE  OK  URANDYWINK 

SEPTE  MBER        II™       1777 

Conipiledlbr  C{iarlemaone  Tower  Jr.. 
bit  ^l.-li.Cncitrdti  ?*'  Son  , 

CIVIl    IHliHltKS 

I'roin  tlie  Mn/>  pnhlifihcil  hij 
Tlic  Historiffil  Society  of 


SCALE  or 


,'— 7-v 


1777.]  BRANDYWINE.  223 

upon  which  place  General  Howe  advanced  two  days  later 
in  force,  as  if  to  make  an  attack,  until  he  had  reached  a 
point  two  miles  distant  from  the  post.  He  did  not  make 
an  attack,  however,  which  aroused  the  suspicion  of  General 
Washington  as  to  his  real  purpose,  and,  as  he  said,1  "  Upon 
reconnoitring  their  situation,  it  appeared  probable  that 
they  only  meant  to  amuse  us  in  front,  while  their  real 
intent  was  to  march  by  our  right,  and,  by  suddenly  pass 
ing  the  Brandy  wine  and  gaining  the  heights  upon  the 
north  side  of  that  river,  get  between  us  and  Philadelphia, 
and  cut  us  off  from  that  city.  To  prevent  this,  it  was 
judged  expedient  to  change  our  position  immediately." 
Accordingly,  General  Washington  moved  his  army  back, 
at  two  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  9th  of  September, 
and  crossed  the  Brandywine  at  Chadd's  Ford  toward  the 
evening  of  that  day. 

The  Brandywine  is  a  very  small  river  made  up  of  the 
combined  waters  of  two  inconsiderable  streams,  called  re 
spectively  the  East  Branch  and  the  West  Branch,  which 
flows  through  a  broken  and  at  some  points  rather  hilly 
country  toward  the  Delaware  River,  which  it  enters  after 
uniting  with  the  Christiana  Creek  somewhat  to  the  north 
and  east  of  Wilmington,  about  twenty-five  miles  below 
the  city  of  Philadelphia.  It  is  passable,  especially  in  the 
late  summer  season,  at  a  number  of  shallow  places  which 
were  well  known  and  utilized  at  the  period  of  the  Revolu 
tion,  among  which  was  Chadd's  Ford,  where  Washington's 
army  intrenched  itself  on  the  night  of  the  9th  of  Sep 
tember,  and  which  has  since  become  famous  from  the 
battle  which  took  place  there  two  days  later.  The  gen 
eral  direction  of  the  stream  at  Chadd's  Ford  is,  speaking 
roughly,  from  north  to  south.  There  are  several  other 
fords  within  a  few  miles,  above  and  below,  notably  those 
known  as  Trimble's  Ford  on  the  West  Branch  and 


1  Washington  to  the  President  of  Congress,  9th  September,  1777  :  Sparks, 
Writings  of  Washington,  v.  50. 


224  BRANDYWINE.  [1777. 

Jefferies's  Ford  on  the  East  Branch,  which  played  a  part 
in  the  action.  The  country  was  at  that  time  thickly 
covered  with  forests,  though  there  were  numerous  roads 
running  through  it  by  which  communication  was  made 
easy,  both  from  north  to  south  and  from  east  to  west. 
Of  these  the  more  important  were  the  main  road,  which 
ran  east  and  west  and  crossed  the  Brandywine  at  Chadd's 
Ford,  leading  by  Welch's  Tavern  and  Kennett  Meeting 
house  ;  to  the  north  of  it,  and  running  in  the  same  di 
rection,  at  a  distance  varying  from  one  to  two  miles,  the 
highway  known  as  the  Street  Road ;  at  right  angles  with 
each  of  these,  to  the  west  of  the  Brandywine,  the  Great 
Valley  Road,  leading  toward  the  north ;  on  the  east  side 
of  the  Brandywine  another,  running  generally  north  and 
south,  by  Sconneltown,  across  the  Street  Road,  to  the  Bir 
mingham  Meeting-house ;  while  an  avenue  leading  east 
and  west  from  Trimble's  Ford  to  Jefferies's  Ford  closed  a 
rude  form  of  quadrangle  about  the  country  through  which 
the  Brandywine  flows,  some  six  or  seven  miles  to  the  north 
of  Citadel's  Ford ;  traversed,  however,  by  several  by-ways 
which  made  any  one  point  within  it  accessible  from  the 
others. 

The  position  taken  by  General  Washington  was  on  the 
east  bank  of  the  Brandywine,  where  he  constructed  in- 
trenchments  upon  the  hilly  ground  directly  facing  and 
commanding  the  passage  at  Chadd's  Ford,  and  drew  up 
his  army  along  the  river,  with  his  right  extending  toward 
the  north,  and  his  extreme  left  protected  by  thickly 
wooded  country  to  the  south  of  the  Ford.  Here  he  re 
mained  on  the  10th  of  September,  expecting  the  appear 
ance  of  the  enemy,  having  thrown  out  in  the  mean  time 
an  advanced  post,  consisting  of  General  Maxwell's  light 
infantry,  on  the  opposite,  or  west,  bank  of  the  Brandy- 
wine  to  defend  the  approaches  to  the  Ford.  The  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  established  his  head-quarters  at  the  house 
of  Benjamin  Ring,  on  the  road  about  one  mile  east  of  the 


1777.]  BKANDYWINE.  225 

Ford,  and  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  lodged  in  a  pictu 
resque  little  house  about  a  quarter  of  a  mile  farther  to 
the  east,  on  the  same  road,  belonging  to  Gideon  Gilpin, 
which  is  still  standing  and  is  known  throughout  the  sur 
rounding  country  as  "  La  Fayette's  Head-Quarters."  The 
right  of  the  American  army  was  commanded  by  General 
Sullivan,  with  six  brigades,  including  those  of  Lord  Stir 
ling  and  General  Stephen.  The  extreme  left,  below  the 
Ford,  was  held  by  General  Armstrong  with  the  Pennsyl 
vania  militia.  General  Wayne's  division,  with  Proctor's 
artillery,  occupied  the  ground  at  the  Ford.  General 
Greene's  division  (consisting  of  the  brigades  of  General 
Weedon  and  General  Muhlenberg),  which  was  accompa 
nied  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  formed  a  reserve  and 
took  during  the  battle  a  central  position  between  the  right 
and  the  left  wing. 

Upon  the  other  side  of  the  Brandywine  the  whole 
British  army,  then  about  seven  miles  distant,  united  at 
Kennett  Square,  on  the  10th  of  September,  and  early  in 
the  morning  of  the  llth  began  its  march  in  two  columns, 
commanded  respectively  by  Lord  Cornwallis  and  General 
Knyphausen,  along  the  road  leading  to  Chadd's  Ford. 
As  soon  as  this  information  reached  General  Washington, 
shortly  after  daylight,  he  put  his  entire  force  under  arms 
and  prepared  to  contest  the  passage  of  the  Brandywine. 
Soon  the  outposts  under  General  Maxwell  were  driven 
in,  after  light  skirmishes,  and  the  British  column  under 
General  Knyphausen,  consisting  of  about  five  thousand 
men,  advanced  to  Chadd's  Ford,  where  it  was  drawn  up 
on  the  heights  opposite  the  American  intrenchments,  and, 
opening  with  its  artillery,  and  making  demonstrations  of 
attack,  appeared  about  to  undertake  the  crossing  at  the 
Ford.  This  proved,  however,  to  be  merely  a  feint ;  for 
the  main  force  of  the  British  army  had  gone  in  another 
direction.  Instead  of  advancing  toward  Chadd's  Ford 
with  General  Knyphausen,  Lord  Cornwallis,  who  was 

VOL.  I.— 15 


226  BKANDYWINE.  [1777. 

accompanied  by  General  Howe,  moved  to  the  north  early 
in  the  morning  with  a  column  of  thirteen  thousand  men 
and  took  the  Great  Valley  Road  leading  to  the  upper  fords 
of  the  Brandywine,  Trimble's  Ford  and  Jefferies's  Ford, 
with  the  purpose  of  turning  the  position  of  the  Ameri 
cans,  and,  while  General  Knyphausen  diverted  their  at 
tention  by  his  parade  at  Chadd's  Ford,  of  falling  upon 
their  rear  and  enclosing  them  between  the  two  divisions 
of  the  British  army.  When  this  movement  should  have 
been  accomplished,  it  was  the  intention  of  General  Knyp 
hausen  to  cross  the  Ford  and  co-operate  by  attacking  the 
Americans  in  front. 

The  result  of  this  plan  was  that  the  action  at  the  battle 
of  the  Brandywine  consisted  of  two  distinct  encounters  ; 
the  one  which  took  place  in  the  afternoon  with  Lord 
Cornwallis's  flanking  column  in  the  neighborhood  of 
the  Birmingham  Meeting-house,  and  that  which  occurred 
about  the  same  time  with  General  Knyphausen  at  Chadd's 
Ford.  Toward  mid-day,  whilst  General  Washington  was 
watching  the  enemy  at  Chadd's  Ford,  information  reached 
him  that  a  very  large  detachment  of  the  British,  with 
many  field-pieces,  had  turned  into  the  Great  Valley  Road 
and  was  marching  toward  the  north  in  the  direction  of 
Trimble's  Ford  and  Jefferies's  Ford ;  it  was  estimated  at 
about  five  thousand  men  by  an  officer  who  reported 
having  seen  it,  and  who  added  that  the  dust  arose  be 
hind  for  a  long  distance.  Believing  from  this  that  the 
enemy  had  divided  his  forces,  General  Washington  de 
termined  immediately  to  make  an  attack  upon  him ; 
which  if  it  had  been  carried  out  without  interruption 
would  probably  have  changed  in  some  very  important 
details  the  result  of  the  day's  work.  He  directed  General 
Sullivan  and  Lord  Stirling  to  cross  the  Brandywine  and 
fall  upon  the  column  commanded  by  Lord  Cornwallis  in 
order  to  keep  it  in  check  whilst  he  himself  should  cross 
at  Chadd's  Ford  and  assault  the  division  of  General 


1777.]  BRANDY  WINE.  227 

Knyphausen.  Unfortunately,  word  was  sent  at  this  criti 
cal  moment  by  General  Sullivan  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  who  received  it  after  he  had  actually  set  his  troops 
in  motion  to  execute  this  manoeuvre,  that  counter-intelli 
gence  had  been  brought  to  him  which  led  him  to  be 
lieve  that  the  reported  movement  of  the  British  was 
only  a  feint,  and  that  the  column  of  Lord  Cornwallis 
had  returned  to  reunite  with  that  of  General  Knyp 
hausen  ;  that  a  major  of  militia  who  had  left  the  forks  of 
the  Brandywine  late  in  the  day  assured  him  there  was  no 
appearance  of  the  enemy  in  that  direction,  and  that  some 
light  horse  who  had  been  sent  out  to  reconnoitre  the  road 
had  returned  with  the  same  information.  In  view  of  this 
uncertainty,  General  Washington  suspended  his  move 
ment.  During  the  interval  of  inactivity  which  followed 
these  conflicting  reports,  a  reputable  citizen  of  the  neigh 
borhood,  named  Thomas  Cheney,  familiarly  known  as 
"  Squire  Cheney,"  rode  up  in  great  haste  to  the  head 
quarters  and  asked  to  see  the  Commander-in-Chief,  to 
whom,  upon  being  admitted  after  some  reluctance  on  the 
part  of  his  staff",  he  announced  that  the  main  body  of 
the  British  army  had  crossed  the  Brandywine  above  and 
was  then  coming  down  on  the  eastern  side  so  rapidly 
that  if  General  Washington  did  not  make  haste  he  would 
be  surrounded ;  whereupon  the  General  replied  that  ac 
cording  to  intelligence  which  he  had  recently  received 
as  to  the  movements  of  the  British  this  statement  could 
not  be  true.  But  Squire  Cheney  exclaimed  with  great 
earnestness,  "  You  are  mistaken,  general ;  my  life  for  it, 
you  are  mistaken.  Put  me  under  guard  until  you  find 
my  story  true." 

Confirmation  of  it  came  almost  immediately  after,  in 
the  following  despatch  sent  by  General  Sullivan  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief : 


1  John  Hickman,  Jr.,  Esq.,  in  the  "  Bulletin  of  the  Historical  Society  of 
Pennsylvania,"  September,  1846. 


228  BRANDYWINE.  [1777. 

"Two  o'clock  P.M. 

"DEAR  GENERAL, — Colonel  Bland  has  this  moment  sent  me 
word  that  the  enemy  are  in  the  rear  of  my  right,  about  two  miles, 
coming  down.  There  are,  he  says,  about  two  brigades  of  them. 
He  also  says  he  saw  dust  back  in  the  country  for  above  an  hour. 

I  am,  &c. 

"JOHN  SULLIVAN." 

At  that  moment  the  American  army  was  virtually  de 
feated  ;  though  it  made  during  the  next  few  hours  a  gal 
lant  resistance.  Its  stubborn  attempt  to  retrieve  its  lost 
fortune  resulted,  at  all  events,  in  a  retreat  with  compara 
tively  small  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  with  strength 
enough  left  to  continue  the  campaign.  If  the  British 
movement  had  been  carried  out  to  completion,  General 
Washington's  forces  must  have  been  utterly  destroyed. 
The  column  under  Lord  Cornwallis  had  made  a  long  de 
tour  by  the  Great  Valley  Road  to  Trimble's  Ford,  thence 
eastward  to  the  passage  called  Jeiferies's  Ford,  and  had 
already  proceeded  down  the  east  side  of  the  Brandywine 
very  nearly  to  the  Birmingham  Meeting-house.  It  was 
then,  at  about  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  only  a  short 
distance  from  General  Sullivan's  flank  and  rear,  having 
completed,  since  it  set  out  early  in  the  morning,  a  march 
of  nearly  seventeen  miles. 

The  Birmingham  Meeting-house,,  a  fine  example  of  the 
early  places  of  worship  of  the  Society  of  Friends,  and  still 
in  excellent  preservation,  stands  upon  the  high  ground  in 
the  hills  that  rise  to  the  east  of  the  Brandywine,  about 
three  miles  toward  the  north  from  the  position  occupied 
by  General  Washington  at  Chadd's  Ford.  Looking  to 
ward  the  northwest,  in  the  direction  from  which  Lord 
Cornwallis  was  then  approaching,  the  ground  about  the 
meeting-house  and  an  adjacent  hill  upon  which  was  the 
residence  of  William  Jones  commanded  a  slope  extending 
across  cultivated  fields  where  the  land  fell  away  gently 
down  to  the  Street  Road  below,  and  afforded  an  excellent 
situation  from  which  to  repel  an  attack  if  time  were  given 


1777.]  BRANDYWINE.  229 

to  dispose  a  force,  and  if  there  were  anything  like  equality 
of  strength  in  the  contending  armies.  Behind  it  were 
dense  forests,  through  which  the  road  ran  to  Dilworth- 
town  and  on  to  Chester ;  and  another  road  led  down  the 
hill,  toward  the  southwest,  to  Chadd's  Ford.  Upon  the  re 
ceipt  of  the  news  that  Cornwallis's  forces  were  at  hand, 
General  Sullivan  was  sent  at  once  with  his  own  division 
and  the  brigades  of  Generals  Stirling  and  Stephen  to  face 
them.  Hastily  moving  his  column  to  the  right,  General 
Sullivan  advanced  up  the  hills  and  occupied  the  advanta 
geous  position  about  the  Birmingham  Meeting-house,  from 
which  the  enemy  were  at  that  time  actually  in  sight. 
General  Wayne  remained  in  the  position  held  by  him 
during  the  morning,  to  protect  the  crossing  at  Chadd's 
Ford.  General  Greene's  troops  were  held  between  these 
two  divisions,  with  the  purpose  of  aiding  either  Sullivan 
or  Wayne  as  the  case  might  require. 

It  was  at  this  point  that  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
performed  his  first  military  service  in  the  cause  of 
American  independence,  displaying  a  personal  devotion 
in  the  heat  of  battle  which  won  distinction  for  him  at 
once  as  a  soldier,  and  left  him,  when  the  action  was 
ended,  one  of  the  heroes  of  the  day.  In  company  with 
General  Washington,  he  had  taken  part,  as  a  volunteer, 
in  the  movements  connected  with  the  crossing  of  the 
Brandywine  and  the  disposition  of  the  army  at  Chadd's 
Ford,  and  he  was  still  at  head-quarters  when  the  news 
came  of  Lord  Cornwallis's  approach.  He  saw  at  a  glance 
that  fighting  was  now  about  to  take  place  along  the  right 
wing,  which  was  sure  to  be  involved  almost  instantly  with 
the  British  column  ;  and,  in  his  eagerness  to  take  part,  he 
begged  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  allow  him  to  go  with 
General  Sullivan  to  the  front.1  This  request  was  granted, 
and  he  set  out. 


1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  24. 


230  BKANDYWINE.  [1777. 

Whilst  the  American  troops  were  forming  upon  the 
brow  of  the  hill  in  front  of  the  Birmingham  Meeting 
house,  and  before  the  lines  were  drawn  up  in  order, 
through  a  delay  caused  by  a  misunderstanding  as  to  the 
exact  positions  to  be  held  by  the  respective  commanders, 
the  British  opened  the  action,  about  half-past  four  in  the 
afternoon.  The  Hessians  crossed  the  Street  Road,  in 
front  of  which  they  had  been  halted,  and,  resting  their 
muskets  upon  the  fence,  delivered  their  fire  against  the 
American  outposts.  This  was  followed  by  a  furious  attack 
from  the  whole  British  column,  now  formed  in  line  of 
battle,  and  very  shortly  afterward  the  engagement  became 
general.  The  onset  was  so  severe  that  the  American  right 
began  to  waver  and  quickly  gave  way.  This  action  left 
the  remainder  of  the  line  exposed  to  a  galling  fire  on 
its  flank,  which  caused  it  also  to  break  and  fall  back  in 
great  confusion  before  the  British,  to  the  ground  behind 
the  meeting-house  and  along  the  road  leading  to  Dilworth- 
town ;  so  that  very  soon  the  retreat  of  General  Sullivan's 
men  was  degenerating  into  a  panic.  La  Fayette,  seeing 
this,  threw  himself  from  his  horse,  and,  plunging  in 
among  the  hurrying  masses,  strove  to  renew  confidence  by 
his  voice  and  by  his  example,  in  the  hope  that  a  stand 
might  yet  be  made  before  the  enemy,  who  were  now  fast 
approaching. 

By  an  heroic  effort,  he  succeeded  in  rallying  about 
himself  a  number  sufficient  to  check  for  a  moment  the 
headlong  flight  of  the  troops,  whilst  Lord  Stirling  formed 
his  brigade  slightly  in  the  rear  upon  a  gentle  rise  and 
opened  fire  upon  the  advancing  enemy.  But  the  task  was 
too  great.  Borne  down  by  the  weight  of  superior  num 
bers,  the  Americans  continued  to  retreat  before  the  left 
wing  of  Cornwallis's  command,  which  had  not  as  yet  been 
engaged  with  General  Sullivan,  and  which  now  came  on 
with  much  spirit  to  the  charge.  La  Fayette  maintained 
his  position  with  General  Sullivan  and  Lord  Stirling,  who 


1777.]  BRANDYWINE.  231 

fought  here  also  with  great  personal  gallantry,  until  the 
British  were  within  twenty  yards  of  them,  when  they  re 
tired  and  escaped  into  the  woods.1 

During  the  struggle  he  had  received  a  musket-ball  in 
his  left  leg  below  the  knee,  but  was  not  conscious  of  it 
in  the  midst  of  the  excitement :  shortly  afterward  his 
attention  was  called  to  it  by  one  of  the  officers  accom 
panying  him,  who  told  him  that  blood  was  running  out 
of  his  boot.  With  the  assistance  of  his  aide-de-camp, 
Major  de  Gimat,  he  remounted  his  horse,  however,  and 
continued  with  the  troops  until,  weakened  by  the  loss  of 
blood,  he  was  obliged  to  stop  for  a  time  and  have  a  band 
age  put  upon  his  wound.2 

In  the  mean  time,  as  soon  as  the  right  wing  was  engaged 
at  the  Birmingham  Meeting-house,  General  Washington 
had  pressed  forward  in  great  haste  from  Chadd's  Ford 
with  fresh  troops,  who,  although  it  was  impossible  to  form 
them  for  action  before  that  part  of  the  army  was  completely 
routed,  were  still  in  time  to  check  the  pursuit.  General 
Greene  moved  his  division  forward,  and,  by  a  skilful 
manoeuvre,  opened  its  ranks  to  allow  the  disordered  and 
flying  troops  to  pass,  after  which  they  were  again  closed 
and  he  took  up  a  position  in  a  narrow  defile,  about  a  mile 
east  of  the  meeting-house,  on  the  road  to  Dilworthtown, 
which  he  held  until  nightfall.  At  Chadd's  Ford  the  mis 
fortune  of  the  day  had  also  overtaken  the  division  of 
General  Wayne,  who,  after  his  flank  had  been  uncovered 
by  the  retreat  of  the  right  wing,  and  after  a  gallant 
attempt  to  sustain  his  position  alone,  was  forced  to  give 
way  before  the  column  of  General  Knyphausen,  the  lat 
ter  having  advanced  across  the  Ford  and  assaulted  the 
American  position  as  soon  as  the  sound  of  the  cannon  and 
musketry  announced  that  Lord  Cornwallis  was  actively 

1  Proceedings  of  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania,  vol.  i.  No.  7,  p.  11 ; 
Marquis  de  Chastellux,  Travels  in  North  America,  i.  245. 
a  Me"moircs  de  ma  Main,  i.  25. 


232  BRANDYWINE.  [1777. 

engaged  toward  the  north.  General  Wayne  retreated  in 
good  order  to  Chester,  where  all  the  American  troops  were 
directed  by  General  Washington  to  concentrate.  The 
road  leading  thither  became  a  scene  of  indescribable  dis 
order  along  the  avenue  of  general  retreat  of  the  army, 
and  La  Fayette  says  that  "  in  the  midst  of  this  horrible 
confusion,  and  with  the  growing  darkness  of  the  night,  it 
was  impossible  to  recognize  anybody."  He  was  carried 
along  with  the  tide  until  they  reached  a  bridge  near  the 
town, — where,  wounded  as  he  was,  and  having  ridden 
twelve  miles,  he  stopped  and  took  measures  to  arrest  the 
hasty  flight  of  the  men  about  him.  With  great  difficulty 
he  succeeded  in  restoring  a  degree  of  order  by  throwing 
out  guards  along  the  approach  to  the  bridge  and  stopping 
the  fugitives.  Later,  the  Commander-in-Chief  arrived, 
with  the  other  generals,  when  La  Fayette  retired  at  length 
and  consented  to  have  his  wound  dressed  by  one  of  the 
surgeons.1  His  conduct  during  the  day  had  been  viewed 
with  the  greatest  favor  by  those  who  shared  its  incidents 
with  him.  He  had  proved  himself  a  man  of  courage 
and  a  soldier ;  and  although  he  had  been  a  few  hours  be 
fore  but  a  foreigner,  a  stranger  who  had  come  into  the 
Continental  army,  he  was  welcomed  that  night  in  the 
American  camp  as  a  tried  friend  and  a  comrade.  Gen 
eral  Washington  directed  the  surgeon,  with  almost  pa 
ternal  solicitude,  to  care  for  his  injury ;  and,  writing  to 
the  President  of  Congress  at  "  Twelve  o'clock  at  night," 
from  Chester,  to  announce  the  battle,  he  mentioned  in  his 
letter  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette.2 


1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  25. 

2  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  59. 

Hon.  John  Blair  Linn,  of  Bellefonte,  Pennsylvania,  calls  my  attention  to 
the  fact  that  it  was  Surgeon  William  Magaw,  of  Mercersburg,  Pennsylvania, 
of  the  First  Pennsylvania  Regiment,  who  attended  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
at  this  time  ;  and  that  when  La  Fayette  was  in  America  in  1825,  Surgeon 
Magaw,  then  eighty  years  of  age,  called  upon  him,  and,  presenting  himself, 
said,  "  General,  do  you  know  me?"  Whereupon  La  Fayette  immediately 


1777.]  BRAND  YWINE.  233 

In  after-life  La  Fayette  recurred  with  tenderness  and 
gratitude  to  the  kind  consideration  and  sympathy  which 
he  found  in  the  hearts  of  the  American  people  in  the 
midst  of  the  period  of  doubt  and  difficulty  through  which 
the  country  was  then  passing.  "  M.  de  La  Fayette  was 
no  longer  a  stranger,"  said  he.  "  There  never  was  an 
adoption  so  complete."  And  while,  in  the  councils  of 
war,  he  trembled  at  the  thought  that  his  voice,  that  of  a 
youth  but  twenty  years  of  age,  might  have  an  influence 
in  deciding  questions  which  should  affect  the  interests 
of  Europe  as  well  as  of  America,  he  was  admitted  to  the 
deliberations  of  the  leaders  of  the  Revolution  and  took 
part  in  the  consideration  of  those  measures  by  which  they 
won  success  for  liberty  in  the  face  of  all  obstacles.1 

This  early  recognition  of  La  Fayette  is  one  of  the  re 
markable  incidents  of  his  career  in  the  Revolution, — all 
the  more  so  when  we  consider  his  youth  and  his  lack 
of  experience  at  that  time  in  the  practical  affairs  of  the 
United  States.  It  was  largely  due  to  the  earnestness  of 
his  character,  which  commended  him  to  those  with  whom 
he  shared  the  difficulties  and  disappointments  of  the  strug 
gle,  and  to  his  honesty  of  purpose,  that  won  confidence 
for  him  which  the  history  of  his  conduct  throughout  the 
war  has  shown  not  to  have  been  misplaced.  Whilst  he 
adapted  himself  with  unusual  facility  to  a  new  national 
character  and  to  a  new  set  of  circumstances,  he  brought 
with  him  into  his  American  life  a  steadfastness,  inherited 
amid  the  rugged  mountains  of  Auvergne,  which  made  him 
a  trusty  counsellor  and  a  loyal  friend.  Of  his  personal 
courage  there  was  no  possible  doubt  from  the  first  moment 
that  he  came  into  the  presence  of  the  enemy. 

It  is  important  to  note  in  this  connection,  in  forming  an 


replied,  to  the  great  pleasure  of  the  old  gentleman,  "I  am  unable  to  recall 
your  name,  but  you  are  the  surgeon  who  dressed  my  wound  at  the  battle 
of  Brandy  wine." 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  28. 


234  BKANDYWINE.  [1777. 

estimate  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  that  the  credit  and 
honor  to  which  he  attained  so  rapidly  upon  his  arrival  in 
this  country,  and  which  increased  each  year  during  his 
service  of  the  United  States  in  the  Revolution,  were  based 
upon  his  own  merit  and  achievements  and  the  sterling 
qualities  of  his  mind.  He  had,  it  is  true,  the  prestige 
of  high  birth,  and  he  was  in  a  sense  the  representative  of 
a  nation  whose  friendship  was  very  precious  to  the  citizens 
of  the  new  Republic,  then  looking  to  the  continent  of 
Europe  for  encouragement  and  support.  These  things  had 
their  value  in  his  formal  relations  to  the  Government, 
and  would,  no  doubt,  have  entitled  him  under  any  cir 
cumstances  to  respectful  consideration ;  but  they  could 
not  suffice  to  fulfil  a  career  like  his.  For  that  which  gave 
La  Fayette  the  affection  of  General  Washington,  which 
won  his  way  to  the  hearts  of  the  American  people  and 
made  him  one  of  the  leaders  in  the  war  of  Independence, 
was  neither  the  nobleman  nor  the  representative ;  it  was 
the  man,  La  Fayette  himself. 

The  night  after  the  action  at  Brandywine  he  lay  with 
the  army  at  Chester,  and  upon  the  following  day  he  was 
transported  by  water  to  Philadelphia,  General  Washington 
having  upon  that  day  marched  his  army  back  to  its  former 
camp  near  the  Falls  of  Schuylkill,  at  Germantown.  The 
British  occupied  the  battle-field  on  the  night  of  the  llth 
of  September,  attending  to  their  wounded,  who  were  so 
numerous  that  it  taxed  the  strength  of  their  surgeons  to 
take  care  of  them,  and  they  were  obliged  to  send  to  Gen 
eral  Washington  for  surgeons  to  look  after  the  wounded 
American  prisoners  whom  they  had  taken.1  That  Gen 
eral  Howe  made  no  attempt  to  follow  the  Americans 
that  night,  or  to  cut  off  their  retreat,  was  regarded  by  La 
Fayette  as  a  grave  error ;  and  in  reviewing  the  situation 
in  the  light  of  subsequent  events  and  of  the  added  experi- 

1  La  Fayette,  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  26. 


1777.]  BRAND  YWINE.  235 

ence  of  many  years,  in  after-life,  he  recorded  his  deliberate 
judgment  that  "if  the  enemy  had  then  advanced  to  Darby 
the  American  army  must  have  been  cut  off  and  destroyed. 
The  British  lost  a  night  of  precious  time,  and  that  was 
perhaps  the  greatest  of  their  mistakes  during  a  war  in 
which  they  made  many  others  besides." 

Whilst  the  wounded  young  general  was  being  tenderly 
cared  for  in  Philadelphia,  his  first  thought  was,  naturally, 
of  his  wife,  whom  he  loved  with  a  deep  affection,  and  from 
whom  he  sought  to  withhold  every  cause  of  anxiety  when 
that  was  possible.  He  made  light  to  her  of  the  dangers 
of  war,  and  playfully  assured  her,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  that  generals  were  never  exposed  to  injury,  indeed 
that  they  lived  so  long  as  to  keep  young  men  out  of  pro 
motion,  and  that,  being  a  general,  he  had  a  warrant  of 
safety ;  though  it  must  be  confessed  that  his  first  encoun 
ter  with  the  enemy  had  not  proved  the  exact  truth  of  his 
assertion. 

The  separation  from  her  husband  was  a  sad  trial  to 
Madame  de  La  Fayette ;  but  she  endured  it  with  ad 
mirable  courage,  and  never  uttered  a  word  of  complaint; 
for  his  interests  were  so  intimately  her  own,  that  what 
ever  contributed  toward  his  honor  and  credit  became  the 
chief  purpose  of  her  life,  and  she  willingly  aided  him 
in  it.  La  Fayette's  consciousness  of  this  impelled  him 
always  to  treat  her  with  the  tenderest  consideration,  and 
his  letters  show  that  he  was  extremely  sensitive  about 
anything  that  might  cause  her  uneasiness  or  give  her 
pain.  Now  that  the  battle  had  been  fought  at  Brandy- 
wine  and  that  he  was  wounded,  he  grew  solicitous  lest  she 
should  hear  the  news,  possibly  in  an  exaggerated  form, 
through  some  other  channel  than  his  own  letters, — that 
she  might  even  be  told  that  he  was  dead.  He  hastened, 
therefore,  to  write  to  her  the  following  letter : 


La  Fayette,  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  26. 


236  BRANDYWINE.  [1777. 

t '  I  write  you  two  words,  dear  heart,  by  some  French  officers, 
friends  of  mine,  who  came  out  with  me,  but  who  have  not  ob 
tained  commissions  and  are  now  returning  to  France.  Let  me 
begin  by  telling  you  that  I  am  well,  because  I  shall  have  to  tell 
you  later  that  we  had  a  battle  yesterday  in  good  earnest  and 
that  our  side  did  not  get  the  best  of  it.  Our  Americans  gave  way 
at  last,  after  having  shown  a  firm  front  for  a  considerable  time, 
and,  whilst  I  was  making  an  effort  to  rally  them,  the  English 
gentlemen  paid  me  the  compliment  of  a  musket- ball,  which 
wounded  me  slightly  in  the  leg.  But  it  is  nothing  serious,  dear 
heart ;  the  ball  touched  neither  bone  nor  nerve,  and  I  shall  have 
nothing  worse  to  endure  than  to  lie  flat  on  my  back  for  a  little 
while — though  this  last  provokes  me  very  greatly.  I  trust,  my 
dear  heart,  that  you  will  not  be  uneasy  about  me.  Indeed,  this 
is  a  good  reason  why  you  should  be  less  so  than  ever,  because  I  am 
now  out  of  active  service  for  some  time  to  come  ;  and  I  beg  you 
to  believe  that  I  intend  to  take  good  care  of  myself.  This  battle 
will  have  some  bad  results  for  America,  I  fear.  But  we  must  try 
to  make  up  for  it  if  we  can.  You  ought  to  have  received  many 
letters  from  me  by  this  time,  unless  the  English  are  as  hostile  to 
my  correspondence  as  they  appear  to  be  to  my  legs.  I  have  had 
only  one  letter  from  you,  and  I  am  longing  for  news.  Adieu.  I 
am  forbidden  to  write  more  than  this.  For  several  days  past  I 
have  had  no  sleep.  Last  night  we  spent  in  making  our  retreat 
and  in  my  journey  to  this  place,  where  I  am  exceedingly  well 
taken  care  of.'7 1 

La  Fayette  remained  but  a  few  days  in  Philadelphia. 
The  approach  of  the  British,  and  the  probability  that  they 
would  soon  take  possession  of  the  city,  made  it  exceed 
ingly  likely,  if  he  stayed  there,  that  he  would  fall  into 
their  hands  as  a  prisoner  of  war.  He  was  transported, 
therefore,  by  water  to  Bristol,  on  the  Delaware  River ; 
and  shortly  afterward  Mr.  Henry  Laurens,  who  was 
going  to  join  Congress  at  York,  passing  through  Bristol, 
took  him  up  in  his  travelling  carriage  and  conveyed 
him  to  Bethlehem,  where  he  was  left  in  charge  of  the 
kind  and  gentle  Moravians.  There,  he  says,  "  the  mild 
religion  of  this  community  of  brethren,  their  unity  of 


1  From  Philadelphia,  12th  September,  1777  :  Correspondance,  i.  100. 


1777.]  BRANDYWINE.  237 

interests,  of  education,  and  of  property,  presented  a  wide 
contrast  in  this  great  and  innocent  family  with  the  scenes 
of  carnage  and  the  convulsions  of  civil  war"  which  he 
had  just  left.1 

Amid  the  peaceful  influences  of  these  surroundings  La 
Fayette  spent  about  four  weeks,  waiting  for  his  wound  to 
heal.  Full  of  enthusiasm  for  the  American  cause,  his  mind 
was  active  with  projects  for  its  advancement,  not  only  at 
home  but  also  in  remote  quarters  of  the  globe  where  the 
British  Government  was  established  and  where  British 
interests  might  be  attacked.  The  enforced  quiet  of  his 
body  appears  to  have  given  occasion  to  an  uncommon 
energy  of  thought  and  to  the  uncontrolled  flight  of  his 


1  In  a  Diary  kept  at  the  Single  Brethren's  House,  which  was  used  by  the 
Continental  army  as  a  hospital,  is  the  following  entry  :  "  1777,  September 
21,  Sunday.  Towards  evening,  as  the  wounded  began  to  arrive,  the  influx 
of  strangers  became  greater,  so  that  the  Inn  could  not  accommodate  all. 
Among  others  came  many  French  officers  and  Colonels,  and  also  a  General, 
who  is  a  distinguished  Marquis."  In  the  Bethlehem  Congregation  Diary 
appear  also  these  entries:  ''1777,  Sept.  21,  Sunday.  Late  in  the  evening 
arrived  the  wounded  generals  Woodford  and  the  Marquis  La  Fayette,  with 
a  large  number  of  disabled  officers.— October  Hi.  The  French  Marquis, 
whom  we  have  found  to  be  a  very  intelligent  and  pleasant  young  man,  came 
to  bid  us  adieu,  and  requested  to  be  shown  through  the  Sisters'  House, 
which  we  were  pleased  to  grant.  He  was  accompanied  by  his  Adjutant, 
and  expressed  his  admiration  of  the  institution.  While  recovering  from 
his  wound,  he  spent  much  of  his  time  in  reading,  and,  among  other  matter, 
the  history  of  our  mission  in  Greenland. — October  18.  The  French  Marquis 
and  General  Woodford  left  for  the  army  to-day." 

Upon  his  arrival  in  Bethlehem,  La  Fayette  was  taken  to  the  old  Sun  Inn, 
which  is  still  used  as  an  inn,  and  is  much  frequented  by  travellers. 

Mr.  John  W.  Jordan,  of  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania,  has 
kindly  communicated  to  me  this  note  :  "  When  La  Fayette  reached  Bethle 
hem,  the  Inn  was  so  crowded  that  he  could  only  be  accommodated  over 
night.  Quarters  were  given  him  in  a  house  near  the  Inn,  then  occupied  by 
the  assistants  to  the  farmer  ;  and  Mrs.  Barbara  Beckel,  the  wife  of  the  chief 
farmer  of  the  Bethlehem  farms,  was  deputed  to  wait  upon  him.  But  as  that 
house  was  inconvenient,  and  as  Mrs.  Beckel  was  unable  to  give  him  proper 
attention  there,  she  had  him  removed  to  her  own  house  (on  the  main  street, 
below  the  Inn),  where  a  suite  of  rooms,  on  the  second  floor,  was  put  in 
order  for  him.  Miss  Liesel  Beckel,  who  assisted  her  mother,  was  living 
when  General  de  La  Fayette  revisited  the  United  States.  I  well  remember 
the  house,  and  I  have  been  in  the  rooms  occupied  by  La  Fayette." 


238  BRANDYWINE.  [1777. 

imagination  ;  and  whilst  "  the  excellent  Moravian  brothers 
were  mourning  over  his  warlike  folly,"  l  he  was  planning 
conquests  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean  and  in  the  far-off  regions 
of  India,  to  which  he  summoned  not  only  the  French 
Colonial  Governors,  but  even  the  ministry  of  France 
itself,  to  aid  in  establishing  the  independence  of  the 
United  States.  He  proposed  to  the  Marquis  de  Bouille,  a 
relative  of  his,  then  Governor  of  the  Windward  Islands, 
a  plan  of  attack  upon  the  British  West  Indies,  to  be 
carried  out  under  the  protection  of  the  American  flag ;  a 
plan  which  M.  de  Bouille  is  said,  indeed,  to  have  looked 
upon  with  considerable  favor,  though,  of  course,  it  could 
not  have  been  sanctioned  at  that  time  by  the  Government, 
which  was  still  at  peace  with  England.  And,  in  spite  of 
his  somewhat  uncertain  relations  with  the  French  Cabinet 
after  his  escape  from  France  and  from  the  lettre-de-cachet, 
he  wrote  to  the  Comte  de  Maurepas,  the  Prime  Minister, 
to  present  a  plan  of  assault,  also  under  the  American  flag, 
upon  the  British  agencies  in  India.  The  minister  did  not 
accept  the  proposition,  but  he  was  struck  by  the  boldness 
of  this  conception  and  the  unusual  vigor  of  its  advocate, 
who  seemed  to  him  to  hesitate  at  nothing.  He  remarked 
afterward  in  connection  with  this  subject  that  he  verily 
believed  La  Fayette  would  some  day  strip  the  palace  of 
Versailles  of  its  furniture  for  the  benefit  of  "  his  Ameri 
can  cause ;"  for  that  when  once  he  got  an  idea  into  his 
head  there  was  no  telling  where  he  would  stop. 

La  Fayette  suffered  considerably  from  his  wound,  at 
Bethlehem.  But  the  lightness  of  his  heart,  and  his  feel 
ings  of  kindness  and  good  will  to  all  about  him,  kept  him 
cheerful ;  while  his  youthful  vigor,  aided  by  excellent  gen 
eral  health,  carried  him  rapidly  toward  recovery.  There 
is  no  trace  of  sadness  or  loneliness  in  his  letters  of  the 
time ;  for  it  was  impossible  for  him  not  to  make  friends. 


Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  28. 


1777.]  BRANDYWINE.  239 

His  genial  temperament  won  those  with  whom  he  lived, 
so  that  he  does  not  appear  to  have  felt  at  any  time  that 
he  was  a  stranger  in  a  strange  land.  His  fixed  deter 
mination  in  coming  to  America  was  to  share  its  fortunes, 
to  attach  himself  to  its  interests,  and  to  make  its  people 
his  people.  In  this  he  remained  perfectly  consistent.  He 
realized  too,  that  in  this  respect  his  position  was  different 
from  that  of  others  who  had  chosen  a  similar  course  in 
enlisting  in  the  war ;  but  he  attributed  the  result  to  cir 
cumstances  that  lay  entirely  within  his  own  control  and 
presumably  in  theirs ;  that  is  to  say,  that  if  the  other 
foreign  officers  did  not  live  happily  in  America  the  fault 
was  largely  to  be  sought  in  their  own  attitude  toward  the 
American  people.  He  said,  in  speaking  of  it,  whilst  he 
was  at  Bethlehem, — 

"All  the  foreigners  who  are  in  the  army,  for  I  shall  not  men 
tion  those  who  have  not  obtained  commissions,  and  who  will, 
consequently,  make  unfair  statements  about  America  when  they 
return  to  France, — because  the  angry  man  and  the  man  seeking 
vengeance  are  not  entirely  honest, — all  the  other  foreigners  now 
employed  here,  I  say,  are  discontented,  and  complaining ;  they 
are  filled  with  hatred  toward  others,  and  they  are  hated  them 
selves.  They  cannot  understand  why  I,  of  all  the  foreigners  in 
America,  should  be  well  treated,  whilst  I  do  not  understand  why 
they  should  be  disliked.  For  my  part,  in  the  midst  of  the  dis 
putes  and  disagreements  common  to  all  armies,  especially  when 
there  are  officers  in  them  of  other  nations,  I,  who  am  of  an  easy 
disposition,  am  fortunate  enough  to  retain  the  good  will  of  all,  both 
foreigners  and  Americans.  I  love  them  all  ;  I  hope  to  deserve 
their  esteem,  and  so  we  are  mutually  satisfied."  ! 

In  this  description  of  the  feelings  and  conduct  of  the 
foreign  officers  in  the  Continental  army,  among  whom 
there  was  no  doubt  a  great  deal  of  discontent,  engendered 
by  jealousy,  possibly  also  by  ill  will,  it  is  fair  to  presume 
that  La  Fayette  had  in  mind  those  principally  of  inferior 


1  To  Mme.  do  La  Fayette,  1st  October,  1777  :  Correspomlance,  i.  106. 


240  BRANDYWINE.  [1777. 

rank  who  had  drifted  to  this  country  in  search  of  employ 
ment  from  the  French  Islands  or  from  France  itself,  in 
that  spirit  of  adventure  which  made  them  unacceptable 
guests  and  not  infrequently  embarrassing  companions  in 
arms.  Notwithstanding  his  very  general  statement  in 
regard  to  the  foreign  officers,  we  must  believe  that  he  had 
some  gentlemen  in  his  thoughts  to  whom,  as  a  matter 
of  course,  it  did  not  apply ;  because  there  were  honorable 
exceptions,  among  the  French  officers,  of  men  whom  La 
Fayette  cherished  and  whose  services  entitle  them  to  our 
grateful  remembrance  in  treating  of  the  incidents  of  the 
time.  There  was,  for  example,  M.  de  Gimat,  La  Fayette's 
own  aide-de-camp,  who  followed  him  with  devotion,  and 
to  whom  he  often  affectionately  referred  as  a  comrade  and 
a  friend ;  there  was  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fleury,  a  distin 
guished  officer  of  engineers,  in  charge  of  the  defences  at 
Fort  Mifflin,  who  was  wounded  while  gallantly  fulfilling 
his  duty  during  the  British  attack  upon  that  post,  and  who 
afterward  received  the  thanks  of  Congress  and  a  medal 
for  his  conduct  at  Stony  Point ; l  there  was  the  Chevalier 
du  Buysson,  aide-de-camp  to  the  Baron  de  Kalb,  who 
fought  heroically  at  Camden  and,  though  disabled  him 
self,  stood  near  his  commander  and  supported  him  when 
the  latter  fell  mortally  wounded  in  the  heat  of  the  com 
bat  ;  there  were  M.  Mauduit-Duplessis,  M.  de  Gouvion, 
M.  Capitaine  de  Chesnoy,  and,  certainly  not  the  least  of 
them  all,  there  was  the  Baron  de  Kalb,  to  whose  self- 
sacrifice  La  Fayette  paid  an  honorable  tribute,  nearly 
half  a  century  later,  when  visiting  the  scene  of.  his  hero 
ism,  in  the  State  of  South  Carolina.2  General  de  Kalb 
was  a  man  of  mature  judgment,  whose  long  career  as  a 
soldier  had  inured  him  to  the  hardships  of  warfare,  in  the 
midst  of  which  he  frequently  set  an  example,  during  the 
Revolution,  of  great  patience  and  fortitude.  His  manner 

1  Journals  of  Congress,  26th  July,  1779. 

2  Kapp's  Kalb,  p.  250. 


1777.]  BRAND  YWINE.  241 

was  affable  and  his  intercourse  agreeable  with  those  about 
him,  though  his  riper  age  made  him,  perhaps,  less  prone 
to  intimacy  than  he  might  otherwise  have  been.  It  is 
true  that  his  own  criticisms  of  America,  given  in  the  con 
fidence  of  private  correspondence,  were  not  free  from  a 
certain  tone  of  severity ;  yet  there  is  no  doubt  that  his 
bearing  as  a  soldier  was  always  in  accord  with  the  obli 
gations  and  the  dignity  of  his  rank. 

Curiously  enough,  we  have  Do  Kalb's  testimony  also  as 
to  the  frettings  and  discord  among  the  foreign  officers, 
given  a  little  later,  in  very  much  the  same  language  as  that 
of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette.  He  wrote  to  Madame  de 
Kalb,  on  the  oth  of  January,  1778,  "On  the  whole,  I  have 
annoyances  to  bear,  of  which  you  can  hardly  form  a  con 
ception.  One  of  them  is  the  mutual  jealousy  of  almost 
all  the  French  officers,  particularly  against  those  of  higher 
rank  than  the  rest.  These  people  think  of  nothing  but 
their  incessant  intrigues  and  backbitings.  They  hate  each 
other  like  the  bitterest  enemies,  and  endeavor  to  injure 
each  other  wherever  an  opportunity  offers.  I  have  given 
up  their  society,  and  very  seldom  see  them.  La  Fayette 
is  the  sole  exception  ;  I  always  meet  him  with  the  same 
cordiality  and  the  same  pleasure.  He  is  an  excellent 
young  man,  and  we  are  good  friends.  ...  La  Fayette 
is  much  liked;  he  is  on  the  best  of  terms  with  Wash 
ington."  There  is  a  refreshing  flavor  of  kindness 
and  gratitude,  as  well  as  the  tone  of  a  healthy  mind,  all 
through  La  Fayette's  correspondence,  in  the  frequent  ref 
erences  to  himself  and  his  surroundings.  Still  making 
light  of  his  wound,  he  reported  to  Madame  de  La  Fayette 
the  devoted  attention  of  his  surgeons,  and  the  tender 
care  with  which  his  hosts  at  Bethlehem  watched  over 
him  whilst  he  was  confined  there ;  and  in  explaining  to 
her  the  details  of  the  campaign,  in  which  it  was  impossible 


1  Kapp's  Kalb,  p.  143. 
VOL.  I.— 10 


242  BKANDYWINE.  [1777. 

to  conceal  the  American  reverses,  he  showed  an  interest 
in  the  welfare  of  this  country  remarkable  for  the  inten 
sity  of  its  feeling  and  highly  honorable  to  him  in  his 
loyalty  to  a  cause  in  which  he  now  regarded  himself  not 
only  as  a  defender,  but  as  a  patriot.  His  love  for  Gen 
eral  Washington  was  one  of  the  leading  motives  of  his 
thought.  The  Commander-in-Chief  understood  La  Fay- 
ette's  nature  and  estimated  his  qualities  very  quickly 
after  having  come  into  contact  with  him ;  he  admitted 
him  to  an  intimacy  which  grew  closer  as  the  war  con 
tinued  and  gave  to  the  younger  man  a  view  of  the  char 
acter  of  Washington  which  filled  him  with  admiration. 
In  his  letter  to  Madame  de  La  Fayette,  from  Bethlehem, 
the  1st  of  October,  1777,  he  said, — 

"Be  entirely  free  from  anxiety  as  to  my  wound,  for  all  the  doc 
tors  in  America  are  aroused  in  my  behalf.  I  have  a  friend  who 
has  spoken  for  me  in  a  way  to  insure  my  being  well  taken  care 
of ;  and  that  is  General  Washington.  That  estimable  man,  whose 
talents  and  whose  virtues  I  admired  before,  whom  I  venerate  the 
more  now  as  I  learn  to  know  him,  has  been  kind  enough  to  me  to 
become  my  intimate  friend.  His  tender  interest  in  me  quickly  won 
my  heart.  I  am  established  in  his  household,  and  we  live  together 
like  two  devoted  brothers,  in  a  mutual  intimacy  and  confidence. 
This  friendship  makes  me  most  happy  in  this  country.  When  he 
sent  his  surgeon-in- chief  to  me,  he  directed  him  to  care  for  me  as 
if  I  were  his  son,  because  he  loved  me  as  much ;  and,  having 
heard  that  I  wanted  to  join  the  army  too  soon  again,  he  wrote 
me  a  letter  full  of  tenderness  in  which  he  admonished  me  to  wait 
until  I  should  be  entirely  well. ' ' l 

This  attachment  of  La  Fayette  to  General  Washington 
is  evident  in  the  frequent  references  to  him  throughout 
his  correspondence,  in  which  we  not  only  find  the  devotion 
of  an  ardent  friendship  in  return  for  acts  of  kindness,  or 
for  the  tender  consideration  with  which  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  treated  this  young  Frenchman,  calling  forth 
from  him  repeated  expressions  of  the  warmest  gratitude, 

1  Correspondance,  i.  105. 


1777.]  GLOUCESTER.  243 

but  have  also  his  deliberate  judgment,  possessing  for  us, 
far  more  than  could  the  mere  references  of  one  friend 
to  the  excellent  qualities  of  another,  the  value  of  a  con 
temporary  estimate  of  the  character  of  Washington, 
formed  by  one  who  studied  him  closely  and  who  knew 
him  well.  A  remarkable  example  of  this  occurs  in  a 
well-considered  letter  written  by  La  Fayette  in  Decem 
ber,  1777,  to  his  father-in-law,  the  Due  d'Ayen,  which 
contains  a  description  of  the  American  situation  at  that 
time,  set  forth  with  striking  conciseness  and  accuracy,  in 
which  he  says, — 

"Our  General  is  a  man  truly  made  for  this  Revolution,  which 
could  not  be  successfully  accomplished  without  him.  I  see  him 
nearer  than  any  man  in  the  world  ;  and  I  see  that  he  is  worthy  of 
the  adoration  of  his  country.  His  warm  friendship  and  his  entire 
confidence  in  me  in  regard  to  all  military  and  political  subjects, 
great  and  small,  that  occupy  him,  place  me  in  a  situation  to  judge 
of  all  that  he  has  to  perform,  to  reconcile,  and  to  overcome.  I 
admire  him  more  each  day  for  the  beauty  of  his  character  and 
of  his  mind.  Certain  foreigners,  offended  at  not  having  obtained 
commissions,  although  that  was  in  no  wise  his  fault,  and  some 
others,  whose  ambitious  projects  he  was  not  willing  to  countenance, 
certain  jealous  cabaleurs,  have  striven  to  injure  his  reputation  ; 
but  his  name  will  be  revered  in  all  coming  ages  by  the  friends  of 
liberty  and  of  humanity  everywhere  ;  and  although  I  am  bound 
to  do  honor  to  my  friend,  yet  I  believe  that  the  part  he  is  now 
sustaining  gives  me  the  right  to  declare  how  much  I  respect  and 
admire  him."  l 

During  La  Fayette's  retirement  at  Bethlehem,  after  the 
battle  of  Brandy  wine,  the  persistent  and  desperate  strug 
gle  had  been  kept  up  by  General  Washington  with  his 
worn-out  troops,  against  the  conquest  of  Pennsylvania  by 
the  British  and  against  their  possession  of  the  Delaware 
River.  Misfortunes  followed  one  another  in  unvarying 
succession,  as  the  Americans  were  forced  to  retire  before 
the  advancing  enemy.  Philadelphia  was  lost  soon  after 

1  Correspondance  dc  La  Fayette,  i.  131. 


244  GLOUCESTER.  [1777. 

the  retreat  from  Brandy  wine,  from  lack  of  men  to  hold  it, 
and  Lord  Cornwallis  entered  the  city  at  the  head  of  his 
British  and  Hessian  grenadiers,  on  the  26th  of  Septem 
ber.  The  battle  of  Germantown  was  fought  and  lost  on 
the  4th  of  October,  in  a  valiant  attempt  to  strike  a  blow 
for  the  nation.  The  American  army  had  retired  to  a 
point  upon  Perkiomen  Creek,  at  Pennybacker's  Mills,  in 
the  present  Montgomery  County,  and  later  in  October  (on 
the  16th)  it  moved  to  Worcester  Township,  whence  it  pro 
ceeded  to  Whitpaine  ;  and  on  the  2d  of  November,  when 
the  British  concentrated  their  forces  within  Philadelphia, 
General  Washington  approached,  and  went  into  camp  at 
Whitemarsh,  about  twelve  miles  to  the  north  of  the  city.1 
Nothing  remained  now  in  the  vicinity  of  Philadelphia  to 
be  contested  except  the  control  of  the  Delaware  River, 
which  was,  of  course,  necessary  for  the  British  to  possess 
in  order  to  have  free  access  by  water  for  the  purpose  of 
supplying  provisions  to  the  army  and  the  citizens  in  the 
town,  and  also,  what  was  very  important  to  General  Howe, 
to  enable  the  land  forces  to  co-operate  with  the  fleet. 
Several  lines  of  chevaux-de-frise  obstructed  the  passage  of 
the  river  a  few  miles  below  Philadelphia,  which  were  de 
fended  by  two  fortifications  that  still  remained  in  pos 
session  of  the  Americans, — Fort  Mifflin,  on  Mud  Island, 
and  Fort  Mercer,  nearly  opposite,  on  the  Jersey  shore, 
at  Red  Bank,  neither  of  which  had  been  constructed  in 
a  manner  to  withstand  a  systematic  attack  by  a  large 
force,  but  which  would  serve  to  annoy  vessels  passing  up 
or  down  the  channel.  Whilst  the  Americans  continued 
to  hold  these  two  posts,  it  was  impossible  for  the  Brit 
ish  to  remove  the  awkward  and  heavy  machines  which 
had  been  sunk  in  the  bed  ef  the  river  and  completely 
obstructed  its  navigation ;  yet  so  long  as  these  impedi 
ments  remained,  General  Howe  was  separated  from  his 

1  Baker,  The  Camp  by  the  Old  Gulph  Mill,  p.  4. 


1777.]  GLOUCESTER.  245 

ships.  Thus  the  attention  of  both  armies  was  directed 
toward  these  little  forts  on  the  Delaware  River,  as,  for 
the  moment,  of  paramount  importance.  Without  them, 
General  Howe  would  be  obliged  to  evacuate  Philadelphia 
and  abandon  the  main  purpose  of  his  expedition.  On 
the  other  hand,  General  Washington  was  reluctant  to 
give  them  up,  because  they  were  the  only  means  that 
remained  to  him,  in  his  enfeebled  condition,  of  embar 
rassing  the  enemy. 

A  spirited  attack  was  made  by  the  British  forces  upon 
Red  Bank  on  the  night  of  the  22d  of  October,  which  was 
repelled  by  the  garrison  and  resulted  in  the  death  of 
Count  Donop,  the  Hessian  commander  of  the  expedition  ; 
but,  while  this  momentary  success  afforded  great  pleasure 
and  encouragement  to  Congress  and  to  the  people,  it 
served  only  to  aid  Washington's  policy  of  delay,  and  to 
postpone  for  but  a  short  time  the  capture  of  those  posts, 
which,  under  existing  circumstances,  was  inevitable. 
Fort  Miffiin  succumbed  on  the  16th  of  November,  before 
a  combined  assault  of  the  British  land  and  naval  batteries, 
after  a  most  determined  resistance  and  only  when  the 
works  were  so  thoroughly  reduced  to  ruins  as  to  afford  no 
further  protection  to  the  garrison.  Two  days  later,  Fort 
Mercer  surrendered  to  Lord  Cornwallis,  who  had  crossed 
over  from  Philadelphia  and  marched  down  on  the  Jersey 
side  with  a  large  force  to  attack  it. 

It  was  during  these  operations  upon  the  Delaware  River 
that  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  now  sufficiently  recovered 
to  join  the  army,  found  an  opportunity,  almost  imme 
diately  after  his  arrival  upon  the  ground,  to  engage  with 
the  enemy  and  to  distinguish  himself  in  a  small  action 
near  Gloucester,  which  he  conducted  with  great  gallantry. 
Although  his  wound  was  not  sufficiently  healed  to  enable 
him  to  wear  his  boot,  his  impatience  to  be  with  the  army 
and  his  great  desire  to  take  part  in  the  remaining  move 
ments  of  the  campaign  led  him  to  the  head-quarters  at  the 


246  GLOUCESTER.  [1777. 

camp,  in  the  present  Montgomery  County,  about  the  20th 
of  October.1 

Shortly  after  his  arrival  there  the  news  was  received 
of  Lord  Cornwallis's  expedition  into  New  Jersey,  where 
upon  General  Washington  ordered  General  Greene  to 
cross  the  Delaware  near  Bristol  and  to  march  down  on 
the  eastern  side,  for  the  purpose  of  opposing  him  as  much 
as  possible,  and,  if  an  opportunity  offered,  of  fighting  him  ; 
for  he  hoped  that  the  American  force  in  New  Jersey  might 
be  augmented  sufficiently  to  cope  with  this  detachment, 
and  if,  by  good  fortune,  General  Greene  should  be  able  to 
defeat  it,  the  result  would  cripple  General  Howe  to  such 
an  extent  that  he  could  not  well  recover.  Always  anxious 
to  be  at  the  front  when  it  was  likely  that  there  would  be 
work  to  do,  La  Fayette,  who,  as  a  volunteer,  had  naturally 
a  wide  privilege  in  serving  where  he  preferred  to  do  so, 
obtained  permission  to  join  General  Greene.  He  had 
already  formed  a  strong  friendship  with  that  officer,  whom 
he  met  at  the  camp  north  of  Philadelphia,  on  Neshaminy 
Creek,  when  he  first  joined  the  army,  and  afterward 
at  the  battle  of  Brandywine ;  and  his  presence  upon  this 
expedition  into  New  Jersey  was  evidently  very  agreeable 
to  General  Greene,  who  wrote  from  a  point  called  Four- 
lanes  End,  near  Bristol,  on  the  20th  of  November,  to 
Mrs.  Greene,  as  follows : 

' i  I  am  now  on  my  march  to  Bed  Bank  Fort.  Lord  Cornwallis 
crossed  over  into  the  Jerseys  day  before  yesterday,  to  invest  that 
place  with  a  large  body  of  troops.  I  am  in  hopes  to  have  the 
pleasure  to  meet  his  Lordship.  This  eccentric  movement  will 
lengthen  out  the  campaign  for  some  weeks  at  least,  and  it  is  possi 
ble  may  transfer  the  seat  of  war  for  the  winter.  .  .  .  The  weather 
begins  to  get  severe,  and  campaigning  of  it  disagreeable,  but  ne 
cessity  obliges  us  to  keep  the  field  for  some  time.  ...  I  lodge  in 
a  fine  country-house  to-night.  The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  is  in 

1  It  is  likely  that  La  Fayette,  who  left  Bethlehem  on  the  18th  of  October, 
joined  the  army  at  Methacton  Hill,  in  Worcester  Township,  where  it  en 
camped  from  the  16th  to  the  21st  of  October. 


1777.]  GLOUCESTER.  247 

company  with  ine  ;  he  has  left  a  young  wife  and  a  fine  fortune  of 
fourteen  thousand  pounds  sterling  per  annum  to  come  and  engage 
in  the  cause  of  liberty — this  is  a  noble  enthusiasm.  He  is  one 
of  the  sweetest- tempered  young  gentlemen  ;  he  purposes  to  visit 
Boston  this  winter  ;  if  so  you'll  have  an  opportunity  to  see  him." 

The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  accompanied  General 
Greene  to  Mount  Holly;  although,  as  Fort  Mercer  had 
already  been  abandoned  and  the  Continental  troops  whom 
Greene  expected  had  not  joined  him,  there  was  no  oppor 
tunity  to  execute  a  movement  against  the  British.  Lord 
Cornwallis  was  at  Gloucester,  nearly  opposite  Philadel 
phia,  and  was  engaged  in  transferring  across  the  river  to 
that  city  a  great  quantity  of  forage  and  provisions  which 
he  had  collected  through  the  fertile  country  of  New  Jer 
sey,  with  a  force  that  was  estimated  to  be  about  five  thou 
sand  men.  His  situation  at  Gloucester  was  entirely  secure 
against  attack,  because  his  camp  lay  immediately  under 
cover  of  the  guns  of  the  British  men  of  war,  which  had 
now  moved  up  the  Delaware  to  protect  his  operations 
in  crossing.  On  the  2-jth  of  November,  La  Fayette  left 
the  head-quarters  at  Mount  Holly  with  about  three  hun 
dred  men,  made  up  of  some  one  hundred  and  fifty  of 
Morgan's  Rifles,  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  Butler,  and 
the  same  number  of  militia,  for  the  purpose  of  recon 
noitring  the  enemy's  position.  He  proceeded  first  to  a 
point  almost  within  reach  of  Gloucester  itself,  called 
Sandy  Point,  a  narrow  tongue  of  land  separated  from  the 
town  by  a  small  stream  called  Newtown  Creek;  where,  in 
order  to  assure  himself  that  the  enemy  were  transferring 
their  provisions  across  the  river,  he  advanced  with  such 
boldness  that  lie  could  plainly  see  their  movements ; 
and  lie  placed  himself,  to  the  consternation  of  those  who 
were  with  him,  in  a  position  where  he  might  readily  have 
been  either  captured  or  shot,  if  the  British  outposts  had 

1  Greene's  Life  of  Greene,  i.  514. 


248  GLOUCESTER.  [1777. 

been  alert ;  indeed,  he  admitted,  afterward,  that  this  was 
an  imprudence  which  might  have  cost  him  dear,  "  if 
those  who  had  it  then  in  their  power  to  kill  him  had  not 
relied  too  confidently  upon  others  who  ought  to  have 
been  upon  the  lookout  to  make  him  a  prisoner."  l  Re 
tiring  from  Sandy  Point,  and  having  crossed  Newtown 
Creek,  he  proceeded,  at  about  four  o'clock  in  the  after 
noon,  with  his  whole  force,  along  the  road  leading  from 
Haddonfield  into  Gloucester.  When  he  had  come  within 
two  miles  of  the  town,  he  fell  in  with  an  advance  post 
of  Hessians  numbering  four  hundred  men,  with  several 
pieces  of  artillery,  whom  he  immediately  attacked  and 
drove  in.  As  the  Hessians  retreated,  La  Fayette  pressed 
them,  advancing  with  great  caution,  however,  and  taking 
care  to  throw  out  small  pickets  along  the  by-ways  which 
crossed  the  Haddonfield  Road,  to  give  him  warning  of 
danger  upon  his  flanks  and  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
getting  behind  him  to  cut  off  his  retreat.  He  drove  the 
Hessians  a  mile  or  more  toward  Gloucester,  killing  and 
wounding  fifty  or  sixty  men,  when  Lord  Cornwallis,  who 
supposed  that  an  attack  was  about  to  be  made  by  the 
whole  division  of  General  Greene,  came  up  at  nightfall, 
with  his  grenadiers,  to  the  support  of  the  retreating  Hes 
sians,  and  La  Fayette  drew  off  under  cover  of  the  dark 
ness  to  rejoin  the  main  body.  This  small  encounter  had 
given  La  Fayette  an  opportunity  to  show  considerable 
military  skill  in  the  management  of  his  troops,  and  he 
won  the  good  opinion  not  only  of  all  those  about  him, 
but  of  General  Greene  himself,  who  reported  it  upon  the 
following  day  to  General  Washington  in  a  letter  in  which 
he  says,  "  The  Marquis,  with  about  four  hundred  militia 
and  the  rifle  corps,  attacked  the  enemy's  picket  last  even 
ing,  killed  about  twenty  and  wounded  as  many  more,  and 
took  about  twenty  prisoners.  The  Marquis  is  charmed 

1  Memoires  cle  ma  Main,  i.  33. 


lift 


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1777.]  GLOUCESTER.  249 

with  the  spirited  behavior  of  the  militia  and  rifle  corps. 
They  drove  the  enemy  above  a  mile  and  kept  the  ground 
until  dark.  .  .  .  The  Marquis  is  determined  to  be  in  the 
way  of  danger." 

La  Fayette  himself  was  full  of  enthusiasm  about  the 
bravery  and  good  conduct  of  his  men.  The  military 
instinct  was  so  strong  within  him  that  he  was  as  proud 
of  their  behavior  as  if  it  had  been  a  personal  compliment 
to  himself,  and  he  addressed  the  militia  and  the  riflemen 
with  all  the  warmth  of  his  heart,  in  expressing  his  grati 
tude.  From  Haddon field  he  wrote  to  General  Washington 
the  next  day,  the  26th  of  November,2 — 

"DEAR  GENERAL,— I  went  down  to  this  place  since  the  day 
before  yesterday,  in  order  to  be  acquainted  of  all  the  roads  and 
grounds  around  the  enemy.  I  heard  at  my  arrival  that  their  main 
body  was  between  Great  and  Little  Timber  Creek  since  the  same 
evening.  Yesterday  morning,  in  reconnoitering  about,  I  have 
been  told  that  they  were  very  busy  in  crossing  the  Delaware. 
I  saw  them  myself  in  their  boats,  and  sent  that  intelligence  to 
General  Greene  as  soon  as  possible,  as  every  other  thing  I  heard 
of.  But  I  want  to  acquaint  your  excellency  of  a  little  event  of 
last  evening,  which,  though  not  very  considerable  in  itself,  will 
certainly  please  you,  on  account  of  the  bravery  and  alacrity  a 


1  Greene's  Life  of  Greene,  i.  528. 

1  Correspondence,  American  edition,  i.  120. 

This  letter  and  all  those  written  by  La  Fayette  to  General  Washington,  as 
well  as  those  to  other  Americans,  were  in  English,  so  far  as  his  command 
of  our  language  extended  at  that  time.  They  were  translated  into  French 
for  the  edition  of  his  Correspondence  published  by  his  family  in  Paris,  but 
were  printed  in  the  American  edition  in  the  exact  wording  used  by  the 
Marquis.  Wherever  he  wrote  in  English,  therefore,  I  have  quoted  from  the 
original ;  the  translations  here  used  I  have  made  from  the  text  of  the  French 
edition,  in  (5  volumes,  Paris,  Fournier  aine",  1837. 

After  the  death  of  General  Washington,  his  family,  with  delicate  consid 
eration,  returned  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  the  original  letters  written 
by  him  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  during  and  after  the  American  War. 
Washington's  letters  to  him  were  all  lost,  however,  with  La  Fayette's  other 
documents,  in  the  destruction  of  the  family  records  at  Chavaniac  during 
the  French  Revolution.  Fortunately,  General  Washington  had  kept  min 
utes  of  most  of  them,  which  La  Fayette  subsequently  had  copied  during  his 
last  visit  to  the  United  States,  in  1824  and  1825. 


250  GLOUCESTER.  [1777. 

small  party  of  ours  showed  on  that  occasion.  After  having  spent 
the  most  part  of  the  day  to  make  myself  well  acquainted  with  the 
certainty  of  their  motions,  I  came  pretty  late  into  the  Gloucester 
Boad,  between  the  two  creeks.  I  had  ten  light-horse  with  Mr. 
Lindsey,  almost  a  hundred  and  fifty  riflemen,  under  Colonel 
Buttler,  and  two  piquets  of  the  militia,  commanded  by  Colonels 
Hite  and  Ellis  :  my  whole  body  was  not  three  hundred.  Colonel 
Armand,1  Colonel  Laumoy,  the  Chevaliers  Duplessis  and  Giniat, 
were  the  Frenchmen  who  went  with  me.  A  scout  of  my  men, 
with  whom  was  Mr.  Duplessis,  to  see  how  near  were  the  first 
piquets  from  Gloucester,  found  at  two  miles  and  a  half  of  it  a 
strong  post  of  three  hundred  and  fifty  Hessians  with  field  pieces, 
(what  number  I  did  know,  by  the  unanimous  deposition  of  their 
prisoners),  and  engaged  immediately.  As  my  little  reconnoiter- 
ing  party  was  all  in  fine  spirits,  I  supported  them.  We  pushed 
the  Hessians  more  than  an  half  mile  from  the  place  where  was 
their  main  body,  and  we  made  them  run  very  fast :  British  rein 
forcements  came  twice  to  them,  but,  very  far  from  recovering  their 
ground,  they  went  always  back.  The  darkness  of  the  night  pre 
vented  us  then  to  push  that  advantage,  and,  after  standing  upon 
the  ground  we  had  got,  I  ordered  them  to  return  very  slow  to 
Haddonfield.  The  enemy,  knowing  perhaps  by  our  drums  that 
we  were  not  so  near,  came  again  to  fire  at  us  ;  but  the  brave  Major 
Moriss,  with  a  part  of  his  riflemen,  sent  them  back,  and  pushed 
them  very  fast.  I  understand  that  they  have  had  between  twenty- 
five  and  thirty  wounded,  at  least  that  number  killed,  among  whom, 
I  am  certain,  is  an  officer  ;  some  say  more,  and  the  prisoners 
told  me  they  have  lost  the  commandant  of  that  body ;  we  got 
yet,  this  day,  fourteen  prisoners.  I  sent  you  the  most  moder 
ate  account  I  had  from  themselves.  We  left  one  single  man 
killed,  a  lieutenant  of  militia,  and  only  five  of  ours  were  wounded. 
Such  is  the  account  of  our  little  entertainment,  which  is  indeed 
much  too  long  for  the  matter,  but  I  take  the  greatest  pleasure  to 
let  you  know  that  the  conduct  of  our  soldiers  is  above  all  praises  : 
I  never  saw  men  so  merry,  so  spirited,  so  desirous  to  go  on  to  the 
enemy,  whatever  forces  they  could  have,  as  that  small  party  was 
in  this  little  fight.  I  found  the  riflemen  above  even  their  repu 
tation,  and  the  militia  above  all  expectations  I  could  have :  I 

1  This  was  the  name  assumed  in  America  by  the  Marquis  de  La  Rouerie, 
who  left  France  because  of  disappointment  in  a  love-affair.  See  Townsend 
Ward,  in  the  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History,  vol.  ii.  p.  1  ;  Chastellux, 
Travels  in  North  America,  i.  183. 


1777.]  GLOUCESTER.  251 

returned  to  them  my  very  sincere  thanks  this  morning.  I  wish 
that  this  little  success  of  ours  may  please  you,  though  a  very 
trifling  one,  I  find  it  very  interesting  on  account  of  the  behaviour 
of  our  soldiers. 

"Some  time  after  I  came  back,  General  Varnurn  arrived  here  ; 
General  Greene  is,  too,  in  this  place  since  this  morning ;  he  en 
gaged  me  to  give  you  myself  the  account  of  the  little  advantage 
of  that  small  part  of  the  troops  under  his  command.  I  have 
nothing  more  to  say  to  your  excellency  about  our  business  on  this 
side,  because  he  is  writing  himself;  I  should  have  been  very  glad, 
if  circumstances  had  permitted  me,  to  be  useful  to  him  upon  a 
greater  scale.  As  he  is  obliged  to  march  slow  in  order  to  attend 
his  troops,  and  as  I  am  here  only  a  volunteer,  I  will  have  the 
honour  to  wait  upon  your  excellency  as  soon  as  possible,  and  I'  11 
set  out  to-day  ;  it  will  be  a  great  pleasure  for  me  to  find  myself 
again  with  you. 

"With  the  most  tender  affection  and  highest  respect,  I  have 
the  honour  to  be, 

"LA  FAYETTE. 

"I  must  tell,  too,  that  the  riflemen  had  been  the  whole  day 
running  before  my  horse,  without  eating  or  taking  any  rest. 

"I  have  just  now  a  certain  assurance  that  two  British  officers, 
besides  those  I  spoke  you  of,  have  died  this  morning  of  their 
wounds  in  an  house ;  this,  and  some  other  circumstances,  let  me 
believe  that  their  lost  may  be  greater  than  I  told  to  your  excel 
lency." 

The  news  of  this  action  was  extremely  gratifying  to 
General  Washington,  because  it  encouraged  the  militia  by 
an  example  of  their  usefulness  to  the  service  and  was  a 
proof  that  they  had  soldierly  qualities  worthy  to  be  com 
pared  with  those  of  older  troops  inured  to  war, — an  en 
couragement  greatly  needed  to  stimulate  enlistments,  which 
were  lagging ;  and,  besides  this,  it  was  in  accord  with  the 
policy  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  at  that  time, — namely, 
to  annoy  and  embarrass  the  enemy  at  every  point,  to  cut 
oft'  their  supplies,  to  attack  their  foraging-parties,  and,  in 
general,  to  make  their  occupation  of  the  country  as  un 
comfortable  as  possible.  It  brought  the  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette  once  more  into  prominence  under  very  favorable 


252  GLOUCESTER,  [1777. 

circumstances  ;  and  it  was  the  direct  cause  of  his  attaining 
what  he  so  earnestly  desired, — the  command  of  a  division 
with  full  authority  as  a  major-general. 

General  Washington  had  written  to  Congress  in  his 
behalf,  from  the  camp  at  Whitemarsh,  soon  after  La  Fay- 
ette  had  returned  to  the  army  from  Bethlehem,  evidently 
willing  to  accede  to  the  solicitations  of  the  young  major- 
general,  who  was  intensely  anxious  to  serve  in  a  capa 
city  more  active  and  more  responsible  than  that  of  a 
mere  volunteer.  But  the  Commander-in-Chief  was  left 
in  doubt  upon  this  subject  as  to  the  intentions  of  Con 
gress,  and,  since  no  official  instructions  had  been  given 
to  him  in  reply  to  his  first  inquiry,  further  than  that 
the  rank  of  major-general  had  been  conferred  upon  La 
Fayette  without  command  or  compensation,  he  felt  some 
embarrassment  as  to  what  course  he  ought  to  take  and 
what  he  was  expected  to  do.  He  began  to  fear  that  La 
Fayette  had  misunderstood  the  intentions  of  Congress,  or 
at  least  had  exaggerated  the  import  of  his  commission ; 
and  yet  General  Washington  held  him  in  such  esteem 
that  he  wished  to  promote  him.  He  recognized  that  La 
Fayette's  earnestness  and  zeal  in  the  American  caus<\  and 
the  services  he  had  rendered,  especially  in  the  exertions 
he  made  to  counteract  in  France  the  injurious  reports  of 
the  war  that  were  spread  abroad  by  the  angered  and  disap 
pointed  Frenchmen  returning  home  without  commissions, 
rendered  him  worthy  of  a  favorable  consideration  on  the 
part  of  Congress.  "  I  feel  myself,"  he  wrote  to  the  Presi 
dent  of  Congress,  "in  a  delicate  situation  with  respect  to 
the  Marquis  de  Lafayette.  He  is  extremely  solicitous  of 
having  a  command  equal  to  his  rank,  and  professes  very 
different  ideas,  as  to  the  purposes  of  his  appointment,  from 
those  Congress  have  mentioned  to  me.  He  certainly  did 
not  understand  them.  I  do  not  know  in  what  light  they 
will  view  the  matter ;  but  it  appears  to  me,  from  a  consid 
eration  of  his  illustrious  and  important  connections,  the 


1777.]  GLOUCESTER.  253 

attachment  which  he  has  manifested  for  our  cause,  and  the 
consequences  which  his  return  in  disgust  might  produce, 
that  it  will  be  advisable  to  gratify  him  in  his  wishes ;  and 
the  more  so,  as  several  gentlemen  from  France,  who  came 
over  under  some  assurances,  have  gone  back  disappointed 
in  thei"  expectations.  His  conduct,  with  respect  to  them, 
stands  in  a  favorable  point  of  view,  he  having  interested 
himself  to  remove  their  uneasiness,  and  urged  the  impro 
priety  of  their  making  any  unfavorable  representations 
upon  their  arrival  at  home ;  and  in  all  his  letters  he  has 
placed  our  affairs  in  the  best  situation  he  could.  Besides, 
he  is  sensible,  discreet  in  his  manners,  has  made  great 
proficiency  in  our  language,  and,  from  the  disposition  lie 
discovered  at  the  battle  of  Brandy  wine,  possesses  a  large 
share  of  bravery  and  military  ardor."  l 

When  the  report  of  La  Fayette's  exploit  at  Gloucester 
reached  General  Washington,  on  the  day  after  it  occurred, 
the  26th  of  November,  lie  wrote  again  to  the  President  of 
Congress,  in  a  letter  which  bears  evidence  of  the  kindest 
feeling  toward  La  Fayette,  to  suggest  his  appointment  to  a 
command.  lie  enclosed  the  extract  from  General  Greene's 
despatch,  quoted  above,  and  added,  "  I  should  also  be 
happv  in  their  determination  respecting  the  Marquis  de 
Lafayette.  He  is  more  and  more  solicitous  to  be  in 
actua)  service,  and  is  pressing  in  his  applications  for  a 
command.  I  ventured  before  to  submit  my  sentiments 
upon  the  measure,  and  I  still  fear  a  refusal  will  not  only 
induce  him  to  return  in  disgust,  but  may  involve  some 
unfavorable  consequences.  There  are  now  some  vacant 
divisions  in  the  army,  to  one  of  which  he  may  be  ap 
pointed,  if  it  should  be  the  pleasure  of  Congress.  I  ani 
convinced  he  possesses  a  large  share  of  that  military 
ardor,  which  generally  characterizes  the  nobility  of  his 
country.  He  went  to  Jersey  with  General  Greene,  and 

1  From  Whitemarsh,  1st  November,  1777  :  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington, 
v.  128. 


254  GLOUCESTER.  [1777. 

I  find  he  has  not  been  inactive  there.  This  you  will  per 
ceive  by  the  following  extract  from  a  letter  just  received 
from  General  Greene/' 1 

This  recommendation  and  the  reports  of  La  Fayette's 
own  conduct  were  so  favorably  received  by  Congress  that 
it  voted,  upon  the  same  day  that  the  General's  letter  was 
received,  as  follows:  "Resolved.  That  General  Washing 
ton  be  informed,  it  is  highly  agreeable  to  Congress  that 
the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  be  appointed  to  the  command 
of  a  division  in  the  Continental  Army."  2  Three  days 
later,  a  general  order  was  issued  announcing  that  the 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was  appointed  to  the  Virginia 
division  lately  of  General  Stephen,  whose  command  had 
been  vacant  since  the  battle  of  Germantown.  The  ap 
pointment  was  received  with  satisfaction  in  the  country ; 
and  we  happen  to  have  an  expression  of  the  popular 
favor,  in  a  letter  written  at  that  time,  and  quoted  by  Mr. 
Sparks,  from  Patrick  Henry  to  General  Washington,  in 
which  he  says,  "  I  take  the  liberty  of  enclosing  to  you  two 
letters  from  France  to  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette.  One 
of  them  is  from  his  lady,  I  believe.  I  beg  to  be  presented 
to  him  in  the  most  acceptable  manner.  I  greatly  revere 
his  person  and  amiable  character." 3 

The  campaign  of  1777  was  just  closing.  Active  opera 
tions  were  threatened  for  a  moment  when  General  Howe 
led  his  army  out  from  Philadelphia  as  far  as  Chestnut 
Hill,  within  a  few  miles  of  Washington's  position  at 
Whitemarsh,  with  the  evident  intention  of  attacking  it. 
But,  having  manoeuvred  for  four  days  as  if  about  to  bring 
on  a  general  engagement,  the  British  suddenly  retired,  on 
the  night  of  the  8th  of  December,  to  Philadelphia.  They 
had  accomplished  nothing  whatever  as  the  result  of  this 
expedition,  except  greatly  to  increase  the  self-reliance  of 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  170. 

2  Journals  of  Congress,  1st  December,  1777. 

3  Sparks,  Waitings  of  Washington,  v.  172. 


1777.]  VALLEY    FORGE.  255 

the  American  army  by  affording  to  it  the  best  evidence 
of  the  respect  in  which  General  Howe  held  the  courage  of 
the  men  and  the  military  skill  of  their  commander,  when, 
having  marched  out  to  fight  them,  he  feared  to  do  so  after 
he  discovered  that  he  should  have  to  meet  them  upon  equal 
terms  as  to  position  and  numbers.  Shortly  afterward  (on 
the  19th  of  December)  General  Washington  withdrew  to 
Valley  Forge,  where,  as  La  Fayette  says,  "  having  skil 
fully  erected,  in  a  few  days,  a  city  of  wooden  huts,  the 
army  established  itself  in  its  melancholy  winter  quarters," 
— melancholy  indeed,  in  its  nakedness,  its  privation,  its 
lack  of  food,  its  suffering  from  disease,  during  that  dread 
ful  winter.  In  the  midst  of  it  all,  La  Fayette,  put  then, 
perhaps,  to  the  severest  test  of  his  allegiance  to  American 
freedom,  shared  with  that  devoted  army  the  bitter  chances 
of  war.  "  The  unfortunate  soldiers,"  as  he  tells  us,  "  were 
in  want  of  everything ;  they  had  neither  coats,  nor  hats, 
nor  shirts,  nor  shoes ;  their  feet  and  legs  froze  till  they 
grew  black,  and  it  was  often  necessary  to  amputate  them. 
.  .  .  The  army  frequently  passed  whole  days  without 
food,  and  the  patient  endurance  of  both  soldiers  and  offi 
cers  was  a  miracle  which  every  moment  served  to  renew ;" 
but  "  the  sacred  fire  of  liberty  was  not  extinguished,  and 
most  of  the  people  hated  British  tyranny."  Perform 
ing  his  military  duties  with  rigid  exactness,  La  Fayette 
adopted  in  every  respect  the  American  dress  and  habits. 
He  tried  to  be  even  more  simple,  more  frugal,  and  more 
self-denying  than  the  Americans  themselves.  Brought 
up  as  he  had  been  in  ease  and  surrounded  by  personal 
comforts,  he  suddenly  changed  his  wrhole  manner  of  living, 
and  his  constitution  adapted  itself  to  privation  as  well  as 
to  fatigue.1  This  example  of  single-minded  devotion  is 
almost  unequalled ;  and  the  fact  that  it  was  entirely  vol 
untary  adds  to  the  strength  of  its  claim  upon  our  gratitude 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  37. 


256  VALLEY    FORGE.  [1777. 

and  respect.  Writing  home  to  the  Due  d'Ayen,  his  letter, 
full  of  earnestness,  expresses  the  zeal  with  which  he 
undertook  his  task : 

"  I  have  passed  the  whole  summer  without  obtaining  a  division, 
which  you  know  I  have  always  wished  for,  and  I  have  lived  all 
that  time  at  General  Washington's  house,  where  I  feel  as  if  I  were 
a  friend  of  twenty  years'  standing.  Since  my  return  from  Jersey, 
he  has  offered  me  the  choice,  among  several  brigades,  of  the 
division  I  prefer,  and  I  have  selected  one  composed  entirely  of 
Virginians.  It  is  weak  in  point  of  numbers  at  present,  even  in 
proportion  to  the  weakness  of  the  whole  army  ;  it  is  almost  naked, 
though  I  have  been  promised  cloth  out  of  which  I  shall  make 
clothes,  and  recruits  out  of  which  soldiers  must  be  made  in  about 
the  same  length  of  time ;  unfortunately  the  latter  is  the  more 
difficult  to  accomplish,  even  for  more  skilful  men  than  I.  ...  I 
read,  I  study,  I  examine,  I  listen,  I  reflect,  and  upon  the  result  of 
all  this  I  make  an  effort  to  form  my  opinion  and  to  put  into  it  as 
much  common  sense  as  I  can.  I  am  cautious  not  to  talk  much,  lest  I 
should  say  some  foolish  thing,  and  still  more  cautious  in  my  actions, 
lest  I  should  do  some  foolish  thing  ;  for  I  do  not  want  to  disappoint 
the  confidence  that  the  Americans  have  so  kindly  placed  in  me."  l 

1  Correspondance  de  La  Fayette,  i.  133-134. 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAIXST    CAXADA.  257 


CHAPTER    VIII. 

THE    PROJECTED     EXPEDITION    AGAIXST    CAXADA    IX    1778. 

IT  was  at  this  period,  whilst  the  army  was  at  Valley 
Forge,  that  the  conspiracy  was  developed,  known  as 
"  Con  way's  Cabal,"  which  had  for  its  purpose  the  over 
throw  of  General  Washington  and  his  removal  from  the 
command  of  the  army ;  in  La  Fayette's  words,  "  that 
greatest  of  calamities,  the  loss  of  the  only  man  capable 
of  conducting  the  Revolution."  What  this  attempt 
actually  was,  or  how  far  its  influence  extended,  has  not 
been  clearly  shown,  and  will  probably  never  be  fully 
understood.  There  is  no  doubt,  however,  that  there  ex 
isted  a  party  in  Congress  who  were  personally  hostile  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  that  they  were  followed  by 
certain  officers  in  the  army  whose  ambitious  designs  or 
secret  jealousy  led  them  easily  into  an  attitude  of  defec 
tion  and  blinded  them,  for  the  moment,  to  every  consider 
ation  but  that  of  their  own  selfish  purposes. 

The  achievement  of  General  Gates  at  Saratoga  gave 
him  a  wider  reputation  for  military  genius  than  he  de 
served  ;  it  filled  his  mind  with  an  idea  of  his  own  great 
ness  and  dazzled  him  with  the  prospect  of  an  illustrious 
career,  in  which  he  saw  himself  the  head  of  the  nation, 
the  new  and  successful  Commander-in-Chief.  This  notion 
unbalanced  his  judgment.  Con  way  was  merely  a  figure 
whom  accident  had  brought  into  the  way  at  an  opportune 
moment  and  whose  turbulent  and  discontented  nature 
made  him  a  ready  tool ;  the  real  conspirator,  no  doubt, 
was  Gates.  He  was  held  up  by  his  secret  friends  before 

1  Momoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  38. 
VOL.  I.— 17 


258  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.        [1778. 

the  people  as  the  general  who  could  save  the  country 
from  threatened  destruction ;  while  Washington  was  de 
cried  as  having  failed  in  the  war.  It  was  said  that,  with 
forces  greatly  superior  to  the  enemy,  Washington  had 
done  nothing;  that  he  had  allowed  Philadelphia  to  be 
captured  through  mismanagement,  and  that  he  had  failed 
of  many  opportunities  to  defeat  the  British.  With  arti 
fices  of  this  kind  they  sought  to  throw  obstacles  in  his 
way  which  should  force  him  to  resign.  That  the  party 
were  strong  in  Congress  is  evident  from  the  facility  with 
which  they  succeeded  in  obtaining  the  control  of  military 
affairs.  A  new  Board  of  War  was  formed,  of  which  Gen 
eral  Gates  was  appointed  president,  and,  in  defiance  of  all 
propriety,  Con  way  was  made  Inspector-General,  and  was 
raised,  above  other  brigadiers  who  outranked  him,  to  the 
grade  of  major-general.1 

A  part  of  this  plot  to  alienate  from  General  Washing 
ton  every  strengthening  influence  and  to  deprive  him  of 
his  friends  was  an  attempt  to  win  over  La  Fayette  by 
promises  of  future  military  distinction,  and  by  flattery. 
Conway,  who  was  a  soldier  of  no  mean  capacity,  sought  to 
ingratiate  himself  with  La  Fayette  by  a  professed  solici 
tude  for  his  welfare  and  by  a  pretended  devotion  to  him 
as  a  comrade  in  the  French  army,  in  which  Conway  had 
also  served,  as  well  as  by  an  appeal  to  mutual  associa 
tions  and  friendships  in  the  Old  World,  which  natu 
rally  induced  in  return  feelings  of  kindness  and  fellow 
ship.  La  Fayette  had  at  that  time  considerable  respect 
for  General  Gates,  whom  he  regarded  as  a  good  soldier 
and  for  whom  he  shared  to  a  great  extent  the  admira 
tion  which  had  spread  through  the  whole  country  in  con- 

1  Though  La  Fayette  believed  that  Charles  Lee,  and  not  Gates,  would  have 
profited  by  the  success  of  this  plot.  "  II  est  remarquable  que  pour  les  plus 
fins  Gates  n'etait  pas  Fobjet  de  1' intrigue.  Quoique  bon  officier,  il  n'avait  pas 
les  moyens  de  se  soutenir.  II  eut  fait  place  au  fameux  general  Lee,  alors 
prisonnier  des  Anglais,  et  le  premier  soin  de  celui-ci  aurait  ete  de  leur  livrer 
et  ses  amis  et  toute  1'Amerique."  Me"moires  de  ma  Main,  i.  38. 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.          259 

sequence  of  his  recent  defeat  and  capture  of  Burgoyne. 
We  have  a  letter  written  by  M.  de  La  Fayette  to  Gates 
from  Bethlehem,  immediately  after  the  capitulation,  in 
which  he  hastened  to  send  to  the  victorious  general  his 
congratulations  and  to  express  the  hope  that  he  might 
have  an  opportunity  of  knowing  him  better  in  the  course 
of  succeeding  events  : 1 

"BETHLEHEM,  14  October,  1777. 

"DEAR  GENERAL,  I  can't  let  go  your  express  without  doing 
myself  the  pleasure  of  congratulating  you  about  your  happy  and 
glorious  success — the  fine  opportunity  of  your  victory,  and  the 
circumstances  (the  taking  fort  Montgomery)  which  it  meet  with, 
is  to  add  something  yet  and  to  your  glory  and  to  the  gratefulness 
of  every  one  who  loves  the  cause  we  fight  for.  I  find  myself 
very  happy  to  have  had  the  pleasure  of  your  acquaintance  before 
your  going  to  take  the  command  of  the  Northern  Army.  I  am 
very  desirous,  sir,  to  convince  you  how  I  wish  to  cultivate  your 
friendship, — it  is  with  such  sentiments  and  those  of  the  most 
perfect  esteem  that  I  have  the  honor  to  be 
"dear  Sir, 

"Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"THE  MARQUIS  DE  LAFAYETTE. 

"I  do  not  wrait  from  our  camp  because  I  am  detained  yet  in 
this  place  for  some  days  by  my  wound  of  Brandy  wine." 

Two  months  later,  he  wrote  again  to  General  Gates, 
from  "the  Gulph,"  on  the  14th  of  December,  1777,  ex 
pressing  the  most  kindly  feelings  toward  him,  with  the 
evident  hope  that  he  and  Gates  should  become  warm 
friends,  a  possibility  which,  under  the  circumstances  of 
that  general's  success  and  rising  fame,  La  Fayette  natu 
rally  contemplated  with  very  great  pleasure  : 2 

"I  have  received  with  the  greatest  satisfaction  the  favor  of 
yours.  The  idea  of  obtaining  your  friendship  is  highly  pleasant 
to  me — be  certain,  Sir,  that  you  can  depend  upon  my  attachement 
for  ever — the  only  love  of  glorious  and  great  actions  should  have 

1  Gates  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society. 

2  Ibid. 


260  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.        [1778. 

inspired  me  with  such  sentiments — but  the  knowledge  I  got  of 
your  character  adds  infinitely  to  the  pleasure  which  my  heart  feels 
in  receiving  the  assurances  of  your  future  affection  towards  a 
young  soldier  who  desire  it  very  heartily.'7 

But  when  he  discovered  through  the  intercepted  cor 
respondence  of  Conway  and  Gates,  which  Lord  Stirling 
communicated  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,1  that  these  men 
referred  contemptuously  to  General  Washington,  he  was 
startled  by  a  duplicity  which  he  had  never  suspected,  and 
he  threw,  without  hesitation,  the  whole  weight  of  his  in 
fluence,  and  exerted  all  the  energy  of  his  earnest  nature, 
in  loyal  defence  of  his  general  and  friend.  During  this 
trying  period  he  saw  General  Washington  frequently  in  the 
closest  intimacy,  and,  admitted  to  his  confidence  perhaps 
more  than  any  other  officer,  he  discussed  with  him  the  situ 
ation  of  the  country  as  well  as  the  subject  of  this  intrigue 
which  now  attempted  to  destroy  his  honor.  Fortunately 
for  us,  a  part  of  their  intercourse  has  been  preserved  in 
the  correspondence  which  passed  between  them  at  that 
time,  which,  while  it  defines  the  attitude  of  General  Wash 
ington  toward  "  Con  way's  Cabal,"  illustrates  the  earnest 
ness  of  character  of  the  younger  man,  and  the  noble 
dignity  and  self-possession  of  the  Commander,  as  well, 
perhaps,  as  anything  that  history  has  preserved. 

On  the  30th  of  December,  1777,  the  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette  wrote,  at  the  Camp,  at  Valley  Forge,  to  General 
Washington,2 — 

i  c  MY  DEAK  GENERAL  j  I  went  yesterday  morning  to  headquar 
ters  with  an  intention  of  speaking  to  your  excellency,  but  you  were 
too  busy,  and  I  shall  lay  down  in  this  letter  what  I  wished  to  say. 
I  don't  need  to  tell  you  that  I  am  sorry  for  all  that  has  happened 
for  some  time  past.  It  is  a  necessary  dependence  of  my  most 
tender  and  respectful  friendship  for  you,  which  affection  is  as 
true  and  candid  as  the  other  sentiments  of  my  heart,  and  much 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  492. 

2  Correspondence  of  La  Fayette,  American  edition,  i.  134. 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CANADA.  261 

stronger  than  so  new  an  acquaintance  seems  to  admit ;  but  another 
reason,  to  be  concerned  in  the  present  circumstances,  is  my  ardent 
and  perhaps  enthusiastic  wishes  for  the  happiness  and  liberty  of 
this  country.  I  see  plainly  that  America  can  defend  herself  if 
proper  measures  are  taken,  and  now  I  begin  to  fear  lest  she  should 
be  lost  by  herself  and  her  own  sons. 

"  When  I  was  in  Europe  I  thought  that  here  almost  every  man 
was  a  lover  of  liberty,  and  would  rather  die  free  than  live  a  slave. 
You  can  conceive  my  astonishment  when  I  saw  that  toryism  was 
as  openly  professed  as  whiggism  itself:  however,  at  that  time  I 
believed  that  all  good  Americans  were  united  together  ;  that  the 
confidence  of  congress  in  you  was  unbounded.  Then  I  entertained 
the  certitude  that  America  would  be  independent  in  case  she 
should  not  lose  you.  Take  away,  for  an  instant,  that  modest  diffi 
dence  of  yourself,  (which,  pardon  my  freedom,  my  dear  General, 
is  sometimes  too  great,  and  I  wish  you  could  know,  as  well  as  my 
self,  what  difference  there  is  between  you  and  any  other  man),  you 
would  see  very  plainly  that  if  you  were  lost  for  America,  there 
is  no  body  who  could  keep  the  army  and  the  revolution  for  six 
months.  There  are  open  dissensions  in  congress,  parties  who  hate 
one  another  as  much  as  the  common  enemy  ;  stupid  men,  who, 
without  knowing  a  single  word  about  war,  undertake  to  judge  you, 
to  make  ridiculous  comparisons  ;  they  are  infatuated  with  Gates, 
without  thinking  of  the  different  circumstances,  and  believe  that 
attacking  is  the  only  thing  necessary  to  conquer.  Those  ideas  are 
entertained  in  their  minds  by  some  jealous  men,  and  perhaps 
secret  friends  to  the  British  Government,  who  want  to  push  you 
in  a  moment  of  ill  humour  to  some  rash  enterprise  upon  the  lines 
or  against  a  much  stronger  army.  I  should  not  take  the  liberty 
of  mentioning  these  particulars  to  you  if  I  did  not  receive  a  letter 
about  this  matter,  from  a  young  good-natured  gentleman  at  York, 
whom  Conway  has  ruined  by  his  cunning,  bad  advice,  but  who 
entertains  the  greatest  respect  for  you. 

u  I  have  been  surprised  at  first,  to  see  the  few  establishments  of 
this  board  of  war,  to  see  the  difference  made  between  northern 
and  southern  departments,  to  see  resolves  from  congress  about 
military  operations  ;  but  the  promotion  of  Couway  is  beyond  all 
my  expectations.  I  should  be  glad  to  have  now  major-generals, 
because,  as  I  know,  you  take  some  interest  in  my  happiness  and 
reputation  :  it  is,  perhaps,  an  occasion  for  your  excellency  to  give 
me  more  agreeable  commands  in  some  interesting  instances.  On 
the  other  hand,  General  Conway  says  he  is  entirely  a  man  to  be 
disposed  of  by  me.  lie  calls  himself  my  soldier,  and  the  reason 


262  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.         [1778. 

of  such  behaviour  to  me  is,  that  he  wishes  to  be  well  spoken  of  at 
the  French  court,  and  his  protector,  the  Marquis  de  Castries,  is  an 
intimate  acquaintance  of  mine  ;  but  since  the  letter  of  Lord  Stir 
ling  I  inquired  in  his  character.  I  found  that  he  was  an  ambitious 
and  dangerous  man.  He  has  done  all  in  his  power,  by  cunning 
manoeuvres,  to  take  off  my  confidence  and  affection  for  you.  His 
desire  was  to  engage  me  to  leave  this  country.  Now  I  see  all  the 
general  officers  of  the  army  against  congress ;  such  disputes,  if 
known  by  the  enemy,  would  be  attended  with  the  worst  conse 
quences.  I  am  very  sorry  whenever  I  perceive  troubles  raised 
among  the  defenders  of  the  same  cause,  but  my  concern  is  much 
greater  when  I  find  officers  corning  from  France,  officers  of  some 
character  in  my  country,  to  whom  any  fault  of  that  kind  may  be 
imputed.  The  reason  of  my  fondness  for  Conway  was  his  being 
by  all  means  a  very  brave  and  very  good  officer.  However,  that 
talent  for  manoeuvres,  and  which  seems  so  extraordinary  to  con 
gress,  is  not  so  very  difficult  a  matter  for  any  man  of  common 
sense  who  applies  himself  to  it.  I  must  pay  to  General  Portail, 
and  some  French  officers,  who  came  to  speak  me,  the  justice  to 
say,  that  I  found  them  as  I  could  wish  upon  this  occasion  ;  for  it 
has  made  a  great  noise  among  many  in  the  army.  I  wish,  indeed, 
those  matters  could  be  soon  pacified.  I  wish  your  excellency 
could  let  them  know  how  necessary  you  are  to  them,  and  engage 
them  at  the  same  time  to  keep  peace,  and  simulate  love  among 
themselves  till  the  moment  when  those  little  disputes  shall  not 
be  attended  with  such  inconveniences.  It  would  be,  too,  a  great 
pity  that  slavery,  dishonour,  ruin,  and  unhappiness  of  a  whole 
world  should  issue  from  some  trifling  differences  between  a  few 
men. 

"  You  will  find,  perhaps,  this  letter  very  useless,  and  even  in 
opportune  ;  but  I  was  desirous  of  having  a  pretty  long  conversa 
tion  with  you  upon  the  present  circumstances,  to  explain  you 
what  I  think  of  this  matter.  As  a  proper  opportunity  for  it  did 
not  occur,  I  took  the  liberty  of  laying  down  some  of  my  ideas  in 
this  letter,  because  it  is  for  my  satisfaction  to  be  convinced  that 
you,  my  dear  General,  who  have  been  indulgent  enough  to  permit 
me  to  look  on  you  as  upon  a  friend,  should  know  the  confession 
of  my  sentiments  in  a  matter  which  I  consider  as  a  very  impor 
tant  one.  I  have  the  warmest  love  for  my  country  and  for  every 
good  Frenchman  :  their  success  fills  my  heart  with  joy  ;  but,  sir, 
besides  Conway  is  an  Irishman,  I  want  countrymen,  who  deserve, 
in  every  point,  to  do  honour  to  their  country.  That  gentleman 
had  engaged  me  by  entertaining  my  head  with  ideas  of  glory  and 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAIXST    CANADA.          263 

shining  projects,  and  I  must  confess,  to  ruy  shaine,  that  it  is  a  too 
certain  way  of  deceiving  ine. 

"  I  wished  to  join  to  the  few  theories  about  war  I  can  have,  and 
the  few  dispositions  nature  gave,  perhaps,  to  me,  the  experience 
of  thirty  campaigns,  in  hope  that  I  should  be  able  to  be  the  more 
useful  in  the  present  circumstances.  My  desire  of  deserving  your 
satisfaction  is  stronger  than  ever,  and  everywhere  you  will  employ 
me  you  can  be  certain  of  my  trying  every  exertion  in  my  power 
to  succeed.  I  am  now  fixed  to  your  fate,  and  I  shall  follow  it  and 
sustain  it  as  well  by  my  sword  as  by  all  means  in  my  power.  You 
will  pardon  my  importunity  in  favour  of  the  sentiment  which 
dictated  it.  Youth  and  friendship  make  me,  perhaps,  too  warm, 
but  I  feel  the  greatest  concern  at  all  that  has  happened  for  some 
time  since. 

"  With  the  most  tender  and  profound  respect,  I  have  the  honour 
to  be,  &c. 

"  LAFAYETTE." 

To  this  earnest  and  sincere  declaration  of  attachment, 
toward  which  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was  evidently 
impelled  by  the  highest  sentiments  of  loyalty  to  the 
American  cause,  as  well  as  of  honor  and  devotion  to  his 
truest  friend,  General  Washington  replied  upon  the  fol 
lowing  day  :l 

"  HEAD-QUARTERS,  31  December,  1777. 

"MY  DEAR  MARQUIS;  Your  favor  of  yesterday  conveyed  to 
me  fresh  proof  of  that  friendship  and  attachment,  which  I  have 
happily  experienced  since  the  first  of  our  acquaintance,  and  for 
which  I  entertain  sentiments  of  the  purest  affection.  It  will  ever 
constitute  part  of  my  happiness  to  know  that  I  stand  well  in  your 
opinion  ;  because  I  am  satisfied  that  you  can  have  no  views  to 
answer  by  throwing  out  false  colours,  and  that  you  possess  a  mind 
too  exalted  to  condescend  to  low  arts  and  intrigues  to  acquire  a 
reputation.  Happy,  thrice  happy,  would  it  have  been  for  this 
army,  and  the  cause  we  are  embarked  in,  if  the  same  generous 
spirit  had  pervaded  all  the  actors  in  it.  But  one  gentleman,  whose 
name  you  have  mentioned,  had,  I  am  confident,  far  different 
views  ;  his  ambition  and  great  desire  of  being  puffed  off,  as  one 
of  the  first  officers  of  the  age,  could  only  be  equalled  by  the 
means  which  he  used  to  obtain  them.  But  finding  that  I  was  de- 

1  Correspondence  of  La  Fayette,  American  edition,  i.  139. 


264  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.        [1778. 

termined  not  to  go  beyond  the  line  of  my  duty  to  indulge  him  in 
the  first, — nor  to  exceed  the  strictest  rules  of  propriety  to  gratify 
him  in  the  second, — he  became  my  inveterate  enemy ;  and  he  has, 
I  am  persuaded,  practised  every  art  to  do  me  an  injury,  even  at 
the  expense  of  reprobating  a  measure  that  did  not  succeed,  that 
he  himself  advised  to.  How  far  he  may  have  accomplished  his 
ends,  I  know  not ;  and,  except  for  considerations  of  a  public 
nature,  I  care  not ;  for,  it  is  well  known,  that  neither  ambitious 
nor  lucrative  motives,  led  me  to  accept  my  present  appointments, 
in  the  discharge  of  which,  I  have  endeavoured  to  observe  one 
steady  and  uniform  system  of  conduct,  which  I  shall  invariably 
pursue,  while  I  have  the  honour  to  command,  regardless  of  the 
tongue  of  slander  or  the  powers  of  detraction.  The  fatal  tendency 
of  disunion  is  so  obvious,  that  I  have,  in  earnest  terms,  exhorted 
such  officers  as  have  expressed  their  dissatisfaction  at  General 
Conway's  promotion,  to  be  cool  and  dispassionate  in  their  decision 
about  the  matter  ;  and  I  have  hopes  that  they  will  not  suffer  any 
hasty  determination  to  injure  the  service.  At  the  same  time,  it 
must  be  acknowledged,  that  officers'  feelings  upon  these  occasions 
are  not  to  be  restrained,  although  you  may  control  their  actions. 

"  The  other  observations  contained  in  your  letter  have  too  much 
truth  in  them  ;  and,  it  is  much  to  be  lamented,  that  things  are  not 
now  as  they  formerly  were.  But  we  must  not,  in  so  great  a  con 
test,  expect  to  meet  with  nothing  but  sunshine.  I  have  no  doubt 
that  everything  happens  for  the  best,  that  we  shall  triumph  over 
all  our  misfortunes,  and  in  the  end  be  happy ;  when,  my  dear 
marquis,  if  you  will  give  me  your  company  in  Virginia,  we  will 
laugh  at  our  past  difficulties  and  the  folly  of  others ;  and  I  will 
endeavour,  by  every  civility  in  my  power,  to  shew  you  how  much 
and  how  sincerely  I  am  your  affectionate  and  obedient  servant." 

La  Fayette  believed  that  this  was  a  crisis  in  American 
affairs  from  which  very  grave  results  were  to  be  feared  by 
all  friends  of  the  nation.  He  realized  the  great  danger 
which  was  now  threatening  General  Washington ;  and, 
aside  from  his  love  for  his  commander,  he  was  convinced, 
and  repeatedly  declared,  that  there  was  no  one  to  fill  his 
place :  with  General  Washington  gone,  the  liberty  of 
America  would  have  to  be  abandoned.  These  considera 
tions  actuated  him  for  the  moment  beyond  all  others. 
They  overcame  his  longing  to  see  France  again,  they  sup- 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.          265 

pressed  the  yearning  toward  his  wife  and  children,  and 
they  determined  him  to  remain  amid  the  frost  and  hard 
ship  of  Valley  Forge  in  order  to  counteract  any  unfavor 
able  influence  that  might  result  from  his  leaving  at  that 
time,  and  to  be  near  General  Washington  if  he  were 
needed.  It  is  evident  that  his  private  interests  were  call 
ing  him  back  to  France,  and  that  the  letters  of  his  wife 
and  family  urged  him  to  go ;  and  it  wrould  not  have  been 
unreasonable  if  he  had  taken  advantage  of  the  many 
months  of  inactivity  which  were  certain  to  follow^  the 
close  of  the  campaign,  to  return  to  his  country  after  an 
absence  of  nearly  a  year  and  to  embrace  his  dear  ones 
whom  he  had  left  behind,  at  his  coming  away,  without  a 
farewell.  But  it  was  characteristic  of  La  Fayette  to  sub 
ordinate  personal  impulses  to  his  convictions  of  duty ; 
and  such  was  his  course  upon  the  present  occasion. 

He  wrote  to  Madame  de  La  Fayette,  from  the  Camp 
at  Valley  Forge,  on  the  6th  of  January,  1778,  the  wreek 
after  his  letter  to  General  Washington,1 — 

"What  a  date,  my  dear  heart,  and  what  a  place  to  write  you 
from  in  the  month  of  January  !  In  a  camp,  in  the  midst  of  the 
forest,  fifteen  hundred  leagues  away  from  you,  I  am  hemmed  in 
by  the  winter.  Not  very  long  ago  we  were  separated  from  the 
enemy  only  by  a  small  river  ;  but  now  we  are  about  seven  leagues 
from  them,  and  here  the  American  army  intends  to  spend  the 
winter  in  their  little  huts  that  are  not  much  more  attractive  than 
dungeon  cells.  I  cannot  tell  whether  it  will  be  convenient  for 
General  Howe  to  make  us  a  visit  in  our  new  settlement ;  but  we 
shall  try  to  receive  him  with  proper  consideration,  if  he  does. 
The  bearer  of  this  letter  will  describe  to  you  the  attractive  sur 
roundings  of  the  place  I  have  chosen  to  stay  in  rather  than  to 
enjoy  the  happiness  of  being  with  you,  of  seeing  all  my  friends, 
of  having  every  imaginable  pleasure.  But  seriously,  dear  heart, 
do  you  not  believe  that  there  must  be  some  very  strong  reasons 
to  induce  me  to  make  this  sacrifice  ?  All  my  feelings  impelled 
me  to  go  ;  but  honor  counselled  me  to  stay  here  ;  and  I  am  sure 
that  after  you  know  in  detail  all  the  circumstances  of  my  present 

1  Correspondance,  i.  143. 


266          PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.         [1778. 

position,  and  when  you  understand  the  situation  of  the  army,  of 
niy  friend  who  commands  it,  and  of  the  whole  American  cause, 
you  will  forgive  me,  you  will  approve  of  my  course,  I  almost 
dare  to  say  you  will  applaud  me.  What  pleasure  I  shall  have 
some  day  in  telling  you  of  all  this  !  .  .  .  But  do  not  condemn 
me  without  a  hearing.  Besides  the  reason  that  I  have  given  you, 
I  have  still  another,  which  I  should  not  mention  to  everybody, 
because  it  might  appear  that  I  was  assuming  an  air  of  ridiculous 
importance.  My  presence  is  more  necessary  to  the  American 
cause  at  this  moment  than  you  may  imagine ;  many  foreigners 
who  have  failed  to  obtain  commissions,  or  whose  ambitious 
schemes  after  having  obtained  them  could  not  be  countenanced, 
have  entered  into  powerful  conspiracies ;  they  have  used  every 
artifice  to  turn  me  against  this  revolution  and  against  him  who  is 
its  leader  ;  and  they  have  taken  every  opportunity  to  spread  the 
report  that  I  am  about  to  leave  the  continent.  Upon  their  side, 
the  British  have  openly  declared  this  to  be  so.  I  cannot  with 
good  conscience  play  into  the  hands  of  these  people.  If  I  were  to 
go,  many  Frenchmen  who  are  useful  here  would  follow  my  ex 
ample.  General  Washington  would  be  really  unhappy  if  I  were 
to  suggest  my  going  away.  His  confidence  in  me  is  greater  than 
I  dare  to  admit  on  account  of  my  age.  In  the  position  that  he 
occupies  he  is  in  danger  of  being  surrounded  by  flatterers  or  by 
secret  enemies  ;  but  he  knows  he  has  in  me  a  loyal  friend  to 
whom  he  may  open  his  heart  and  who  will  always  tell  him  the 
truth.  ^s"ot  a  day  passes  that  he  does  not  hold  a  long  conver 
sation  with  me  or  write  me  a  long  letter,  and  he  is  kind  enough 
to  consult  me  upon  the  most  important  subjects.  There  is  at 
this  moment  a  particular  matter  in  connection  with  which  my 
presence  here  is  useful  to  him.  This  is  not  the  time  for  me  to 
talk  of  going  away." 

Assuming  then  a  less  serious  tone,  M.  de  La  Fayette 
continued,  with  his  usual  buoyancy  of  spirit, — 

"You  will  learn  from  the  bearer  of  this  letter  that  I  am  in  very 
good  health,  that  my  wound  has  healed,  and  that  the  change  of 
climate  has  not  affected  me.  Do  you  not  think  that,  when  I  go 
home,  we  shall  be  old  enough  to  establish  ourselves  in  our  own 
house,  to  live  happily  together,  to  entertain  our  friends,  and  that, 
in  the  midst  of  a  delightful  freedom,  we  shall  be  content  to  read 
the  foreign  newspapers  without  having  the  curiosity  to  go  abroad 
ourselves  to  trace  the  course  of  passing  events  ?  I  love  to  build 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAIXST    CANADA.          267 

chateaux  en  France  of  happiness  and  pleasure.  You  always  share 
them  with  me,  dear  heart,  and  when  once  we  shall  be  together 
again  nothing  shall  separate  us  or  prevent  us  from  enjoying  the 
sweetness  of  loving  each  other  and  the  most  tranquil  and  delicious 
happiness.  .  .  . 

"  Several  of  the  general  officers  here  have  brought  their  wives 
to  the  camp.  I  am  very  envious,  not  of  their  wives,  but  of  the 
pleasure  they  have  in  being  able  to  see  them.  General  Washing 
ton  too  is  about  to  send  for  his  wife.  As  for  the  British,  they 
have  just  received  a  reinforcement  of  three  hundred  demoiselles 
from  New  York ;  and  we  captured  lately  one  of  their  vessels 
loaded  with  the  chaste  wives  of  officers  coming  to  join  their 
husbands,  who  were  terribly  frightened  lest  they  should  be 
kept  for  the  American  army." 

The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette's  reference  in  this  letter  to 
his  relations  with  General  Washington  is  of  a  highly  per 
sonal  nature,  which,  as  he  said  himself,  he  would  not,  as 
any  other  prudent  man  would  not,  declare  openly  before 
the  world.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that  this  was 
written,  in  the  most  intimate  privacy,  to  his  wife.  The 
earnestness  of  his  desire  to  serve  and  assist  his  com 
mander  in  the  midst  of  the  most  trying  circumstances, 
and  his  evident  loyalty,  expressed  out  of  the  fulness  of 
his  heart,  preserve  it  from  the  suspicion  of  undue  self- 
esteem.  Besides,  the  situation  was  truly  as  he  described 
it ;  he  was  very  close  to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  we 
have  Washington's  own  testimony  to  his  confidence  in  him 
in  connection  with  this  very  subject  to  which  La  Fayette 
referred  in  his  letter  as  "  a  particular  matter."  Writing 
to  General  Gates  upon  the  question  of  the  intercepted 
letter  of  Conway,  General  Washington  declared  to  him 
that  "  neither  this  letter,  nor  the  information  which  occa 
sioned  it,  was  ever  directly  or  indirectly  communicated  by 
me  to  a  single  officer  in  this  army  out  of  my  own  family, 
excepting  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette." 

But,  in  spite  of  M.  de  La  Fayette's  resolution  to  stand 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  492. 


268          PKOJECTED    EXPEDITION   AGAINST    CANADA.        [1778. 

by  the  Commander-in-Cliief  during  this  crisis  in  his 
affairs,  the  conspirators,  who  were  still  fomenting  hostility 
and  stubbornly  developing  their  intrigue,  decided  upon 
removing  him  from  the  head-quarters,  in  order  to  deprive 
General  Washington  of  the  moral  weight  of  his  presence, 
— with  the  hope,  possibly,  that,  by  flattering  attentions  to 
him,  they  might  ultimately  win  him  over  to  their  side. 
La  Fayette  had  come  to  be  looked  upon  as  in  some  sense 
the  representative  of  France  in  America ;  for  his  rank  as 
major-general  naturally  made  him  the  foremost  of  the 
French  officers  then  serving  in  the  Continental  army, 
whose  opinions  were  likely  to  be  adopted  by  all  the  others, 
and  his  distinguished  position  at  the  Court  of  Versailles 
was  supposed  to  give  him  an  influence  there  which  would 
be  very  potent  in  the  event  of  the  participation  by  the 
French  Government  in  the  War  of  Independence.  The 
party  of  the  Cabal  appear  to  have  believed  that  if  they 
could  succeed  in  turning  this  influence  into  their  own 
direction  there  was  a  chance  that  it  would  make  them 
the  leaders  with  whom  the  French  Cabinet  would  treat  in 
the  negotiations  which  were  expected  to  follow  soon,  and 
which  were  looked  forward  to  with  hopeful  anticipation 
by  all  classes  of  people  in  the  United  States ;  and  in  that 
event  Lee,  Gates,  and  Conway  would  come  forth  as  the 
great  soldiers  of  the  Revolution,  who,  by  assuming  the 
credit  of  having  established  an  alliance  which  should 
assure  the  independence  of  America,  might  find  an  easy 
road  to  the  accomplishment  of  their  purposes,  and  publish 
themselves  as  the  saviors  of  the  country.  At  all  events, 
if  they  succeeded  in  nothing  more,  they  were  determined 
to  alienate  that  influence  from  General  Washington ;  and 
consequently  their  designs  were  aimed,  for  the  moment, 
toward  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette. 

With  exceeding  cleverness,  they  hit  upon  a  plan  which 
would  appeal  more  than  any  other  to  La  Fayette,  because 
it  touched  at  once  his  love  of  France,  his  desire  for  glory 


1778.]          PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.          269 

in  arms,  and  his  readiness  to  inflict,  by  his  own  actions, 
an  injury  upon  "the  hereditary  enemy"  of  his  country, 
whom  every  Frenchman  feared  and  hated.  This  was  an 
independent  expedition,  which  he  should  be  appointed  to 
command,  against  Canada,  The  expedition,  as  we  see  it 
now,  was  nothing  but  a  plot,  It  was  not  conceived  with 
any  regard  to  its  ultimate  success ;  and  it  failed  because 
there  was  not  a  single  element  of  success  contained  in  it. 
No  military  genius  had  been  employed  in  considering  the 
means  and  methods  by  which  a  campaign  of  that  charac 
ter  might  be  carried  on,  and  no  military  preparations  had 
been  made ;  for  there  were  neither  forces  at  hand  for  the 
purpose,  nor  transportation  or  provisions  with  which  they 
could  have  been  supplied  if  troops  enough  had  been 
brought  together  to  make  even  a  reasonable  demonstration 
of  attack  against  the  enemy's  country.  Neglect  of  this 
kind  in  an  actual  military  operation  would  have  been 
disgraceful.  The  fact,  however,  that  there  were  men  in 
the  American  army,  possibly  also  in  Congress,  who  were 
capable  of  lending  themselves  to  an  unworthy  fiction 
which  embarrassed  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  one  of 
the  darkest  hours  of  the  war,  and  led  to  a  considerable 
expenditure  of  money  when  the  country  was  destitute,  is 
lamentable  indeed. 

General  Washington  knew  nothing  of  it  until  La  Fay- 
ette  received  orders  from  Congress  to  take  command  ;  he 
was  left  intentionally  in  ignorance,  and  not  only  was  he 
not  consulted,  but  he  was  subjected  to  the  mortification  of 
seeing  one  of  his  own  officers  taken  from  him  and  ordered 
to  assume  an  independent  military  command  over  which 
he,  although  Commander-in-Chief,  should  have  neither 
supervision  nor  control.  General  Washington  received  at 
Valley  Forge  an  official  announcement  of  this  expedition 
from  the  Board  of  War,  and,  without  betraying  any  per 
sonal  feeling  at  the  insult  thrust  upon  him  by  it,  or  criti 
cising  the  action  of  Congress,  he  handed  to  the  Marquis 


270  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.        [1778. 

de  La  Fayette  the  commission  which  had  been  enclosed  for 
him  as  an  independent  commander-in-chief  who  should 
proceed  at  once  to  Congress  to  receive  his  instructions, 
with  this  simple  expression  of  regard :  "  I  would  rather 
they  had  selected  you  for  this  than  any  other  man."  * 

On  the  22d  of  January,  1778,  Congress  had  resolved 
"  That  an  irruption  be  made  into  Canada,  and  that  the 
Board  of  War  be  authorized  to  take  every  necessary 
measure  for  the  execution  of  the  business  under  such 
general  officers  as  Congress  shall  appoint,  and  apply  for 
such  sums  of  money  as  may  be  thought  by  them  proper 
and  requisite  for  the  expedition,"  and  upon  the  following 
day  they  proceeded  to  elect  Major-General  the  Marquis  de 
La  Fayette,  Major-General  Con  way,  and  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Stark  as  the  officers  to  conduct  the  "  irruption  into 
Canada."  2 

La  Fayette  was  deceived  by  the  promises  that  had  been 
made  to  him  as  to  the  support  he  should  receive  through 
out  the  expedition  from  Congress  and  the  Board  of  War, 
as  well  as  by  the  representations  made  by  friends  of  the 
Cabal  of  the  number  of  troops  that  were  to  be  ready  for 
him  upon  his  arrival  at  Albany,  which  was  to  be  his  point 
of  departure  for  the  campaign,  the  preparations  as  to 
clothing,  arms,  ammunition,  wagons,  and  all  the  necessary 
details  of  camp  equipage,  which  he  believed  to  have  been 
seriously  considered  beforehand,  but  in  regard  to  which, 
in  point  of  fact,  nothing  had  been  done.  The  idea  of 
wresting  Canada  from  the  British  fired  his  mind  with 
ambition  to  succeed  in  an  undertaking  which  promised 
great  opportunities  for  a  young  commander  to  distin 
guish  himself  before  the  world  in  his  military  profes 
sion.  As  a  Frenchman  he  accepted  with  especial  delight 
the  mission  to  a  French  province,  among  a  people  whose 
language  and  attachments  made  them  kindred  to  him- 

1  Me*moires  de  La  Fayette,  i.  73,  Fragment  C. 

2  Journals  of  Congress,  22d  and  23d  of  January,  1778. 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAIXST    CANADA.  271 

self.  To  give  them  liberty  by  uniting  them  with  the 
thirteen  free  States  of  America  was  to  him  an  exalted 
purpose,  comparable  with  the  best  achievements  in  the 
lives  of  all  patriots  and  soldiers.  To  have  thrown  off  a 
hated  domination  and  to  have  avenged,  in  the  rescue  and 
independence  of  Canada,  one  of  the  sorest  humiliations 
of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  would  have  made  him  at  once 
a  hero  and  would  have  crowned  him  with  glory  in  France. 
Nothing  could  have  been  a  greater  inducement  to  the 
youthful  general. 

But  it  must  be  said  to  the  honor  of  M.  de  La  Fayette 
that,  in  the  face  of  these  tempting  offers  which  were  cun 
ningly  prepared  to  seduce  him  by  the  dazzling  prospect 
of  his  own  greatness,  and  by  fame  which  seemed  almost 
within  his  grasp,  he  held  his  loyalty  supreme.  Before 
his  duty  as  a  man  he  placed  nothing  else ;  his  upright 
principles  directed  him  into  the  path  of  right  as  he  saw  it 
and  knew  it,  without  regard  to  self.  He  would  not  turn 
against  Washington. 

Immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  his  commission,  he  de 
clared  that  he  should  not  accept  it  if  by  so  doing  he  were 
to  be  removed  from  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  he  wrote 
to  Congress  that  he  must  decline  the  command  they  had 
offered  him  unless  he  could  remain  under  the  orders  of 
General  Washington  and  report  directly  to  him.  He  also 
presented  himself  to  the  committee  of  Congress,  who  hap 
pened  at  that  time  to  be  visiting  the  camp,  and  emphati 
cally  announced  to  them  that  nothing  could  induce  him 
to  separate  himself  from  the  General,  but  that  he  should 
rather  stay  with  him,  even  as  an  aide-de-camp,  than  accept 
any  independent  commission  which  they  might  present  to 
him.  He  replied  to  Congress,  in  a  formal  communication 
addressed  to  that  body,  that  he  would  accept  the  command 
of  the  expedition  to  Canada  upon  condition  that  he  should 
be  subordinate  to  General  Washington  and  considered 
merely  as  one  of  his  officers  detached  for  a  special  service, 


272  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.        [1778. 

also  that  he  should  report  directly  to  the  General  in  the 
first  instance  and  should  make  the  reports  of  his  opera 
tions  to  Congress  in  duplicate,  but  not  otherwise.  These 
conditions  were  accepted,  to  the  gratification  of  M.  de  La 
Fayette,  who  thereupon  made  preparations  to  start  at  once, 
in  the  dead  of  winter,  upon  a  campaign  which,  whatever 
might  have  been  its  promises  of  success,  must  necessarily 
have  entailed  enormous  hardship.1 

The  instructions  sent  to  him  by  General  Gates,  as  Presi 
dent  of  the  Board  of  War,  were  as  follows : 

"  Instructions  for  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  Major- General  in  the 
Army  of  the  United  States,  commanding  an  expedition  to  Canada.'2' 

"The  Troops  selected  for  the  above  service  consist  of  the  fol 
lowing  Corps,  viz. 

Brigadier  General  Nixon's  Brigade. 

Colonel  Van  Schaick's  Beginient. 

Colonel  Warner's  do 

Colonel  J.  Livingston's        do 

Colonel  Hazen's  do 

Colonel  Bedel's  do 

Capt.  Whitconib's  Bangers  — 

"These  Corps  will,  at  a  low  estimate,  make  Two  Thousand 
Five  Hundred  Combatants ;  and  all,  except  Bedel's  Eeginient, 
will  rendezvous  at  Bennington. 

"That  will  march  from  Co-os,  where  it  is  raised,  to  the  mouth 
of  Onion  Biver  ;  the  place  appointed  for  the  General  Rendezvous. 
As  most  of  the  troops  ordered  for  this  service  have  been  upon 
duty  in  Canada,  there  will  be  no  want  of  any  other  guides  than 
such  as  may  be  chosen  from  them.  General  Stark,  Colonel  War 
ner  and  Colo.  Bedel,  with  the  Assist.  Depy.  Qr.  Master  General, 
Colonel  Hazen,  know  every  road,  pass,  and  post,  in  the  country. 
You  have  only  to  consult  with  them,  as  you  advance,  and,  if 
absolutely  necessary,  upon  your  Betreat. 

"Colonel  Greaton,  the  Commanding  Officer  at  Albany,  has 
directions,  in  concert  with  the  Qr.  Master  General,  the  Conimy. 
Genl.  and  the  Commander  of  the  Artillery  at  Albany,  to  provide 
Ammunition,  Provisions,  Stores  and  as  many  Carriages  as  may 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  39  and  72. 

J  Department  of  State,  Papers  of  the  Old  Congress. 


1778.]        PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.  273 

be  requisite  for  the  intended  service.  Colonel  Hazen  is  sent  for 
ward  to  expedite  the  execution  of  these  orders.  You  need,  there 
fore,  be  under  no  concern,  for  supplies. 

"As  success  will  depend,  principally,  upon  the  vigor,  and 
alertness,  with  which  the  enterprise  is  conducted,  the  Board 
recommend  it  to  you  to  lose  no  time.  The  rapidity  of  your 
motions,  and  the  consternation  of  the  enemy,  will  do  the  business. 

"The  season  of  the  year  being  severe,  though  healthy,  the 
commissary  of  clothing,  at  Albany,  is  ordered  to  furnish  all  the 
woolens,  and  every  comfort  his  stores  can  afford.  You  will  con 
stantly  be  in  the  woods,  at  night,  where  the  troops  are  so  well 
acquainted  with  the  mode  of  covering  themselves,  that  you  will 
find  tents  unnecessary  and  cumbersome. 

"The  proper  officers  are  now  providing  Forage,  at  the  general 
and  particular  places  of  rendezvous. 

"Upon  your  gaining  possession  of  St.  Johns  or  Montreal,  you 
will  publish  a  Declaration  of  your  Intentions  to  the  Canadians, 
and  invite  them  to  join  the  Army  of  the  United  States.  Colo. 
Hazen7 s  Regiment,  of  four  battalions,  is  to  be  first  compleated  to 
the  establishment ;  and  the  officers  and  soldiers  who  enlist  are  to 
be  allowed  the  bounty,  and  reward,  offered  them  by  Congress  in 
their  Resolution  of  1776. — Unless  you  shall  be  of 

opinion,  after  considering  the  political  complexion  of  the  inhabi 
tants,  that  it  is  not  a  proper  crisis  for  inviting  the  Canadians  to 
take  an  open  part  with  these  States  ;  in  which  case  you  will  pub 
lish  a  Manifesto,  requiring  a  strict  neutrality  on  the  part  of  the 
Canadians  ;  and  suggesting  such  other  considerations,  as  you  shall 
deem  adapted  to  the  situation  of  affairs. 

"If,  iii)on  your  entering  Canada,  you  find  a  general  disinclina 
tion  of  the  natives,  to  join  the  American  Standard,  you  will  de 
stroy  all  the  Works  and  Vessels,  at  St.  Johns,  Chamblee  and  the 
Isle  Aux  Noix,  and  retire  by  the  best  route,  to  the  settlement, 
tluMice  to  Saratoga,  and  our  present  advanced  posts  on  the  Wood 
Creek  and  Hudson's  River. 

"If,  on  the  contrary,  the  Canadians  are  ardently  desirous  of 
assisting  to  establish  the  Freedom,  and  Independence  of  America, 
you  will  inform  them,  that  when  they  embark  in  the  Common 
Canst*,  they  must  determine  to  receive  the  Resolves  of  Congress, 
and  the  Currency  of  America,  with  that  Reverence,  and  Alacrity, 
which  have  ever  been  manifested  in  the  Acts  and  Dealings  of  the 
Subjects  of  the  United  States. 

"They  are  then  to  be  requested  to  send  Delegates,  to  represent 
their  State  in  the  Congress  of  the  United  States,  and  to  conform, 
VOL.  I.— is 


274          PROJECTED    EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CANADA.        [1778. 

in  all  political  respects,  to  the  Union,  and  Confederation,  estab 
lished  in  them. 

"In  taking  possession  of  Montreal,  which  is  a  principal  object 
of  this  expedition,  you  will  take  into  your  possession,  for  the  use 
of  the  public,  all  the  Arms,  Ammunition,  and  Warlike  Stores, 
together  with  all  the  linnens,  woolens  and  Indian  goods,  that  may 
be  found,  in,  or  near  the  City  of  Montreal ;  making  such  allow 
ances  for  the  private  property,  so  secured,  as  you  shall  think  most 
consistent  with  justice  and  sound  policy,  and  the  merits  of  the 
respective  individuals,  to  which  they  belong.  In  transacting  this 
business,  you  will  take  effectual  care,  to  prevent  every  species  of 
plunder  and  embezzlement ;  as  these  may  tend  to  raise  suspicions, 
in  the  minds  of  the  Canadians,  that  may  be  both  dishonourable, 
and  prejudicial  to  the  interest  of  the  United  States. 

"  This  Board  would  suggest  to  you  the  propriety  of  calling  upon 
the  Governor,  Senate  and  Assembly  of  the  State  of  New  York, 
now  sitting  at  Poughkepsie,  on  your  way  to  Albany,  and  taking 
their  advice  upon  all  such  matters  as  may  contribute  to  the  glory 
and  success  of  your  expedition.'7 

In  connection  with  these  Instructions,  from  which  Gen 
eral  de  La  Fayette  was  justified  in  believing  that  the  un 
dertaking  had  been  honestly  conceived  and  thoroughly 
provided  for,  in  every  military  requisite,  at  least,  that  the 
season  of  the  year  demanded  and  the  state  of  the  country 
would  permit,  there  is  a  curious  paper  still  preserved  in 
the  Archives  of  the  United  States,  endorsed  "  Additional 
Instructions  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette — signed  in  the 
hand  writing  of  General  Gates/' l  the  seeming  contradic- 
toriness  of  which,  when  compared  with  the  avowed  pur 
poses  of  the  expedition  as  set  forth  above,  in  which  the 
conquest  of  Canada,  the  taking  of  Montreal,  and  the 
union  of  that  people  with  the  United  States  are  promi 
nently  held  out  to  La  Fayette  as  the  objects  which  he 
was  to  make  an  effort  to  attain,  bears  evidence  of  the  in 
sincerity  which,  without  question,  permeated  the  whole 
scheme.  In  this  paper  the  expedition  is  reported  to 
Congress  as  a  mere  predatory  incursion,  stripped  entirely 

1  Department  of  State,  MSS.,  Papers  of  the  Old  Congress. 


1778.]        PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.  275 

of  the  inducements  which  alone  enlisted  La  Fayette  in  the 
undertaking.     It  reads  as  follows : 

"To  these  Instructions  is  superadded  a  cautionary  one  repre 
senting  to  the  Marquis,  That  the  primary  object  is  a  mere  Incur 
sion  or  Eavage  with  a  view  to  destroy  the  enemy's  shipping  and 
stores  and  to  bring  away  or  destroy  all  such  goods  as  will  be  of 
service  to  the  enemy  and  if  brought  off  as  will  be  useful  to  the 
Army  of  the  U.  States,  and  therefore  that,  if,  upon  attempting 
the  enterprise,  the  Marquis  shall  be  of  opinion  from  all  circum 
stances  that  it  is  not  prudent  to  proceed  on  so  large  a  scale  as 
that  before  mentioned,  he  will  go  no  farther  than  a  Eavage  and 
bring  his  troops  off  after  doing  what  injury  he  can  to  the  enemy, 
their  vessels,  stores  or  effects. 

"As  this  Addition  is  now  mislaid,  this  Board  have  sent  the 
effect  or  tenor  of  it  from  their  memory,  that  Congress  may  not  be 
delayed  from  having  all  the  information  the  Board  can  give. 

"HORATIO  GATES, 

"President." 

As  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  has  made  no  mention 
in  his  Memoires  and  published  Correspondence  of  this 
"  cautionary"  instruction,  it  is  possible  that  he  never 
received  it,  since  the  document  is  said  to  have  been  "  mis 
laid  ;"  or  that,  if  he  did  receive  it,  he  gave  it  no  serious 
attention,  because  he  was  convinced  at  the  time  that  lie 
was  being  dealt  with  in  good  faith  ;  indeed,  he  had  no 
reason  then  to  suspect  the  contrary.  But  in  the  light  of 
subsequent  events  the  idea  suggests  itself  that  this  was 
artfully  conceived  in  order  to  dull  the  edge  of  expectation 
in  Congress  as  to  a  military  enterprise  that  had  been 
allowed  to  attract  very  considerable  attention,  and  to 
shield  the  Board  of  War  against  responsibility  for  its 
failure,  which,  from  the  nature  of  the  circumstances,  must 
inevitably  come,  and  did  come,  shortly  afterward. 

Nevertheless,  La  Fayette,  after  consultation  with  Gen 
eral  Washington,  began  immediately  his  preparations  to 
set  out.  In  order  to  cross  Lake  Champlain  upon  the  ice 
and  to  return,  it  was  important  for  him  to  move  at  the 


276  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA        [1778. 

very  earliest  moment ;  and,  though  the  month  of       4  not 
was  already  gone,  he  had  still  to  make  the  long    -°  ^ave 

from  the  heart  of  Pennsylvania  to  Albany  before 

P  ,  .  .       .      ,      .,          >art  of 

even  lay  out  the  plan  01  his  campaign  in  detail.       '-—but 

Con  way,  it  will  be  observed,  had  been  selected  tc  accom 
pany  him  as  one  of  the  commanding  officers  of  the  expe 
dition,  not  at  the  request  or  with  the  knowledge  of  General 
de  La  Fayette,  but  upon  the  instigation  of  the  Board  of 
War ;  and  in  this  selection  is  very  probably  to  be  found 
one  of  the  leading  motives  of  the  scheme.  In  the  insid 
ious  atmosphere  of  Conway's  flatteries  and  promises,  far 
removed  from  the  personal  influences  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  amid  new  scenes  in  which  he  was  to  be  per 
mitted  to  amuse  himself  into  forgetfulness  of  former  at 
tachments  by  the  vanity  aroused  through  having  become 
himself  a  central  figure,  it  was  hoped  that  his  allegiance 
might  gradually  be  weakened,  and  that  he  would  fall  a 
victim  to  the  cunning  of  intrigue.  It  must  be  confessed, 
the  plan  was  well  conceived ;  but  it  was  measu:  ^  to  a 
smaller  man  than  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette.  F  rojj£ 
not  accept  of  General  Conway  as  his  adviser ;  *e  of 
rounded  himself  with  friends  of  his  own  anx  -ntest. 
Frenchmen  then  in  the  American  service,  and 
tioned  and  obtained  the  consent  of  Congress  to  a  ... 
the  expedition  Major-General  the  Baron  de  Kalo,  as  a 
companion  and  adviser  in  whom  he  had  confidence.  Thus 
he  defeated  the  plot. 

In  General  Gates's  own  house,  in  the  presence  of  the 
conspirators  who  were  known  to  be  of  the  Ca  '  ^ 
Fayette  boldly  proposed  the  health  of  General  W  Veat 
ton  and  called  upon  them  to  drink  it;  which  tl  "-ore 
reddening  with  shame.1 

He  wrote  the  following  letter  to  the  President  of  Con 
gress  : 2 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  39. 

2  Department  of  State,  MSS.,  Papers  of  the  Old  Congress. 


177t     PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAIXST   CANADA.          277 

his  '  "  YORKTOWX,  this  31  January,  1778. 

Kalb  ,  SIR, — I  beg  you  would  receive  yourself  and  present  to 
who    -able  Congress  my  warmest  thanks  for  the  mark  of  con- 
gen«j    ey  have  honored  me  with  in  appointing  me  to  the  coin- 
Jrl':  '  i  Northern  Army.     I  schall  be  very  happy  if  circum 
stances,  ^  mean  such  ways  of  succeeding  as  will  be  granted  to  my 
desires  on  every  point,  enable  me  to  accept  a  favor  which  I  have 
received  with  the  most  sincere  gratefulness — as  soon  as  I  received 
notice  of  the  propositions  which  were  made  to  me  by  the  Board 
of  War,  I  desired  the  opinion  of  the  gentlemen  from  Congress 
who  were  in  camp,  and  seeing  them  convinced  as  well  as  myself 
that  I  should  come  here  before  going  to  Albany,  I  got  this  leave 
from  his  excellency  Gnl  Washington,  and  I  repaired  to  this  place 
in  order  to  know  in  which  light  I  could  consider  the  expedition 
proposed  to  me  against  Montreal. 

"  I  have  been  surprised  to  receive  the  news  of  my  appointment, 
and  the  instructions  of  my  commission  by  any  other  hand  than 
this  of  my  general — it  engaged  me  to  make  this  very  stranger  to 
my  mind  and  very  strange  in  itself  reflexion,  that  I  was  not  per 
haps  looked  on  as  a  detachment  of  his  excellency's  army  under 
his  immediate  command — however  I  hope  that  idea  was  ground 
less  anf  I  find  even  it  was  a  ridiculous  one. — I  look  upon  it  as 
a  muf      iSgher  honor  and  a  much  pleasanter  satisfaction  for  me, 
'^       isidered  only  as  an  officer  of  his,  under  his  immediate 
gi'  '     an  if  I  was  in  any  other  light — it  is  not  for  satisfying 
lir      >ride  that  I  speak  so,  but  for  the  advantage  of  the  thing 
i*:      and  for  complying  to  the  sentiments  which  I  know  to  be 
arts  of  all  the  frenchmen  who  are  to  come  along  with  me. 
"it     ,  Sir,  an  highly  pleasant  idea  for  me  to  think  of  a  large 
parcell  of  my  countrymen,  driving  theyr  natural  and  tyrannical 
ennemy  out  of  the  lands  they  had  taken  from  'em,  and  enjoying 
all  the  advantages  of  liberty,  by  theyr  strict  union  with  thirteen 
other  suites — how  happy  I  would  be  had  I  the  satisfaction  of 
In  '          i  instrument  of  such  a  revolution,  my  love  for  the  freedom 
hid  in  general,  and  in  this  particular  instance,  my  con- 
>*      ty  with  the  Canadians,  and  the  name  of  frenchman  I  am 
with,  will  be  sufficient  proofs, — if  I  had  believed  that  I 
.HI  sent  for  doing  good  and  right  to  the  Canadians,  then  I 

should  not  have  hesitated  an  instant  to  decline  this  commission — 
but  as  I  am  fully  convinced  that  I  would  promote  theyr  happiness 
as  well  as  the  advantage  of  the  United  States,  I  shall  undertake 
it  with  the  greatest  chearfulness,  if  those  means  are  taken  which 
I  think  proper  to  succeed — it  is  far  from  the  temper  of  my  mind 


278  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST    CANADA.        [1778. 

to  accept  the  governement  of  any  business  which  I  cou-d  not 
carry  to  nay  own  honor,  and  the  utility  of  the  people  WiO  have 
put  theyr  confidence  in  me. 

"gnl  Gates  has  been  pleased  to  communicate  to  me  one  part  of 
the  project — other  instructions  will  come  soon  in  my  hands — but 
I  was  anxious  to  make  as  soon  as  possible  my  thanks  to  the  hon 
orable  Congress,  and  in  the  same  time  to  let  them  know  which 
were  some  of  my  sentiments  about  this  matter.  I  went  for  that 
purpose  as  soon  as  I  received  the  letter  of  the  hble  Board  of  War. 

* i  I  shall  make  use  with  the  greatest  pleasure  of  the  liberty 
which  has  been  granted  to  me  of  taking  along  with  us  some  of 
the  frenchmen  who  are  here  and  to  choose  those  I  am  more  ac 
quainted  with.  I  dare  answer  that  the  Unit  States  will  be  satis 
fied  with  theyr  services,  and  the  Canadians  pleased  with  theyr 
manners  and  good  examples.  I  enclose  here  the  list  which  I  have 
been  permitted  to  make  out.  We  know  all  that  the  name  of  french 
men  imposes  to  us  great  duties  to  deserve  it,  but  no  exertions  will 
be  forgotten  on  our  part  to  show  ourselves  worthy  of  the  country 
we  have  had  the  advantage  to  be  born  in. 

"I  entertain  the  hope  that  such  a  collection  of  frenchmen 
among  whom  some  are  not  unknown  to  the  english  nation,  going 
for  helping  Canadians  against  the  common  ennerny,  will  spread 
troublesome  reflexions  in  the  hearts  of  many  in  theyr  ministry, 
and  be  of  some  weight  for  declaring  war  to  france — this  I  desire 
heartily  because  I  am.  fully  convinced  that  it  is  the  advantage  of 
my  country  to  take  now  a  more  active  part  in  the  present  contest. 

"The  honorable  Congress  will  give  me  leave  to  mention  them, 
as  a  thing  of  the  highest  moment  that  for  my  operations,  princi 
pally  for  my  councils,  and  for  giving  to  me  theyr  advices  I  have  not 
a  sufficient  number  of  general  officers  with  those  whom  I  find  the 
Congress  and  Board  of  War  have  been  pleased  to  appoint  to  me — 
the  only  troops  who  will  be  at  or  about  Albany  are  more  numerous 
than  any  division  is  now  in  the  Army  and  if  we  have  some  succes 
I  understand  it  will  increase  every  day  aniasingly — but  it  is  the 
least  matter,  and  we  must  not  so  much  consider  the  number  of 
men  as  the  importance  of  our  business — there  will  be  gveat 
many  instances  where  I'l  want  the  advice  and  exertions  of  more 
than  two  gnl  officers.  I  think  it  is  as  much  of  my  duty  as  of  jiiy 
delicacy  to  confess  all  what  I  should  need,  before  the  same  men 
who  appointed  me,  and  with  the  succes  of  the  enterprise — I  had 
desired  General  Mc  douggal,  not  that  I  am  very  intimately  ac 
quainted  with  him,  but  by  the  knowledge  I  have  of  his  rigid  and 
imperturbable  virtue — the  state  of  his  health  would  not  permit 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION   AGAINST    CANADA.          279 

his  going  now  in  a  so  cold  country — but  there  is  the  baron  de 
Kalb  who  has  seen  more  war  than  any  officer  in  the  continent, 
who  came  over  with  ine,  who  if  I  was  to  point  out  any  of  the 
general  officers  who  are  to  be  in  that  expedition,  had  an  indubita 
ble  right  to  my  mentioning  his  name — he  desires  to  come  with  me  ; 
he  will  be  much  more  useful  to  America  if  he  is  employed  there 
— I  take  the  liberty  of  recommending  that  in  the  most  strongest 
terms,  not  at  all  because  there  where  are  more  than  two  brigadiers 
it  seems  it  should  be  two  Major  Generals,  but  because  I  think 
very  firmly  that  for  the  good  of  the  service  and  the  succes  of  the 
enterprise  it  is  of  the  highest  importance  and  of  an  absolute 
necessity. 

"  You  will  find  me,  Sir,  very  difficult  and  rather  too  cautious 
— but  it  come  chiefly  from  my  being  strongly  convinced  how  far 
indebted  I  am  to  the  Congress  of  the  United  States  for  the  con 
fidence  they  honor  me  with—I  want  to  deserve  it,  and  when  mat 
ters  will  be  settled,  then  no  exertion  schall  be  forgotten  on  my 
part  for  showing  myself  worthy  of  such  a  commission — my  first 
step  towards  Albany  will  be  decisive  for  my  fate — therefore  I 
must  avoid  any  inconsidered  one — if  before  venturing  myself  to 
it  I  would  not  insist  upon  the  means  of  succes  I  look  upon  as 
necessary,  then  myself  and  the  french  officers,  whose  attachment 
has  connected  theyr  going  there  with  my  having  taking  that 
command,  we  schould  take  the  place  of  men  who  could  perhaps 
give  a  greater  weight  to  that  expedition  in  europe,  gain  better  the 
hearts  of  the  Canadians,  and  engage  them  with  little  difficulty  to 
raise  up  against  the  common  ennemy. 

"  When  I  will  get  the  detail  of  my  instructions,  the  returns  of 
my  resources  of  every  kind,  and  as  many  intelligences  as  I  can 
get  from  the  board  of  "War,  then  the  board  will  give  me  leave  to 
consider  deeply  which  objections  I  can  make  (for  the  advantage 
for  the  expedition)  to  what  schould  be  granted  to  me — Knowing 
the  just  time  at  which  things  will  be  ready  is  by  circumstances 
of  the  highest  importance,  the  quantity  and  quality  of  cloathing, 
of  arms  which  will  be  delivered  to  our  soldiers,  those  which  are 
destinated  for  as  many  soldiers  as  will  be  in  our  party,  and  as 
many  Canadians  as  will  serve  under  the  American  colours,  our 
magasines,  stores  of  every  kind,  our  provisions,  waggons,  horses 
&c.  &c.  are  things  of  which  a  single  one  may  throw  down  all  the 
enterprise — but  as  it  is  not  prohibited  to  look  in  a  fair  prospect  as 
far  as  it  can  go,  if  circumstances  would  permit  to  us  a  longer  stay, 
if  a  siege  of  a  greater  importance  was  thought  proper  and  ordered 
by  Congress  then  other  steps  should  be  taken  and  foreseen — there 


280          PROJECTED   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CANADA.        [1778. 

is  one  thing  of  the  greatest  importance  to  provide  for — it  is  to 
prevent  the  enneiny  coming  up  in  our  rear  or  obliging  us  by  the 
least  motion  to  make  a  precipitate  retreat — by  my  being  sent  there 
on  a  political  as  well  as  a  military  [view]  I  am  [inteng]  to  beg 
to  Congress  instructions  from  themselves  for  what  I  am  to  do  in 
that  [former]  way — and  to  give  me  officers  to  whom  I  can  have 
the  greatest  confidence  on  every  respect— what  I  promise  must 
be  relligiously  kept,  and  my  honor  as  well  as  my  love  for  the 
french  blood  obliges  me  to  take  care  not  to  make  the  least  mis 
understanding,  as  many  things  as  can  be  foreseen,  I  want  to 
have  them  cleared — for  the  others  I  fancy  some  liberty  will  be 
granted  to  me,  and  then  Fl  judge  according  to  my  conscience 
and  the  advice  of  every  honest  man  and  warm  friend  to  the 
american  cause  I  may  consult — 

"  I  fancy  that  I  will  get  the  answers  Congress  will  be  pleased  to 
make  to  the  several  articles  of  this  letter  about  in  the  same  time 
that  my  most  interesting  business  with  the  board  will  be  done — 
then,  Sir,  if  I  can  hope  to  satisfy  the  views  of  Congress  and  the 
feelings  of  my  own  heart,  Fl  repair  immediately  to  camp,  and 
after  taking  the  leave  and  the  last  orders  of  my  general,  Fl  go 
as  far  as  possible  with  the  officers  who  are  to  follow  me,  to  the 
place  where  I  hope  to  show  by  my  conduct  my  gratefulness  and 
my  warm  attachement  for  the  United  States  of  America. 

"  With  the  highest  regard  I  have  the  honor  to  be, 
"Sir, 

"  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"THE  Ms  DE  LAFAYETTE." 

Truly  it  was  a  pity  to  waste  so  good  a  disposition 
in  so  poor  a  cause.  It  is  probable  that  an  attack  upon 
Canada  in  the  winter-time,  when  the  British  were  not  pre 
pared  for  active  operations,  would  have  been  produc 
tive  of  good  results  if  it  had  been  made  by  a  sufficiently 
large  and  well-equipped  force ;  and  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  an  army  led  by  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  among 
whose  officers  were  many  Frenchmen,  some  of  them  distin 
guished  soldiers  known  by  reputation  to  the  Canadians, 
would  have  had  considerable  advantage  over  almost  any 
other  in  winning  the  friendship  and  co-operation  of  the 
inhabitants.  But  it  is  also  true  that  the  whole  available 
resources  of  the  United  States  would  not  have  sufficed 


1778.]        PROJECTED    EXPEDITION   AGAINST    CANADA.          281 

at  that  moment  to  provide  for,  and  properly  to  equip, 
such  an  expedition ;  and  none  knew  this  better  than  the 
Board  of  War. 

Nevertheless,  La  Fayette  set  out  with  a  hopeful  heart 
and  a  firm  determination  to  succeed.  On  the  3d  of  Feb 
ruary,  1778,  he  left  the  town  of  York,  in  Pennsylvania, 
where  Congress  then  was,  and,  crossing  the  Susquehanna 
River,  which  was  packed  with  floating  ice,  he  mounted 
his  horse  and  started  with  his  guide  upon  the  long  jour 
ney  of  nearly  four  hundred  miles  that  was  to  take  him  to 
Albany. 

The  weather  was  intensely  cold ;  the  roads  were  bad, 
and  his  progress  was  very  difficult  as  he  advanced,  some 
times  in  a  sleigh,  sometimes  on  horseback,  weary  and  wet 
and  exposed  to  all  the  changes  of  an  inclement  season. 
It  was  much  harder  than  he  had  expected,  this  winter 
work  in  a  Northern  climate ;  he  realized  it  only  after  he 
had  made  the  trial.  But  it  shows  the  steadiness  of  his 
purpose  that,  having  discovered  the  growing  difficulties 
of  his  task,  he  still  went  on. 

About  a  week  after  leaving  York,  he  wrote  to  General 
Washington,  from  Flemington,  in  New  Jersey,1 — 

"I  go  on  very  slowly  ;  sometimes  drenched  by  rain,  sometimes 
covered  by  snow,  and  not  entertaining  many  handsome  thoughts 
about  the  projected  incursion  into  Canada ;  if  successes  were  to 
be  had,  it  would  surprise  me  in  a  most  agreeable  manner  by  that 
very  reason  that  I  don't  expect  any  shining  ones.  Lake  Cham- 
plain  is  too  cold  for  producing  the  least  bit  of  laurel,  and  if  I  am 
not  starved  I  shall  be  as  proud  as  if  I  had  gained  three  battles. 
.  .  .  Could  I  believe,  for  one  single  instant  that  this  pompous  com 
mand  of  a  northern  army  will  let  your  excellency  forget  a  little  us 
absent  friends,  then  I  would  send  the  project  to  the  place  it  comes 
from.  But  I  dare  hope  that  you  will  remember  me  sometimes. 
I  wish  you,  very  heartily,  the  greatest  public  and  private  happi 
ness  and  successes.  It  is  a  very  melancholy  idea  for  me  that  I 

1  Correspondence,  American  edition,  i.  153 ;  Letter  of  9th  February, 
1778. 


282          PROJECTED   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CANADA.        [1778. 

cannot  follow  your  fortunes  as  near  your  person  as  I  could  wish. ; 
but  my  heart  will  take,  very  sincerely,  its  part  of  everything 
which  can  happen  to  you,  and  I  am  already  thinking  of  the 
agreeable  moment  when  I  may  come  down  to  assure  your  excel 
lency  of  the  most  tender  affection  and  highest  respect.77 

Finally,  after  struggling  on  against  the  severity  of  the 
winter,  La  Fayette  arrived  in  Albany  on  the  17th  of 
February,  but  only  to  find  that  he  had  been  deceived,  and 
to  learn  with  mortification  that  his  bright  anticipation  of 
glorious  service  in  behalf  of  the  United  States  and  for 
the  honor  of  France  was  but  a  dream.  Instead  of  the 
enthusiasm  he  expected  on  every  side,  he  met  nothing 
but  discouragement  from  those  he  counted  upon.  He 
had  been  spurred  on  by  General  Gates  to  hasten  his  jour 
ney,  lest  General  Stark  should  have  preceded  him  upon 
the  expedition  and  should  have  destroyed  the  British 
fleet  before  his  arrival ;  but,  to  his  amazement,  when  he 
reached  Albany,  General  Stark  seemed  never  to  have 
heard  of  the  undertaking.  General  Conway,  who  had 
arrived  a  few  days  before,  the  official  representative  of 
the  Board  of  War,  with  whom  this  enterprise  originated, 
received  M.  de  La  Fayette  with  the  curt  announcement 
that  the  matter  was  not  to  be  thought  of;  and  La  Fayette 
had  the  testimony  of  experienced  officers,  like  General 
Schuyler,  General  Lincoln,  and  Benedict  Arnold  (the 
latter  of  whom  knew,  as  well  as  any  man  then  alive,  the 
difficulties  of  an  expedition  into  Canada) ,  that  it  would  be 
impossible  to  succeed  in  this  attempt.1 

The  ardent  young  soldier  discovered  that  he  had  been 
entrapped.  In  bitter  disappointment,  he  saw  himself 
artfully  removed  from  the  companionship  of  his  beloved 
friend,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  for  a  purpose  which  he 
began  now  but  too  clearly  to  understand ;  and,  with  a 
heavy  heart,  he  realized  that,  in  spite  of  his  heroic  efforts 

1  See  also  the  letter  of  Benedict  Arnold  to  Gouverneur  Morris,  2d  Febru 
ary,  1778, — Appendix  B. 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION   AGAINST    CANADA.  283 

to  carry  out  the  plan  lie  had  in  mind,  he  must  perforce 
content  himself  to  give  it  up. 

His  correspondence,  which  fortunately  has  been  pre 
served  to  us,  tells  the  story  best  in  the  language  in  which 
he  put  it.  Two  days  after  his  arrival  at  Albany,  he  wrote 
to  General  Washington,1 — 

"  DEAII  GENERAL, — Why  am  I  so  far  from  you  and  what  busi 
ness  had  the  board  of  War  to  hurry  nie  through  the  ice  and  snow 
without  knowing  what  I  should  do,  neither  what  they  were  doing 
themselves  ?  You  have  thought,  perhaps,  that  their  project  would 
be  attended  with  some  difficulty,  that  some  means  had  been 
neglected,  that  I  could  not  obtain  all  the  success  and  the  im 
mensity  of  laurels  which  they  had  promised  to  me ;  but  I  defy 
your  excellency  to  conceive  any  idea  of  what  I  have  seen  since  I 
left  the  place  where  I  was  quiet  and  near  my  friends,  to  run  my 
self  through  all  the  blunders  of  madness  or  treachery,  (God  knows 
what).  Let  me  begin  the  journal  of  my  fine  and  glorious  campaign. 

"  According  to  Lord  Stirling's  advice,  I  went  by  CoryelFs 
Ferry  to  Bingo's  tavern,  where  Mr.  Duer  had  given  me  a  rendez 
vous  ;  but  there  no  Duer  was  to  be  found,  and  they  did  never 
hear  from  him.  From  thence  I  proceeded  by  the  State  of  Xew 
York  and  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  the  friends  of  America  as 
warm  in  their  love  for  the  Comuiander-in-Chief  as  his  best  friend 
could  wish.  I  spoke  to  Governor  Clinton,  and  was  much  satisfied 
with  that  gentleman.  At  length  I  met  Albany,  the  17th,  though 
I  was  not  expected  before  the  25th.  General  Couway  had  been 
here  only  three  days  before  me,  and  I  must  confess  I  found  him 
very  active  and  looking  as  if  he  had  good  intentions ;  but  we 
know  a  great  deal  upon  that  subject.  His  first  word  has  been 
that  the  expedition  is  quite  impossible.  I  was  at  first  very  diffi 
dent  of  this  report,  but  have  found  that  he  was  right.  Such  is, 
at  least,  the  idea  I  can  form  of  this  ill-concerted  operation  within 
these  two  days. 

"  General  Schuyler,  General  Lincoln,  General  Arnold,  had 
written,  before  my  arrival,  to  General  Conway,  in  the  most  ex 
pressive  terms,  that,  in  our  present  circumstances,  there  was 
no  possibility  to  begin,  now,  an  enterprise  into  Canada.  Hay, 
deputy  quarter-master-general ;  Cuyler,  deputy-commissary-gen- 
eral ;  Mearsin,  deputy  clothier-general,  in  what  they  call  the 

1  10th  February,  1778,  Correspondence  of  La  Fayette,  American  edition, 
i.  154. 


284          PROJECTED   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CANADA.         [1778. 

northern  department,  are  entirely  of  the  same  opinion.  Colonel 
Hazen,  who  has  been  appointed  to  a  place  which  interferes  with 
the  three  others  above  mentioned,  was  the  most  desirous  of  going 
there.  The  reasons  of  such  an  order  I  think  I  may  attribute  to 
other  motives.  The  same  Hazen  confesses  we  are  not  strong 
enough  to  think  of  the  expedition  in  this  moment.  As  to  the 
troops,  they  are  disgusted,  and  (if  you  except  some  Hazen' s 
Canadians)  reluctant,  to  the  utmost  degree,  to  begin  a  winter  in 
cursion  in  a  so  cold  country — I  have  consulted  everybody,  and 
everybody  answers  me  that  it  would  be  madness  to  undertake 
this  operation. 

"I  have  been  deceived  by  the  board  of  War;  they  have,  by 
the  strongest  expressions,  promised  to  me  three  thousand,  and 
(what  is  more  to  be  depended  upon)  they  have  assured  me  in 
writing,  two  thousand  and  five  hundred  combatants,  at  a  low  estimate. 
IsTow,  Sir,  I  do  not  believe  I  can  find  in  all  twelve  hundred  fit  for 
duty,  and  most  part  of  those  very  men  are  naked,  even  for  a 
summer's  campaign.  I  was  to  find  General  Stark  with  a  large 
body,  and  indeed  General  Gates  had  told  to  me,  General  Stark  will 
have  burnt  the  fleet  before  your  arrival.  Well,  the  first  letter  I  re 
ceive  in  Albany  is  from  General  Stark,  who  wishes  to  know  ivhat 
number  of  men,  from  whence,  for  tvhat  time,  for  what  rendezvous,  I 
desire  him  to  raise.  Colonel  Bedel,  who  was  to  rise  too,  would 
have  done  something  had  he  received  money.  One  asks,  what  en 
couragement  his  people  will  have,  the  other  has  no  clothes  j  not 
one  of  them  has  received  a  dollar  of  what  was  due  to  them.  I 
have  applied  to  every  body,  I  have  begged  at  every  door  I  could 
these  two  days,  and  I  see  that  I  could  do  something  were  the  ex 
pedition  to  be  begun  in  five  weeks.  But  you  know  we  have  not 
an  hour  to  lose,  and  indeed  it  is  now  rather  too  late,  had  we 
everything  in  readiness. 

"There  is  a  spirit  of  dissatisfaction  prevailing  among  the  sol 
diers,  and  even  the  officers,  which  is  owing  to  their  not  being 
paid  for  some  time  since.  This  department  is  much  indebted, 
and  as  near  as  I  can  ascertain,  for  so  a  short  time,  I  have  already 
discovered  near  eight  hundred  thousand  dollars  due  to  the  Conti 
nental  troops,  some  militia,  the  quarter- master's  department  &c. 
&c.  It  was  with  four  hundred  thousand  dollars,  only  the  half  of 
which  is  arrived  to-day,  that  I  was  to  undertake  the  operation, 
and  satisfy  the  men  under  my  commands.  I  send  to  Congress  the 
account  of  those  debts.  Some  clothes,  by  Colonel  Hazen' s  activity, 
are  arrived  from  Boston,  but  not  enough  by  far,  and  the  greatest 
part  is  cut  off. 


1778.]         PEOJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAIXST    CANADA.  285 

"We  have  had  intelligence  from  a  deserter,  who  makes  the 
enemy  stronger  than  I  thought.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  straw 
on  board  the  vessels  to  burn  them.  I  have  sent  to  Congress  a  full 
account  of  the  matter  j  I  hope  it  will  open  their  eyes.  What 
they  will  resolve  upon  I  do  not  know,  but  I  think  I  must  wait 
here  for  their  answer.  I  have  enclosed  to  the  president,  copies 
of  the  most  important  letters  I  had  received.  It  would  be 
tedious  for  your  excellency,  were  I  to  undertake  the  minutest 
detail  of  everything ;  it  will  be  sufficient  to  say  that  the  want 
of  men,  clothes,  money,  and  the  want  of  time,  deprives  me  of  all 
hopes  as  to  this  excursion.  If  it  may  begin  again  in  the  month 
of  June,  by  the  east,  I  cannot  venture  to  assure ;  but  for  the 
present  moment  such  is  the  idea  I  conceive  of  the  famous  incur 
sion,  as  far  as  I  may  be  informed  in  so  short  a  time. 

"Your  excellency  may  judge  that  I  am  very  distressed  by  this 
disappointment.  My  being  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  ex 
pedition  is  known  through  the  continent,  it  will  be  soon  known  in 
Europe,  as  I  have  been  desired,  by  members  of  Congress,  to  write 
to  my  friends ;  my  being  at  the  head  of  an  army,  people  will  be 
in  great  expectations,  and  what  shall  I  answer  f 

"I  am  afraid  it  will  reflect  on  my  reputation,  and  I  shall  be 
laughed  at.  My  fears  upon  that  subject  are  so  strong,  that  I 
would  choose  to  become  again  only  a  volunteer,  unless  Congress 
offers  the  means  of  mending  this  ugly  business  by  some  glorious 
operation  ;  but  I  am  very  far  from  giving  to  them  the  least  notice 
upon  that  matter.  General  Arnold  seems  very  fond  of  a  diversion 
against  New  York,  and  he  is  too  sick  to  take  the  field  before  four 
or  five  months.  I  should  be  happy  if  something  was  proposed  to 
me  in  that  way,  but  I  will  never  ask,  nor  even  seem  desirous,  of 
anything  directly  from  Congress ;  for  you,  dear  general,  I  know 
very  well,  that  you  will  do  everything  to  procure  me  the  only 
thing  I  am  ambitious  of— glory. 

"I  think  your  excellency  will  approve  of  my  staying  here  till 
further  orders,  and  of  my  taking  the  liberty  of  sending  my  de 
spatches  to  Congress  by  a  very  quick  occasion,  without  going 
through  the  hands  of  my  general ;  but  I  was  desirous  to  acquaint 
them  early  of  my  disagreeable  and  ridiculous  situation. 

"  With  the  greatest  affection  and  respect, 

"I  have  the  honour  to  be,  &c." 

M.  tie  La  Fayette  decided,  as  we  have  seen,  to  stay  in 
Albany,  not  only  because  he  was  awaiting  further  orders 
from  the  Board  of  War,  to  whom  he  immediately  coinmu- 


286          PKOJECTED   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CANADA.        [1778. 

nicated  his  situation,  but  also  because  he  still  entertained 
the  hope  that  something  might  yet  be  done  to  justify  his 
having  gone  there,  and,  as  he  said  to  General  Conway,1 
"  by  every  exertions  when  I  can  find  any  probability  not 
to  ruin,  or  dishonour  the  troops  under  my  command." 

His  earnest  appeals  to  General  Gates,  to  whom,  as  Presi 
dent  of  the  Board  of  War  and  his  superior  officer,  he 
showed  at  least  the  courtesy  of  assuming  that  he  also  had 
been  misled  as  to  the  preparations  for  the  expedition,  con 
tain  repeated  expressions  of  his  anxiety  to  accomplish,  in 
one  way  or  another,  some  effective  result.  He  persuaded 
himself  that  he  might  have  succeeded,  in  spite  of  all  ob 
stacles,  if  only  time  enough  had  been  given  him ;  and, 
chafing  under  enforced  idleness  and  disappointment,  he 
discussed  various  plans  of  action,  not  practicable  under 
the  circumstances,  which  served  but  to  prove  the  hope 
lessness  of  his  case.  Of  these  were  the  diversion  against 
New  York  to  which  he  referred  in  his  letter  to  General 
Washington,  and  an  incursion  into  Canada  for  the  mere 
purpose  of  burning  the  British  fleet.  He  wrote  to  Gen 
eral  Gates,2 — 

"I  confess  I  was  perhaps  too  sanguine  in  my  hopes,  or  too  quick 
in  my  feelings  when  I  saw  them  deceived  ;  but  consider,  Sir,  the 
charming  prospect  I  had  before  my  eyes,  and  you  will  conceive 
how  concerned  I  must  be  on  this  occasion.  What  hurts  me  more 
is  to  think  that  we  want  only  time,  and  was  I  in  the  month  of 
January  I  would  be  certain  of  carrying  the  business.  I  dare  say 
you  will  be  yourself  very  surprised  to  see  things  so  different  from 
what  they  had  been  represented  to  you  and  you  had  represented 
to  me — be  certain,  Sir,  I  was  never  so  unhappy  as  in  this  circum 
stance,  tho?  the  general  opinion  of  every  rank  and  condition  in 
the  civil  as  well  as  the  military  line  assures  me  that  I  could  not  do 
anything  in  our  present  situation. 

"  However  I  cannot  give  up  all  idea  of  doing  something  in  that 
quarter.  I  hear  every  scheme  on  this  subject  and  find  very  little 
probabilities  of  succes — no  body  thinks  the  grand  expedition 

1  Letter  of  19th  February,  1778  :  New  York  Historical  Society. 

2  23d  February,  1778  :  Gates  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society. 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAINST   CANADA.  287 

could  be  carried,  but  some  speak  of  burning  the  fleet  by  surprise 
with  a  detachment — General  Conway  is  much  against  it,  and  I 
confess  it  seems  to  me  he  is  in  right — tho'  doing  or  trying  nothing 
in  tliis  moment  is  exasperating  to  the  last  degree.  .  .  .  Fort 
Schuyler  should  be  provided  for  six  months,  I'l  go  to  that  fort, 
and  I'l  have  the  honor  to  write  you  how  I  have  found  it. — It  seems 
to  me  that  the  people  is  rather  proud  of  an  expedition  against 
New  York — I  am  told  that  in  the  month  of  June  there  is  a  very 
easy  way  into  the  heart  of  Canada,  in  everything  you  believe  I'l 
be  useful  to  the  American  cause,  till  the  moment  perhaps  not  very 
far  where  my  business  will  oblige  me  to  leave  this  continent,  be 
certain,  Sir,  that  I  shall  always  be  ready ;  and  I  dare  say  where 
I  am  obliged  to  stop  nobody  will  go  on." 

It  appears  also  from  M.  cle  La  Fayette's  letters  to  Gen 
eral  Gates,  as  if  to  add  irrefragable  proof  of  the  disgrace 
ful  lack  of  principle  upon  the  part  of  those  concerned  in 
ordering  this  expedition  to  be  undertaken,  that,  while  no 
provision  had  been  made  for  the  munitions  of  war  and 
supplies  with  which  to  equip  the  army,  the  money  which 
had  been  promised  to  the  young  commander  for  this  pur 
pose  was  not  provided  for  him,  as  indeed,  under  exist 
ing  circumstances,  it  could  not  have  been.  The  pay  of 
the  troops  was  far  in  arrears,  as  we  have  seen  ;  the  quar 
termaster's  department  and  the  commissary's  were  bare ; 
and,  although  M.  de  La  Fayette  reported  to  General 
Washington  the  arrival  of  a  sum  much  smaller  than 
he  expected  for  the  equipment  of  his  command,  he  dis 
covered,  upon  the  first  demand  made  in  that  direction, 
that  even  this  was  not  for  him.  So  greatly  was  he  dis 
turbed  by  this,  to  him,  presumable  mischance,  that  he 
freely  offered  his  private  credit  to  be  used  in  supplying 
pressing  wants.  He  wrote  to  General  Gates,1  "  every  body 
is  after  me  for  monney — be  so  good  as  to  let  me  know 
how  I  must  do — I  have  given  leave  to  every  one  in  public 
departments  if  they  could  borrow  on  my  private  credit 

1  23d  February  and  llth  March,  1778  :  Gates  Papers,  New  York  Historical 
Society. 


288          PROJECTED   EXPEDITION   AGAINST   CANADA.         [1778. 

for  paying  their  debts,  to  do  it  without  difficulty."  And 
"  we  want  monney,  Sir,  and  monney  will  be  spoken  of  by 
me  till  I  will  be  enabled  to  pay  our  poor  soldiers,  not 
only  justice  and  humanity  but  even  prudence  obliges  us 
to  satisfy  them  soon ;  all  the  monney  goes  by  other  ways. 
I  have  seen  a  letter  to  Colonel  Hay  where  you  tell  him 
that  the  very  same  400,000  dollars  you  told  me  were  for 
me,  are  destinated  to  him.  ...  I  was  a  little  distressed  to 
know  how  to  employ  the  monney  which  I  thought  was  for 
the  expedition  till  I  saw  in  one  of  your  letters  to  CL  Hay 
that  it  was  coming  for  the  department."  No  wonder  he 
wrote  to  General  Gates,1  "  I  expect  with  the  greater  impa 
tience  letters  from  Congress  and  the  Board  of  War  where 
I'l  be  acquainted  of  what  I  am  to  do.  I  hope  the  good 
intentions  of  honorable  Board  in  my  favor  could  be  em 
ployed  in  a  better  occasion — indeed,  Sir,  there  has  been 
good  deal  of  deception  and  neglect  in  that  affair." 

In  the  mean  time  the  season  wore  away ;  the  months 
of  February  and  March  passed,  and  General  de  La  Fay- 
ette  occupied  himself  at  Albany  with  such  duties  as  he 
could  find  there  to  do,  aiding,  in  the  mean  time,  the 
garrison  of  Fort  Schuyler  with  provisions  and  clothing, 
and,  at  the  invitation  of  General  Schuyler,  going  up  the 
Mohawk  Valley  to  attend  a  notable  council  of  Indians. 
La  Fayette  made  terms  of  friendship  with  the  Oneidas 
and  the  Tuscaroras  especially.  His  manners  and  appear 
ance  pleased  them  so  greatly  that  they  adopted  him  into 
their  tribes,  giving  to  him  the  name  of  Kayewla,  formerly 
borne  by  one  of  their  warriors ;  after  which,  in  order  to 
strengthen  the  attachment  of  these  people  to  the  American 
cause,  he  acceded  to  their  request  that  they  should  be 
allowed  to  have  a  fort  of  their  own,  and  he  detached  one 
of  his  best  engineers,  M.  de  Gouvion,  to  construct  it  for 
them.2  Thus  he  made  an  effort  to  face  with  a  manly  heart 

1  Gates  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society. 
s  Mdmoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  44. 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION   AGAINST    CANADA.          289 

the  unfortunate  circumstances,  which  he  called,  in  a  let 
ter  to  General  Washington,  "  my  distressing,  ridiculous, 
foolish,  and,  indeed,  nameless  situation,"  —to  which  the 
General  replied,  encouraging  him  by  assurances  of  friend 
ship  and  esteem,  and  soothing  with  the  utmost  tenderness 
the  injuries  caused  by  disappointment  and  mortification 
to  his  over-sensitive  nature. 

Washington's  letter  of  the  10th  of  March2  seems,  in 
its  solicitous  tenderness,  like  one  written  by  a  father  to 
his  son  : 

"MY  DEAR  MARQUIS, — I  have  had  the  pleasure  of  receiving 
your  two  favours  of  the  19th  and  23d  of  February,  and  hasten  to  dis 
pel  those  fears  respecting  your  reputation,  which  are  excited  only 
by  an  uncommon  degree  of  sensibility.  You  seem  to  apprehend 
that  censure,  proportioned  to  the  disappointed  expectations  of  the 
world,  will  fall  on  you  in  consequence  of  the  Canadian  expedition. 
But,  in  the  first  place,  it  will  be  no  disadvantage  to  you  to  have  it 
known  in  Europe  that  you  had  received  so  manifest  a  proof  of  the 
good  opinion  and  confidence  of  Congress  as  an  important  detached 
command  ;  and  I  am  persuaded  that  every  one  will  applaud  your 
prudence  in  renouncing  a  project,  in  pursuing  which  you  would 
vainly  have  attempted  physical  impossibilities  ;  indeed,  unless 
you  can  be  chargeable  with  the  invariable  effects  of  natural  causes, 
and  be  arraigned  for  not  suspending  the  course  of  the  seasons,  to 
accommodate  your  march  over  the  lake,  the  most  prompt  to  slan 
der  can  have  nothing  to  found  blame  upon. 

"However  sensibly  your  ardour  for  glory  may  make  you  feel 
this  disappointment,  you  may  be  assured  that  your  character 
stands  as  fair  as  ever  it  did,  and  that  no  new  enterprise  is  neces 
sary  to  wipe  off  this  imaginary  stain.  The  expedition  which  you 
hint  at  I  think  unadvisable  in  our  present  circumstances.  Any 
thing  in  the  way  of  a  formal  attack,  which  would  necessarily  be 
announced  to  the  enemy  by  preparatory  measures,  would  not  be 
likely  to  succeed.  If  a  stroke  is  meditated  in  that  quarter,  it  must 
be  effected  by  troops  stationed  at  a  proper  distance  for  availing 
themselves  of  the  first  favourable  opportunity  offered  by  the 
enemy,  and  success  would  principally  depend  upon  the  sudden 
ness  of  the  attempt.  This,  therefore,  must  rather  be  the  effect 

1  23d  February,  1778  :  Correspondence,  American  edition,  i.  159. 

2  La  Fayette's  Correspondence,  American  edition,  i.  161. 
VOL.  I.— 19 


290  PROJECTED    EXPEDITION   AGAINST    CANADA.         [1778. 

of  time  and  chance  than  premeditation.  You  undoubtedly  have 
determined  judiciously  in  waiting  the  further  orders  of  Congress. 
Whether  they  allow  me  the  pleasure  of  seeing  you  shortly,  or 
destine  you  to  a  longer  absence,  you  may  assure  yourself  of  the 
sincere  good  wishes  of, 

"  Dear  Sir,  &c. 

"P.S.  Your  directing  payment  of  such  debts  as  appear  to 
be  most  pressing  is  certainly  right — There  is  not  money  enough 
to  answer  every  demand ;  and  I  wish  your  supplies  of  clothing 
had  been  better.  Your  ordering  a  large  supply  of  provisions 
into  Fort  Schuyler  was  a  very  judicious  measure,  and  I  thank 
you  for  it." 

La  Fayette's  exile  to  Albany  terminated  shortly  after 
ward.  The  influence  of  the  Cabal  was  weakening  to  its 
dissolution  in  the  face  of  the  universal  attachment  of  the 
people  to  the  person  of  General  Washington.  Slander 
and  intrigue  could  not  shake  the  confidence  which  they 
had  in  his  ability  to  lead  them  through  the  perils  of  their 
struggle  for  liberty  and  ultimately  to  triumph,  in  the 
independence  of  the  United  States. 

Conway,  deserted  by  his  former  associates,  without  in 
fluence,  without  official  position,  hated  and  mistrusted, 
made  a  humble  apology  to  General  Washington  for  what 
he  had  said  and  done ;  and  he  finally  left  this  country  in 
disgrace  to  return  to  France. 

Better  influences  now  prevailing,  Congress  resolved  that 
the  Canadian  expedition  was  impracticable  and  should  be 
abandoned,  directing  at  the  same  time  that  the  Marquis 
de  La  Fayette  and  Baron  de  Kalb  should  return  to  the 
army.  In  justice  to  La  Fayette,  it  was  resolved  "  That 
Congress  entertain  a  high  sense  of  his  prudence,  activity, 
and  zeal,  and  that  they  are  fully  persuaded  nothing  has 
or  would  have  been  wanting  on  his  part,  or  on  the  part  of 
his  officers  who  accompanied  him,  to  give  the  expedition 
the  utmost  possible  effect." 

1  Secret  Journal  of  Congress,  March  2,  1778. 


1778.]         PROJECTED    EXPEDITION    AGAIXST    CANADA.  291 

With  infinite  relief  La  Fayette  set  out  upon  his  return, 
and  he  arrived  without  accident  at  the  head-quarters  in 
Valley  Forge,  early  in  April,  in  time  to  learn  the  news 
which  filled  his  soul  with  pride,  and  which  was  then 
being  hailed  with  joy  throughout  the  land,  that  of  the 
alliance  of  the  United  States  of  America  with  His  Most 
Christian  Majesty  of  France. 


292  ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FRANCE  [1777. 


CHAPTER    IX. 

ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FRANCE    AND    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

THE  political  activity  of  the  Cabinet  of  Versailles 
during  the  greater  part  of  the  year  1777  was  directed 
toward  an  effort  to  return  to  the  situation  which  had  been 
reached  in  the  month  of  October  of  1776,  when  the  di 
plomacy  of  the  Comte  de  Vergennes  had  prepared  the 
way  for  united  action  upon  the  part  of  the  two  monarchies 
against  Great  Britain,  and  when  the  French  Secretary  of 
State,  alarmed  by  the  reports  of  American  defeat  on  Long 
Island,  had  suddenly  held  back  at  the  moment  that  the 
Spanish  Court  was  ready  to  accept  his  policy  of  interven 
tion  in  the  War  of  Independence. 

Spain,  as  we  have  seen,  retired  from  the  position  which 
her  Government  had  assumed  through  the  Marques  de 
Grimaldi,  and  under  the  more  conservatively  Spanish 
administration  of  his  successor,  the  Conde  de  Florida- 
blanca,  her  ministry  was  less  inclined  to  regard  the  inter 
ests  of  the  kingdom  as  identical  with  those  of  France  in 
matters  of  colonial  policy  or  in  its  relations  to  England. 
Besides  this,  it  will  be  remembered,  Spanish  national 
pride  had  been  seriously  offended  by  the  unexpected  re 
jection  on  the  part  of  M.  de  Vergennes  of  the  assent  of 
King  Carlos  III.  to  a  policy  which  had  been  incessantly 
urged  by  the  arguments  and  persuasions  of  the  French 
Foreign  Office. 

In  order  to  induce  the  Court  of  Madrid  to  resume  its 
attitude  of  sympathy  and  co-operation,  the  Comte  de  Ver 
gennes  found  himself,  therefore,  obliged  to  do  much  of  his 
former  work  a  second  time.  He  proceeded  in  this  en- 


n 


AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.  293 


deavor  with  skilful  method  and  with  remarkable  diligence, 
in  carrying  along  his  diplomatic  correspondence,  as  the 
French  Archives  fully  attest,  by  a  series  of  documents  re 
lating  to  the  affairs  of  France  and  Spain  and  America, 
which  messengers  were  constantly  bearing  from  Versailles 
to  Madrid,  with  every  conceivable  argument  for  union 
of  action  under  the  Family  Compact,  derived  from  the 
progress  of  affairs  in  the  United  States  or  the  results  of 
party  feeling  in  England. 

Circumstances  were  greatly  changed,  however,  and,  in 
spite  of  his  efforts,  he  did  not  meet  this  time  with  success. 
The  Government  of  Spain  was  not  inclined  toward  war 
with  Great  Britain.  On  the  one  hand,  its  relations  with 
Portugal  were  considerably  improved  ;  for,  the  King  of 
Portugal  having  died,  the  source  of  irritation  which  had 
arisen  from  the  policy  of  his  minister,  M.  de  Pombal,  who 
now  lost  his  influence  at  that  Court,  was  removed.  But,  on 
the  other  hand,  what  was  of  much  more  serious  considera 
tion  in  Madrid  was  that  the  Spanish  Colonies  in  the  West 
Indies  were  not  protected  sufficiently  against  hostile  attack, 
and  the  great  treasure-fleet  of  Spain,  with  a  cargo  valued 
at  some  fifty  millions  of  piasters,  was  preparing  to  return 
from  Mexico,  and,  in  the  event  of  war,  would  be  exposed 
upon  the  high  seas  to  capture  or  destruction.  Therefore, 
even  if  the  Spanish  ministry  were  inclined  to  break  the 
existing  peace,  it  could  not  afford  to  do  so  at  once,  with 
the  risk  of  endangering  these  enormous  interests  of  its 
own.  Its  diplomatic  correspondence  in  regard  to  the 
situation,  and  in  reply  to  M.  de  Vergennes,  was  long, 
wearisome,  and  dilatory. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  attitude  of  France  toward  the 
struggle  in  the  United  States  had  not  changed.  It  was 
still  one  of  sympathy,  of  secret  encouragement  and  assist 
ance,  with  the  promise  of  open  recognition  as  soon  as 
France  should  have  strengthened  herself  sufficiently  by 
the  co-operation  of  Spain,  or  by  her  own  efforts  to  increase 


F 


294  ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FRANCE  [17 

her  land  forces  and  to  improve  her  navy,  or  when  Eng 
land  should  be  wea]§|ned  by  the  opposition  which  she  met 
with  in  America.  True,  the  Comte  de  Vergennes  had 
changed  the  appearance  of  his  relations  with  the  Agents 
of  Congress  accordingly  as  circumstances  made  it  neces 
sary  for  him  to  deal  with  Great  Britain ;  but  there  is  no 
evidence  that  he  ever  wavered  in  his  purpose  of  sus 
taining  the  Revolution  and  ultimately  of  participating  in 
the  war. 

His  desire  to  secure  the  co-operation  of  Spain  grew 
more  intense  because  he  dared  not  venture  alone  into  a 
declaration  of  hostilities,  and  yet  he  was  becoming  fear 
ful  that  unless  the  Colonies  obtained  speedy  relief  they 
must  be  forced  by  their  necessities  into  submission  to  the 
mother-country  and  might  accept  the  conciliatory  meas 
ures  which  Parliament  was  then  ready  to  offer  for  peace. 
In  the  event  of  a  reconciliation,  the  opportunity  of 
France  for  vengeance  would  be  gone  ;  and,  besides  this, 
the  Secretary  of  State  thought  it  possible  that  a  new  dan 
ger  to  her  welfare  might  arise  from  the  turning  upon  her 
by  Great  Britain  of  all  its  reunited  forces,  in  punishment 
for  the  political  offence  she  had  committed  by  secretly 
aiding  the  rebellion. 

The  American  Commissioners  in  France  very  quickly 
grasped  the  situation,  and  they  took  advantage  of  this 
argument,  almost  immediately  after  the  arrival  of  Dr. 
Franklin  in  Paris,  to  enforce  their  representations  of  the 
state  of  affairs  at  home,  with  a  solemnity  which  unques 
tionably  had  its  influence  at  Versailles,  where  the  subject 
had  already  been  discussed  with  apprehension  in  the 
Cabinet.  In  the  formal  appeal  for  ships  of  the  line,  for 
troops,  and  for  munitions  of  war  which  they  addressed 
to  M.  de  Vergennes  on  the  5th  of  January,  1777,1  they 
said  to  the  minister, — 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  245. 


1777.]  AND    THE    UXITED    STATES.  295 

"We  also  beg  it  may  be  particularly  considered,  that  while  the 
English  are  masters  of  the  American  seas,  and  can,  without  fear 
of  interruption,  transport  with  such  ease  their  army  from  one 
part  of  our  extensive  coast  to  another,  and  we  can  only  meet  them 
by  laud  marches,  we  may  possibly,  unless  some  powerful  aid  is 
given  us  or  some  strong  diversion  be  made  in  our  favor,  be  so 
harassed  and  be  put  to  such  immense  distress,  as  that  finally  our 
people  will  find  themselves  reduced  to  the  necessity  of  ending  the 
war  by  an  accommodation. 

"The  Courts  of  France  and  Spain  may  rely  with  the  fullest 
confidence  that  whatever  stipulations  are  made  by  us  in  case  of 
granting  such  aid,  will  be  ratified  and  punctually  fulfilled  by  the 
Congress,  who  are  determined  to  found  their  future  character, 
with  regard  to  justice  and  fidelity,  on  a  full  and  perfect  perform 
ance  of  all  their  present  engagements. 

"  Korth  America  now  oilers  to  France  and  Spain  her  amity  and 
commerce.  She  is  also  ready  to  guaranty  in  the  firmest  manner  to 
those  nations  all  their  present  possessions  in  the  West  Indies,  as 
well  as  those  they  shall  acquire  from  the  enemy  in  a  war  that  may 
be  consequential  of  such  assistance  as  she  requests.  The  in 
terests  of  the  three  nations  are  the  same.  The  opportunity  of 
cementing  them  and  of  securing  all  the  advantages  of  that  com 
merce,  which  in  time  will  be  immense,  now  presents  itself.  If 
neglected,  it  may  never  again  return  ;  and  we  cannot  help  sug 
gesting  that  a  considerable  delay  may  be  attended  with  fatal  con 
sequences.'7 


A  little  later,  they  went  again  to  the  Secretary  of  State 
with  the  same  logic,  encouraged,  no  doubt,  by  the  growing 
sentiment  throughout  France  in  favor  of  war  upon  Eng 
land,  which  now  began  to  make  itself  felt  on  all  sides, 
and  by  the  evident  willingness  with  which  their  reason 
ing  had  been  listened  to  in  the  councils  of  the  King. 
They  presented  the  necessities  of  the  United  States  in 
view  of  the  great  armaments  which  it  was  understood 
England  was  making  ready  with  the  aid  of  German  mer 
cenary  troops,  the  inconvenience  arising  from  delay  in 
shipping  arms  and  munitions  of  war  which  had  been 
promised  from  France,  the  great  danger  to  be  appre 
hended  from  the  defection  of  the  negroes,  "  who,  being 


296  ALLIANCE   BETWEEN    FRANCE  [1777. 

excited  and  armed  by  the  British,  may  greatly  strengthen 
the  invaders,"  and  they  attached  the  formal  declarations 

"That  notwithstanding  the  measures  taken  to  convince  the 
Court  of  Britain  that  France  does  not  countenance  the  Americans, 
that  Court,  according  to  our  information,  believes  firmly  the  con 
trary  ;  and  it  is  submitted  to  the  consideration  of  Your  Excellency 
whether,  if  the  English  make  a  conquest  of  the  American  States, 
they  will  not  take  the  first  opportunity  of  showing  their  resent 
ment,  by  beginning  themselves  the  war  that  would  otherwise  be 
avoided ;  and  perhaps  beginning  it  as  they  did  the  last,  without 
any  previous  declaration. 

"That,  upon  the  whole,  we  can  not  on  this  occasion  omit 
expressing  our  apprehensions  that,  if  Britain  is  now  suffered  to 
recover  the  Colonies  and  annex  again  their  great  growing  strength 
and  commerce  to  her  own,  she  will  become  in  a  few  years  the  most 
formidable  power  by  sea  and  land  that  Europe  has  yet  seen,  and 
assuredly,  from  the  natural  pride  and  insolence  of  that  people, 
a  power  to  all  the  other  States  the  most  pernicious  and  intoler 
able." 

They  submitted,  therefore,  with  all  deference  to  the 
wisdom  of  His  Majesty  and  his  ministers,  whether,  if  the 
independence  of  the  United  States  of  America,  with  the 
consequent  diminution  of  British  power  and  the  freedom 
of  commerce  with  them,  were  an  object  of  importance  to 
all  Europe  and  to  France  in  particular,  this  was  not  the 
proper  time  for  effectual  exertions  in  their  favor,  for  be 
ginning  that  war  which  could  scarcely  be  much  longer 
avoided,  and  which  would  be  sanctified  by  this  best  of 
justifications,  that  a  much  injured  and  innocent  people 
would  thereby  be  protected  and  delivered  from  cruel  op 
pression  and  secured  in  the  enjoyment  of  their  just  rights  ; 
than  which  nothing  could  contribute  more  to  the  glory  of 
His  Majesty  and  of  that  nation.1 

During  this  time,  however,  the  French  Foreign  Office 
continued  to  veil  its  communications  with  the  Americans 
with  extreme  caution,  lest  these  should  attract  anew  the 

1 1st  February,  1777 :  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  257. 


1777.]  AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.  297 

suspicions  of  the  British  ministry  and  embarrass  the  diplo 
matic  relations,  which,  to  say  the  least,  were  then  none 
too  cordial.  The  arrival  of  Dr.  Franklin  rendered  this 
especially  difficult,  because  the  presence  of  the  distin 
guished  American  in  Paris  became  at  once  the  subject  of 
unusual  interest,  not  only  among  scholars  and  students 
whom  his  literary  reputation  would  naturally  attract,  but 
also  among  men  of  the  world  and  military  men  of  rank, 
who  began  to  frequent  his  little  house  at  Passy  to  see  the 
celebrated  "  docteur"  and  to  hear  him  talk  about  the 
Revolution  in  America.  Indeed,  the  movements  of  the 
Continental  army  were  discussed  with  maps  and  plans, 
and  the  battles  fought  again,  as  if  France  were  a  partici 
pant  in  the  struggle  and  the  Parisians  were  watching 
interests  partly  their  own.  "  The  conduct  of  our  General, 
in  avoiding  a  decisive  action,"  wrote  the  Commissioners, 
"  is  much  applauded  by  the  military  people  here,  partic 
ularly  Marshals  Maillebois,  Broglio,  and  D'Arcy.  M. 
Maillebois  has  taken  the  pains  to  write  his  sentiments  of 
some  particulars  useful  in  carrying  on  our  war,  which  we 
send  enclosed.  But  that  which  makes  the  greatest  im 
pression  in  our  favor  here  is  the  prodigious  success  of  our 
armed  ships  and  privateers.  The  damage  we  have  done 
their  West  India  trade  has  been  estimated,  in  a  represen 
tation  to  Lord  Sandwich,  by  the  merchants  of  London,  at 
one  million  eight  hundred  thousand  pounds  Sterling,  which 
has  raised  insurance  to  twenty-eight  per  cent.,  being  higher 
than  at  any  time  in  the  last  war  with  France  and  Spain."  l 
Nevertheless,  the  French  Secretary  of  State  was  deter 
mined  to  avoid  the  acknowledgment  of  Dr.  Franklin's 
presence  openly  as  long  as  it  could  be  avoided,  and  es 
pecially  to  create  a  favorable  impression  in  England.  He 
wrote  to  the  Ambassador  in  London  that  he  "  was  still 


1  B.  Franklin,  Silas  Deane,  and  Arthur  Lee  to  the  Committee  of  Secret 
Correspondence,  6th  February,  1777  :  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton, 
ii.  261. 


298  ALLIANCE   BETWEEN   FRANCE  [1777. 

ignorant  of  the  motive  of  the  voyage  of  this  member  of 
Congress/'  and  he  instructed  M.  de  Noailles,  in  case  he 
should  be  called  upon  in  England  for  an  explanation,  to 
take  refuge  behind  the  general  ignorance  in  this  regard 
which  he  shared  with  the  ministry.  Franklin  had  been 
in  Paris  ten  days  at  that  time,  and,  although  M.  de  Ver- 
gennes  could  say  that  he  did  not  know  officially  what  the 
purpose  of  his  coming  was,  for  he  had  not  seen  him  then, 
yet  that  statement  was  dangerously  close  to  the  limit  of 
exact  truth ;  for  Franklin,  Deane,  and  Lee  had  pre 
sented  their  credentials  and  had  asked  for  an  audience, 
which  M.  de  Vergennes  accorded  them,  as  we  have  seen, 
on  the  28th  of  December,  the  same  day  he  wrote  to  the 
Ambassador  in  London.1 

The  American  Commissioners  were  not  deceived,  how 
ever,  by  this  official  denial  of  their  presence,  as  to  the 
purposes  of  France.  Dr.  Franklin's  coming  had,  in 
fact,  given  new  vigor  to  the  relations  already  established 
at  the  Court  by  Mr.  Silas  Deane ;  and  not  only  was  the 
assurance  of  aid  to  the  Colonies  reaffirmed,  but  every 
facility  was  presented  to  the  Agents  of  Congress  that  a 
neutral  Power  could  offer  the  belligerents  without  occa 
sioning  an  immediate  outbreak  of  hostilities.  "  In  our 
first  conversation  with  the  Minister,  after  the  arrival  of 
Mr.  Franklin,"  they  wrote,2  "  it  was  evident  that  this 
Court,  while  it  treated  us  privately  with  all  civility,  was 
cautious  of  giving  umbrage  to  England,  and  was  there 
fore  desirous  of  avoiding  an  open  reception  and  acknowl 
edgment  of  us,  or  entering  into  any  formal  negotiation 
with  us  as  Ministers  from  Congress.  To  make  us  easy, 
however,  we  were  told  that  the  ports  of  France  were 
open  to  our  ships  as  friends ;  that  our  people  might  freely 

1  Angleterre,  t.  519,    No.    116 :   Doniol,    La  Participation  de  la  France, 
ii.  306. 

2  B.  Franklin  and  Silas  Deane  to  the  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence, 
12th  March,  1777  :  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  283. 


1777.]  AND    THE    UNITED   STATES.  299 

purchase  and  export,  as  merchandise,  whatever  our  States 
had  occasion  for,  vending  at  the  same  time  our  own  com 
modities  ;  that  in  doing  this  we  should  experience  all  the 
facilities  that  a  Government  disposed  to  favor  us  could, 
consistent  with  treaties,  afford  to  the  enemies  of  a  friend. 
But  though  it  was  at  that  time  no  secret  that  two  hundred 
field-pieces  of  brass  and  thirty  thousand  fusils,  with  other 
munitions  of  war  in  great  abundance,  had  been  taken  out 
of  the  King's  magazines  for  the  purpose  of  exportation  to 
America,  the  Minister,  in  our  presence,  affected  to  know 
nothing  of  that  operation,  and  claimed  no  merit  to  his 
Court  on  that  account.  But  he  intimated  to  us  that  it 
would  be  well  taken  if  we  communicated  with  no  other 
person  about  the  Court  concerning  our  affairs  but  himself, 
who  would  be  ready  at  all  convenient  times  to  confer 
with  us." 

The  Commissioners  added  that,  during  the  several  con 
ferences  held  by  them  with  the  representatives  of  the 
French  Government,  every  step  was  taken  to  gratify 
England  publicly,  by  attending  to  the  remonstrances  of 
her  Ambassador,  forbidding  the  departure  of  ships  which 
had  military  stores  on  board,  recalling  officers  who  had 
leave  of  absence  and  were  going  to  join  the  Continental 
army,  and  giving  strict  orders  that  American  prizes  should 
not  be  sold  in  French  ports ;  "  yet,  that  we  might  not  be 
discouraged,  it  was  intimated  to  us  by  persons  about 
the  Court  that  those  measures  were  necessary  at  present, 
France  not  being  yet  quite  ready  for  a  war,  and  that  we 
might  be  assured  of  her  good  will  to  us  and  our  cause." 

Therefore  the  Commissioners  were  wise  enough  to  ac 
quiesce,  under  circumstances  which  were  already  exceed 
ingly  advantageous  to  the  cause  they  represented,  although 
in  some  respects,  as  in  the  matter  of  the  negotiation  of  a 
treaty  which  they  hoped  to  accomplish,  the  French  Gov 
ernment  had  not  fulfilled  the  wishes  and  expectations  of 
Dr.  Franklin.  Whilst  they  exerted  all  the  influence  that 


300  ALLIANCE   BETWEEN   FRANCE  [1777. 

they  could  bring  to  bear  in  this  direction,  they  carefully 
avoided  any  attempt  to  coerce  the  ministry.  Indeed,  at 
the  end  of  May,  five  months  after  Franklin's  arrival,  he 
and  Silas  Deane  wrote  to  Congress  that,  although  the 
treaty  of  commerce  was  not  as  yet  being  proceeded  with, 
because  the  plan  of  the  Cabinet  appeared  to  be  not  to 
enter  into  any  transaction  with  the  Colonies  that  might 
imply  an  acknowledgment  of  American  independence 
whilst  peace  continued  between  France  and  England, 
yet  "they  tell  us  we  enjoy  all  the  advantages  already 
which  we  propose  to  obtain  by  such  a  Treaty,  and  that  we 
may  depend  on  continuing  to  receive  every  indulgence  in 
our  trade  that  is  allowed  to  the  most  favored  nations. 
Feeling  ourselves  assisted  in  other  respects,  cordially  and 
essentially,  we  are  the  more  readily  induced  to  let  them 
take  their  own  time,  and  to  avoid  making  ourselves  trouble 
some  by  an  unreasonable  importunity.  The  interest  of 
France  and  Spain,  however,  in  securing  our  friendship 
and  commerce,  seems  daily  more  and  more  generally  un 
derstood  here,  and  we  have  no  doubt  of  finally  obtaining 
the  establishment  of  that  commerce  with  all  the  formalities 
necessary." 

Indeed,  there  was  very  little  ground  for  reasonable  com 
plaint,  and  very  little  doubt  that  the  assertion  of  the 
French  Cabinet  was  true  that  the  United  States  were  re 
ceiving,  in  fact,  the  very  benefits  which  they  sought  in  an 
alliance,  so  far  as  those  benefits  did  not  imply  a  partici 
pation  in  open  hostilities ;  for,  in  the  month  of  March,  ten 
ships,  loaded  with  munitions  of  war,  under  the  sanction  of 
the  Government,  by  Beaumarchais  (Roderique  Hortales  et 
Cie.),  were  crossing  the  sea  to  America,  the  names  of  some 
of  them  having  been  changed  by  that  clever  intermediary 
in  order  the  better  to  escape  the  notice  of  British  spies 
and  to  get  out  of  port  undisturbed ;  and  Beaumarchais 

1  25th  May,  1777  :  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  324. 


1777.]  AXD    THE    UNITED    STATES.  301 

said  in  the  report  of  his  movements  to  M.  de  Vergennes, 
"  Never  was  a  commercial  transaction  pressed  with  more 
vigor,  in  spite  of  every  sort  of  obstacle  that  I  have 
encountered." 

But  at  the  Court  of  Spain  the  earnest  solicitations  of 
the  French  Ambassador  still  brought  forth  no  definite 
statement  of  the  part  that  the  Spanish  Government  was 
willing  to  take  in  conjunction  with  France  when  a  suitable 
opportunity  should  occur  to  intervene  between  England 
and  her  Colonies.  In  response  to  the  efforts  of  M.  de  Ver 
gennes  to  force  from  the  Conde  de  Floridablanca  some  in 
timation,  at  least,  of  his  general  policy  under  the  Family 
Compact,  the  Spanish  Premier  merely  declared  that  "  there 
was  too  little  secrecy  at  the  Court  of  Versailles"  to  justify 
him  in  expressing  his  opinions  freely,  and  that  later,  upon 
some  proper  occasion,  he  should  communicate  with  M.  de 
Vergennes.2 

It  was  impossible,  therefore,  for  the  French  Cabinet  to 
count  upon  the  co-operation  of  Spain,  though  that  was 
now  the  only  cause  of  further  delay  in  its  decision  to 
take  part  openly  in  the  war.  The  Government  of  King 
Louis  was  ready  for  the  event ;  it  had  made  diligent 
exertions  for  many  months  to  equip  and  strengthen  the 
navy,  which  was  looked  upon  as  the  most  important  ele 
ment  of  success  in  the  case  of  a  war  that  must  necessarily 
depend  upon  the  superiority  at  sea.  It  is  very  probable 
that  when  M.  de  Vergennes  hesitated,  the  year  before, 
to  undertake  hostilities  against  Great  Britain,  his  hesita 
tion  was  largely  due  to  the  unfinished  condition  of  the 
French  marine  forces  at  that  moment ;  but  there  was  no 
longer  evidence  of  this  weakness  by  the  middle  of  the 
year  1777  ;  for  the  navy  had  been  reorganized,  and  was 


1  7th  March,  1777  :  Letter  quoted  by  M.  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la 
France,  ii.  315,  note. 

f,  *  M.  d'Ossun  to  the  Comte  de  Vergennes,  7th  July,  1777  ;  Espagne,  t.  585, 
No.  17  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  442. 


302  ALLIANCE   BETWEEN    FRANCE  [1777. 

in  a  state  of  efficiency  which  the  Secretary  of  State  de 
clared  would  last  throughout  the  reign  of  Louis  XVI. 
and  far  beyond.1 

The  situation  in  France  had  been  reduced,  then,  simply 
to  the  decision  of  the  question  whether  the  Government 
should  wait  longer,  in  the  hope  of  inducing  the  King 
of  Spain  to  unite  in  the  undertaking,  or  whether  France 
should  go  into  the  war  alone.  This  is  evident  throughout 
the  voluminous  diplomatic  correspondence  which  took 
place  between  the  Foreign  Office  at  Versailles  and  the 
French  Ambassador  at  Madrid  during  the  summer  and 
autumn  of  1777.  Whilst  the  conventional  language  of 
mutual  understanding  was  constantly  employed  by  M. 
de  Vergennes  in  all  his  official  communications  with  the 
Cabinet  of  Spain,  through  which  it  was  made  to  appear 
that  King  Louis  XVI.  looked  with  respectful  eagerness 
for  the  advice  and  approval  of  his  uncle  of  Spain  in 
every  measure  relating  to  the  attitude  toward  Great 
Britain,  and  was  solicitous  to  take  no  step  which  had  not 
received  the  sanction  of  his  ripe  experience  and  wise 
judgment,  France  was  rapidly  approaching  the  point  at 
which  she  was  to  adopt  the  course  of  entering  alone 
into  the  treaty  with  America  and  leaving  the  way  open 
to  Spain  to  follow  when  it  should  suit  that  Government 
to  do  so. 

The  boldness  of  certain  American  privateers,  in  sailing 
out  of  French  ports  to  destroy  or  capture  British  mer 
chantmen  and  in  returning  thither  with  their  prizes,  left 
the  Cabinet  of  France  no  alternative  before  the  protests 
of  the  British  Ambassador,  and  forced  it  to  prohibit  this 
use  of  French  protection,  which  could  not  be  justified 
upon  any  principle  under  the  existing  treaty  obligations 
of  France.  Captain  Wickes  of  the  frigate  Eeprisal, 
which  had  conveyed  Dr.  Franklin  to  France,  committed 

1  M.  de  Vergennes  to  the  Marquis  de  Noailles,  2d  May,  1777  ;  Angleterre,  t. 
523,  No.  3  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  446. 


1777.]  AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.  303 

an  act  of  this  sort  almost  immediately  after  having  set  his 
guest  ashore,  by  cruising  in  the  English  Channel  and 
seizing  several  British  vessels,  which  he  carried  into 
L'Orient  as  prizes.  Orders  were  sent  to  him  by  the  Gov 
ernment  to  go  out  of  the  port  within  twenty-four  hours ; 
but,  as  he  complained  that  his  frigate  had  sprung  a-leak, 
he  was  permitted  to  remain  until  the  necessary  repairs 
were  made,  and  was  then  enjoined  to  put  to  sea.  As  he 
was  not  seriously  impressed,  however,  with  the  disap 
proval  of  the  French  authorities,  he  associated  himself, 
even  then,  with  two  other  captains,  Nicholson  and  John 
son,  of  the  privateers  Lexington  and  Dolphin,  and,  after 
another  cruise  in  the  Channel,  ail  three  came  into  France 
bringing  the  prizes  they  had  made. 

M.  de  Vergennes  thereupon  addressed  a  note  to  the 
American  Commissioners  in  Paris  reminding  them  that, 
while  he  had  assured  them,  at  their  first  interview,  that 
they  should  enjoy  in  France  every  security  and  comfort 
which  had  been  shown  to  foreigners,  and  that  every 
facility  should  be  granted  to  American  commerce  com 
patible  with  the  exact  observance  of  the  King's  treaties, 
there  was  an  article  which  forbade  the  admission  of  priva 
teers  into  the  King's  ports,  and  that  the  Commissioners 
had  promised  to  conform  to  it.  He  called  their  attention 
to  the  fact  that  the  Reprisal,  the  Lexington,  and  the  Dol 
phin  had  come  in  for  refuge,  declaring  at  the  same  time 
that  lie  believed  the  Commissioners  to  be  gentlemen  too 
well  informed,  and  too  penetrating,  not  to  see  how  such 
conduct  affected  the  dignity  of  the  King,  his  master, 
whilst  it  offended  the  neutrality  which  His  Majesty  pro 
fessed  ;  that  it  was  by  the  King's  express  order  that  the 
subject  was  brought  to  their  notice,  with  the  royal  instruc 
tions  which  had  been  sent  to  the  ports  that  privateers 
should  be  sequestered  and  detained  until  sufficient  secu 
rity  had  been  given  that  they  would  return  directly  to 
their  own  country  and  not  expose  themselves  by  new  acts 


304  ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FRANCE  [1777. 

of  hostility  to  the  necessity  of  seeking  an  asylum  in  the 
ports  of  France. 

But  in  this  admonition  which  the  public  faith  obliged 
the  Cabinet  to  present  to  the  representatives  of  Congress, 
and  which  the  representatives  perfectly  understood  in  its 
bearings  upon  the  political  situation  at  that  moment, 
as,  in  fact,  a  mere  concession  to  the  demands  of  England 
in  order  to  ward  off  hostilities  for  a  short  time,  the  true 
relations  of  France  with  the  United  States  are  definitely 
expressed  by  the  closing  paragraph  of  the  official  docu 
ment,  in  which  the  Comte  de  Vergennes  said,  "  What  I 
have  the  honor  to  inform  you,  sirs,  of  the  King's  disposi 
tion,  by  no  means  changes  the  assurances  which  I  was 
authorized  to  make  to  you  at  the  time  of  your  arrival,  and 
which  I  again  renew,  for  the  security  of  your  residence, 
and  of  all  such  of  your  nation  whom  it  may  suit  to  reside 
among  us,  as  well  as  with  respect  to  the  commerce  allowed 
of,  which  will  meet  with  every  facility  on  our  part  that 
our  laws  and  usages  will  permit."  l  This  was  near  the 
close  of  the  period  of  France's  dissembling  in  her  rela 
tions  with  Great  Britain.  The  decision  of  the  Cabinet 
in  favor  of  war  was  arrived  at  but  a  few  days  later,  with 
the  King's  full  knowledge  and  assent,  and  after  a  mature 
discussion  in  the  royal  presence  of  the  plain  question, 
"  whether  that  was  the  moment  to  be  taken  advantage  of 
in  order  to  place  England  in  such  a  position  that  it 
would  be  impossible  for  her  any  longer  to  disturb  the 
public  order  ?"  That  question  being  disposed  of  affirma 
tively,  it  remained  only  to  decide  what  course  of  action 
should  be  pursued  in  regard  to  the  Americans. 

The  Comte  de  Vergennes  presented  the  subject  to  Louis 
XVI.  in  a  document  which  still  remains  in  the  Archives 
of  France,  entitled  "  A  memoir  communicated  to  the  King, 

1  Comte  de  Vergennes  to  the  Commissioners,  16th  July,  1777  :  Diplomatic 
Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  364.  And  see  the  reply  of  B.  Franklin  and 
Silas  Deane,  17th  July,  1777  :  ibid.,  p.  365. 


1777.]  AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.  305 

the  23d  of  July,  1777,  and  approved  by  His  Majesty  the 
same  day."  l  The  argument,  which  resembles  in  its  gen 
eral  outline  that  of  the  "  Considerations"  of  the  preceding 
year,  was  intended  to  lead  the  Cabinet  of  Spain  into  the 
conviction  that  the  two  Crowns  w^ere  alike  threatened  by 
the  preponderance  of  Great  Britain  in  the  political  affairs 
of  Europe,  and  that  it  was  imperative  that  the  house 
of  Bourbon  should  seize  the  opportunity  then  offered  to 
establish  its  ascendency  by  means  of  the  American  War. 
But,  while  it  repeated  to  some  extent  the  reasoning  that 
had  become  familiar  through  frequent  presentation  at 
Madrid  as  well  as  at  Versailles,  this  paper  has  a  tone  of 
determination,  evidently  based  upon  the  progress  of  events, 
which  had  been  lacking  in  the  documents  of  1776,  and 
which  indicates  that  the  purpose  of  France  was  then 
definitively  fixed. 

The  first  question  to  be  considered,  said  M.  de  Ver- 
gennes,  was  "  whether  it  was  a  matter  of  indifference  to 
the  two  Crowns  that  the  American  Colonies  should  sub 
mit  to  the  yoke  of  the  mother-country,  or  that  they  should 
succeed  in  their  present  effort  and  be  free,"  the  reply  to 
which,  he  declared,  was  to  be  found  in  another  question, 
namely,  "  Is  it  good  and  sound  politics  to  contribute 
toward  the  strengthening  of  an  enemy  when  one  has  at 
hand  an  opportunity  to  weaken  him  ?"  Evidently  no  one 
could  hesitate  in  answer  to  such  a  proposition  when  it 
promised  revenge,  glory,  and  the  humiliation  of  Great 
Britain.  Besides  this,  he  insisted,  when  the  prodigious 
efforts  then  being  made  separately  in  England  and  in 
America  were  considered,  the  picture  became  frightful  to 
contemplate  if  one  imagined  those  forces  reunited  and 
directed  against  a  new  object. 

Here  is  the  identical  train  of  thought  that  we  have 
seen  running  through  French  diplomacy  ever  since  the 

1  Espagne,  t.  585,  No.  5<>.     The  text  is  printed  by  M.  Doniol,  La  Participa 
tion  de  la  France,  ii.  4(50-4 (>'.». 
VOL.  I.— 120 


306  ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FRANCE  [1777. 

outbreak  of  the  troubles  in  the  Colonies, — the  opportunity 
to  strike  at  England,  and  the  danger  of  war  with  her  if 
the  opportunity  were  neglected.  The  day  had  arrived, 
however,  for  the  Secretary  of  State  to  disclose  his  inten 
tion.  It  was  too  late,  he  declared,  to  flatter  one's  self 
that  "the  weak  and  indirect  assistance  hitherto  sent  out 
parsimoniously  and  timidly  to  the  Colonies  would  enable 
them  to  make  a  successful  resistance ;"  on  the  contrary, 
something  more  must  now  be  done  to  help  them  to  win, 
and  to  deserve  their  gratitude  when  peace  should  be  re 
stored.  Their  subjugation  would  be  a  dangerous  weapon 
in  the  hand  of  Great  Britain,  which  France  and  Spain 
would  regret  for  centuries  having  allowed  her  to  snatch 
away.  It  might,  indeed,  he  admitted,  offend  the  magna 
nimity  and  the  religious  sentiments  of  the  two  monarchs, 
thus  to  take  advantage  of  the  unhappy  situation  of  Eng 
land  to  strike  her  a  blow  which,  if  not  mortal,  would 
at  least  destroy  her  power  and  her  influence.  But  a 
greater  interest  than  these  was  at  stake,  and,  said  he,  "  It 
is  an  accepted  doctrine,  both  in  politics  and  in  war,  that 
it  is  better  to  forestall  than  to  be  forestalled."  The  two 
monarchies  could  soon  be  ready ;  for  the  French  fisher 
men  would  be  coming  home  from  Newfoundland  directly, 
and  the  Spanish  treasure-fleet  would  be  safely  in  port 
from  Mexico ;  nothing  would  remain  to  be  done  then 
but  to  put  into  execution  whatever  plan  it  should  be  con 
sidered  wise  to  adopt. 

It  was  important,  however,  said  M.  de  Vergennes, 
not  merely  to  talk  well,  but  to  act  well.  The  moment 
had  come  either  to  help  the  United  States  effectively  and 
with  courage,  or  else  to  abandon  them  altogether ;  and 
the  months  of  January  and  February  of  1778  were  the 
limit  of  the  time  after  which,  if  nothing  were  done,  the 
two  Crowns  must  forever  regret  the  loss  of  a  neglected 
opportunity. 

A  copy  of  this  document,  formally  approved  under  the 


1777.]  AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.  307 

hand  of  the  King,  was  despatched  to  the  French  Ambas 
sador  at  Madrid,  to  be  submitted  by  him  to  the  Conde  de 
Floridablanca.  It  marks  the  period  at  which  France, 
having  decided  upon  the  war,  exerted  her  influence  to 
induce  the  Court  of  Spain  to  unite  with  her.  The  effort 
was  sustained  throughout  the  rest  of  the  year  1777,  with 
unremitting  diligence,  and  the  persuasive  powers  of  the 
Comte  de  Vergennes  found  ample  occupation  in  replying 
to  the  objections  and  discussing  the  dilatory  expedients 
suggested  by  the  unwilling  mind  of  the  Spanish  Premier. 
But  the  date  of  an  open  declaration  of  hostilities  had  been 
fixed ;  and,  as  the  event  proved,  the  United  States  were 
assured  of  the  participation  of  France  after  King  Louis 
XVI.  had  written  his  assent  upon  the  Memoire  of  the 
23d  of  July,  1777. 

That  Dr.  Franklin  and  his  colleagues  in  Paris  were 
thoroughly  informed  as  to  the  course  of  events,  and  were 
able  to  estimate  the  influences  then  at  work,  as  well  as  to 
perceive  the  bearing  of  their  results  upon  the  relations  of 
France,  Spain,  and  Great  Britain,  is  evident  from  their 
reports  to  Congress,  which  bear  traces  of  growing  confi 
dence  in  the  ultimate  success  of  their  mission  on  behalf 
of  the  United  States.  Not  only  did  Dr.  Franklin's  dis 
tinguished  social  position  at  the  French  capital  enable 
him  to  ascertain  with  precision  the  drift  of  national  senti 
ment  upon  the  question  of  the  war  with  England,  but 
there  is  no  doubt  that  the  opinions  of  the  King  and  the 
Cabinet  reached  him  more  or  less  directly  through  his 
intercourse  with  people  who  occupied  high  official  station 
at  the  Court.  He  could  not  fail  to  observe  that  he  was 
treated  with  an  exceptional  courtesy  which  implied  the 
friendship  of  France  toward  America ;  and  he  knew, 
although  the  minister  never  spoke  of  the  matter  in  his 
presence,  that  the  large  shipments  of  supplies  and  mu 
nitions  of  war  then  being  made  to  the  United  States 
through  Hortales  et  Cie.  were  in  reality  contributions 


308  ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FKANCE  [1777. 

from  the  King's  Government  toward  the  establishment  of 
American  independence. 

The  summer  having  passed  without  an  open  recognition 
from  France,  he  and  his  companions  wrote  to  Congress, 
on  the  8th  of  September,1 — 

"This  Court  continues  the  same  conduct  that  it  has  held  ever 
since  our  arrival.  It  professes  to  England  a  resolution  to  observe 
all  Treaties,  and  proves  it  by  restoring  prizes  too  openly  brought 
into  their  ports,  imprisoning  such  persons  as  are  found  to  be  con 
cerned  in  fitting  out  armed  vessels  against  England  from  France, 
warning  frequently  those  from  America  to  depart,  and  repeating 
orders  against  the  exportation  of  warlike  stores.  To  us  it  pri 
vately  professes  a  real  friendship,  wishes  success  to  our  cause, 
winks  at  the  supplies  we  obtain  here  as  much  as  it  can  without 
giving  open  grounds  of  complaint  to  England,  privately  affords 
us  very  essential  aids,  and  goes  on  preparing  for  war.  How  long 
these  two  parts  will  continue  to  be  acted  at  the  same  time,  and 
which  will  finally  predominate,  may  be  a  question.  As  it  is  the 
true  interest  of  France  to  prevent  our  being  annexed  to  Britain, 
that  so  the  British  power  may  be  diminished,  and  the  French 
commerce  augmented,  we  are  inclined  to  believe  the  sincerity  is 
towards  us,  more  especially  as  the  united  bent  of  the  nation  is 
manifestly  in  our  favor  ;  their  not  having  yet  commenced  a  war  is 
accounted  for  by  various  reasons.  The  Treaties  subsisting  among 
the  Powers  of  Europe,  by  which  they  are  obliged  to  aid  those  at 
tacked  more  than  those  attacking,  which  it  is  supposed  will  make 
some  difference,  they  not  being  fully  prepared,  the  absence  of 
their  seamen  in  their  fishery  and  West  Indies,  and  the  treasure 
expected  from  New  Spain,  with  the  sugars  from  the  Islands,  have 
all,  it  is  said,  contributed  to  restrain  the  national  desire  of  a 
breach  with  England,  in  which  her  troublesome  power  may  be 
reduced,  the  wealth  and  strength  of  France  increased,  and  some 
satisfaction  obtained  for  the  injuries  received  in  the  unfair  com 
mencement  of  the  last  war." 

Thus  the  situation  remained  outwardly  uncertain  until 
the  end  of  the  year  1777,  the  Cabinet  of  France,  in  the 
mean  time,  still  secretly  encouraging  and  assisting  the 
United  States,  still  trying  to  persuade  the  Court  of 

1  B.  Franklin,  Silas  Deane,  and  Arthur  Lee  to  the  Committee  of  Foreign 
Affairs  :  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  "Wharton,  ii.  388. 


1777.]  AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.  309 

Spain,  still  maintaining,  by  an  exceedingly  artificial  inter 
change  of  assurances  of  friendship,  at  least  the  outward 
signs  of  peace  with  Great  Britain. 

But  in  the  month  of  December  the  course  of  events 
took  an  unexpected  turn  in  the  direction  toward  which 
the  policy  of  the  Comte  de  Vergennes  had  constantly 
tended,  and  brought  that  opportunity  which  he  was 
awaiting,  when  reverses  to  the  British  arms  in  America 
should  produce  the  moment  of  weakness  in  the  affairs  of 
England  which  he  could  justify  at  once  as  the  motive  and 
the  occasion  for  France  to  strike  her  enemy  a  blow.  It 
came  now,  when  a  despatch  from  the  United  States  Con 
gress  brought  to  the  legation  at  Passy  the  astonishing 
news  that  the  formidable  army  of  General  Burgoyne, 
from  which  so  much  had  been  expected  in  England,  was 
defeated,  captured,  and  held  by  the  Americans  as  prisoners 
of  war.  This  intelligence,  which  was  immediately  com 
municated  to  the  King,  aroused  the  liveliest  interest  among 
all  classes  of  people  in  France.  It  had  an  inconceivable 
effect  upon  the  minds  of  men,  said  Beaumarchais  ; 1  it  was 
hailed  witli  expressions  of  delight  throughout  the  city 
which  seemed  like  the  rejoicing  that  might  follow  a 
French  victory  won  by  French  arms. 

In  this  respect,  at  least,  the  battle  of  Saratoga  is  en 
titled  to  be  considered  as  one  of  the  decisive  battles  of 
the  world,  that  it  marks  an  epoch  in  the  course  of  the 
American  Revolution ;  for  it  led  to  the  participation  of 
France  in  the  War  of  Independence,  and  it  was  one  of 
the  critical  turning-points  in  the  history  of  freedom  in 
America.  "  Now  is  the  time  to  act,"  said  the  Comte  de 
Vergennes;  "  aut  nunc  ant  nunquam :  the  lost  time  was 
perhaps  not  our  fault,  but  there  is  no  more  now  to  lose." 


1  To  the  Com  to  do  Yerponnep,  7th  December,  1777  ;  Angleterre,  t.  525,  Xo. 
17  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  642. 

2  To  the  Comte  de  Montmorin,  13th  December,  1777  ;  Espagne,  t.  587,  No. 
103  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  Franco,  i.  643. 


310  ALLIANCE   BETWEEN    FRANCE  [1777. 

No  time  was  lost,  indeed,  by  the  Council  of  the  King ; 
for  a  note  was  sent  at  once  to  the  legation  of  the  United 
States  which  formally  opened  negotiations  with  the  Com 
missioners  of  Congress  for  a  treaty  of  commerce  and 
alliance,  and  which  was  the  initial  step  toward  the  decla 
ration  of  hostilities  against  Great  Britain.  This  note, 
written  upon  the  gilt-edged  paper  which  Louis  XVI.  used 
for  his  private  correspondence,  and  assented  to  by  his 
"  approuve"  on  the  6th  of  December,  1777,1  announced 
to  the  American  Commissioners  that  His  Majesty  desired 
them  to  be  informed  that  the  situation  of  public  affairs 
had  made  it  impossible  theretofore  for  him  to  accede  to 
their  requests,  and  to  testify  to  the  united  Provinces  of 
North  America  by  open  marks  of  friendship  the  interest 
which  His  Majesty  had  always  entertained  in  their  cause ; 
but  that,  as  circumstances  appeared  then  more  favorable 
to  the  establishment  of  intimate  relations  with  them,  he 
should  no  longer  decline  to  listen  to  any  propositions 
that  the  Commissioners  might  have  to  make  to  him,  to 
consider  them,  and  to  give  to  the  United  States  every 
proof  that  circumstances  would  permit  of  his  interest  and 
his  affection. 

His  Majesty  reminded  the  Commissioners,  however, 
that  the  more  he  was  inclined  to  give  them  these  proofs 
of  his  sentiments  the  more  he  should  expect  from  the 
wisdom  and  the  prudence  of  the  Commissioners  them 
selves,  in  respecting  the  motives  of  secrecy  which  would 
not  yet  allow  the  King  to  recognize,  and  openly  declare, 
the  independence  of  the  United  States;  that  His  Majesty 
was  bound  by  the  closest  ties  to  the  King  of  Spain,  by  reason 
of  which  he  was  unwilling  to  make  any  engagement  to 
which  that  Prince  was  not  a  party  and  which  was  not  to 
be  executed  in  concert  with  him  ;  and  that  therefore,  while 
His  Majesty  declared  that  he  was  disposed  to  entertain 

1  Angleterre,  t.  526,  No.  60 :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  625. 


1777.]  AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.  311 

such  propositions  as  the  Commissioners  might  have  to 
make  to  him,  it  was  with  the  express  reservation  that 
nothing  should  be  concluded  without  the  assent  of  the 
King  his  uncle. 

There  can  be  no  reasonable  doubt  that  this  document 
was  prepared  with  the  full  knowledge  and  co-operation 
of  Dr.  Franklin  and  his  colleagues,  and  that  their  reply 
was  composed  with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary  of 
State ;  for  the  terms  of  the  latter  so  exactly  express  the 
arguments  of  M.  de  Yergennes,  in  language  so  closely 
resembling  that  used  by  him  in  other  documents  which 
relate  to  the  subject  at  that  period,  that  the  evidences  of 
concerted  action  are  distinctly  traceable  in  it.  It  served 
the  valuable  purpose  of  opening  negotiations  with  the 
United  States  upon  the  basis  of  an  urgent  demand  made 
by  the  Americans  themselves  that  their  long-neglected 
appeal  should  be  heard  ;  and  it  became  thus  the  vehicle 
by  which  to  convey  to_the  Court  of  Spain  a  new  presen 
tation  of  the  A  UK •!';,••  ^m|H^M|^^  ^8  bearing  upon  the 
interests  of  the  two  Crowns,  coupled  with  the  most  per 
suasive  solicitations  from  the  Cointe  de  Vergennes  that 
the  monarchies  should  now  unite  in  a  definite  policy  to 
ward  England ;  whilst  at  the  same  time  the  assurance 
contained  in  it  that  the  King  of  France  would  take  no 
step  without  the  approval  and  advice  of  his  uncle  was 
intended  to  exert  additional  influence  at  Madrid,  as  an 
evidence  of  the  good  faith  of  France. 

The  carefully  prepared  answer  of  the  Commissioners, 
which  supplements  the  note  addressed  to  them  by  the 
Secretary  of  State,  is  dated  two  days  later,  on  the  8th  of 
December,  1777.1  In  it  they  begged  leave  to  represent  to 
His  Excellency  the  Cointe  de  Vergennes  that  it  was  then 
nearly  a  year  since  they  had  had  the  honor  of  putting 
into  his  hands  the  propositions  of  Congress  for  a  treaty 

1  B.  Franklin,  Silas  Deane,  and  Arthur  Lee  to  the  Comte  de  Vergennes: 
Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  p.  444. 


312  ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FRANCE  [1777. 

of  amity  and  commerce,  requesting  also  the  aid  of  ships 
of  war,  and  offering  to  join  the  forces  of  the  United 
States  with  those  of  France  and  Spain  in  acting  against 
the  dominions  of  Great  Britain,  and  to  make  no  peace 
but  in  conjunction  with  those  Courts  if  Great  Britain 
should  declare  war  against  them,  to  all  which  they  had 
received  no  determinate  answer ;  but  that  they  were  ap 
prehensive  lest  a  continuance  of  this  state  of  uncertainty 
with  regard  to  those  propositions,  together  with  the  reports 
that  must  soon  be  spread  in  America  of  rigorous  treatment 
met  with  in  Spanish  and  French  ports,  should  give  ad 
vantage  to  the  enemy  in  making  ill  impressions  upon  the 
minds  of  the  American  people,  who,  from  the  secrecy  en 
joined  upon  the  Commissioners,  could  not  be  informed  of 
the  friendly  and  essential  aids  that  had  been  generously 
but  privately  afforded  them.  The  Commissioners  con 
ceived,  therefore,  that,  present  circumstances  considered, 
the  completing  of  such  a  treato^it  that  time  must  have 
the  most  happy  effect ^MMii^llple  credit  of  the  United 
States  abroad  and  stre^menmgtheir  resolution  at  home, 
as  well  as  in  discouraging  and  diminishing  their  internal 
enemies  and  in  confirming  their  friends  who  might  other 
wise  waver. 

"  And  the  Commissioners,"  they  added,  "  are  further 
of  opinion  that  the  aid  of  ships  desired  might  at  this 
juncture  be  employed  with  great  advantage  to  America, 
which  when  honored  with  a  conference  they  can  more 
particularly  explain.  They  therefore  request  Your  Ex 
cellency  most  earnestly  to  resume  the  consideration  of 
those  affairs,  and  appoint  them  some  speedy  day  of 
audience  thereupon." 

A  courier  was  despatched  immediately  by  M.  de  Ver- 
gennes  to  the  French  Embassy  at  Madrid  with  a  copy  of 
this  letter  from  the  Commissioners,  enclosed  in  a  personal 
communication  to  the  Ambassador,  in  which  he  directed 
him  to  present  the  subject  at  once  to  the  King's  attention, 


1777.]  AXD    THE    UXITED    STATES.  313 

assuring  him  that  the  French  Cabinet  regarded  the  situa 
tion  as  critical,  and  earnestly  soliciting  a  prompt  reply 
from  the  Government  of  Spain.1  The  appeal  was  a  strong 
one.  It  would  unquestionably  have  carried  conviction 
with  it  in  Spain  if  the  Spanish  ministry  had  been  open 
to  conviction,  and  if  the  Conde  de  Floridablanca  had 
been  willing  to  accept  upon  any  conditions  the  policy 
which  had  been  acceded  to  by  his  predecessor  in  the 
councils  of  the  King.  Spain  was  not  ready  for  war, 
however,  and  this  last  appeal  to  her  sympathies — for  it 
was  the  last  that  the  French  Secretary  of  State  made 
before  the  signing  of  the  treaty — met  with  the  same  re 
ception  that  had  been  accorded  to  the  former  representa 
tions  of  M.  de  Vergennes,  except  that,  possibly,  it  drew 
forth  a  more  distinct  declaration  from  the  Spanish  Pre 
mier,  who  now  said,  with  considerable  warmth,  that  if 
France  treated  with  the  Americans  her  act  would  lead  to 
war,  and  that  there  was  neither  an  object  to  be  gained  by 
making  war  at  that  timfc  nor  affixed  plan  for  carrying  it 
out.  He  would  not  accept  the  humiliation  of  England  as 
a  sufficient  basis  upon  which  the  two  monarchies  could 
begin  hostilities. 

In  the  mean  time,  events  were  progressing  with  rapidity 
at  Versailles ;  with  such  rapidity,  indeed,  that  before  the 
courier  could  return  from  Madrid  with  the  Spanish  reply, 
favorable  or  unfavorable  as  the  event  might  prove,  France 
had  committed  herself  to  the  United  States.  The  audi 
ence  which  the  Commissioners  had  asked  for  in  their  note 
to  M.  de  Vergennes  was  granted  them  on  the  12th  of  De 
cember,  four  days  later,  and  only  one  day  after  the  courier 
had  set  out  for  Madrid.  Dr.  Franklin  and  his  colleagues 
reported  it  to  Congress  on  the  18th,  in  replying  to  the 
despatches  which  had  announced  the  surrender  of  Bur- 
goyne,  which,  they  said,  had  "  apparently  occasioned  as 

1  Cointc  de  Vergennes  to  M.  de  Montmorin,  llth  December,  1777;  E.spagne, 
t.  587,  No.  99 :  cited  by  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  632. 


314  ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FRANCE  [1777. 

much  general  joy  in  France  as  if  it  had  been  a  victory 
of  their  own  troops  over  their  own  enemies."  l 

"We  took  the  opportunity,"  said  they,  "of  pressing  the  Min 
istry  by  a  short  memorial  to  the  conclusion  of  our  proposed  treaty, 
which  had  so  long  lain  under  their  consideration  and  been  from 
time  to  time  postponed.  A  meeting  was  had  accordingly  on  Fri 
day,  the  12th  instant,  in  which  some  difficulties  were  mentioned 
and  removed  ;  some  explanations  asked  and  given  to  satisfaction. 
As  the  concurrence  of  Spain  is  necessary,  we  were  told  that  a 
courier  should  be  despatched  the  next  day  to  obtain  it,  which  we 
are  since  assured  was  done  ;  and  in  three  weeks  from  the  time  the 
answer  is  expected.2 

"  On  signifying  to  the  Ministry  the  importance  it  might  be  of 
at  this  juncture — when  probably  Britain  would  make  some  propo 
sitions  of  accommodation — that  the  Congress  should  be  informed 
explicitly  what  might  be  expected  from  France  and  Spain,  M. 
Gerard,  one  of  the  Secretaries,  came  yesterday  to  inform  us, 
by  order  of  the  King,  that,  after  long  and  full  consideration  of 
our  aifairs  and  propositions  in  Council,  it  was  decided,  and  His 
Majesty  was  determined,  to  acknowledge  our  independence,  and 
make  a  Treaty  with  us  of  amity  and  commerce  ;  that  in  this  Treaty 
no  advantage  would  be  taken  of  our  present  situation  to  obtain 
terms  from  us  which  otherwise  would  not  be  convenient  for  us 
to  agree  to ;  His  Majesty  desiring  that  the  Treaty,  once  made, 
should  be  durable,  and  our  amity  subsist  forever,  which  could  not 
be  expected  if  each  nation  did  not  find  its  interest  in  the  continu 
ance,  as  well  as  in  the  commencement  of  it.  It  was  therefore  his 
intention  that  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  should  be  such  as  we  might 
be  willing  to  agree  to  if  our  State  had  been  long  since  established 
and  in  the  fulness  of  strength  and  power,  and  such  as  we  shall 
approve  of  when  that  time  shall  come ;  that  His  Majesty  was 
fixed  in  his  determination  not  only  to  acknowledge,  but  to  sup 
port,  our  independence  by  every  means  in  his  power  ;  that  in 
doing  this  he  might  probably  soon  be  engaged  in  war,  with  all  the 
expenses,  risk,  and  damage  usually  attending  it,  yet  he  should  not 
expect  any  compensation  from  us  on  that  account,  nor  pretend 
that  he  acted  wholly  for  our  sakes ;  since,  besides  his  real  good 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  452. 

2  A  second  courier  was  sent  to  Madrid,  on  the  13th  of  December,  to  inform 
M.  de  Montmorin  of  this  interview.     Espagne,  t.  587,  No.  101 :  Doniol,  La 
Participation  de  la  France,  ii.  037. 


1778.]  AND    THE    UNITED    STATES.  315 

will  to  us  and  our  cause,  it  was  manifestly  the  interest  of  France 
that  the  power  of  England  should  be  diminished  by  our  separa 
tion  from  it.  .  .  .  That,  as  soon  as  the  courier  returned  from 
Spain  with  the  concurrence  expected,  the  affair  would  be  pro 
ceeded  in  and  concluded  ;  and  of  this  we  might  give  the  Congress 
the  strongest  assurances  in  our  despatches,  only  cautioning  them 
to  keep  the  whole  for  the  present  a  dead  secret,  as  Spain  had 
three  reasons  for  not  immediately  declaring  :  her  money  fleet  not 
yet  come  home,  her  Brazil  army  and  fleet  the  same,  and  her  peace 
with  Portugal  not  yet  quite  completed  ;  but  these  obstacles  would 
probably  soon  be  removed." 

It  is  evident  that  the  Commissioners  and  the  Cabinet 
were  in  complete  accord  at  that  time ;  and  this  docu 
ment,  which  constitutes  a  valuable  page  of  the  history  of 
the  United  States,  shows  how  thoroughly  they  were  ac 
quainted  with  the  negotiations  that  were  then  being  car 
ried  forward  with  Spain,  as  well  as  with  the  discussions 
upon  the  situation  that  were  constantly  taking  place  in 
the  King's  Council.  The  echoes  of  these  are  distinctly 
heard  between  Versailles  and  Madrid,  and  prove  how 
deliberately  the  Government  of  France  entered  into  the 
treaty  with  the  United  States,  after  mature  consideration, 
in  which  the  King  was  finally  brought  to  decide  that  he 
would  make  us  his  allies,  and  that  through  us  he  would 
be  enabled  to  wreak  his  revenge  upon  the  ancient  enemy 
of  his  house. 

There  was  no  deception  as  to  the  motives  of  France. 
Franklin  and  those  with  him  knew  perfectly  well  what 
were  the  causes  of  the  hostility  that  existed  between  her 
and  the  kingdom  of  Great  Britain,  and  they  understood 
how  these  causes  might  be  made  to  serve  the  interests  of 
the  United  States  of  America.  That  France  came  into 
our  Revolution  for  reasons  of  policy  which  were  satisfac 
tory  to  her  King  and  to  his  Cabinet,  and  which  were  strong 
enough  to  make  them  assume  the  burden  and  danger  of 
another  war,  was  manifest  to  the  Commissioners,  and  they 
so  declared  it  to  Congress  and  to  the  nation.  But  what 


316        ALLIANCE    BETWEEN    FRANCE   AND    AMERICA.       [1778. 

these  American  patriots  expressed  their  gratitude  for,  and 
what  it  is  for  us  in  our  day,  as  well  as  for  Americans 
yet  to  come,  to  remember  always  to  the  honor  of  France, 
is,  that  she  did  enter  into  our  struggle,  that  she  did 
give  us  her  aid  when  we  needed  it,  and  that,  no  matter 
what  her  own  private  interests  may  have  been,  it  was 
her  participation  in  the  War  of  Independence  that  made 
American  liberty  possible  in  the  eighteenth  century. 

The  couriers  having  returned  from  Spain  without  the 
assent  of  that  Government,  the  King  of  France  decided 
to  wait  no  longer ;  and  on  the  8th  of  February  Benjamin 
Franklin  and  Silas  Deane  wrote  to  the  President  of  Con 
gress,1  "  We  have  now  the  great  satisfaction  of  acquainting 
you  and  the  Congress  that  the  Treaties  with  France  are  at 
length  completed  and  signed. " 

The  treaties  of  commerce  and  alliance  were  signed  on 
the  6th  of  February,  1778. 

1  Diplomatic  Correspondence,  Wharton,  ii.  490. 


1778.]  VALLEY    FORGE    AND    BARREN    HILL.  317 


CHAPTER    X. 

LA  FAYETTE  AT  VALLEY  FORGE  AND  BARREN  HILL. 

No  event  had  taken  place  since  the  outbreak  of  the 
war  which  gave  so  great  a  degree  of  encouragement  to 
the  American  people  as  the  signing  of  the  treaties  of 
commerce  and  alliance  between  France  and  the  United 
States.  No  single  incident  in  the  course  of  the  struggle 
with  Great  Britain  so  clearly  foreshadowed  the  ultimate 
establishment  of  independence  as  did  this  acknowledg 
ment  of  the  political  existence  of  the  American  Gove/n- 
ment  by  one  of  the  foremost  Powers  of  the  world ;  arid  it 
is  hardly  possible  to  overestimate  the  value  of  the  imme 
diate  influence  which  it  exerted  at  home  and  abroad,  or 
of  the  part  which  it  contributed  to  the  final  result.  '  It 
stimulated  the  whole  country  to  renewed  efforts  to  bear  a 
burden  which  was  fast  becoming  too  heavy  for  its  waning 
strength  ;  and  in  the  new  hope  which  this  helping  hand 
held  forth  to  a  courageous  people,  it  cfcsed  the  door  for 
ever  against  the  offers  of  conciliation  which  the  British 
ministry  were  making  at  that  very  moment,  willing  then 
to  grant  all  the  claims  of  right  which  had  been  asserted 
by  the  Colonists  at  the  outset.  Thenceforward  the  nature 
of  the  contest  was  changed  in  the  eyes  of  the  European 
Powers  who  had  been  watching  its  progress ;  and  the 
conflict  which,  but  the  year  before,  had  been  the  cause, 
amoSg  the  petty  German  princes,  of  hiring  or  ^soiling 
their  subjects  to  Great  Britain  for  the  suppression,  as  it 
was  said,  of  a  mutiny  in  America,  now  became  a  war 
between  the  British  monarchy  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
American  people  and  the  King  of  France  on  the  other. 


318  LA    FAYETTE    AT    VALLEY    FORGE  [1778. 

The  alliance  with  France  assured  the  independence  of 
the  United  States ;  this  was  one  of  the  conditions  upon 
which  the  treaty  was  based ;  and,  although  it  was  evident 
that  England  would  not  yield  readily,  and  that  the  war 
must  still  go  on,  possibly  with  increased  bitterness,  yet 
its  character  would  henceforth  be  essentially  different. 
The  existence  of  the  nation  had  been  substantially  estab 
lished. 

The  news  of  the  treaties,  brought  by  Mr.  Simeon 
Deane  from  France,  was  received  with  the  greatest  ex 
ultation  in  America.  The  despatches  were  delivered  by 
him  on  Saturday,  the  2d  of  May,  1778,  after  Congress 
had  adjourned  ;  but  the  House  was  immediately  convened, 
in  order  that  the  joyful  tidings  might  be  published  at 
once,  and  on  the  following  Monday  the  treaties  were 
ratified  by  Congress;  after  which,  in  the  overflow  of 
happiness  at  the  event,  they  were  published,  in  forget- 
fulness  of  the  proper  diplomatic  consideration  which  would 
have  required  the  consent  of  both  contracting  parties  to 
such  a  proceeding. 

The  celebrations  which  followed  produced  a  holiday 
even  amid  the  desolation  of  Valley  Forge.  General 
Washington  gave  a  dinner  at  the  head-quarters  in  honor 
of  the  event,  and  .great  rejoicings  took  place  throughout 
the  army,  with  toasts  and  songs  andfeux  dejoie.  A  letter 
of  Mr.  Robert  Morris  to  General  Washington,  on  the  9th 
of  May,  reflects  the  universal  sentiment:  "When  I  con 
gratulate  your  Excellency  on  the  great  good  news  lately 
received  from  France,  you  will  not  expect  me  to  express 
my  feelings.  Were  I  in  your  company,  my  countenance 
might  show,  but  my  pen  cannot  describe  them.  Most 
sincerely  do  I  give  you  joy.  Our  independence  ift  un 
doubtedly  secured  ;  our  country  must  be  free." 

To  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  this  news  brought  un- 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  357,  note. 


1778.]  AND    BARREN   HILL.  319 

bounded  pleasure.  It  was  the  fulfilment  of  his  most 
ardent  hopes ;  it  filled  him  with  pride  at  the  thought  that 
his  countrymen  were  engaged  in  the  cause  of  American 
Independence,  to  which  he  himself  was  devoted.  It  jus 
tified,  to  some  extent,  at  least,  his  own  action  in  leaving 
France,  and  gave  him  reason  to  believe  that  his  conduct 
was  now  approved  at  home,  perhaps  even  that  it  had  had 
some  influence  in  guiding  public  sentiment  toward  Amer 
ica.  Above  all,  however,  was  the  joy  in  his  heart  which 
came  from  the  feeling  that  now  the  cause  of  the  United 
States  was  the  cause  of  France  ;  for  before  everything 
else  in  the  world  La  Fayette  was  a  Frenchman.  He 
would  never  have  left  his  country  if  there  had  been  an 
opportunity  for  him  to  go  into  active  service  at  home  in 
the  practice  of  his  profession ;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that 
he  would  rather  have  gone  to  war  as  a  subordinate  in  the 
armies  of  France  than  to  have  accepted  even  the  highest 
rank  in  any  other  country.  But  now  that  it  seemed 
likely  that  he  could  serve  France  in  America,  in  company 
also  with  his  own  countrymen  and  comrades  in  arms,  in 
a  war  of  revenge  against  the  enemy  whom  all  French 
men  hated  most  of  all  their  enemies,  he  felt  that  this  was 
an  event  of  crowning  good  fortune,  than  which  nothing 
could  give  him  greater  happiness  or  satisfaction.  Im 
mediately  upon  the  arrival  of  the  news  in  the  camp,  on 
the  2d  of  May,  he  collected  all  the  other  French  officers 
about  him  and  joined  with  them  in  the  celebration  of  the 
event.1  A  few  days  later,  he  had  the  distinguished  honor 
of  commanding  a  part  of  the  army  on  the  occasion  of  the 
grand  review  which  General  Washington  held  at  Valley 
Forge  in  honor  of  the  treaties.  This  review  was  made 
still  more  impressive  by  the  character  given  it  as  an  act 
of  national  thanksgiving  and  of  reverent  acknowledg 
ment  of  the  divine  goodness  toward  the  people  of  the 


Meinoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  46. 


320  LA    FAYETTE    AT    VALLEY    FORGE  [1778. 

United  States  in  the  assurance  of  their  liberties  vouch 
safed  to  them  through  the  alliance  with  France. 

The  Commander-in-Chief  issued  a  general  order  at 
Valley  Forge,  on  the  6th  of  May,  as  follows : 1 

* l  It  having  pleased  the  Almighty  Ruler  of  the  Universe  to  de 
fend  the  cause  of  the  United  American  States,  and  finally  to  raise 
us  up  a  powerful  friend  among  the  princes  of  the  earth,  to  estab 
lish  our  liberty  and  independency  upon  a  lasting  foundation ;  it 
becomes  us  to  set  apart  a  day  for  gratefully  acknowledging  the 
divine  goodness,  and  celebrating  the  important  event,  which  we 
owe  to  his  divine  interposition.  The  several  brigades  are  to  be 
assembled  for  this  purpose  at  nine  o'clock  to-morrow  morning, 
when  their  chaplains  will  communicate  the  intelligence  contained 
in  the  Postscript  of  the  Pennsylvania  Gazette  of  the  2nd  instant, 
and  offer  up  thanksgiving,  and  deliver  a  discourse  suitable  to  the 
occasion.  At  half  after  ten  o'  clock  a  cannon  will  be  fired,  which 
is  to  be  a  signal  for  the  men  to  be  under  arms  ;  the  brigade  inspec 
tors  will  then  inspect  their  dress  and  arms  and  form  the  battalions 
according  to  the  instructions  given  them,  and  announce  to  the 
commanding  officers  of  the  brigade  that  the  battalions  are  formed. 

"The  commanders  of  brigades  will  then  appoint  the  field- 
officers  to  the  battalions,  after  which  each  battalion  will  be 
ordered  to  load  and  ground  their  arms.  At  half  past  eleven  a 
second  cannon  will  be  fired  as  a  signal  for  the  march,  upon  which 
the  several  brigades  will  begin  their  march  by  wheeling  to  the 
right  by  platoons,  and  proceed  by  the  nearest  way  to  the  left 
of  their  ground  by  the  new  position  ;  this  will  be  pointed  out 
by  the  brigade  inspectors.  A  third  signal  will  then  be  given,  on 
which  there  will  be  a  discharge  of  thirteen  cannon  ;  after  which 
a  running  fire  of  the  infantry  will  begin  on  the  right  of  Wood- 
ford's,  and  continue  throughout  the  front  line ;  it  will  then  be 
taken  up  on  the  left  of  the  second  line  and  continue  to  the  right. 
Upon  a  signal  given,  the  whole  army  will  huzza.  Long  live  the 
King  of  France;  the  artillery  then  begins  again  and  fires  thirteen 
rounds  ;  this  will  be  succeeded  by  a  second  general  discharge  of 
the  musketry  in  a  running  fire,  and  huzza,  Long  live  the  friendly 
European  Powers.  The  last  discharge  of  thirteen  pieces  of  artillery 
will  be  given,  followed  by  a  general  running  fire,  and  huzza,  The 
American  States." 


Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  355  :  from  the  Orderly  Book. 


1778.]  AXD    BARREN    HILL.  321 

This  manoeuvre  was  successfully  carried  out ;  and  the 
army  is  said  to  have  presented  a  brilliant  appearance. 
Major-General  Lord  Stirling  commanded  on  the  right, 
the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  on  the  left,  and  the  Baron 
de  Kalb  on  the  second  line  ;  and  upon  the  following  day 
General  Washington  announced  in  a  general  order, — 

"The  Couiraander-in-Chief  takes  great  pleasure  in  acquainting 
the  army  that  its  conduct  yesterday  afforded  him  the  highest  sat 
isfaction.  The  exactness  and  order  with  which  all  its  movements 
were  formed,  is  a  pleasing  evidence  of  the  progress  it  has  made 
in  military  improvement,  and  of  the  perfection  to  which  it  may 
arrive  by  a  continuance  of  that  laudable  zeal  which  now  so  hap 
pily  prevails.  The  General,  at  the  same  time,  presents  his  thanks 
to  Baron  Steuben,  and  the  gentlemen  acting  under  him,  for  their 
exertions  in  the  duties  of  their  office,  the  good  effects  of  which 
are  already  apparent,  and  for  the  care,  activity,  and  propriety 
with  which  they  conducted  the  business  of  yesterday. " 

This  period  marks  an  interesting  change  in  the  disci 
pline  of  the  American  troops  which  was  due  to  the  per 
severance  and  instruction  of  the  Baron  Steuben,  whose 
labors  transformed  the  untaught  masses  of  militia  and 
Continental  soldiers  at  Valley  Forge  from  what  was,  in 
fact,  little  more  than  an  aggregation  of  men  totally  igno 
rant  of  discipline  in  the  military  sense,  without  order, 
without  uniformity  of  movement,  without  system  in  its 
organization  or  government,  without  any  kind  of  instruc 
tion  except  such  as  related  to  forming  or  changing  front 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  into  a  trained  and  organized 
force.  It  is  one  of  the  strangest  features  of  the  American 
Revolution  that,  in  spite  of  all  their  defects,  these  men 
had  frequently  gone  into  battle  and  had  fought  with  the 
superior  forces  of  British  and  Germans  to  whom  they 
were  opposed,  with  results  that  cannot  be  regarded  as  other 
than  extraordinary  by  any  one  who  carefully  studies  the 
progress  of  the  war.  It  was  incomprehensible  to  foreign 
observers,  accustomed  to  the  order  and  discipline  and 

VOL.  I.— 21 


322  LA   FAYETTE   AT   VALLEY    FORGE  [1778. 

scrupulously  careful  preparation  for  fighting  in  the 
armies  of  Europe.  It  appeared  to  foreign  military  men 
like  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Senor  Galves,  the  Span 
ish  Governor  of  Louisiana,  commented  upon  this  with 
amusement  and  wonder  in  writing  a  despatch  to  his  Gov 
ernment.  "  Up  to  this  time/'  said  he,  "  we  have  always 
supposed  that  troops  should  be  disciplined  and  equipped 
before  going  into  battle,  but  what  has  happened  here  dis 
proves  this  theory ;  for  the  Americans,  by  their  courage 
alone,  without  training  and  without  breeches,  have  whipped 
the  British  who  had  both."  x 

When  Baron  Steuben  arrived  at  the  camp  at  Valley 
Forge,  in  February,  1778,  he  found  it  in  a  deplorable 
state.  His  own  relation  of  it  informs  us,2 — 

"The  effective  strength  of  the  army  was  divided  into  divisions, 
commanded  by  major-generals  ;  into  brigades,  commanded  by  brig 
adier-generals  ;  and  into  regiments,  commanded  by  colonels.  The 
number  of  men  in  a  regiment  was  fixed  by  Congress  as  well  as  in 
a  company — so  many  infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery.  But  the 
eternal  ebb  and  flow  of  men  engaged  for  three,  six,  and  nine 
months,  who  went  and  came  every  day,  rendered  it  impossible  to 
have  either  a  regiment  or  a  company  complete ;  and  the  words 
company,  regiment,  brigade,  and  division  were  so  vague  that  they 
did  not  convey  any  idea  upon  which  to  form  a  calculation,  eithei 
of  a  particular  corps  or  of  the  army  in  general.  They  were  so 
unequal  in  their  number  that  it  would  have  been  impossible  to 
execute  any  manoeuvres.  Sometimes  a  regiment  was  stronger 
than  a  brigade.  I  have  seen  a  regiment  consisting  of  thirty  men, 
and  a  company  of  one  corporal.  .  .  .  Not  only  the  clothes  but  the 
arms  were  carried  off  by  those  who  had  completed  their  term  of 
service.  General  Knox  assured  me  that,  previous  to  the  estab 
lishment  of  my  department,  there  never  was  a  campaign  in  which 
the  military  magazines  did  not  furnish  from  five  thousand  to 
eight  thousand  muskets  to  replace  those  which  were  lost  in  the 
way  I  have  described  above.  The  loss  of  bayonets  was  still 
greater.  The  American  soldier,  never  having  used  this  arm,  had 

1  Comte  de  Montmorin  to  M.  de  Vergennes,  1st  June,  1778  ;  Espagne,  t. 
589,  No.  98  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  261. 

2  Kapp,  Life  of  Steuben,  p.  115. 


1778.]  AND    BARREN    HILL.  323 

no  faith  in  it,  and  never  used  it  bnt  to  roast  his  beefsteak,  and 
indeed  often  left  it  at  home.  ...  No  captain  kept  a  book.  Ac 
counts  were  never  furnished  or  required.  .  .  .  The  arms  at  Valley 
Forge  were  in  a  horrible  condition,  covered  with  rust,  half  of 
them  without  bayonets,  many  from  which  a  single  shot  could  not 
be  fired.  The  pouches  were  quite  as  bad  as  the  arms.  A  great 
many  of  the  men  had  tin  boxes  instead  of  pouches,  others  had 
cow-horns;  and  muskets,  carbines,  fowling-pieces,  and  rifles  were 
seen  in  the  same  company. 

"The  description  of  the  dress  is  easily  given.  The  men  were 
literally  naked,  some  of  them  in  the  fullest  extent  of  the  word. 
The  officers  who  had  coats  had  them  of  every  color  and  make. 
I  saw  officers,  at  a  grand  parade  at  Valley  Forge,  mounting  guard 
in  a  sort  of  dressing-gown,  made  of  an  old  blanket  or  woollen  bed 
cover.  With  regard  to  their  military  discipline,  I  may  safely  say 
no  such  thing  existed.  In  the  first  place,  there  was  no  regular 
formation.  A  so-called  regiment  was  formed  of  three  platoons, 
another  of  five,  eight,  nine,  and  the  Canadian  regiment  of  twenty- 
one.  The  formation  of  the  regiments  was  as  varied  as  their  mode 
of  drill,  which  consisted  only  of  the  manual  exercise.  Each  colo 
nel  had  a  system  of  his  own,  the  one  according  to  the  English, 
the  other  according  to  the  Prussian  or  the  French  style.  .  .  .  The 
greater  part  of  the  captains  had  no  roll  of  their  companies,  and 
had  no  idea  how  many  men  they  had  under  their  orders.  When  I 
asked  a  colonel  the  strength  of  his  regiment,  the  usual  reply  was, 
'Something  between  two  and  three  hundred  men.'  " 


It  is  startling  to  read  the  account  of  the  internal  weak 
ness  and  lack  of  preparation  of  this  Continental  army,  to 
whose  steady  courage  and  endurance  through  this  time  of 
suffering  and  trial  we  owe  so  great  a  debt  of  gratitude ;  it 
is  a  story  which  none  of  us  would  accept  but  for  the  fact 
that  it  comes  from  an  authority  which  we  have  no  right 
to  question.  Baron  Steuben  brought  to  his  task  a  long 
experience  in  military  affairs  and  a  knowledge  acquired 
in  the  war  school  of  Frederick  the  Great,  through  which 
he  succeeded,  by  dint  of  untiring  personal  application 
and  extraordinary  earnestness  of  purpose  in  his  under 
taking,  in  establishing  order,  uniformity,  and  method,  as 
well  as  strictness  of  discipline,  among  the  troops.  One 


324  LA    FAYETTE   AT    VALLEY    FORGE  [1778. 

of  the  first  results  of  his  training  was  the  excellent  bear 
ing  of  the  men  at  the  grand  review  at  Valley  Forge,  to 
which  General  Washington  referred  with  evident  satis 
faction  in  his  general  order  of  the  8th  of  May,  quoted 
above. 

In  the  midst  of  the  rejoicings  over  the  news  from  France, 
General  Washington  was  not  blind  to  the  fact  that  there 
remained  much  to  be  done  in  America  before  the  war 
could  be  ended  by  the  acknowledgment  in  England  of  the 
independence  of  the  United  States.1  His  belief  was  that, 
although  it  might  be  taken  for  granted  that  the  British 
force  could  not  be  greatly  strengthened  by  new  troops, 
which  under  present  circumstances  were  not  likely  to  be 
sent  out  from  England,  yet  their  remaining  strength  would 
be  dangerous  if  it  should  be  concentrated  and  properly 
directed  in  the  ensuing  campaign.  From  certain  move 
ments  lately  reported  to  him,  notably  the  sailing  from  Phil 
adelphia  of  two  hundred  transport-vessels,  he  judged  that 
it  might  be  General  Howe's  purpose  to  evacuate  Rhode 
Island  and  move  the  troops  from  there  to  New  York  to 
operate  along  the  Hudson  River,  or  possibly  to  use  them 
in  reinforcing  Philadelphia ;  in  which  latter  event  the 
army  at  Valley  Forge  would  need  to  be  strengthened 
immediately.  With  this  object  in  view,  he  summoned 
a  council  of  war  at  Valley  Forge,  on  the  8th  of  May,  at 
which  were  present  Major-Generals  Gates,  Greene,  Stir 
ling,  Mifflin,  La  Fayette,  de  Kalb,  Armstrong,  and  Steu- 
ben,  with  Brigadier-Generals  Knox  and  du  Portail.2  The 
Commander-in-Chief  laid  before  the  council  the  state  of 
the  enemy's  forces,  which  he  estimated  at  something  more 
than  sixteen  thousand  men ;  of  these  about  ten  thousand 
were  in  Philadelphia,  four  thousand  in  New  York,  and 
about  two  thousand  in  Rhode  Island.  Of  the  Continental 

1  Letters  to  Major-General  Heath,  5th  May,  1778,  and  to  Major-General 
McDougall,  same  date  :  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  356,  359. 

2  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  360,  note. 


1778.]  AND    BARREN    HILL.  325 

troops  there  were  at  Valley  Forge  about  eleven  thousand 
eight  hundred  men,  including  the  sick  ;  and  the  other  de 
tachments  at  Wilmington  and  upon  the  Hudson  River, 
with  reinforcements  that  might  reasonably  be  counted 
upon,  would  swell  the  number  of  effective  troops  to 
twenty  thousand.  Thereupon  the  council  was  requested 
to  decide  what  measures  it  would  be  best  to  pursue. 

"  After  a  full  and  unreserved  discussion,  it  was  the 
unanimous  opinion  of  the  council,  that  the  line  of  conduct 
most  consistent  with  sound  policy,  and  best  suited  to  pro 
mote  the  interests  and  safety  of  the  United  States,  was  to 
remain  on  the  defensive  and  wait  events,  and  not  attempt 
any  offensive  operation  against  the  enemy,  till  circum 
stances  should  afford  a  fairer  opportunity  of  striking  a 
successful  blow.  As  the  enemy  were  strongly  fortified  by 
nature,  and  by  artificial  works,  in  all  their  positions,  it 
would  require  a  greatly  superior  force  to  attack  them, 
with  any  hope  of  a  favorable  issue.  It  was  agreed  that  to 
take  Philadelphia  by  storm  was  impracticable,  and  that 
thirty  thousand  men  would  be  requisite  for  a  blockade. 
The  Continental  force  could  not  be  so  much  increased 
by  the  militia,  even  if  that  description  of  troops  could 
be  relied  on  for  such  an  enterprise.  In  short,  strong  ob 
jections  were  believed  to  exist  against  all  offensive  move 
ments."  Consequently,  it  was  decided  to  remain  quietly 
at  Valley  Forge  for  the  present,  at  least,  and  await  the 
development  of  the  enemy's  plans. 

It  became  more  evident  each  day,  in  the  mean  time, 
from  all  information  that  General  Washington  could  ob 
tain,  that  the  British  were  contemplating  some  movement 
of  importance ;  and,  as  the  days  wore  on,  he  concluded, 
rightly,  as  it  afterward  proved,  that  their  purpose  was  to 
evacuate  Philadelphia, — a  step  which  now  became  all  the 
more  probable  because  of  the  announcement  of  the  treat 
ies  with  France.  For,  if  a  French  fleet  were  to  enter  the 
Delaware  River  and  cut  off  the  communication  by  sea, 


326  LA    FAYETTE    AT    VALLEY    FOKGE  [1778. 

and  if  a  sufficient  force  were  to  be  landed  along  the  river 
bank  to  co-operate  with  the  Continental  army  at  Valley 
Forge,  which  could  have  been  considerably  reinforced  in 
case  of  necessity,  —  as  we  have  seen  by  the  statements 
made  at  the  council  of  war,  —  the  situation  of  General 
Howe  would  become  at  once  exceedingly  dangerous  and 
embarrassing.  In  this  connection  General  Washington 
concluded  to  send  out  a  detachment  toward  the  enemy's 
lines  at  Philadelphia,  for  the  purpose  of  watching  their 
movements  and  of  keeping  the  army  informed  in  the 
event  of  their  attempting  to  execute  any  contemplated 
design,  as  well  as  to  harass  and  annoy  them  if  an  oppor 
tunity  should  offer  itself  whilst  the  British  were  retreat 
ing.  He  selected  a  force  for  this  purpose  from  among  his 
most  reliable  troops,  and  appointed  the  Marquis  cle  La 
Fayette  to  take  command  of  the  expedition,  —  a  mark  of 
confidence  which  not  only  proves  the  esteem  in  which  the 
Commander-in-Chief  held  La  Fayette,  but  also  shows 
that  he  valued  his  judgment  as  a  commander,  and  his 
military  skill,  sufficiently  to  intrust  to  him  the  carrying 
out  of  a  delicate  manoeuvre  in  the  face  of  the  enemy, 
and  to  send  with  him  a  body  of  men  whom  he  could  not 
afford,  under  any  circumstances,  to  have  weakened  or  de 
stroyed.  This  gave  La  Fayette  an  opportunity  to  show 
his  coolness  and  self-possession  in  the  midst  of  danger, 
and  his  skill  in  extricating  himself  from  difficulty,  quite 
as  well  as  any  other  performance  of  his  during  the  war  ; 
and  it  won  for  him  a  special  commendation  from  the 
General  in  a  letter  written  afterward  to  Congress. 

The  instructions  given  to  La  Fayette  by  General 
Washington  when  he  was  appointed  to  this  enterprise 
were  as  follows  :  l 


,  —  The  detachment   under  your  command,   with  which 
you  will  immediately  march  towards  the  enemy's  lines,  is  de- 

1  Sparks,  Writing?  of  Washington,  v.  368. 


1778.]  AND    BARREN    HILL.  327 

signed  to  answer  the  following  purposes ;  namely,  to  be  a  secu 
rity  to  this  canip  and  a  cover  to  the  country  between  the  Del 
aware  and  the  Schuylkill,  to  interrupt  the  communication  with 
Philadelphia,  to  obstruct  the  incursions  of  the  enemy's  par 
ties,  and  to  obtain  intelligence  of  their  motions  and  designs. 
This  last  is  a  matter  of  very  interesting  moment,  and  ought  to 
claim  your  particular  attention.  You  will  endeavour  to  pro 
cure  trusty  and  intelligent  spies,  who  will  advise  you  faithfully 
of  whatever  may  be  passing  in  the  city,  and  you  will  without 
delay  communicate  to  me  every  piece  of  material  information 
you  obtain. 

"  A  variety  of  concurring  accounts  make  it  probable,  that  the 
enemy  are  preparing  to  evacuate  Philadelphia.  This  is  a  point, 
which  it  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  ascertain  ;  and,  if  possible, 
the  place  of  their  future  destination.  Should  you  be  able  to  gain 
certain  intelligence  of  the  time  of  their  intended  embarkation,  so 
that  you  may  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  it,  and  fall  upon  the 
rear  of  the  enemy  in  the  act  of  withdrawing,  it  will  be  a  very  de 
sirable  event.  But  this  will  be  a  matter  of  no  small  difficulty, 
and  will  require  the  greatest  caution  and  prudence  in  the  execu 
tion.  Any  deception  or  precipitation  may  be  attended  with  the 
most  disastrous  consequences. 

"You  will  remember,  that  your  detachment  is  a  very  valuable 
one,  and  that  any  accident  happening  to  it  would  be  a  very 
severe  blow  to  this  army.  You  will  therefore  use  every  possible 
precaution  for  its  security,  and  to  guard  against  a  surprise.  Xo 
attempt  should  be  made,  nor  any  thing  risked,  without  the 
greatest  prospect  of  success,  and  with  every  reasonable  advan 
tage  on  your  side.  I  shall  not  point  out  any  precise  position 
to  you  ;  but  shall  leave  it  to  your  discretion  to  take  such  posts 
occasionally  as  shall  appear  to  you  best  adapted  to  the  purposes 
of  your  detachment.  In  general,  I  would  observe,  that  a  sta 
tionary  post  is  unadvisable,  as  it  gives  the  enemy  an  opportunity 
of  knowing  your  situation,  and  concerting  plans  successfully 
against  you.  In  case  of  any  offensive  movement  against  this 
army,  you  will  keep  yourself  in  such  a  state  as  to  have  an  easy 
communication  with  it,  and  at  the  same  time  harass  the  enemy's 
advance. 

"Our  parties  of  horse  and  foot  between  the  rivers  are  to  be 
under  your  command,  and  to  form  part  of  your  detachment.  As 
great  complaints  have  been  made  of  the  disorderly  conduct  of  the 
parties,  which  have  been  sent  towards  the  enemy's  lines,  it  is  ex 
pected  that  you  will  be  very  attentive  in  preventing  abuses  of  the 


328  LA    FAYETTE   AT    VALLEY    FORGE  [1778. 

like  nature,  and  will  inquire  how  far  complaints  already  made  are 
founded  in  justice. 

"Given  under  my  hand,  at  Head  Quarters,  this  18th  day  of 
May,  1778. » 

La  Fayette  accordingly  left  camp  on  the  18th  of 
May,  with  about  twenty-two  hundred  men.  One  part  of 
these  was  led  by  General  Poor ;  another  part  consisted  of 
about  six  hundred  Pennsylvania  militia,  under  General 
Potter ;  there  was  also  the  independent  company  of  Cap 
tain  Alan  MacLean,  as  well  as  about  fifty  Iroquois  Indians. 
He  had,  as  his  force  of  artillery,  five  pieces  of  cannon. 

He  crossed  the  Schuylkill  River  at  Swede's  Ford  and 
advanced  about  twelve  miles  along  the  eastern  bank,  fol 
lowing  what  is  known  as  the  Ridge  Road,  to  a  point  very 
near  the  eleventh  mile-stone  from  the  city  of  Philadelphia, 
where  there  was  a  little  hamlet,  called  Barren  Hill,  with 
a  church  and  a  graveyard,  upon  the  high  ground  of  the 
ridge  between  the  Valley  of  the  Schuylkill  and  the 
country  to  the  eastward  which  drains  into  the  Delaware 
River.  From  it  the  Ridge  Road  runs  almost  due  south 
to  Philadelphia,  while  to  the  east  there  is  a  road  which 
leads  to  White  Marsh  and  to  Chestnut  Hill,  and  another 
going  in  a  southeasterly  direction  to  Germantown  ;  on  the 
west,  by  a  very  easy  descent,  a  road  ran  through  Spring 
Mill  to  Matson's  Ford  of  the  Schuylkill  River,  at  the 
present  town  of  Conshohocken,  some  three  miles  north 
westerly  from  Barren  Hill.  This  position,  therefore,  was 
extremely  well  suited  to  the  purposes  of  La  Fayette's  ex 
pedition  ;  because,  whilst  it  afforded  an  opportunity  of 
taking  up  an  advantageous  position  in  case  of  attack,  it 
permitted  reconnoissances  to  be  made  with  ease  in  any 
direction,  either  toward  the  city,  or  through  the  country 
lying  near  the  Delaware,  or  along  the  slope  of  the  river 
bank  on  the  Schuylkill  side,  and  it  admitted  the  prompt 
and  effective  execution  of  a  military  operation  in  case  of 
necessity,  as  the  young  general  found  afterward,  to  his 


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1778.]  AND    BARREN    HILL.  329 

great  good  fortune.     La  Fayette  saw  the  advantages  of 
this  situation,  and  selected  it  with  excellent  judgment. 

Drawing  up  his  troops  upon  a  small  prominence  to  the 
west  of  the  Ridge  Road,  just  south  of  the  hamlet  of  Bar 
ren  Hill,  in  a  position  which  commanded  admirably  the 
approaches  along  the  highway  from  Philadelphia,  he  pro 
tected  his  right  wing  by  the  abrupt  descent  which  made 
it  inaccessible  from  the  side  toward  the  Schuylkill,  whilst 
his  left  rested  upon  a  stretch  of  forest  in  front  of  which 
were  one  or  two  substantial  stone  houses,  which  could 
be  made  to  serve  as  fortifications  in  case  of  need.  Well 
in  advance  of  his  line  he  placed  his  five  pieces  of  cannon ; 
and  beyond  these,  again,  in  the  direction  of  Philadelphia, 
were  pickets  who  guarded  the  highway  for  two  miles, 
Captain  MacLean's  company,  which  performed  this  ser 
vice,  having  pushed  forward  as  far  as  the  ninth  mile-stone 
from  the  city,  accompanied  by  the  Iroquois  warriors, 
whose  methods  of  warfare  made  them  exceedingly  useful 
in  this  case  as  scouts.  As  his  command  was  now  secured 
against  sudden  attack  upon  his  front  and  to  his  right,  it 
remained  for  General  La  Fayette  to  protect  his  left  flank 
against  surprise  from  the  direction  of  White  Marsh  and 
Chestnut  Hill,  in  which  direction  he  detected  the  weak 
ness  of  his  attitude  if  the  enemy  should  come  out  in  force 
by  the  roads  to  the  east  of  him  and  turn  his  position.  In 
order  to  guard  against  this  misadventure,  he  assigned  the 
duty  of  guarding  the  flank  to  the  militia  under  General 
Potter,  who  was  ordered  to  take  his  post  upon  the  road 
leading  in  a  northwesterly  and  southeasterly  direction 
from  Swedes'  Ford  to  White  Marsh,  which  formed  a  junc 
tion  with  the  roads  running  into  Chestnut  Hill  and  Ger- 
mantown  and  was  the  natural  outlet  to  a  force  advancing 
from  Philadelphia  by  any  route  to  the  eastward  of  Barren 
Hill.  For  some  reason  that  our  documents  do  not  ex 
plain,  the  militia  failed  to  carry  out  this  order ;  and  upon 
that  turned  the  whole  result  of  the  expedition. 


330  LA    FAYETTE    AT    VALLEY    FOKGE  [1778. 

In  the  mean  time,  word  of  La  Fayette's  movements 
was  taken  to  Philadelphia  by  British  spies,  and  awakened 
there  an  extraordinary  interest  among  the  officers  of  the 
garrison ;  for  the  reputation  of  the  young  general  had 
extended  within  the  lines  of  the  enemy  through  reports 
coming  by  way  of  England  which  had  given  a  detailed 
account  of  his  setting  out  for  America,  exaggerated  some 
what,  no  doubt,  in  many  of  its  attendant  circumstances, 
but  substantially  true  in  the  main ;  and  his  career  was 
naturally  watched  with  unusual  attention,  both  because 
his  important  influence  and  his  rank  in  Europe  would  have 
singled  him  out,  in  any  event,  amid  his  present  surround 
ings  in  the  Continental  army,  and  especially  because,  as  a 
French  nobleman  who  had  voluntarily  entered  into  the 
war,  and  who  had  never  hesitated  to  express  with  the 
utmost  freedom  his  political  opinions  or  to  declare  his 
intentions  in  this  connection,  he  aroused  necessarily  an 
indignant  protest  in  the  minds  of  all  Englishmen.  It 
would  have  gratified  them  to  see  him  defeated ;  but  it 
would  have  produced  unbounded  joy  if  he  could  have 
been  outwitted  and  captured,  if  he  could  have  been 
brought  into  Philadelphia  at  the  termination  of  his  first 
enterprise,  to  be  loaded  with  indulgent  courtesy  and  feted 
with  mock  admiration,  and  later,  perhaps,  to  be  returned 
to  France  with  his  heroism  reduced  to  the  vainglory  of 
a  school-boy,  and  his  prestige  extinguished  in  ridicule. 
Something  of  this  kind  came  very  near  happening  at 
Barren  Hill ;  and  La  Fayette  was  probably  never  in  such 
grave  danger  at  any  other  time  in  the  course  of  his  life. 
If  he  had  been  captured  upon  this  expedition,  he  would 
inevitably  have  been  ruined. 

The  British  commanders  in  Philadelphia  seized  upon 
this  opportunity  with  the  greatest  possible  readiness,  deter 
mined  to  take  advantage  of  it  to  destroy  the  small  detach 
ment  which  was  now  isolated  from  the  main  body  of  the 
American  army  and  to  bring  back  La  Fayette  in  triumph 


1778.]  AXD    BARREN    HILL.  331 

as  a  prisoner  of  war.  So  great  was  the  importance  attached 
to  the  result  of  their  undertaking  that  General  Clinton, 
who  at  that  moment  was  about  to  succeed  to  the  command 
upon  the  withdrawal  of  General  Howe,  decided  to  lead  it 
in  person,  in  order  to  be  perfectly  sure  of  its  success  ;  and 
the  enthusiasm  among  the  officers  attained  such  a  point 
that  General  Howe  himself,  who  was  still  in  Philadelphia, 
preparing  for  his  return  to  England,  chose  to  accompany 
the  expedition,  that  he  might  end  his  campaigns  in  Amer 
ica  by  taking  part  in  a  brilliant  stroke  from  which  they 
all  expected  great  enjoyment  and  credit.  It  was  not  sup 
posed  for  a  moment  that  La  Fayette  could  escape  capture, 
because  he  was  to  be  opposed  by  a  force  considerably  more 
than  four  times  as  great  as  his  own  was  known  to  be ;  and, 
under  the  plan  by  which  it  was  intended  to  cut  off  his 
retreat  by  a  rapid  movement  upon  his  flank  and  in  his 
rear,  he  would  have  nothing  left  but  to  surrender  at  dis 
cretion  or  to  fight  under  enormous  disadvantages.  The 
certainty  of  this  prospect  afforded  such  pleasure  to  Gen 
eral  Howe  and  General  Clinton  that  they  invited  a  com 
pany  of  ladies  and  gentlemen  to  an  entertainment  in  Phil 
adelphia,  upon  the  following  day,  to  meet  the  Marquis 
de  La  Fayette ; l  and  M.  de  La  Fayette  was  afterward 
informed  that  Admiral  Lord  Howe  had  accompanied  the 
expedition  as  a  volunteer,  that  he  might  share  with  the 
other  officers  the  enjoyment  that  all  anticipated. 

One  division  of  the  British  army,  which  consisted  of 
eight  thousand  men  made  up  of  regular  troops  and  Hes 
sians,  with  fifteen  pieces  of  field  artillery,  under  the 
command  of  General  Grant,  moved  out  of  Philadelphia  to 
the  eastward  through  Frankford,  on  the  Delaware  River, 
and  by  a  circuitous  route  advanced  to  AVhitemarsh,  where 
they  took  the  road  leading  directly  to  Swedes'  Ford. 
Having  reached  a  point  a  short  distance  north  of  Ger- 


Mi- moires,  i.  75  :  Fragments  extraits  de  divers  Munuscrits, — D. 


332  LA    FAYETTE   AT    VALLEY    FORGE  [1778. 

mantown,  General  Grant  proceeded  with  his  column  along 
this  road,  in  order  to  gain  possession  of  the  avenues  of 
escape  for  La  Fayette  in  case  he  should  attempt  to  recross 
the  Schuylkill  River  either  at  Swedes'  Ford  or  at  Mat- 
son's  Ford,  and,  whilst  thus  effectually  securing  the  ad 
vantage  of  him  in  the  rear,  to  mass  a  sufficient  number 
of  British  troops  in  that  position  to  check  any  reinforce 
ment  that  might  be  sent  out  to  him  from  Valley  Forge 
upon  the  first  signal  of  alarm.  In  the  mean  time,  another 
column,  composed  of  grenadiers,  accompanied  by  a  small 
body  of  cavalry,  under  General  Grey,  had  set  out  from 
Philadelphia  by  way  of  Germantown  and  was  marching 
along  the  road  which  branches  off  from  the  highway  to 
Swedes'  Ford  north  of  Germantown  and  runs  directly  to 
the  Barren  Hill  Church,  in  order  to  occupy  La  Fayette's 
attention  and  to  open  the  attack  upon  his  left  wing  at  that 
point ; 1  whilst  a  third  column  was  advancing  northward 
along  the  Ridge  Road,  to  engage  him  in  front  of  his  po 
sition  ;  and  this  force  was  accompanied  by  General  Clin 
ton  and  General  Howe  in  person.2 

Thus  far  the  enterprise  of  the  British  commander  had 
been  fully  developed  in  accordance  with  the  plan  agreed 
upon.  La  Fayette  was  almost  surrounded ;  if  he  retreated 
toward  Swedes'  Ford,  he  would  fall  into  the  hands  of 
General  Grant ;  if  he  moved  toward  the  east,  in  the  hope 
of  gaining  the  Delaware  River,  he  would  meet  General 
Grey,  who  was  in  direct  communication  with  General 
Grant's  force,  and  these  two  together  would  have  an  easy 
task  to  perform ;  if  he  tried  to  escape  by  the  Ridge  Road 
to  some  lower  point  on  the  Schuylkill,  he  would  encounter 
General  Clinton  and  General  Howe  in  the  very  way  in 

1  Stedman  says  that  General  Grey  "  marched  from  Philadelphia  along  the 
western  branch  of  the  Schuylkill,"  and  stationed  himself  "at  a  ford  two  or 
three  miles  in  front  of  La  Fayette's  right  flank." — History  of  the  American 
War,  i.  377. 

2  Marquis  de  Chastellux,  Travels  in  North  America,  London,  1787,  i.  295. 


1778.]  AND    BARREN    HILL.  333 

which  those  gentlemen  hoped  to  meet  him.  All  uncon 
scious  of  the  danger  he  was  in,  La  Fayette  was  about  to 
carry  out  the  orders  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  as  to 
discovering,  if  possible,  the  intentions  of  the  enemy,  and 
their  probable  evacuation  of  Philadelphia,  by  sending  a 
messenger  to  the  city  who  should  gather  such  informa 
tion  as  might  be  current  there,  for  which  purpose  he  had 
secured  a  young  woman,  who,  under  pretext  of  visiting 
her  relations,  was  upon  the  point  of  setting  out  upon 
that  errand.  La  Fayette  was  giving  her  his  final  instruc 
tions,  upon  the  morning  of  the  20th  of  May,  when  word 
was  brought  to  him  that  a  party  of  dragoons  wearing 
red  coats  had  been  seen  in  the  Whitemarsh  road.  This 
information  contained  at  the  moment  nothing  startling 
to  his  mind,  for  he  had  posted  General  Potter  to  guard 
the  road  to  Whitemarsh,  and  there  happened  to  be  some 
cavalry  among  the  Pennsylvania  militia  whose  coats  were 
red.  There  was  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  troops 
reported  from  there  formed  a  part  of  General  Potter's 
command.  La  Fayette  had  made  an  appointment  to 
meet  that  officer  upon  the  Whitemarsh  Road  that  day, 
and  it  appears  to  have  been  his  intention  to  transfer  his 
detachment  thither  that  night.  Nevertheless,  he  took 
immediate  steps  to  ascertain  the  situation,  with  the  result 
that  a  report  came  back  to  him,  soon  after,  that  a  column 
was  advancing  upon  him  toward  his  left  wing ;  this  was 
the  detachment  of  General  Grey,1  sent  forward,  as  we 
have  seen,  by  General  Grant ;  and  shortly  afterward  one 
of  his  aides,  who  had  been  sent  out  by  him  to  reconnoitre, 
returned  with  the  intelligence  that  General  Grant's  column 
was  marching  along  the  road  leading  to  Swedes'  Ford, 
and  that  the  head  of  the  column  had  already  taken  pos 
session  of  the  only  line  of  escape  to  Valley  Forge  from 
Barren  Hill  by  Swedes'  Ford.  At  the  same  moment,  the 

1  Momoires,  i.  7G  :  Fragments  extraits  de  divers  Manuscrits,— D. 


334  LA    FAYETTE   AT    VALLEY    FORGE  [1778. 

cry  arose  among  the  troops,  in  La  Fayette's  presence,  that 
they  were  surrounded. 

The  situation  was  one  to  tax  severely  the  young  gen 
eral's  courage  and  presence  of  mind.  He  had  no  one  to 
rely  upon  for  assistance,  and  to  act  quickly  was  the  only 
hope  that  remained  for  him.  His  first  step,  whilst  he 
assumed  as  good  a  countenance  as  he  could  before  his  men, 
was  to  change  his  front,  in  order  to  meet  General  Grey  on 
his  left ;  this  he  did  by  throwing  a  part  of  his  detach 
ment  beyond  the  church,  and  posting  some  of  his  force  in 
the  churchyard,  where  the  stone  wall  afforded  them  ex 
cellent  breast-works  against  the  expected  attack  in  that 
direction.  In  the  mean  time  he  discovered  through  his 
aides,  whom  he  had  sent  out  in  haste  in  all  directions, 
that,  whilst  they  were  unable  to  reach  Valley  Forge,  there 
was  one  road  along  the  Schuylkill  River  which  was  still 
open,  although  General  Grant  was  then  as  near  to  it  as 
he  was,  and  if  the  British  troops  should  advance  but  a 
little  farther  in  that  direction  his  only  possible  chance  of 
escape  would  be  gone.  The  Whitemarsh  Road,  which  Gen 
eral  Grant  was  following,  formed  a  junction,  not  far  to  the 
north  of  Barren  Hill,  with  the  road  leading  to  Matson's 
Ford,  directly  to  the  west  of  where  La  Fayette  now  was ; 
and  it  was  evidently  General  Grant's  intention  to  cut  off 
that  ford  of  the  Schuylkill  also,  that  he  might  become 
absolutely  master  of  the  situation.  The  fact  that  he  was 
rather  slow  in  securing  that  position,  and  the  good  fortune 
which  attended  an  extremely  well  devised  effort  to  detain 
him,  saved  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  from  capture.1 

La  Fayette  instantly  conceived  the  idea  of  gaining 
Matson's  Ford  before  General  Grant  could  reach  there. 
The  conformation  of  the  land  at  Barren  Hill  afforded  him 
a  very  good  opportunity  to  do  this.  It  happens  that  the 

1  There  is  a  local  tradition  that  General  Grant  stopped  at  the  Broad  Axe 
Tavern  to  take  his  breakfast,  and  thus  gave  an  opportunity  for  intelligence 
to  be  sent  to  La  Fayette. 


1778.1  AND    BARREN   HILL.  335 

road  from  Barren  Hill  to  the  Schuylkill  River  falls  away 
rapidly  behind  a  high  bank  on  the  northern  side,  so 
that,  soon  after  leaving  the  church,  an  army  marching 
in  the  direction  of  the  river  would  disappear  completely 
from  the  view  of  an  observer  standing  upon  the  high 
ground,  the  direction  from  which  a  part  of  General 
Grant's  force  was  approaching,  or  on  the  east,  where 
General  Grey  was  planning  the  attack.  Leaving  a  small 
force  to  make  a  demonstration  about  the  church,  La 
Fayette  gained  time  by  throwing  forward  false  heads  of 
columns  toward  the  north,  where  the  country  was  heavily 
wooded,  placing  them  in  such  a  manner  that  they  should 
appear  to  be  emerging  from  the  forest,  for  the  purpose 
of  misleading  General  Grant,  whilst  he  formed  the  re 
mainder  of  his  detachment  in  marching  order  and  quietly 
dropped  down  the  road  to  the  Schuylkill.  The  false 
heads  of  columns  arrested  the  attention  of  General  Grant 
and  held  him  long  enough  for  the  successful  execution 
of  this  movement ;  for  whilst  he  hesitated  the  Americans 
were  slipping  away. 

La  Fayette  appointed  General  Poor  to  command  the 
van,  and  sent  with  him  his  most  trusted  aide-de-camp,  M. 
de  Gimat,  whilst  he  remained  behind,  and,  when  sufficient 
time  had  elapsed,  brought  up  the  rear  with  all  his  men. 
The  march  was  so  successfully  accomplished  that  his  whole 
detachment  passed  safely  through  Spring  Mill  and  beyond 
the  point  at  which  General  Grant  could  have  intercepted 
it,  reaching  the  passage  of  the  Schuylkill  at  Matson's 
Ford  and  crossing  in  safety  without  losing  a  man,1  just 
as  the  British,  who  had  in  the  mean  time  discovered 
the  deception,  came  up  in  pursuit.  Once  upon  the  other 
side  of  the  river,  La  Fayette  drew  up  his  men  to  prepare 
for  an  attack  and  to  contest  the  passage  of  the  ford  if  the 
enemy  should  decide  to  follow  him  ;  but  he  was  left  unmo- 

1  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  p.  48.    Stedman  says,  however,  that  the  British 
cavalry  "  killed  or  took  about  forty."    History  of  the  American  War,  i.  378. 


336  LA   FAYETTE   AT   VALLEY   FORGE  [1778. 

lested;  for  they  retired  after  having  halted  for  a  short 
time  upon  the  eastern  bank,  within  full  sight  of  his  re 
treating  column,  the  British  cavalry  and  hussars  having 
been  detached  in  a  fruitless  attempt  to  overtake  him ;  and 
Lieutenant  Wickham,  who  was  present,  said  that  when  he 
saw  La  Fayette's  men  dotting  the  water  as  they  forded 
the  Schuylkill  they  reminded  him  of  "  the  corks  of  a 
fishing  seine." l  In  the  mean  time,  General  Clinton,  ad 
vancing  along  the  Ridge  Road,  quickly  drove  in  the  out 
posts  at  the  very  time  that  La  Fayette  was  retreating, 
and  he  is  said  to  have  been  exceedingly  surprised  and 
angered  when,  upon  his  arrival  at  Barren  Hill  Church,  he 
found  nothing  there  but  a  column  of  red-coats  marching 
toward  him  from  the  opposite  direction,  with  no  enemy 
anywhere  in  sight.  The  only  encounter  which  actually 
took  place  occurred  a  little  before  that  time  with  Gen 
eral  Clinton's  advance  guard,  and  it  was  one  of  the  most 
curious  in  the  course  of  the  war.  A  company  of  British 
dragoons,  moving  along  the  Ridge  Road  near  Barren 
Hill,  came  suddenly  upon  the  Iroquois  of  La  Fayette's 
force,  who  were  doing  picket  duty  at  that  point :  the 
savages  started  up  from  the  ground  with  their  mad  war- 
whoop,  and,  terrified  by  the  cavalry,  which  they  had  never 
seen  before,  they  instantly  fled ;  whilst  the  dragoons,  on 
their  side,  were  thrown  into  such  disorder  by  a  sight  and 
a  sound  equally  new  to  them,  that  they  retreated  hastily 
in  the  opposite  direction. 

The  British  troops  had  had  a  long  and  fatiguing  march, 
which  ended  now  in  mortification  and  disappointment ; 
and,  without  attempting  any  further  enterprise  against  the 
Continental  army,  General  Clinton  and  General  Howe  led 
their  soldiers  back  to  Philadelphia,  as  La  Fayette  said, 
"  very  tired,  very  much  ashamed,  and  very  much  laughed 
at"  for  their  exploit.2  The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  re- 

1  Simcoe's  Military  Journal,  p.  61. 

2  Memoires  de  La  Fayette,  i.  76,  Fragment  D. 


1778.]  AND    BARREN    HILL.  337 

mained  all  night  at  the  western  side  of  Matson's  Ford, 
and  upon  the  following  day,  having  ascertained  the  with 
drawal  of  the  British,  he  recrossed  the  river  and  took  up 
his  former  position  at  Barren  Hill ;  after  which  he  pro 
ceeded  to  the  northward,  by  the  road  which  he  had  origi 
nally  taken  in  leaving  the  camp  of  the  army,  and,  passing 
over  again  at  Swedes'  Ford,  arrived  safely  at  Valley  Forge. 
The  alarm-guns  which  he  had  fired  the  day  before  had 
been  heard  in  the  camp,  where  the  forces  were  hastily  put 
under  arms,  and  they  had  been  a  source  of  great  anxiety 
to  General  Washington,  who  apprehended  not  only  serious 
difficulty  but  also  an  injury  to,  possibly  even  the  destruc 
tion  of,  one  of  the  choicest  bodies  of  his  troops.  He  wel 
comed  the  detachment  back  with  infinite  pleasure.  After 
having  heard  their  story  in  detail,  he  gave  the  young 
commander  credit  for  his  good  judgment  and  skill,  and 
in  writing  to  Congress,  a  few  days  later,  he  took  occasion 
to  mention  him  with  distinction,  as  follows : l  "  On  the 
night  of  the  19th  the  enemy  moved  out  in  force  against 
the  detachment  under  the  Marquis  de  Lafayette,  men 
tioned  in  my  letter  of  the  18th,  which  made  a  timely  and 
handsome  retreat  in  great  order  over  the  Schuylkill  at 
Matson's  Ford.  Our  loss  was  nine  men  in  the  whole. 
The  enemy's  loss  is  supposed  to  be  something  more. 
Their  march  was  circuitous  and  rapid,  and  I  should 
imagine  many  of  their  men  suffered  from  it.  General 
Clinton,  it  is  said,  commanded  in  person." 

It  is  doubtful  if  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  ever  fully 
realized  how  important  a  crisis  for  him  was  this  affair 
at  Barren  Hill.  The  subsequent  incidents  of  his  life 
brought  reverses,  disappointments,  sorrows,  imprison 
ment,  and  defeat,  all  the  vicissitudes  that  go  to  make  up 
the  sum  of  experience  in  a  long  and  eventful  career, 
during  which  he  was  applauded,  criticised,  admired,  or 

1  Letter  to  the  President  of  Congress,  24th  May,  1778  :  Sparks,  Writings  of 
Washington,  v.  377. 
VOL.  I.— 22 


338  LA   FAYETTE   AT   VALLEY   FORGE  [1778. 

condemned,  according  to  the  feelings  that  his  actions 
aroused  among  friends  and  enemies  amid  the  frightful 
social  disorders  through  which  he  was  destined  to  live ; 
but  none  of  these  wrought  a  personal  injury  comparable 
with  the  blight  that  must  have  fallen  upon  him  if  his 
service  in  the  United  States  had  been  suddenly  cut  short 
on  that  eventful  day  in  May,  1778.  If  the  misfortune 
had  overtaken  him  then  of  being  captured  by  the  British, 
upon  the  first  occasion  when  he  had  been  intrusted  with 
a  separate  command,  involving,  as  it  would  have  done,  the 
loss  to  the  Continental  army  of  an  extremely  valuable 
body  of  men,  the  chances  are  that  he  would  have  been 
overwhelmed  by  the  consequences,  and  that  his  influence 
would  have  been  damaged  beyond  repair.  The  hold  he 
had  at  that  time  upon  the  affairs  of  the  nation  was 
comparatively  slight;  it  might  have  been  broken,  and 
the  memory  of  La  Fayette  would  have  become  that  of  a 
mere  incident  in  the  War  of  Independence ;  he  would 
not  have  had  an  opportunity  to  render  to  this  country 
the  valuable  services  which  he  rendered  afterward,  in  the 
councils  of  war,  and  in  his  relations  with  the  French 
Government  and  with  the  French  troops  in  America,  as 
well  as  on  the  field  of  battle ;  nor  would  he  have  been  re 
warded  for  the  high-minded  zeal  and  self-sacrifice  which 
have  forever  endeared  him  to  the  American  people. 

The  British  sentiment  of  the  time,  in  Philadelphia, 
affected  to  regard  this  expedition  with  contempt,  probably 
with  a  view  to  concealing  the  mortification  which  it  really 
caused  in  the  British  army.  "  The  Royal  Pennsylvania 
Gazette"  announced  that  "  Intelligence  being  received  that 
Mr.  Washington  and  his  tattered  retinue  had  abandoned 
their  mud  holes  and  were  on  the  march  to  Germantown, 
a  detachment  of  British  and  Hessian  troops  went  out  to 
meet  and  escort  them  into  the  city ;  but  the  rebels,  being 
apprised  of  their  approach,  flew  back  with  precipitation 
to  what  they  call  their  camp,  determined  to  act  no  further 


1778.]  AND    BARREN    HILL.  339 

on  the  offensive  than  might  be  consistent  with  their  per 
sonal  safety."  But,  in  spite  of  this  pretended  scorn  for 
American  affairs,  common  enough,  no  doubt,  at  that 
period,  in  discussing  them,  we  know,  through  a  letter  of 
Colonel  Laurens  to  his  father,1  "  that  General  Grant  had 
escaped  a  court  martial  for  his  conduct  on  the  affair  of 
Marquis  de  Lafayette,  by  his  powerful  interest,  but  that 
he  was  much  blamed  and  abused  in  circles  of  officers." 
And  a  little  more  than  one  month  later  the  splendidly 
appointed  army  of  Sir  Henry  Clinton  was  in  full  retreat 
through  New  Jersey,  with  "  Mr.  Washington  and  his 
tattered  retinue"  in  pursuit. 

An  incident  occurred  at  Valley  Forge  about  this  time 
which  illustrates  the  confidence  with  which  La  Fayette 
was  looked  to  by  his  soldiers  in  matters  relating  to  their 
personal  interests,  and  the  good  will  with  which  he  re 
sponded  to  their  wishes,  even  when  he  did  not  agree  with 
their  views.  An  objection  was  made  by  some  of  the 
officers  under  his  command  to  the  oath  of  allegiance  re 
cently  prescribed  by  Congress,  which  was  to  be  adminis 
tered  to  every  officer  in  the  service  of  the  United  States, 
a  certificate  as  to  his  having  taken  it  being  duly  for 
warded  to  the  office  of  the  Adjutant-General.  Whilst 
the  provisions  of  this  order  were  being  carried  out  in 
the  camp,  an  extraordinary  unwillingness,  probably  grow 
ing  out  of  a  mistaken  conception  upon  the  part  of  some 
officers  as  to  the  indirect  result  which  such  an  obligation 
might  have  upon  future  promotion  in  the  service,  mani 
fested  itself  among  the  Virginia  troops  in  General  Wood- 
ford's  brigade.  There  is  no  evidence  of  disloyalty  upon 
their  part ;  on  the  contrary,  the  officers  appear  to  have 
subscribed  to  the  oath,  though  under  protest  as  to  the 
peculiar  objections  conceived  by  themselves,  which  really 

1  John  Laurens  to  Henry  Laurens,  loth  June,  1778:  The  Army  Corre 
spondence  of  Colonel  John  Laurens,  by  Wm.  Gihnore  Simms,  Publications 
of  the  Bradford  Club,  New  York,  1807. 


340  LA    FAYETTE    AT    VALLEY    FORGE  [1778. 

were  based  upon  no  reasonable  foundation,  and  do  not 
seem  to  have  been  suggested  in  any  other  part  of  the 
army.  The  difficulty  evidently  arose  from  an  exceedingly 
narrow  interpretation  of  the  form  of  the  act  of  allegiance 
itself,  and  especially  of  the  words  "and will  serve  the  said 

United  States  in  the  office  of ,  which  I  now  hold."  l 

After  a  discussion  with  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  of 
the  questions  which  seemed  to  them  to  be  involved,  but 
which,  in  his  opinion,  did  not  affect  their  relations  to 
the  army  in  the  manner  they  had  assumed,  La  Fayette 
acceded  to  their  request  that  he  should  submit  their  case 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief,  whereupon  twenty-six  of 
these  officers  prepared  and  delivered  to  him  the  following 
memorial : 

' i  1.  The  tenor  of  the  oath  they  in  some  measure  consider  an 
indignity  ;  they  will  not  undertake  to  determine  it  unnecessary  ; 
an  indignity,  as  it  presupposes  that  some  of  them  have  acted  con 
trary  to  their  sentiments  ;  it  may  be  unnecessary,  for  those  officers, 
who  ventured  their  lives  and  fortunes  in  support  of  American 
Independence,  could  have  no  other  reason  but  the  apparent  one. 

"  2.  As  many  officers  at  present  are  injured  in  their  rank,  and 
cannot  possibly  continue  in  the  army  exactly  in  their  present 
situation,  they  apprehend  it  would  be  an  impropriety  in  them  to 
swear  to  continue  in  their  present  posts,  as  the  rank  of  the  juror 
is  to  be  taken  when  the  oath  is  administered. 

"3.  Would  not  the  oath  debar  an  officer  from  the  privilege 
of  resigning,  when  circumstances  might  render  it  indispensably 
necessary  that  he  should  quit  the  army  ? 

"4.  The  taking  of  the  oath,  while  the  present  establishment 

1  The  oath  was  as  follows :  "  I  do  acknowledge  the  United  States  of 
America  to  be  free,  independent,  and  sovereign  States,  and  declare  that  the 
people  thereof  owe  no  allegiance  or  obedience  to  George  the  Third,  King  of 
Great  Britain  ;  and  I  renounce,  refuse,  and  abjure  any  allegiance  or  obe 
dience  to  him  ;  and  I  do  swear,  (or  affirm),  that  I  will,  to  the  utmost  of  my 
power,  support,  maintain,  and  defend  the  said  United  States  against  the 
said  King  George  the  Third,  and  his  heirs  and  successors,  and  his  or  their 
abettors,  assistants,  and  adherents,  and  will  serve  the  said  United  States  in 

the  office  of ,  which  I  now  hold,  with  fidelity,  according  to  the  best 

of  my  skill  and  understanding.  So  help  me  God." — Journals  of  Congress, 
3d  February,  1778. 


1778.]  AND    BARREN    HILL.  341 

continues,  most  of  the  subscribers  are  of  opinion,  would  lay  them 
under  a  pointed  restraint  in  endeavoring  to  procure  a  change, 
which  the  whole  army  have  long,  not  only  most  ardently  wished 
for,  but  conceived  absolutely  necessary  for  its  preservation ;  a 
change,  that  would  put  them  on  an  honorable  and  advantageous 
footing."  l 

General  de  La  Fayette  forwarded  this  document  to  head 
quarters  with  the  following  letter  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief:2 

"VALLEY  FORGE  CAMP,  the  15th  May,  1778. 

"MY  DEAR  GENERAL, — Agreeable  to  your  excellency's  orders, 
I  have  taken  the  oath  of  the  gentlemen  officers  in  General  Wood- 
ford's  brigade,  and  their  certificates  have  been  sent  to  the  adjutant 
general's  office.  Give  me  leave,  now,  to  present  you  with  some 
observations  delivered  to  me  by  many  officers  in  that  brigade, 
who  desire  me  to  submit  them  to  your  perusal.  I  know.  Sir, 
(besides  I  am  not  of  their  opinion  in  the  fact  itself),  that  I  should 
not  accept  for  you  the  objections  those  gentlemen  could  have  had, 
as  a  body,  to  any  order  from  Congress ;  but  I  confess  the  desire 
of  being  agreeable  to  them,  of  giving  them  any  mark  of  friend 
ship  and  affection  which  is  in  my  power,  and  acknowledging  the 
kind  sentiments  they  honour  me  with,  have  been  my  first  and 
dearest  considerations.  Besides  that,  be  pleased  to  consider  that 
they  began  by  obeying  orders,  and  want  only  to  let  their  beloved 
general  know  which  were  the  reasons  of  their  being  rather  re 
luctant,  (as  far  as  reluctance  may  comply  with  their  duty  and 
honour),  to  an  oath,  the  meaning  and  spirit  of  which  was,  I  be 
lieve,  misunderstood  by  them.  I  may  add,  Sir,  with  a  perfect 
conviction,  that  there  is  not  one  among  them  but  would  be  thrice 
happy  were  occasions  offered  to  them  of  distinguishing  yet,  by 
new  exertions,  their  love  for  their  country,  their  zeal  for  their 
duty  as  officers,  their  consideration  for  the  civil  superior  power, 
and  their  love  for  your  excellency. 

"  With  the  greatest  respect  and  most  tender  affection, — I  have 
the  honour  to  be,  &c." 

To  which  General  Washington  replied  as  follows : 3 


1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  307,  note. 

1  La  Fayette's  Correspondence,  American  edition,  p.  170. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  171. 


342  VALLEY    FORGE    AND    BARREN    HILL.  [1778. 

"CAMP,  17  May,  1778. 

"DEAR  SIR, — I  received  yesterday  your  favour  of  the  15th  in 
stant,  enclosing  a  paper  subscribed  by  sundry  officers  of  General 
Woodford's  brigade,  setting  forth  the  reasons  for  not  taking  the 
oath  of  abjuration,  allegiance,  and  office  ;  and  I  thank  you  much 
for  the  cautious  delicacy  used  in  communicating  the  matter  to  me. 
As  every  oath  should  be  a  free  act  of  the  mind,  founded  on  the 
conviction  of  its  propriety,  I  would  not  wish,  in  any  instance, 
that  there  should  be  the  least  degree  of  compulsion  exercised ; 
nor  to  interpose  my  opinion,  in  order  to  induce  any  to  make  it, 
of  whom  it  is  required.  The  gentlemen,  therefore,  who  signed 
the  paper,  will  use  their  own  discretion  in  the  matter,  and  swear 
or  not  swear,  as  their  conscience  and  feelings  dictate. 

1  i  At  the  same  time,  I  cannot  but  consider  it  as  a  circumstance 
of  some  singularity,  that  the  scruples  against  the  oath  should  be 
peculiar  to  the  officers  of  one  brigade,  and  so  very  extensive. 
The  oath  in  itself  is  not  new.  It  is  substantially  the  same  with 
that  required  in  all  governments,  and,  therefore,  does  not  imply 
any  indignity  ;  and  it  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  professions, 
actions,  and  implied  engagements  of  every  officer.  The  objection 
founded  on  the  supposed  unsettled  rank  of  the  officers,  is  of  no 
validity,  rank  being  only  mentioned  as  a  further  designation  of 
the  party  swearing  ;  nor  can  it  be  seriously  thought  that  the  oath 
is  either  intended  to  prevent,  or  can  prevent,  their  being  pro 
moted,  or  their  resignation. 

"  The  fourth  objection,  stated  by  the  gentlemen,  serves  as  a  key 
to  their  scruples ;  and  I  would  willingly  persuade  myself,  that 
their  own  reflections  will  point  out  to  them  the  impropriety  of 
the  whole  proceeding,  and  not  suffer  them  to  be  betrayed  in 
future  into  a  similar  conduct.  I  have  a  regard  for  them  all,  and 
cannot  but  regret  that  they  were  ever  engaged  in  the  measure. 
I  am  certain  they  will  regret  it  themselves, — sure  I  am,  that  they 
ought.  I  am,  my  dear  Marquis,  Your  affectionate  friend  and 
servant." 

No  further  action  appears  to  have  been  taken  upon  this 
subject  by  the  officers  who  signed  the  memorial,  and  the 
incident  terminated,  so  far  as  we  know,  with  this  letter 
from  General  Washington  to  M.  de  La  Fayette. 


1778.]  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY.  343 


CHAPTER    XL 

RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  AND  BATTLE   OF 
MONMOUTH. 

THE  uncertainty  of  communication  by  letter  between 
Europe  and  America  at  this  period  of  the  Revolution 
was  a  source  of  great  anxiety  to  M.  de  La  Fayette. 
Many  weeks,  and  even  months,  passed  away  without 
bringing  him  news  from  his  wife  and  children,  whose 
welfare  was  constantly  in  his  thoughts.  His  longing  to 
hear  from  them  became  so  great  at  times  as  to  cause 
him  mental  suffering  which  far  outweighed  the  privations 
to  which  he  was  subjected,  in  common  with  all  the  army, 
at  Valley  Forge.  Of  these  latter  he  never  complained ; 
but  the  uncertainty  as  to  his  family,  whether  they  were 
well,  whether  his  second  child  was  born,  whether  it  was 
a  son  or  a  daughter,  the  thousand  questions  that  suggest 
themselves  to  a  father's  heart  in  a  long  absence  from 
home,  made  the  distance  across  the  Atlantic  seem  to  him 
unlimited  in  its  immensity,  and  caused  the  days  to  lag 
interminably  as  they  passed  by.  "  Strive  at  least,"  he 
wrote  to  Mine,  de  La  Fayette,  "  to  give  me  some  con 
solation.  Do  not  neglect  a  single  opportunity  of  sending 
me  word  of  yourself.  I  have  not  had  news  of  any  one 
for  millions  of  centuries !  My  situation  is  a  cruel  one 
indeed,  in  this  frightful  ignorance  of  all  those  who  are 
dear  to  me."  l  His  own  letters  to  France,  as  also  those 
written  to  him  from  home,  were  sent  as  occasion  offered  ; 
sometimes  by  French  officers  returning  home,  or  by  those 
coming  to  America,  sometimes  by  the  hands  of  private 

1  Correspondance  de  La  Fayette,  i.  169. 


344  RETREAT    OF    THE   BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

gentlemen  crossing  the  ocean,  or  by  ship-captains  whose 
vessels  were  going  directly  to  ports  from  which  letters 
could  be  forwarded,  or  even  by  means  so  extremely 
uncertain  that  there  was  but  the  merest  chance  of  their 
arriving  at  their  destination.  Aside  from  accidental 
delay,  from  possible  negligence  upon  the  part  of  the 
numerous  carriers  to  whom  letters  were  confided,  and 
from  actual  loss,  there  was  always  the  danger  of  cap 
ture  at  sea  to  be  taken  into  account  by  any  vessel  enter 
ing  or  leaving  the  American  ports.  In  view  of  the  ever- 
present  likelihood  of  falling  in  with  British  cruisers,  La 
Fayette  said,1  "  I  never  write  a  word  to  send  to  Europe 
without  feeling  sad  for  the  destiny  that  awaits  it.  And 
certainly,  in  this  regard,  I  work  more  for  Lord  Howe 
than  for  any  one  of  my  friends."  It  is  remarkable,  under 
the  circumstances,  that  so  many  letters  arrived  as  we 
know  to  have  done  so  ;  for,  while  many  undoubtedly  were 
lost,  possibly  the  greater  number,  yet  the  published  cor 
respondence  of  M.  de  La  Fayette  shows  that  those  in 
tended  for  him  occasionally  finished  their  long  and  cir 
cuitous  voyages  and  came  to  his  hand.  An  interesting 
example  of  this  method  of  correspondence  is  thus  de 
scribed  by  M.  de  La  Fayette  himself  in  writing  to  his 
wife  from  the  camp  at  Whitemarsh  : 2 

' i  You  will  receive  this  letter,  perhaps,  in  the  course  of  five  or 
six  years,  for  I  am  writing  to  you  by  an  indirect  opportunity  of 
which  I  have  no  great  hopes.  Fancy  the  long  journey  that  my 
letter  will  have  to  make.  An  officer  of  the  army  will  take  it  to 
Fort  Pitt,  three  hundred  miles  in  the  interior  of  the  continent ; 
thence  it  will  be  sent  by  a  boat  down  the  great  Ohio  Biver,  through 
a  country  inhabited  only  by  savages  ;  when  once  it  reaches  New 
Orleans,  a  little  vessel  will  take  it  to  the  Spanish  Islands ;  from 
there  a  ship  belonging  to  that  nation  will  carry  it, — God  knows 
when, — whenever  it  goes  back  to  Europe.  Even  then  it  will  be 

1  To  the  Due  D'Ayen  :  Correspondance  de  La  Fayette,  i.  124. 

2  Correspondance  de  La  Fayette,  i.  115. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  345 

a  long  way  from  you  ;  and  only  after  passing  through  the  sticky 
hands  of  all  the  Spanish  postmen  will  it  be  able  to  cross  the 
Pyrenees.  It  may  have  been  opened  and  sealed  half  a  dozen  times 
before  coming  to  you  ;  but  then,  at  last,  it  will  give  proof  to  my 
dear  heart  that  I  neglect  no  opportunity,  even  the  most  remote, 
to  send  news  to  her  of  myself  and  to  repeat  to  her  how  much  I 
love  her." 

Whilst  he  was  upon  the  road  toward  the  camp  at  Valley 
Forge,  in  December,  1777,  La  Fayette  received  the  news 
of  the  birth  of  his  second  daughter,  Anastasie,1  which 
had  taken  place  at  Paris  on  the  1st  of  July,  1777 ;  and, 
although  he  appears  to  have  wished  very  earnestly  for  a 
son  at  that  time,  to  inherit  his  name  and  his  title,  as  well 
as  to  add  lustre  to  the  house  of  Noailles,  this  event  gave 
him  exceeding  pleasure.  His  letters  show  the  joy  that 
filled  his  heart  at  the  thought  of  "  embracing  his  two 
little  girls"  upon  his  return  home.  Unfortunately,  how 
ever,  there  was  sad  news  on  the  way  for  him.  He  learned, 
soon  afterward,  of  the  death  of  his  eldest  daughter,  Hen 
riette.  La  Fayette  loved  this  child  fondly ;  he  spoke 
of  her  constantly  in  writing  to  Mine,  de  La  Fayette,  he 
sent  affectionate  messages  to  her,  and  asked  to  be  told  of 
her,  how  she  was  growing,  whether  she  remembered  him, 
picturing  to  himself  the  while  what  happiness  he  should 
have  in  taking  her  into  his  arms  again, —  the  little 
daughter  who  was  to  be  not  only  his  companion,  but 
his  best  friend,  for  life.  "  For  you  know  I  am  very 
fond  of  telling  news,"  he  wrote.2  "  I  beg  you  to  be  so, 
dear  heart,  in  everything  you  say  about  me  to  Hen- 
riette, — my  poor  little  Henriette ;  kiss  her  a  thousand 
times  for  me,  talk  to  her  of  me ;  but  do  not  tell  her  all 
the  ill  of  me  that  I  deserve.  I  shall  be  punished  enough 
if  she  does  not  recognize  me  when  I  return.  That  shall 
be  the  penance  that  Henriette  shall  impose  upon  me." 

1  Afterward  Madame  Charles  de  Latour-Maubourg. 

2  Correspond  a  nee  de  La  Fayette,  i.  100. 


346  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1773. 

And  again,1  "  I  am  sure  I  shall  find  my  poor  little  Hen- 
riette  very  gentle  and  attractive  when  I  return.  I  hope 
she  will  scold  me  well,  and  that  she  will  talk  to  me  with  all 
the  freedom  of  friendship ;  for  my  daughter  will  always 
be,  I  hope,  the  best  friend  I  have.  I  shall  want  to  be  a 
father  only  in  the  sense  of  loving  her,  and  my  paternal 
affection  will  adjust  itself  perfectly  to  the  relation  of  close 
friendship  between  us." 

The  death  of  this  child  was  a  heavy  blow  to  him.  In 
his  intense  sorrow  he  wrote  to  Mme.  de  La  Fayette  from 
Valley  Forge,2  "  How  terrible  my  separation  has  become  ! 
I  have  never  felt  before  the  horror  of  my  situation. 
My  heart  is  full  of  my  own  grief,  and  of  yours  which  I 
was  not  with  you  to  share ;  and  the  great  length  of  time 
that  elapsed  before  I  heard  this  news  adds  to  my  distress. 
Imagine,  my  dear  heart,  my  cruel  situation :  whilst  I 
mourn  for  the  one  I  have  lost,  I  tremble  for  the  safety 
of  those  who  are  still  left  to  me.  The  distance  from 
Europe  to  America  never  seemed  so  immense  to  me  as 
it  does  now.  The  dreadful  loss  of  our  child  is  in  my 
thoughts  every  moment  of  the  day.  This  news  came  to 
me  immediately  after  that  of  the  treaty,  and  whilst  I  was 
bowed  down  with  grief  I  had  to  accept  congratulations 
and  take  part  in  the  public  rejoicing." 

Early  in  the  morning  of  the  18th  of  June,  1778,  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  with  the  British  army  evacuated  Philadel 
phia.  Having  crossed  the  Delaware  River  to  Gloucester, 
he  set  out  upon  his  line  of  march  through  New  Jersey 
toward  New  York ;  his  force  was  divided  into  two  col 
umns,  one  of  which  he  led  himself  and  the  other  was 
under  Lieutenant-General  Knyphausen,  aggregating  some 
seventeen  thousand  effective  men,  with  artillery,  full  mili 
tary  equipment,  and  an  immense  baggage-train  which 


1  Correspondance  de  La  Fayette,  i.  114. 
2 16th  June,  1778  :  Ibid.,  i/177. 


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1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MONMOUTH.  347 

stretched  for  nearly  twelve  miles  along  the  country  roads. 
Proceeding  by  way  of  Haddonfield,  Mount  Holly,  and 
Crosswicks,  he  advanced  to  Allentown  and  Imlaytown, 
where  he  arrived  a  week  later,  having  marched  in  that 
time  only  about  forty  miles.  It  was  impossible,  up  to  that 
point,  for  the  American  Commander-in-Chief  to  deter 
mine  with  accuracy  the  purpose  of  the  British  general ; 
for  until  he  should  have  passed  beyond  Allentown  there 
were  two  roads  open  to  him,  the  one  leading  directly  to 
Amboy,  and  the  other,  more  circuitous,  to  Sandy  Hook. 
Nor  was  it  less  difficult  to  decide  from  the  appearance  of 
his  army  what  policy  he  intended  to  adopt, — whether 
to  retreat  silently  to  join  the  garrison  at  New  York,  or 
to  open  hostilities  in  an  active  campaign.  The  slowness 
of  his  march  might  indicate  the  latter  purpose,  from  one 
point  of  view ;  for,  while  his  progress  was  unquestionably 
retarded  by  the  weather,  which  was  rainy  at  that  time  and 
exceedingly  hot,  yet  there  were  details  of  his  movement 
that  appeared  to  indicate  an  intention  of  bringing  on  a 
general  engagement  in  New  Jersey  with  the  American 
army.  As  an  alternative  to  this,  it  was  believed  by  some 
that  he  aimed  at  an  occupation  of  the  passes  through 
the  highlands  along  the  Hudson  River. 

General  Washington,  who  was  fully  on  the  alert  as  to 
every  movement  of  the  enemy,  summoned  his  generals  to 
a  council  of  war,  at  Valley  Forge,  on  the  17th  of  June, 
as  soon  as  it  became  evident  that  an  operation  of  some  im 
portance  was  about  to  be  undertaken  from  Philadelphia. 
To  this  council  he  submitted  the  questions,  whether  any 
enterprise  ought  to  be  attempted  against  the  enemy  at 
once ;  whether  the  army  should  retain  its  present  posi 
tion  until  the  completed  evacuation  of  Philadelphia,  or 
should  immediately  cross  the  Delaware ;  whether,  if  the 
enemy  should  march  through  New  Jersey,  it  would  be 
prudent  to  attack  them  on  their  road,  or  whether  it  were 
deemed  better  to  advance  directly  to  the  Hudson  River  in 


348  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

order  to  secure  the  communication  between  New  England 
and  the  other  States ;  finally,  whether,  in  the  event  of 
overtaking  the  enemy  in  New  Jersey,  a  partial  or  a  gen 
eral  attack  should  be  made.  The  opinions  given  by  the 
general  officers  were  so  varied  in  their  conclusions  that 
General  Washington  requested  each  to  reply  in  writing 
upon  the  following  day.  This  was  done  accordingly,  but 
by  that  time  the  movement  of  the  British  into  New  Jersey 
had  become  known,  and  the  question  for  consideration  was 
whether  they  should  be  attacked  upon  the  march.  Most 
of  the  officers  were  opposed  to  an  attack,  on  account  of  the 
inequality  of  force ;  prominent  among  whom  was  General 
Charles  Lee,  then  second  in  command,  whose  insidious 
arguments,  no  doubt,  influenced  many  of  them,  and  whose 
treacherous  proceeding  already  begun  came  very  near  being 
the  means,  a  short  time  afterward,  of  bringing  immeasu 
rable  disaster  upon  the  Continental  army,  at  Monmouth. 

In  spite  of  Lee's  attempts,  however,  to  deter  American 
soldiers  from  attacking  their  enemy  in  the  field  when  the 
interests  of  their  country  presented  an  opportunity  for  its 
defence,  the  Commander-in-Chief  held  to  his  purpose  of 
carrying  on  the  war  by  fighting  the  British  as  he  had 
done  before ;  and  he  was  supported  in  this  decision  by 
General  Greene,  General  Wayne,  General  Cadwalader, 
and  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette.  He  determined  to  follow 
Sir  Henry  Clinton  into  New  Jersey  and  to  attack  him  if 
an  opportunity  should  present.  He  ordered  General 
Philemon  Dickinson,  who  was  then  collecting  the  New 
Jersey  militia,  to  begin  active  operations  immediately  in 
order  to  impede  the  British  army,  by  destroying  bridges 
ahead  of  it,  by  felling  trees  across  the  roads,  and  by  em 
barrassing  it  in  every  other  possible  manner  upon  its 
march ;  and  General  Maxwell  was  sent  forward  with  a 
New  Jersey  brigade  to  assist  him  in  this  operation.  Gen 
eral  Washington  set  out  with  the  main  body  of  the  army 
from  Valley  Forge  on  the  19th  of  June,  and  proceeded  to 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE    OF    MOXMOUTH.  349 

the  Delaware  River,  which  he  crossed  on  the  22d  at 
Cory-ell's  Ferry ;  and  upon  the  following  day  he  took 
up  a  strong  position  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  river,  at 
Hopewell.  He  had  ordered  General  Lee  on  the  18th  to 
set  out  with  three  brigades,  ahead  of  the  army,  to  cross  at 
Coryell's  Ferry  and  to  halt  at  the  first  strong  position 
after  passing  the  Delaware,  till  further  orders,  unless  he 
should  receive  authentic  intelligence  that  the  enemy  had 
proceeded  by  a  direct  route  to  South  Amboy,  or  still 
lower ;  in  which  event  he  was  to  march  to  the  North 
River.1  He  also  directed  General  Wayne,  with  two  Penn 
sylvania  regiments  and  the  brigade  formerly  of  General 
Conway,  to  follow  General  Lee's  division  to  Coryell's 
Ferry,  leaving  a  proper  distance  between  the  two  com 
mands,  so  that  they  should  not  interfere  with  each  other.2 
The  remainder  of  the  army  left  Valley  Forge  in  three 
divisions,  the  first  of  which,  composed  of  General  Wood- 
ford's  and  General  Scott's  brigades  and  the  North  Caro 
lina  brigade,  was  commanded  by  the  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette ;  the  other  two  were  under  the  Baron  de  Kalb 
and  Lord  Stirling,  respectively. 

When  General  Washington  had  crossed  the  Delaware 
with  his  army  and  had  taken  his  position  in  Hopewell 
Township,  about  five  miles  from  Princeton,  Sir  Henry 
Clinton  was  encamped  in  the  neighborhood  of  Allentown, 
a  little  to  the  east  of  the  river,  upon  the  road  leading 
toward  Amboy.  On  the  24th  of  June,  Washington  de 
tached  a  considerable  force  to  reconnoitre  the  enemy's 
position  and  to  harass  them  upon  their  flanks  and  in 
the  rear,  by  which  disposition  Colonel  Morgan's  corps  was 
directed  to  gain  their  right  flank,  General  Maxwell  to 
hang  upon  the  left,  and  General  Scott  to  gall  their  left 
flank  and  rear,  while  General  Cadwalader,  with  two  or 


1  Postscript  to  General   Lee's  Instructions  :    Lee  Papers,  New  York  His 
torical  Society,  ii.  407. 

2  Instructions  to  General  Wayne  :  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  411. 


350  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

three  hundred  Continental  troops  and  his  volunteers,  ad 
vanced  directly  in  the  rear.1  Upon  the  same  day,  in 
order  to  decide  what  course  to  pursue  from  this  point,  in 
view  of  the  positions  of  the  two  armies,  Washington  called 
a  council  of  war,  to  which  he  submitted  the  question 
whether  it  were  advisable  to  hazard  a  general  action,  and, 
if  so,  whether  it  should  be  brought  on  by  an  immediate 
general  attack,  by  a  partial  attack,  or  by  taking  such  a 
position  as  must  compel  the  enemy  to  become  the  assail 
ants.  Here  again,  as  before  at  Valley  Forge,  General 
Lee,  who  appears  to  have  been  desperate  in  his  attempt 
to  secure  for  the  British  army  an  undisturbed  passage 
through  New  Jersey,  vehemently  denounced  the  policy 
of  attacking  it ;  with  great  eloquence  and  skilful  ad 
dress  he  argued  that  instead  of  molesting  the  retreating 
enemy  it  would  be  the  part  of  wisdom  to  help  them  for 
ward,  even  to  build  a  bridge  of  gold  to  let  them  pass ; 
that  the  United  States  were  just  upon  the  threshold  of  a 
powerful  foreign  alliance,  which  ought  to  be  fostered  and 
encouraged  in  every  possible  way,  and  that  that  was  not 
the  moment  in  which  everything  should  be  placed  at  the 
hazard  of  a  single  throw ;  and,  besides  this,  the  British 
army  had  never  before  been  so  well  disciplined,  nor  so 
dangerous  to  attack.  In  conclusion,  he  proposed  that  the 
American  forces  should  advance  immediately  to  White 
Plains.2 

The  boldness  and  plausibility  of  his  harangue  carried 
with  him,  as  upon  the  former  occasion,  the  sentiment  of 
very  many  of  the  officers  present,  especially  of  Lord  Stir 
ling  and  of  the  brigadier-generals ;  so  that  the  council  of 
war  gave  its  decision  against  the  policy  of  attack.  The 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  however,  stood  manfully  by  the 
other  view.  His  turn  to  speak  came  late  in  the  council, 
after  the  others  had  given  their  opinions  ;  but  he  presented 

1  To  General  Dickinson  :  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  417. 

2  La  Fayette,  Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  50. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF   MOXMOUTH.  351 

his  arguments  with  great  earnestness  in  favor  of  striking 
a  blow  at  an  enemy  who  were  retiring  before  them,  only  a 
clay's  march  from  the  army,  and  he  appealed,  with  the 
whole  force  of  his  soldierly  instincts  aroused,  to  American 
honor,  patriotism,  and  gallantry  not  to  allow  an  opportu 
nity  such  as  that  to  pass  unimproved  ;  it  would  be  a  shame 
to  the  leaders  of  the  army,  he  said,  and  a  humiliation 
to  the  soldiers,  if  the  British  could  traverse  the  whole 
country  of  New  Jersey  unmolested ;  they  ought  to  be 
pursued,  in  any  event,  and,  if  nothing  more  were  done, 
their  rear-guard  ought  to  be  attacked  ;  the  army  should 
manoeuvre  in  such  a  manner  as  to  take  advantage  of  posi 
tion,  and  watch  for  a  possible  separation  of  forces  to  cut 
off  detachments,  and,  if  an  opportunity  presented  itself, 
to  strike.  He  won  the  support  of  a  few  officers,  though 
the  majority  voted  with  General  Lee.  That  same  evening 
he  continued  his  arguments  before  General  Washington, 
in  presence  of  several  of  the  officers,  and  upon  that  occa 
sion  he  was  seconded  by  General  Greene  and  Colonel 
Alexander  Hamilton. 

The  council  of  war  had  not  agreed  to  General  Lee's 
proposal  to  advance  to  White  Plains ;  on  the  contrary, 
although  it  decided  against  a  general  attack  upon  the 
enemy,  it  favored  the  reinforcement  of  the  troops  then 
upon  the  British  left  flank,  by  fifteen  hundred  men,  to 
serve  as  occasion  might  offer.  Thereupon  General  Scott 
was  immediately  sent  forward  to  the  lines  with  that  force ; 
and  upon  the  following  day,  the  2oth  of  June,  the  army 
advanced  to  Kingston.  General  Washington's  purpose, 
which  he  maintained  through  all  the  wavering  opinions 
of  his  officers,  with  that  exalted  self-possession  which  never 
forsook  him,  was  to  engage  the  enemy.  Their  superior 
discipline  and  equipment  were  no  arguments  to  induce 
him  to  stand  idly  by  and  look  on  with  his  army  in  order 
that  a  hostile  British  force  might  quietly  traverse  one  of 
the  American  States.  He  felt  no  inclination  to  provide 


352  KETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

them  with  a  bridge  of  gold.  His  determination  was  fixed, 
to  act  at  once,  upon  his  own  responsibility  if  need  be,  and 
upon  his  own  judgment  of  what  was  right.  His  views  in 
this  direction  began  to  influence  some  of  his  generals  upon 
whom  he  relied,  and  who  were  now  ready  to  sustain  him. 

On  the  25th  of  June,  word  was  brought  to  him  that  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  had  moved  forward  from  Allentown  and 
was  marching  in  the  direction  of  Monmouth  Court-House ; 
whereupon,  with  a  view  to  strengthening  his  advanced 
forces  upon  the  lines,  he  ordered  General  Wayne  forward 
with  a  detachment  of  one  thousand  selected  troops.  With 
this  addition,  the  American  force  then  operating  against 
the  enemy,  in  advance  of  the  main  army,  aggregated  be 
tween  four  and  five  thousand  men ;  and  it  had  become  of 
such  importance,  from  its  position  and  its  character,  as 
well  as  from  the  circumstances  governing  his  situation, 
that  Washington  determined  to  appoint  a  major-general 
to  take  command  of  it.  This  duty  fell  by  right  of  rank 
to  General  Lee,  who  declined  it.  General  Washington 
thereupon  appointed  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  to  take 
command. 

His  instructions  were  as  follows  : l 

"To  THE  MARQUIS  DE  LAFAYETTE: 

"Sin, — You  are  immediately  to  proceed  with  the  detachment 
commanded  by  General  Poor,  and  form  a  junction  as  expeditiously 
as  possible  with  that  under  the  command  of  General  Scott.  You 
are  to  use  the  most  eifectual  means  for  gaining  the  enemy's  left 
flank  and  rear,  and  giving  them  every  degree  of  annoyance.  All 
Continental  parties,  that  are  already  on  the  lines,  will  be  under 
your  command,  and  you  will  take  such  measures,  in  concert  with 
General  Dickinson,  as  will  cause  the  enemy  the  greatest  impedi 
ment  and  loss  in  their  march.  For  these  purposes  you  will  attack 
them  as  occasion  may  require  by  detachment,  and,  if  a  proper 
opening  should  be  given,  by  operating  against  them  with  the 
whole  force  of  your  command.  You  will  naturally  take  such  pre 
cautions,  as  will  secure  you  against  surprise,  and  maintain  your 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  v.  417. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MONMOUTH.  353 

communication  with  this  army.    Given  at  Kingston,  this  25th  day 
of  June,  1778. " 

General  de  La  Fayette  received  this  order  with  great 
pleasure.  It  accorded  with  his  opinion  expressed  in  the 
council  of  war ;  it  offered  him  an  opportunity  which  he 
had  earnestly  desired  ever  since  he  came  to  America,  to 
command  an  active  force  against  the  enemy  in  the  field, 
and  opened  the  way  to  distinction  if  he  should  succeed  in 
acquitting  himself  acceptably ;  besides  this,  he  was  acting 
under  the  immediate  supervision  of  General  Washington 
in  carrying  out  a  plan  which  the  Commander-in-Chief 
had  himself  prepared  and  as  to  the  success  of  which  he 
felt  very  great  solicitude.  Successful  management  upon 
this  occasion  would  have  meant  much  even  to  any  of  the 
more  experienced  officers  of  the  army ;  it  meant  every 
thing  to  an  ambitious  young  soldier  like  La  Fayette. 
Certainly  no  offer  could  have  been  more  flattering.  He 
seized  it  gladly,  and  set  out  at  once  with  his  detachment 
upon  the  course  marked  out  in  his  instructions. 

By  the  evening  of  the  same  day  he  had  advanced  to 
Cranberry,  whence  he  wrote  to  General  Washington  as 
follows  :l 

11  CRANBERRY,  half-past  nine  o'clock. 

"  [25th]  June,  1778. 

"DEAR  GENERAL, — Inclosed  I  have  the  honor  to  send  you  a 
letter  which  Colonel  Hamilton  was  going  to  send  me  from  this 
place  when  I  arrived  with  the  detachment,  and  which  may  give 
yon  an  idea  of  the  position  of  the  enemy.  I  will  try  to  meet  and 
collect  as  soon  as  possible  our  forces,  tho'  I  am  sorry  to  find  the 
enemy  so  far  down  that  way.  We  will  be  obliged  to  march  pretty 
fast,  if  we  want  to  attack  them.  It  is  for  that  I  am  particularly 
concerned  about  provisions.  I  send  back  immediately  for  the 
purpose,  and  beg  you  would  give  orders  to  have  them  forwarded 
as  speedily  as  possible,  and  directed  to  march  fast,  for  I  believe 
we  must  set  out  early  to-morrow  morning.  The  detachment  is 
in  a  wood,  covered  by  Cranberry  Creek,  and  I  believe  extremely 


1  Lee  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society,  ii.  415. 
)L.  I.—  23 


354  RETREAT    OF    THE   BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

safe.  We  want  to  be  very  well  furnished  with  spirits  as  a  long 
and  quick  march  may  be  found  necessary,  and  if  General  Scott's 
detachment  is  not  provided,  it  should  be  furnished  also  with 
liquor  ;  but  the  provisions  of  this  detachment  are  the  most  neces 
sary  to  be  sent  as  soon  as  possible,  as  we  expect  them  to  march. 

"If  anything  new  comes  to  my  knowledge,  I  will  immediately 
write  your  Excellency,  and  I  will  send  an  express  in  the  morning. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be  &c. 

"  LAFAYETTE. 

"I  wish  also  we  could  get  some  axes,  but  it  should  not  stop  the 
so  important  affairs  of  provisions. " 

The  letter  from  Colonel  Hamilton  which  La  Fayette 
enclosed  in  the  foregoing  was  as  follows : 

"  25  June,  1778. 

"SiR, — We  find  on  our  arrival  here  that  the  intelligence  re 
ceived  on  the  road  is  true.  The  enemy  have  all  filed  off  from 
Allen  Town,  on  the  Monmouth  Eoad.  Their  rear  is  said  to  be  a 
mile  westward  of  Lawrence  Taylor's  tavern,  six  miles  from  Allen 
Town.  General  Maxwell  is  at  Hyde's  Town,  about  three  miles 
from  this  place.  General  Dickinson  is  said  to  be  on  the  enemy's 
right  flank ;  but  where,  cannot  be  told.  We  can  hear  nothing 
certain  of  General  Scott  5  but,  from  circumstances  he  is  probably 
at  Allen  Town.  We  shall,  agreeably  to  your  request,  consider 
and  appoint  some  proper  place  of  rendezvous  for  the  union  of  our 
force,  which  we  shall  communicate  to  Generals  Maxwell  and  Scott, 
and  to  yourself.  In  the  meantime  I  would  recommend  to  you  to 
move  toward  this  place  as  soon  as  the  convenience  of  your  men 
will  permit.  I  am  told  that  Colonel  Morgan  is  on  the  enemy's 
right  flank.  We  had  a  slight  skirmish  with  their  rear  this  fore 
noon,  at  Eobert  Montgomery's,  on  the  Monmouth  Eoad,  leading 
from  Allen  Town.  We  shall  see  General  Maxwell  immediately, 
and  you  will  hear  from  us  again.  Send  this  to  the  General  after 
reading  it. 

"I  am  your  ob't  Serv't, 

"ALEX.  HAMILTON. 

"DOCTOR  STILE'S  HOUSE,  CRANBERRY  TOWN,  9  o'clock. 
"We  are  just  informed  that  General  Scott  passed  by  Hooper's 
Tavern,  five  miles  from  Allen  Town,  this  afternoon  at  five  o'  clock. '' 

La  Fayette  was  in  excellent  spirits,  advancing  upon  the 
enemy,  who  were  then  but  a  short  distance  ahead  of  him, 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MONMOUTH.  355 

moving  toward  Monmouth  Court-House :  full  of  anima 
tion  at  the  thought  of  engaging  them,  his  only  fear 
was  that  he  might  not  be  able  to  come  up  with  them; 
but  he  determined,  at  all  events,  to  push  forward.  He 
wrote  again  to  General  Washington,  early  the  following 
morning,1 — 

"  AT  CRANBERRY,  5  o'clock,  June  [20th],  1778. 

"DEAR  GENERAL, — I  have  received  your  orders  for  marching 
as  fast  as  I  could,  and  I  have  marched  without  waiting  for  the 
provisions  tho'  we  want  them  extremely.  General  Forman  and 
Colonel  Hamilton  sat  out  last  night  to  meet  the  other  troops  and 
we  shall  be  together  at  Hidestown  or  somewhat  lower.  General 
Forman  is  firmly  of  opinion  that  we  may  overtake  the  enemy,— 
for  my  part  I  am  not  so  quiet  upon  the  subject  as  he  is,  but  his 
sentiment  is  of  great  weight  on  account  of  his  knowledge  of  the 
country.  It  is  highly  pleasant  to  me  to  be  followed  and  coun 
tenanced  by  the  army  that  if  we  stop  the  enemy  and  meet  with 
some  advantage  they  may  push  it  with  vigor.  I  have  no  doubt 
but  if  we  overtake  them  we  possess  a  very  happy  chance.  How 
ever,  I  would  not  have  the  army  quite  so  near  as  not  to  be  quite 
master  of  its  motions,  but  a  very  little  distance  may  do  it.  I  have 
heard  nothing  of  the  enemy  this  morning.  An  officer  of  militia 
Says,  that  after  they  had  pitched  their  tents  yesterday  night,  they 
struck  them  again.  But  I  am  inclined  to  believe  they  did  not 
go  farther,  and  that  the  man  who  brought  the  intelligence  was 
mistaken.  I  expect  some  at  Hidestown  which  I  will  immediately 
forward  to  you.  I  beg  when  your  Excellency  will  write  to  me,  that 
you  could  let  me  know  the  place  you  have  reached,  that  I  might 
govern  myself  accordingly. 

u  With  the  highest  respect  I  have  the  honor  to  be  &c. 

"LAFAYETTE." 

Up  to  this  point  the  movement  against  the  British  army 
had  been  carried  out  precisely  as  General  Washington  in 
tended,  in  execution  of  the  plan  which  he  had  decided 
upon  after  concluding  to  assume  the  offensive, — namely, 
to  press  so  closely  upon  the  enemy's  flanks  and  in  their 
rear  as  to  annoy  and  impede  them  as  much  as  possible 

1  Lee  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society,  ii.  416. 


356  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

by  the  strong  detachment  thrown  out  ahead  of  his  main 
body,  now  acting  under  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette, 
whilst  he  should  follow  closely  enough  behind  to  maintain 
constant  communication,  in  order  that  if  the  enterprise 
of  the  advanced  force  should  lead  to  a  counter-movement 
upon  the  British  side  and  should  result  in  a  general  en 
gagement,  which  was  very  probable,  he  might  come  to  its 
support  at  once  with  his  entire  strength  and  thus  attack 
Sir  Henry  Clinton  with  the  whole  American  army.  The 
difficulty  of  manoeuvring  a  retreating  force  through  that 
part  of  New  Jersey,  over  roads  that  necessarily  presented 
many  serious  obstacles,  especially  in  view  of  the  impedi 
ment  to  the  British  army  presented  by  its  enormous 
baggage-train,  which  would  require  almost  half  its  avail 
able  force  to  protect,  gave  the  American  commander  rea 
sonable  ground  to  hope  for  a  happy  issue  to  the  event. 

But  at  this  point  General  Charles  Lee,  who  was  the 
controlling  influence  and  at  the  same  time  the  evil  genius 
of  the  battle  of  Monmouth,  interrupted  the  plan.  It  is 
not  easy  to  determine  his  precise  motive  in  the  step  that 
he  took, — whether  it  was  personal  jealousy  of  the  credit 
which  La  Fayette  was  likely  to  obtain  from  the  expedi 
tion,  in  a  command  which  he  might  have  held  himself  if 
he  would,  that  aroused  him  to  the  purpose  of  defeating  the 
younger  general's  prospects  now  that  they  were  bright 
ening  visibly  as  the  campaign  progressed,  or  whether  he 
became  alarmed  at  the  vigorous  hostility  with  which  he 
saw  that  the  enemy  was  about  to  be  pursued  and  would 
certainly  be  attacked,  in  spite  of  his  utmost  exertions  in 
the  councils  and  in  the  camp  to  prevent  it.  The  proba 
bility  is  that  both  these  feelings  agitated  his  wayward 
spirit,  and  fired  him  with  selfishness  and  envious  hate  on 
the  one  hand,  whilst  they  drove  him,  on  the  other,  into 
the  stubborn  determination  of  carrying  out  his  secret 
purpose  by  an  act  of  deliberate  treachery.  He  had  no 
love  for  La  Fayette ;  for  in  their  views  upon  the  progress 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  357 

of  the  war  they  were  so  entirely  opposed  to  each  other 
that  they  could  not  become  intimate  friends,  and  Lee  was 
a  man  who  was  by  nature  intensely  jealous  of  other  men's 
success.1  He  hated  and  opposed  Washington  throughout 
his  whole  career  in  the  army.  He  longed  for  the  chief 
command  himself,  and  it  was  the  hope  of  obtaining  this, 
probably  as  much  as  anything  else,  that  induced  him  to 
serve  in  America.  He  was  an  Englishman  by  birth, 
by  education,  by  early  military  training,  and  he  always 
remained  an  Englishman  in  sympathy.  To  have  lived 
upon  an  estate  in  England,  as  an  English  gentleman, 
would  have  fulfilled  his  ideal  of  happiness.  As  it  was, 
his  heart  was  not  in  the  war ;  he  would  gladly  have 
aided  the  Commissioners  to  effect  a  reconciliation,  and  he 
was  determined  to  secure  for  the  British  army,  by  every 
means  that  lay  within  his  power,  an  undisturbed  passage 
through  New  Jersey  in  this  summer  of  1778.  The  first 
move  to  make,  therefore,  at  this  time,  was  to  stop  the 
progress  of  La  Fayette ;  otherwise  it  would  be  too  late. 

Lee  acted  upon  this  impulse  immediately,  by  asking 
of  General  Washington  the  command  of  the  advanced 
forces,  which  had  been  his  in  the  beginning  by  senior 
ity.  He  wrote  as  follows  to  the  Commander-in-Chief : 2 

"CAMP,  AT  KINGSTON,  25  June,  1778. 

"DEAR  GENERAL, — When  I  first  assented  to  the  Marquis  de 
Lafayette's  taking  the  command  of  the  present  detachment,  I 
confess  I  viewed  it  in  a  very  different  light  from  that  in  which  I 
view  it  at  present.  I  considered  it  as  a  more  proper  business 
of  a  young,  volunteering  general,  than  of  the  second  in  command 
in  the  army ;  but  I  find  it  is  considered  in  a  different  manner. 
They  say  that  a  corps  consisting  of  six  thousand  men,  the  greater 
part  chosen,  is  undoubtedly  the  most  honorable  command  next  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  that  my  ceding  it  would  of  course  have 

1  "  Son  visage  etait  laid,  son  esprit  mordant,  son  cceur  ambitienx  et  avare, 
son  caractere  incompatible,  et  toute  sa  personne  originale." — M£moires  de 
ma  Main,  i.  49. 

2  Lee  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society,  ii.  417. 


358  KETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

an  odd  appearance.  I  must  entreat,  therefore,  after  making  a 
thousand  apologies  for  the  trouble  my  rash  assent  has  occasioned 
you,  that,  if  this  detachment  does  march,  I  may  have  the  com 
mand  of  it.  So  far  personally ;  but,  to  speak  as  an  officer,  I  do 
not  think  that  this  detachment  ought  to  march  at  all,  until  at 
least  the  head  of  the  enemy's  right  column  has  passed  Cranberry  ; 
then,  if  it  is  necessary  to  march  the  whole  army,  I  cannot  see  any 
impropriety  in  the  Marquis's  commanding  this  detachment,  or  a 
greater,  as  an  advanced  guard  of  the  army ;  but  if  this  detach 
ment,  with  Maxwell's  corps,  Scott's  Morgan's  and  Jackson's,  is  to 
be  considered  as  a  separate,  chosen,  active  corps,  and  put  under 
the  Marquis's  command  until  the  enemy  leave  the  Jerseys,  both 
myself  and  Lord  Stirling  will  be  disgraced. 

"I  am,  dear  General,  Yours  &c. 

" CHARLES  LEE." 

Of  course  it  was  not  a  new  discovery  made  now  by 
General  Lee  that  the  advanced  corps  consisted  of  a  body 
of  select  troops  which  the  Commander-in-Chief  designed 
to  concentrate  for  active  operations,  under  the  command 
of  a  major-general.  As  second  in  command  in  the  army, 
he  was  perfectly  acquainted  with  what  was  taking  place ; 
and,  besides,  he  was  watching  the  conduct  of  this  cam 
paign  as  keenly  as  any  other  man  in  America.  He  had  a 
special  design  in  doing  so.  He  had  begun,  even  before 
the  army  moved  out  of  Valley  Forge,  to  put  into  ex 
ecution  this  design,  to  shield  the  enemy,  by  trying  to 
induce  General  Washington  to  draw  off  into  the  interior 
of  Pennsylvania,  along  the  Susquehanna  River,  upon  an 
ingeniously  contrived  falsehood  that  Lee  believed  the 
British  would  move  toward  the  south  in  the  direction 
of  the  Head  of  Elk  upon  evacuating  Philadelphia ;  by 
which  reasoning,  however,  the  Commander-in-Chief  was 
not  in  the  slightest  degree  deceived.  General  Lee  had 
labored  strenuously  afterward  in  the  councils  of  war  to 
prevent  an  attack  upon  the  British  during  their  march. 
He  had  refused  to  command  the  advanced  detachment, 
probably  with  the  specific  determination  of  not  making 
the  attack  himself;  and  he  now  asked  for  the  command 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MONMOUTH.  359 

in  order  to  prevent  the  attack  from  being  made  by  some 
body  else.  That  this  was  his  purpose,  is  evident  from  his 
subsequent  conduct  in  the  action.  After  having  made 
his  request  to  General  Washington,  he  appealed  to  the 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette  to  give  up  the  command,  saying 
to  him,  "  I  place  my  fortune  and  my  honor  in  your  hands  ; 
you  are  too  generous  to  destroy  both  the  one  and  the 
other."  l 

La  Fayette's  unselfish  conduct  throughout  this  affair 
does  the  highest  honor  to  the  qualities  of  his  heart  and 
mind.  He  was  proud  of  his  command ;  yet  in  the  face 
of  this  appeal  he  consented  to  give  it  up,  and  he  sent 
word  at  once  to  General  Washington  that  he  would 
serve  under  General  Lee.  A  little  later  in  the  morning 
of  the  26th,  upon  which,  as  we  have  seen,  he  had  written 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief  at  five  o'clock  from  Cran 
berry,  he  wrote  again  as  follows : 2 

"  ICETOWN  [HronTSTOWN],  26th  June,  1778. 
"  at  a  quarter  after  seven. 

"DEAR  GENERAL — I  hope  you  have  received  my  letter  from 
Cranberry,  where  I  acquaint  you  that  I  am  going  to  Ice  Town, 
though  we  are  short  of  provisions.  When  I  got  there  I  was  sorry 
to  hear  that  Mr.  Hamilton,  who  had  been  riding  all  the  night,  had 
not  been  able  to  find  anybody  who  could  give  him  certain  intel 
ligence  ;  but  by  a  party  who  came  back,  I  hear  the  enemy  are 
in  motion,  and  their  rear  about  one  mile  off  the  place  they  had 
occupied  last  night,  which  is  seven  or  eight  miles  from  here.  I 
immediately  put  Generals  Maxwell  and  Wayne's  brigades  in 
motion,  and  I  will  fall  lower  down,  with  General  Scott's,  with 
Jackson's  regiment,  and  some  militia.  I  should  be  very  happy 
if  we  could  attack  them  before  they  halt,  for  I  have  no  notion 
of  taking  one  other  moment  but  this  of  the  march.  If  I  cannot 
overtake  them,  we  could  lay  at  some  distance,  and  attack  to 
morrow  morning,  provided  they  don't  escape  in  the  night,  which 
I  much  fear,  as  our  intelligences  are  not  the  best  ones.  I  have 
sent  some  parties  out,  and  I  will  get  some  more  light  by  them. 

1  Me1  moires  de  ma  Main,  i.  51. 

2  La  Fayette's  Correspondence,  American  edition,  i.  178. 


360  RETREAT    OF   THE   BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

"I  fancy  your  excellency  will  move  clown  with  the  army,  and 
if  we  are  at  a  convenient  distance  from  you,  I  have  nothing  to 
fear  in  striking  a  blow  if  opportunity  is  offered.  I  believe  that, 
in  our  present  strength,  provided  they  do  not  escape,  we  may  do 
something. 

"  General  Forman  says  that,  on  account  of  the  nature  of  the 
country,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  be  turned  by  the  right  or  left, 
but  that  I  shall  not  quite  depend  upon. 

"  An  officer  just  from  the  lines  confirms  the  account  of  the 
enemy  moving.  An  intelligence  from  General  Dickinson  says 
that  they  hear  a  very  heavy  fire  in  the  front  of  the  enemy's 
column.  I  apprehend  it  is  Morgan,  who  had  not  received  my 
letter,  but  it  will  have  the  good  effect  of  stopping  them,  and  if 
we  attack,  he  may  begin  again. 

"Sir,  I  want  to  repeat  to  you  in  writing  what  I  have  told  to 
you,  which  is,  that  if  you  believe  it,  or  if  it  is  believed  neces 
sary  or  useful  to  the  good  of  the  service  and  the  honour  of  Gen 
eral  Lee,  to  send  him  down  with  a  couple  of  thousand  men,  or 
any  greater  force ;  I  will  cheerfully  obey  and  serve  him,  not 
only  out  of  duty,  but  out  of  what  I  owe  to  that  gentleman's 
character. 

"I  hope  to  receive,  soon,  your  orders  as  to  what  I  am  to  do  this 
day  or  to-morrow,  to  know  where  you  are  and  what  you  intend, 
and  would  be  happy  to  furnish  you  with  the  opportunity  of  com 
pleting  some  little  advantage  of  ours. 

"  LAFAYETTE. 

"The  road  I  understand  the  enemy  are  moving  by,  is  the 
straight  road  to  Monmouth." 

Upon  the  same  day  General  Washington  wrote,1 — 

"  CRANBERRY,  26th  June,  1778. 

"MY  DEAR  MARQUIS, — General  Lee's  uneasiness,  on  account 
of  yesterday's  transaction,  rather  increasing  than  abating,  and 
your  politeness  in  wishing  to  ease  him  of  it,  have  induced  me  to 
detach  him  from  this  army  with  a  part  of  it,  to  reinforce,  or  at 
least  cover,  the  several  detachments  at  present  under  your  com 
mand.  At  the  same  time,  that  I  felt  for  General  Lee's  distress 
of  mind,  I  have  had  an  eye  to  your  wishes  and  the  delicacy 
of  your  situation ;  and  have,  therefore,  obtained  a  promise  from 
him,  that  when  he  gives  you  notice  of  his  approach  and  coni- 

1  La  Fayette's  Correspondence,  American  edition,  i.  180. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MONMOUTH.  361 

mand,  he  will  request  you  to  prosecute  any  plan  you  may  have 
already  concerted  for  the  purpose  of  attacking,  or  otherwise  an 
noying  the  enemy  j  this  is  the  only  expedient  I  could  think  of  to 
answer  the  views  of  both.  General  Lee  seems  satisfied  with  the 
measure,  and  I  wish  it  may  prove  agreeable  to  you,  as  I  am,  with 
the  warmest  wishes  for  your  honour  and  glory,  and  with  the  siii- 
cerest  esteem  and  affection— 

' 1  Your  most  obedient  servant, 

i  l  G°  WASHINGTON.  > ' 

At  the  same  time  he  took  occasion  to  send  the  following 
to  General  Lee  : l 

"CRANBERRY,  26  June,  1778. 

"DEAR  SIR, — Your  uneasiness  on  account  of  the  command  of 
yesterday's  detachment  fills  me  with  concern,  as  it  is  not  in  my 
power  fully  to  remove  it  without  wounding  the  feelings  of  the 
Marquis  de  Lafayette.  I  have  thought  of  an  expedient,  which 
though  not  quite  equal  to  the  views  of  either  of  you,  may  in 
some  measure  answer  both  ;  and  that  is,  to  make  another  detach 
ment  from  this  army  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  and  supporting 
the  several  detachments  now  under  command  of  the  Marquis, 
and  giving  you  the  command,  of  the  whole,  under  certain  restric 
tions  ;  which  the  circumstances  arising  from  your  own  conduct 
yesterday  render  almost  unavoidable. 

"The  expedient  I  would  propose  is,  for  you  to  march  towards 
the  Marquis  with  Scott's  and  Varnum's  brigades.  Give  him 
notice,  that  you  are  advancing  to  support  him,  and  that  you  are 
to  have  command  of  the  whole  advanced  body  ;  but,  as  he  may 
have  formed  some  enterprise  with  the  advice  of  the  officers  com 
manding  the  several  corps  under  his  command,  which  will  not 
admit  of  delay  or  alteration,  you  will  give  him  every  assistance 
and  countenance  in  your  power.  This,  as  I  have  observed  before, 
is  not  quite  the  thing  ;  but  may  possibly  answer,  in  some  degree, 
the  views  of  both.  That  it  may  do  so,  and  the  public  service 
receive  benefit  from  the  measure,  is  the  sincere  wish  of,  dear  Sir, 
"Your  most  obedient  servant, 

"G°  WASHINGTON." 

In  the  mean  time,  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was  ad 
vancing  against  the  enemy,  with  enthusiasm  for  the  work 


1  Lee  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society,  ii.  421. 


362  RETKEAT    OF   THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

that  had  been  set,  so  happily  in  accordance  with  his 
own  most  ardent  desire,  for  him  to  perform.  He  was 
almost  upon  the  British ;  and,  although  the  lack  of  pro 
visions  had  proved  an  extremely  annoying  hinderance  to 
his  progress,  he  continued  to  strengthen  his  position,  and 
so  to  maintain  communication  with  the  main  army,  then 
only  a  few  miles  away  from  him,  that  he  began  to  an 
ticipate  the  results  of  an  attack  which  he  would  have 
made  upon  the  enemy's  flanks  and  rear  the  following 
day.  If  he  had  been  permitted  to  do  so,  the  history  of 
that  campaign  would  doubtless  have  been  a  very  different 
page  from  the  one  we  now  read ;  it  is  probable  that  the 
whole  war  would  have  been  influenced  by  it,  and  the 
final  result  more  quickly  attained.  For,  under  the  cir 
cumstances  which  governed  him  at  that  moment,  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  was  in  danger  of  being  seriously  crippled 
in  the  action  which  threatened  him ;  and  it  was  precisely 
this  that  he  had  feared. 

General  Washington  received  the  following  report  from 
La  Fayette  on  the  afternoon  of  the  26th : l 

"AT  ROBINS' s  TAVERN,  half  past  four. 
"  26  June,  1778. 

"DEAK  GENERAL, — I  have  received  your  excellency's  favor 
notifying  your  arrival  at  Cranberry,  and  am  glad  to  have  antici 
pated  your  orders  in  not  going  too  far.  I  have  felt  the  unhappy 
effects  of  the  want  of  provisions,  for  I  dare  say  if  we  had  not 
been  stopped  by  it,  as  we  were  already  within  three  miles  of  the 
enemy's  rear,  we  would  very  easily  have  overtaken  them  and 
fought  with  advantage. 

"I  have  consulted  the  general  officers  of  the  detachment,  and 
the  general  opinions  seems  to  be  that  I  should  march  in  the  night 
near  them,  so  as  to  attack  the  rear  guard  when  on  the  march. 
We  have  also  spoken  of  a  night  attack.  The  latter  seems  dan 
gerous.  The  former  will  perhaps  give  them  time  of  escaping,  as 
it  is  impossible  I  would  move  quite  close  by  them,  at  least  nearer 
than  three  miles. — Col.  Morgan  is  towards  the  right  flank,  Gen. 

1  Lee's  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society,  ii.  423. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  363 

Dickinson  is  a  little  upon  the  left,  Gens.  Scott  and  Maxwell  have 
insisted  upon  going  further  down  than  we  are  now  ;  for  Wayne's 
and  Jackson's  corps  they  have  not  had  provisions  at  all  but  will 
be  able  to  march  in  the  night.  I  beg  you  would  let  me  know  your 
intention  and  your  opinion  of  the  matter,  my  motions  depend 
much  upon  wrhat  the  army  will  do  for  countenancing  them.  I  beg 
you  would  be  very  particular  upon  what  you  think  proper  to  be 
done  and  what  your  excellency  will  do.  I  wish  indeed  you  would 
anticipate  the  different  cases  which  may  happen  according  to  the 
place  where  the  enemy  lays. — Gen.  Wayne,  Col.  Hamilton  and 
several  officers  have  gone  to  reconnoitre  it.  I  fancy  they  will  lay 
about  seven  or  eight  miles  from  here.  Your  Excellency  knows 
that  by  the  direct  road  you  are  only  three  miles  further  from 
Mon  mouth  than  we  are  in  this  place. 

"The  enemy  is  said  to  march  since  this  morning,  with  a  great 
confusion  and  fright.  Some  prisoners  have  been  made,  and  de 
serters  come  amazingly  fast.  I  believe  an  happy  blow  would 
have  the  happiest  effect,  and  I  always  regret  the  time  we  have 
lost  by  want  of  provisions. 

1  c  I  beg  you  would  answer  to  me  immediately,  and  with  the 
highest  respect  I  have  the  honor  to  be  &c. 

"  LAFAYETTE." 

General  Washington  had  moved  forward  with  the  main 
army  from  Kingston,  where  the  baggage  was  left  behind, 
with  the  purpose  of  maintaining  his  distance  from  the  ad 
vanced  corps  under  La  Fayette  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be 
able  to  support  it  in  case  its  presence  upon  the  enemy's 
rear  should  lead  to  an  engagement ;  and  on  the  26th  of 
June  he  was  at  Cranberry,  whilst  La  Fayette  had  pro 
ceeded  along  the  Monmouth  road  to  a  point  about  five 
miles  distant  from  the  British  camp.  The  intense  heat 
of  the  weather,  from  which  the  troops  were  suffering, 
and  a  storm  that  came  on,  prevented  General  Washing 
ton  from  advancing  beyond  Cranberry  as  he  had  in 
tended  to  do ;  and,  fearing  that  whilst  his  main  body 
remained  at  Cranberry  the  advanced  corps  would  be 
too  far  upon  the  right  to  make  an  attack,  or  to  be  sup 
ported  in  case  of  an  operation  against  it  on  the  part 
of  the  enemy,  he  sent  an  order,  late  in  the  afternoon 


364  RETKEAT    OF    THE   BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

of  that  day,  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  to  file  off  by 
his  left  toward  Englishtown.1 

This  order  reached  La  Fayette  too  late  for  him  to  exe 
cute  it  in  the  evening ;  but  he  did  so  very  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  27th,  having  written  the  following  letter 
to  General  Washington  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  his 
instructions : 2 

"Half-past  ten  (P.  M.  26th),  June,  1778. 

"DEAR  GENERAL, — Your  orders  have  reached  me  so  late  and 
found  me  in  such  a  situation  that  it  will  be  impossible  to  follow 
them  as  soon  as  I  could  wish.  It  is  not  on  account  of  any  other 
motive  than  the  impossibility  of  moving  the  troops  and  making 
such  a  march  immediately,  for  in  receiving  your  letter  I  have 
given  up  the  project  of  attacking  the  enemy,  and  I  only  wish  to 
join  Gen.  Lee.  I  was  even  going  to  set  out,  but  all  the  Brigadiers, 
Officers,  &c.  have  represented  that  there  was  a  material  impossi 
bility  of  moving  troops  in  the  situation  where  ours  find  themselves. 
I  do  not  believe  Gen.  Lee  is  to  make  any  attack  tomorrow,  for 
then  I  would  have  been  directed  to  fall  immediately  upon  them, 
without  making  11  miles  entirely  out  of  the  way.  I  am  here  as 
near  as  I  will  be  at  English  Town.  Tomorrow  at  two  o'  clock  I 
will  set  off  for  that  place. 

"I  do  not  know  if  Morgan's  corps,  the  militia,  &c.  must  be 
brought  along  with  the  other  part  of  the  detachment.  Gen. 
Forman  who  don't  approve  much  of  that  motion,  says  that  our 
right  flank  must  be  secured,  unless  to  incur  the  most  fatal  conse 
quences  for  the  whole  army. 

i  i  I  beg  your  pardon,  Sir,  if  my  letter  is  so  badly  written,  but  I 
want  to  send  it  soon  and  to  rest  one  or  two  hours. 
"I  have  the  honor  to  be  &c. 

"  LAFAYETTE." 

The  disappointment  of  M.  de  La  Fayette  evident  in 
this  letter  was  perhaps  not  unreasonable  in  view  of  his 
circumstances  at  that  moment ;  for  they  obliged  him  to 
give  up  at  once  all  hope  of  making  the  attack  upon  the 
enemy  for  which  he  had  completed  his  plans  during  his 

1  Washington   to   the   President  of   Congress,    1st   July,    1778 :    Sparks, 
Writings  of  Washington,  v.  422. 

2  Lee  Papers,  New  York  Historical  Society,  ii.  425. 


1778.]  AXD    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  365 

operations  with  the  advanced  force,  and  it  was  especially 
hard  for  him  to  renounce  that  purpose  at  the  moment 
when  his  wishes  appeared  upon  the  point  of  being  real 
ized.  The  position  of  the  enemy  was  then  so  well  taken, 
however,  that  it  would  have  been  out  of  the  question 
to  attack  them  without  the  support  of  the  whole  Con 
tinental  army ;  they  had  marched  that  day  with  extreme 
caution,  having  placed  all  their  baggage  in  front,  and  be 
ing  protected  in  the  rear  by  a  strong  concentrated  force, 
with  a  rear-guard  of  a  thousand  men  about  four  hundred 
paces  from  the  main  body.  They  lay  encamped  on  the 
night  of  the  26th  with  their  van  slightly  beyond  Mon- 
mouth  Court-House,  in  a  position  in  which  both  wings 
were  well  protected.  Colonel  Alexander  Hamilton,  who 
was  with  La  Fayette,  and  who  happened  to  be  writing 
to  General  Washington  when  the  hitter's  order  arrived  to 
file  off  by  the  left,  declared  that  "  to  attack  them  in  this 
situation,  without  being  supported  by  the  whole  army, 
would  be  folly  in  the  extreme.  ...  If  it  should  be 
thought  advisable  to  give  the  necessary  support,  the 
army  can  move  to  some  position  near  the  enemy's  left 
Hank,  which  would  put  them  in  a  very  awkward  situ 
ation,  with  so  respectable  a  body  in  their  rear ;  and  it 
would  put  it  out  of  their  power  to  turn  either  flank, 
should  they  be  so  disposed."  l 

Nevertheless,  La  Fayette  obeyed  his  orders  implicitly, 
and  moved  with  his  detachment  before  daylight,  on  the 
morning  of  the  27th  of  June,  to  Englishtown,  whither  he 
had  been  directed  to  proceed,  it  having  become  impos 
sible  to  support  him  properly  in  his  more  remote  position 
on  the  Monmouth  road  when  General  Washington  had 
decided  to  advance  from  Cranberry  by  the  road  lead 
ing  to  Englishtown.  Besides  this,  it  was  Washington's 

1  Hamilton  to  Washington,  2(3th  June,  1778,  Evening :   Lee  Papers,  Xew 
York  Historical  Society,  ii.  424. 


366  RETREAT    OF   THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

intention  to  concentrate  his  forces  as  a  matter  of  military 
precaution,  in  view  of  his  proximity  to  the  enemy. 

Upon  arriving  at  Englishtown,  La  Fayette  yielded  the 
command  of  the  advanced  detachment  to  General  Lee, 
under  whom  he  then  served  until  the  crisis  came  upon 
the  following  day  at  the  battle  of  Monmouth. 

This  action,  which  took  place  upon  the  28th  of  June, 
1778,  is  the  most  confusing  in  its  movements,  and  the 
most  difficult  to  present,  or  to  follow  in  detail,  of  any  of 
the  battles  during  the  Revolutionary  War ;  chiefly,  no 
doubt,  from  the  fact  that  it  was  not  fought  upon  any 
principle,  or  with  regard  to  any  general  plan  calculated 
either  from  the  disposition  of  the  enemy,  the  nature  of 
the  ground,  or  the  advantages  possessed  by  the  Conti 
nental  army ; *  the  troops  were  allowed  to  waste  their 
efforts  in  small,  disunited  parties ;  they  were  annoyed 
and  confused  by  conflicting  orders;  and,  after  having 
been  completely  disorganized,  they  were  thrown  into  an 
unnecessary  and,  as  it  was  justly  called  at  the  time,  a 
shameful  retreat.  It  is  a  remarkable  case,  of  a  detach 
ment  in  excellent  spirits,  fully  prepared  for  action,  and 
almost  within  musket-shot  of  the  enemy,  suddenly  turned 
away,  distracted  and  almost  entirely  destroyed,  through 
the  treachery  of  its  commander. 

On  the  night  of  the  27th  of  June  the  positions  of  the 
two  armies  were  as  follows.  General  Washington  had 
advanced  with  the  main  body  of  his  troops  along  the  road 
leading  to  Englishtown,  and  was  encamped  about  three 
miles  west  of  that  place ;  General  Lee  was  at  Englishtown 
with  his  command ;  Colonel  Morgan's  corps  was  very 
close  upon  the  enemy's  right  flank,  while  General  Dickin 
son,  with  the  Jersey  militia,  was  upon  their  left : 2  thus 


1  J.  Laurens  to  Henry  Laurens,  30th  June,  1778  :  Simms,  Correspondence 
of  J.  Laurens,  195. 

2  Washington  to  Congress,  1st  July,  1778  :  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington, 
v.  424. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  367 

the  whole  Continental  force  was  so  situated  as  to  have 
been  readily  concentrated  for  a  general  action,  with  its 
advanced  posts  almost  touching  the  enemy's  flanks.  The 
British  army  was  encamped  in  a  strong  position  near 
Monmouth  Court-House,  with  its  right  wing  extending 
about  a  mile  and  a  half  beyond  the  court-house  to  the 
junction  of  the  roads  leading  toward  Shrewsbury  and 
Middletown,  and  its  left  lying  along  the  road  from  Allen- 
town  to  Monmouth,  the  same  that  La  Fayette  had  been 
following  the  day  before,  extending  about  three  miles  to 
the  southwest  of  the  court-house ;  its  best  troops  were 
drawn  up  in  the  rear,  consisting  of  the  grenadiers,  the 
light  infantry,  and  the  chasseurs  of  the  line ;  each  flank 
was  protected  by  a  wood,  with  a  marsh  extending  toward 
the  rear,  and  its  whole  front  covered  by  a  wood  and  for  a 
considerable  extent  to  the  left  by  a  morass. 

General  Washington  was  convinced,  from  his  knowledge 
of  the  country  and  from  the  information  obtained  by  him 
upon  the  ground,  that  if  the  enemy  succeeded  in  reach 
ing  the  heights  of  Middletown,  some  ten  or  twelve  miles 
beyond  their  present  position,  they  would  be  so  strongly 
posted  that  there  would  be  no  hope  of  a  successful  enter 
prise  against  them.  Thereupon  he  determined  to  attack 
them  in  the  rear  the  moment  they  should  get  in  motion. 
He  informed  General  Lee  of  this  intention,  and  ordered 
him  to  prepare  for  an  attack  and  to  keep  his  troops  con 
stantly  lying  upon  their  arms  to  be  in  readiness  at  the 
shortest  notice.  He  took  the  same  measures  with  the 
troops  composing  the  main  body. 

Whilst  General  Washington  was  giving  these  instruc 
tions  to  General  Lee,  at  head-quarters,  on  the  afternoon 
of  the  27th  of  June,  he  invited  General  Wayne,  General 
Maxwell,  General  Scott,  and  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette, 
who  were  standing  near  by,  to  come  forward  to  the  place 
where  he  was  talking,  and  in  their  presence  he  announced 
that  he  intended  to  have  the  enemy  attacked  the  following 


368  RETREAT    OF   THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

morning  by  the  troops  under  the  command  of  General 
Lee,  and  requested  that  officer  to  call  his  generals  to 
gether  during  the  afternoon  in  order  to  agree  upon  some 
concerted  plan  of  action.  General  Lee  assented  to  this, 
and  promised  to  meet  them  at  his  quarters  at  five  o'clock ; 
after  which  they  separated.  General  Scott,  who  appears 
to  have  understood  the  hour  appointed  to  be  half-past 
five,  arrived  at  that  time  and  was  told  that  "  General  Lee 
had  rode  out."  General  Wayne,  however,  with  General 
Maxwell  and  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  arrived  at  five 
and  met  General  Lee.  They  found  his  attitude  one  of 
complete  indifference  as  to  the  proposed  movement;  he 
held  no  council  with  these  general  officers,  he  suggested 
no  plan  to  them,  nor  did  he  call  upon  them  for  informa 
tion  or  for  their  opinions.  He  simply  informed  them  that 
he  had  nothing  to  recommend  except  that  they  should 
not  dispute  as  to  rank  in  case  he  should  order  forward 
either  the  right  wing  or  the  left  to  begin  the  action  ;  and 
the  conference  lasted  only  a  short  time,  for,  as  we  have 
seen,  it  was  over  when  General  Scott  arrived  half  an 
hour  later.  In  the  course  of  the  evening  General  Scott 
met  General  Lee,  who  told  him  substantially  what  he  had 
told  the  others,  namely,  that  he  had  no  orders,  but  that 
they  were  not  to  dispute  about  rank.1 

It  is  clear  that  Lee  had  already  determined  to  thwart 
the  purpose  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  either  by  pre 
venting  an  attack  the  next  day  upon  the  British  army, 
or,  if  an  attack  were  made  in  spite  of  him,  by  causing 
it  to  miscarry. 

About  five  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  the  28th  of  June, 
word  was  received  at  head-quarters  that  the  enemy  had 
begun  to  march,  whereupon  General  Washington  imme 
diately  put  his  army  in  motion  and  sent  an  aide-de-camp 
to  General  Lee  directing  him  to  move  on  and  attack  them, 

1  Lee's  Trial,  New  York  Historical  Society :  Testimony  of  General  Scott, 
General  Wayne,  General  Maxwell,  and  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette. 


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1778.]  AND    BATTLE    OF    MOXMOUTH.  369 

unless  there  should  be  some  very  powerful  reasons  to  the 
contrary ;  he  announced  to  him  at  the  same  time  that 
he  was  then  marching  to  support  him,  and  that  in  order 
to  do  this  more  readily  he  had  ordered  his  men  to  leave 
their  packs  and  blankets  behind. 

General  Lee  accordingly  put  his  troops  in  motion  from 
the  point  occupied  by  him  at  Englishtown,  and  advanced 
in  an  easterly  direction  along  a  road  running  through  a 
wood  about  a  mile  to  the  north  of  Moumouth  Court- 
House,  and  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy's  left  flank,  who 
were  then  retiring  from  the  court-house  and  moving  also 
in  a  general  easterly  direction.  General  Lee's  forces  were 
distributed  as  follows.  In  front  Colonel  Butler,  with 
two  hundred  men ;  then  Colonel  Jackson,  with  an  equal 
number ;  Scott's  brigade,  with  a  part  of  Woodford's,  six 
hundred  men,  with  two  pieces  of  artillery  ;  General  Yar- 
num's,  about  the  same  number,  with  two  pieces  of  artil 
lery  ;  General  Wayne's  detachment  of  a  thousand  men, 
with  two  pieces  of  artillery ;  General  Scott's  detachment, 
fourteen  hundred  men,  with  four  pieces  of  artillery ;  and 
General  Maxwell's,  one  thousand  men,  with  two  pieces  of 
artillery  :  in  all,  some  five  thousand  men,  with  twelve 
pieces  of  artillery,  exclusive  of  the  militia.1  About  eight 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  the  van,  under  Colonel  Butler, 
arrived,  toward  the  north  and  east  of  Monmouth  Court- 
House,  upon  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  who  were  then 
in  full  march,  moving  in  great  haste  and  confusion.  The 
main  body  of  General  Lee's  detachment  was  formed  at 
the  edge  of  the  wood,  about  half  a  mile  distant  north 
ward  from  the  court-house.  At  this  point  General  Lee 
ordered  General  Wayne  to  leave  his  own  troops  and  to 
take  command  of  those  in  front,  saying  that  it  was  a  post 
of  honor,  and  also  that,  as  the  enemy  were  advancing, 
he  should  come  forward  at  once.  When  General  Wayne 


1  General  Wayne's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial. 
VOL.  I.— 24 


370  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

arrived  at  the  front,  in  obedience  to  this  order,  he  found 
there  drawn  up  about  six  hundred  men  of  Scott's  and 
Woodford's  brigades  and  of  General  Varnum's  brigade, 
with  two  pieces  of  artillery.  Upon  the  reception  of  some 
message  from  General  Dickinson  as  to  the  enemy's  move 
ments,  General  Lee  ordered  a  halt  to  be  made  here,  and 
shortly  afterward  he  gave  the  order  to  advance ;  but 
they  had  not  proceeded  far  before  information  reached 
General  Lee  that  the  enemy  were  advancing  toward  him 
at  a  right  angle  by  a  road  that  ran  from  the  court-house 
in  a  northerly  direction  toward  the  road  he  was  then  fol 
lowing  in  the  woods ;  whereupon  he  formed  some  of  his 
men  so  as  to  face  toward  the  court-house  and  to  cover  the 
roads  in  the  woods  where  his  troops  had  advanced  and 
were  formed.  From  there  he  ordered  Colonel  Butler  with 
his  detachment,  and  Colonel  Jackson  with  his,  to  continue 
toward  the  front.  Colonel  Butler  formed  the  advance 
guard  and  marched  on.  The  troops  then  took  up  the 
line  of  march  again  and  followed  him  until  they  arrived 
near  the  edge  of  some  open  ground  in  view  of  the  court 
house,  where  they  discovered  a  body  of  the  enemy's  horse 
drawn  up  on  the  northeast  side  of  the  village,  between 
them  and  the  court-house.  General  Lee  immediately 
ordered  a  halt,  and  faced  some  of  his  troops  about  so  as 
to  make  them  front  toward  this  body  of  horse,  though 
keeping  the  men  well  under  cover  of  the  woods. 

Up  to  this  point,  General  Lee  had  carried  out  the  in 
structions  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  so  far,  at  least,  as 
his  actions  gave  any  indication  :  he  had  put  his  troops  in 
motion,  he  had  continued  with  them  and  directed  their 
advance,  and  he  had  come  actually  within  sight  of  the 
enemy.  He  appears,  however,  not  to  have  gone  be 
yond  this.  The  moment  he  had  reached  the  position  from 
which  it  was  intended  that  he  should  begin  active  opera 
tions  against  the  British  army,  and  when  all  the  circum 
stances  were  propitious  to  the  fulfilment  of  the  plan  pre- 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  371 

pared  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  General  Lee  stopped. 
He  never  directed  the  attack  to  be  made ;  he  did  not 
order  a  single  gun  to  be  fired.  He  gave  the  signal  for 
retreat.  General  Wayne  afterward  testified  as  to  this 
precise  moment  when  the  enemy's  horse  were  discovered 
on  the  road  to  the  northeast  of  the  court-house : 

"  General  Lee  and  myself  were  advancing  to  reconnoitre  the 
enemy,  and  bad  directed  the  horse  and  gentlemen  with  as  to  re 
main  under  cover.  In  advancing  a  piece  forward  General  Lee 
received  some  message  which  stopped  him. 

"I  went  on  to  a  place  where  I  had  a  fair  prospect  from  my 
glass  of  the  enemy.  Their  horse  seemed  so  much  advanced  from 
the  foot,  that  I  could  hardly  perceive  the  movement  of  the  foot, 
which  induced  me  to  send  for  Colonel  Butler's  detachment,  and 
Colonel  Jackson's  detachment,  in  order  to  drive  their  horse  back. 
I  then  detached  part  of  Butler's  people,  who  drove  the  horse  into 
the  village,  by  which  means  I  could  perceive  the  enemy  were 
moving  from  us  in  very  great  disorder  and  confusion.  This 
intelligence  I  sent  by  one  of  my  volunteer  aids  to  General  Lee, 
requesting  that  the  troops  might  be  pushed  on." 

Shortly  after  this,  General  AVayne  observed  that  the 
enemy  had  made  a  halt  and  appeared  to  be  forming  in 
some  order,  though  they  were  not  in  much  force  as  yet, 
probably  six  hundred  foot  and  about  three  hundred  horse  ; 
he  sent  to  General  Lee  to  inform  him  of  this  and  to 
request  again  that  the  troops  should  be  pushed  on.  One 
of  his  aides  returned  with  the  order  that  General  Wayne 
should  advance  with  Colonel  Butler's  detachment  and 
with  that  of  Colonel  Jackson,  which  had  been  sent  for 
ward,  about  four  hundred  men  together,  which  he  did ; 
whereupon  the  enemy  took  up  their  line  of  march  and 
moved  on.  General  Wayne  crossed  the  morass  about 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  east  and  north  of  the 
court-house,  at  the  edge  of  a  road  leading  to  Middle- 
town,  near  the  road  the  enemy  were  marching  upon, — 
when  the  latter  halted  and  fired  a  field-piece ;  the  main 
body  of  General  Lee's  troops  was  at  that  time  still  ad- 


372  RETREAT   OF   THE   BRITISH   ARMY,  [1778. 

vancing,  and  had  arrived  at  the  edge  of  the  inorass  some 
what  to  the  northeast  of  the  court-house. 

Colonel  Butler's  detachment  being  in  the  van,  the 
enemy  advanced  with  about  three  hundred  horse,  sup 
ported  by  about  two  hundred  foot,  and,  with  the  purpose 
of  gaining  his  right  flank,  made  a  charge  upon  him  ;  but 
Butler  met  them  with  so  determined  a  resistance  and  so 
well  directed  a  fire  that  they  broke  and  fell  back.  This 
was  the  only  encounter  which  Lee's  troops  had  with  the 
enemy  before  the  retreat,  and  in  this  the  advantage  was 
decidedly  in  favor  of  the  American  arms. 

General  Wayne  was  looking  anxiously  now  for  the  ex 
pected  support  in  order  to  follow  up  the  advantage  gained  ; 
and,  believing  that  it  would  be  sent  forward  to  him  at 
once,  he  directed  Colonel  Butler  to  advance  upon  the 
broken  column  of  the  enemy.  Colonel  Butler's  force 
being  small,  however,  he  had  proceeded  only  about  two 
hundred  yards  when  the  British  artillery  opened  fire 
upon  him  with  four  pieces.  In  the  mean  time,  General 
Wayne,  who  was  in  the  van  with  Colonel  Butler,  observed 
that  a  force  of  the  enemy,  amounting,  as  he  estimated,  to 
some  eighteen  hundred  men,  was  inclining  fast  toward  his 
right,  apparently  with  the  intention  of  gaining  a  piece 
of  high  ground  nearly  in  front  of  the  court-house, — the 
head  of  their  column  having  halted  there  and  formed, 
and  each  detachment  forming  in  succession  as  it  came  up. 
He  sent  one  of  his  aides  immediately  to  order  the  rest  of 
his  troops  then  in  front  of  the  morass  to  come  forward, 
while  the  American  artillery  began  to  reply  to  the  British 
fire  from  a  point  about  half  a  mile  in  the  rear  of  Butler's 
detachment.  To  his  surprise,  his  aide  came  back  and 
reported  that  the  troops  had  been  ordered  to  repass  the 
marsh  in  their  rear,  and  that  they  were  retiring  over  it. 
General  Wayne,  at  a  loss  to  understand  this  movement, 
galloped  up  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette — who  during 
this  time  was  serving  as  a  volunteer,  under  the  orders  of 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  373 

General  Lee,  with  the  selected  troops  of  the  advanced 
detachment,  and  was  at  that  moment  near  Colonel  Living 
ston's  and  Colonel  Stewart's  regiments — and  asked  him 
what  he  was  going  to  do  with  the  troops.  General  de  La 
Fayette  replied  that  he  had  orders  to  cross  the  marsh,  and 
that  he  should  form  near  the  court-house  and  "  from  that 
to  the  woods."  Once  more  General  Wayne  hastily  sent 
an  aide  to  General  Lee,  requesting  that  the  troops  might 
be  sent  forward  to  his  support ;  but,  as  before,  word  was 
returned  to  him  that  the  troops  were  withdrawing  from 
him,  that  they  had  been  ordered  to  retire  from  the  court 
house,  and  that  they  were  now  doing  so ;  and  almost  at 
the  same  moment  one  of  General  Lee's  aides  rode  up 
and  told  him  that  it  was  not  General  Lee's  purpose  to 
attack  the  enemy  in  front,  but  that  he  intended  to  cut 
them  off  and  was  preparing  to  throw  a  detachment  upon 
their  left. 

General  Scott  and  General  Wayne  then  retired,  with 
their  force,  across  the  morass,  leaving  Colonel  Butler 
still  to  hold  his  post  upon  the  enemy's  flank ;  and  the 
two  generals  rode  to  the  court-house  to  reconnoitre  the 
ground.  From  there  General  Wayne  sent  Major  Fish- 
bourne  to  General  Lee  to  request  that  the  troops  might  at 
least  be  returned  to  the  position  they  had  last  abandoned, 
which  was  in  a  ravine  near  the  court-house,  and  to  say 
to  the  general  that  the  number  of  the  enemy  did  not  ap 
pear  to  be  more  than  two  thousand  men,  about  a  mile  dis 
tant,  in  front.  This  was  about  an  hour  after  the  charge 
of  the  enemy's  horse  had  been  repelled  by  Colonel  But 
ler,  who  still  occupied  his  former  position,  advanced  some 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  the  north  and  east  of  the 
court-house.  Major  Fishbourne  returned  and  said  that 
General  Lee  gave  no  answer,  further  than  that  he  would 
see  General  Wayne  himself, — which  promise,  however,  he 
did  not  fulfil.  In  the  mean  time,  to  the  amazement  of 
both  officers  and  men,  none  of  whom  understood  what 


374  RETREAT    OF   THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

purpose  they  were  serving  or  whither  they  were  going, 
and  without  its  being  threatened  in  any  direction  by  the 
enemy,  the  whole  advanced  detachment  of  the  army  was 
in  retreat ;  although  the  ground  occupied  by  it  had  been 
"  the  best  formed  by  nature  for  defence  of  any,  perhaps, 
in  this  country." 

General  Wayne,  having  failed  to  obtain  support  in 
answer  to  his  repeated  demands  made  of  General  Lee, 
was  now  obliged  to  send  an  order  to  Colonel  Butler  to 
fall  back,  lest  in  his  exposed  position  he  should  be  sur 
rounded  and  taken ;  and,  having  secured  that  brave 
officer,  General  Wayne  and  General  Scott  retired  to  the 
court-house,  where  they  formed  their  troops  in  an  orchard 
near  the  village.  In  spite  of  the  neglect  shown  by  his 
commander  to  all  his  former  requests  for  support,  Gen 
eral  Wayne  sent  Major  Fishbourne  once  more,  and  with 
him  Major  Lenox,  to  beg  of  General  Lee  to  halt  the 
troops  in  order  to  cover  General  Scott's  command ;  but 
those  officers  returned  soon  after  and  reported  that  the 
troops  were  then  about  a  mile  away  and  were  still  re 
tiring,  "  and  they  believed  there  would  be  no  stand  yet 
awhile."  General  Wayne  and  General  Scott  held  their 
ground,  however,  in  the  orchard  near  the  court-house, 
until  the  head  of  the  enemy's  column,  which  was  now 
advancing  upon  the  retiring  Continental  forces,  had 
passed  through  the  village  and  had  separated  them  from 
the  body  of  their  other  troops  toAvard  the  rear,  and  at 
length  General  Wayne,  with  a  very  small  company  of 
horse  which  he  had  with  him,  sustained  a  charge  from 
the  enemy ;  after  which,  from  absolute  necessity,  he  fell 
back,  embarrassed,  disappointed,  and  justly  angered  at 
this  unreasonable  failure  which  he  and  his  fellow-officers 
had  been  driven  into,  in  spite  of  their  willingness  and 
their  efforts  to  engage  the  enemy. 

1  General  Wayne  and  General  Scott  to  General  Washington,  30th  June, 
1778. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE    OF    3IOXMOUTH.  375 

The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  had  marched  with  the  ad 
vanced  detachment  that  morning  as  a  volunteer,  and  had 
joined  himself,  at  General  Lee's  request,  to  the  selected 
troops  in  the  van,  at  the  head  of  General  Wayne's  and 
General  Scott's  detachments,1  in  the  full  expectation  of 
coming  to  action  with  the  British  grenadiers  as  soon  as 
the  troops  should  overtake  the  enemy's  rear-guard.2  After 
he  had  proceeded  about  a  mile  from  Englishtown  in  the 
direction  of  the  British  position,  General  Lee  ordered 
him  to  halt.  Being  anxious  to  engage  with  his  force,  he 
went  to  General  Lee  and  asked  what  was  the  matter. 
General  Lee  told  him  that  the  reports  as  to  the  enemy's 
movements  did  not  agree,  and  therefore  he  was  waiting 
for  further  information.  Shortly  afterward,  however,  La 
Fayette  was  ordered  to  proceed,  and  then,  again,  he  was 
directed  to  halt,  His  position  at  this  second  halt  being 
very  ill  suited  to  any  manoeuvre  that  circumstances  might 
render  it  necessary  for  him  to  undertake,  he  sent  an  aide- 
de-camp  to  General  Lee  to  inform  him  of  that  fact  and 
to  ask  that  he  might  be  allowed  to  move  on  to  better 
ground.  His  aide  reported  that  General  Lee  said  he 
would  provide  for  him  later,  but  that  for  the  moment 
it  was  of  no  consequence.  Just  then  the  message  from 
General  Wayne  came  back  to  the  main  body  of  the 
detachment  requesting  of  General  Lee  that  some  of  the 
troops  might  be  sent  forward,  and  Colonel  Jackson's  regi 
ment  was  pushed  up ;  whereupon  La  Fayette,  who  had 
now  arrived  at  the  morass  to  the  northeast  of  the  court 
house,  and  was  growing  impatient  at  the  delay  and  fear 
ful  that  he  might  lose  an  opportunity  to  engage,  quickly 
pointed  out  a  short  road  by  which  this  regiment  might 
reach  the  front ;  and  shortly  afterward  he  began  to  ad 
vance  again  and  crossed  the  morass  to  its  eastern  side. 

Almost  at  the  same  time,  one  of  General  Lee's  aides 

1  Captain  Mercer's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial. 

2  La  Fayette's  Testimony  :  see  Appendix  C. 


376  KETKEAT    OF    THE    BEITISH    AKMY,  [1778. 

said  to  him  that  the  enemy's  rear-guard  was  sure  to  be 
captured,  and  General  Lee  himself,  who  happened  to  be 
near  by,  called  out  to  him,  "  My  dear  Marquis,  I  think 
those  people  are  ours !"  General  Lee  requested  La  Fay- 
ette  to  order  Colonel  Livingston's  regiment  to  file  off  along 
the  wood,  and  upon  his  suggestion  that  the  cannon  could 
not  be  taken  that  way,  Lee  answered  that  they  could 
go  along  the  road.  This  was  at  the  time  when  Colonel 
Butler's  force  was  engaged  with  the  enemy  in  the  van ; 
and,  whilst  La  Fayette  was  making  every  possible  effort  to 
proceed  toward  the  front,  an  order  was  delivered  to  him 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hamilton  from  General  Lee,  direct 
ing  that,  as  a  detachment  of  the  enemy  were  gaining  his 
right,  he  should  oppose  them  by  a  counter-movement  and 
gain  their  left.1  Whilst  La  Fayette  was  preparing,  with 
Colonel  Livingston,  to  execute  this  order,  he  noticed,  to 
his  surprise,  that  the  troops  behind  him  were  beginning 
to  retire,  and  word  was  brought  to  him  that  they  had  been 
ordered  by  General  Lee  to  take  post  farther  back,  toward 
the  village  of  Freehold :  he  supposed  this  to  have  been 
done  because  of  their  exposed  position  upon  the  open 
ground,  and  as  a  precaution  against  having  their  flank 
turned.  It  was  whilst  this  manoeuvre  was  being  executed 
that  General  Wayne  galloped  up  to  La  Fayette  and  asked 
him  what  he  was  going  to  do  with  the  troops ;  to  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  he  replied  that  they  were  retiring 
by  command  of  General  Lee,  but  that  he  should  take 

1  It  is  important  to  remember,  in  this  connection,  that  this  order  was  not 
an  effort  on  the  part  of  General  Lee  to  check  the  enemy,  but  was  given  at 
the  suggestion  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Alexander  Hamilton,  who  observed 
some  of  the  enemy's  cavalry  filing  toward  their  left,  as  if  to  attempt  some 
thing  on  the  right  of  General  Lee's  troops  ;  he  informed  the  general  of  this 
and  submitted  to  him  whether  it  wrould  not  be  proper  to  send  some  troops  to 
counteract  that  manoeuvre  and  turn  their  left  flank  ;  Lee  approved  of  this 
suggestion,  and  authorized  him  to  give  orders  to  that  effect  to  a  column  on 
the  right.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hamilton,  therefore,  gave  the  order  to  the 
Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  who  was  leading  that  column.  (Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hamilton's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial.) 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  377 

up  his  position  near  the  court-house  and  "  from  that  to 
the  woods."  Thereupon  La  Fayette  went  personally  to 
see  General  Lee  in  order  to  learn  the  purpose  of  this 
movement :  he  found  him  near  the  village,  directing  the 
troops  to  fall  still  farther  back ;  and  by  that  time  all  the 
columns  were  beginning  to  move  in  retreat.  La  Fayette 
found  himself,  like  all  the  others  who  served  that  day 
under  General  Lee,  swept  along  by  the  irresistible  and 
unaccountable  movement  which  had  set  in  toward  the 
rear.  In  spite  of  his  most  strenuous  efforts  to  reach  the 
front,  he  had  not  been  able  to  come  into  action  with 
the  enemy,  but  was  prevented  from  carrying  out  the  one 
order  which  General  Lee  gave  him,  to  move  toward  the 
enemy's  left  flank,  by  having  been  abandoned  in  an  ex 
tremely  exposed  position  in  the  open  plain,  whilst  the 
troops  who  should  have  been  sent  to  support  him  in 
this  manoeuvre  were  withdrawn  at  the  critical  moment 
and  sent  to  the  rear  by  order  of  General  Lee.1  With 
the  other  officers  who  were  about  him,  he  had  the  mortifi 
cation  of  leaving  the  field  without  having  been  permitted 
to  strike  a  blow. 

General  Wayne  and  General  Scott  united,  two  days 
after  the  action,  in  a  statement  of  the  case  to  General 
Washington,  in  which  they  declared  to  him,  "  Thus  were 
these  several  select  detachments  unaccountably  drawn  off 
without  being  suffered  to  come  to  action,  although  we  had 
the  most  pleasing  prospect,  from  our  numbers  and  position, 
of  obtaining  the  most  glorious  and  decisive  victory.  .  .  . 
We  have  taken  the  liberty  of  stating  these  facts,  in  order 
to  convince  the  world  that  our  retreat  from  the  court-house 
was  not  occasioned  by  the  want  of  numbers,  position,  or 
wishes  of  both  officers  and  men  to  maintain  that  post.  AVe 
also  beg  leave  to  mention,  that  no  plan  of  attack  was  ever 
communicated  to  us,  or  notice  of  a  retreat,  until  it  had 

1  General  Foreman's  Testimony,  and  La  Fayette's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial ; 
Memoires  de  ma  Main,  i.  52. 


378  RETREAT    OE    THE   BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

taken  place  in  our  rear,  as  we  supposed  by  General  Lee's 
order."  l 

What  happened  to  General  Wayne,  to  General  Scott, 
and  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  happened  also  to  Gen 
eral  Foreman,  General  Maxwell,  General  Varnum,  and 
many  other  officers  serving  that  day  under  the  command 
of  General  Lee.  Each  found  himself  executing  an  order 
of  which  he  did  not  understand  the  purpose,  and  each  was 
withdrawing  his  troops  when  his  own  judgment  and  the 
circumstances  which  governed  the  situation  of  both  the 
British  and  the  Continental  army  convinced  him  that 
he  ought  rather  to  advance.  Confusion  broke  out  every 
where  ;  no  one  knew  whither  he  was  expected  to  go,  or 
what  position  he  was  to  assume  after  giving  up  the  one 
he  then  occupied ;  no  general  officer  understood  precisely 
whether  he  was  to  act  by  himself  or  to  join  with  the  force 
of  some  one  else ;  many  of  the  troops  were  obliged  to 
retire  from  the  ground  they  had  taken  because  other 
troops  who  should  have  supported  them  on  the  right  or  on 
the  left  were  withdrawing  and  they  could  not  stay  behind 
alone.  So,  step  by  step,  they  were  going  back  over  the 
ground  toward  Englishtown  which  they  had  advanced 
upon  in  the  morning,  with  a  growing  disorder  that  threat 
ened  soon  to  break  through  all  restraint  and  to  precipitate 
the  army  into  a  headlong  flight  before  the  British  column, 
which  had  instantly  seized  upon  its  advantage  and  was 
now  advancing  in  pursuit. 

It  is  not  pertinent  to  the  present  inquiry  to  exam 
ine  in  detail  the  various  movements  of  troops  which  took 
place,  or  to  describe  with  military  exactness  the  positions 
taken  up  by  each  detachment,  in  the  action  at  Monmouth 
on  the  morning  of  the  28th  of  June.  These  are  fully 
and  precisely  set  forth  in  the  testimony  taken  before  the 
court-martial  which  afterward  tried  General  Charles 

1  Letter  of  General  Wayne  and  General  Scott  to  General  Washington, 
30th  June,  1778  :  Sparks,  Correspondence  of  the  Revolution,  ii.  150. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE    OF    MOXMOUTH.  379 

Lee ; l  though  some  of  the  evidence  then  given  may  be 
suitably  referred  to  here,  in  connection  with  what  has 
gone  before  and  as  bearing  upon  the  general  result  with 
which  we  now  have  to  do. 

General  Foreman  testified  that,  shortly  after  the  enemy's 
horse  had  charged  Colonel  Butler's  detachment,  he  rode 
forward  to  discover  the  number  and  the  position  of  the 
enemy,  who  he  conceived  had  left  their  rear-guard  at 
Freehold  only  to  make  a  demonstration  in  order  to  pre 
vent  the  Continental  forces  from  advancing.  From  what 
he  saw  of  them,  he  judged  that  their  number  did  not 
exceed  one  thousand  men  ;  whereupon  he  rode  back  and 
informed  General  Lee  of  this,  describing  to  him  their 
position,  and  adding  that  he  believed  them  to  be  consid 
erably  in  the  rear  of  the  column  ;  he  also  offered  to  take 
a  detachment  along  a  road  which  lay  to  the  left,  to  double 
their  right  flank.  The  only  reply  that  General  Lee  made 
to  him  was,  "  I  know  my  business."  General  Foreman 
observed,  at  the  same  time,  that  General  Lee  was  ordering 
a  body  of  troops  to  march  into  a  wood  on  the  left  of  the 
column,  which  troops,  he  was  informed,  wrere  a  part  of 
those  under  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette.  A  short  time 
later,  he  saw  General  Lee  riding  toward  the  front ;  he 
noticed  that  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  ordered  Colonel 
Livingston's  and  Colonel  Stewart's  regiments  to  march 
toward  the  enemy's  left,  and  he  was  informed  by  General 
de  La  Fayette  that  he  had  been  directed  by  General  Lee 
to  gain  the  enemy's  left  flank.  General  Foreman  fur 
ther  testified  that  General  de  La  Fayette  did  not  gain  the 
enemy's  left  flank,  because,  as  he  supposed,  of  the  retreat 
ordered  at  that  time  to  the  village,  which  retreat  he  pre 
sumed  to  have  been  ordered  by  General  Lee,  who  was 
present  and  did  not  contradict  it.  The  troops  then  began 
to  form  in  the  rear  of  the  village,  with  their  left  extend- 

1  Published  by  the  Xew  York  Historical  Society,  1873. 


380  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

ing  to  a  wood  to  the  northward  and  their  right  to  the 
southward ;  but  before  the  line  was  completed  the  troops 
again  retreated,  and  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  told  him 
that  this  was  by  order  of  General  Lee. 

There  appeared  by  this  time  much  confusion  and  irregu 
larity  among  the  troops  ;  those  upon  the  left  of  the  village 
were  retreating  in  line,  those  upon  the  right,  in  column. 
General  Foreman  inquired  of  several  officers  where  they 
were  retreating  to.  They  said,  to  the  woods.  But  upon 
asking  them,  further,  which  woods,  they  replied  that  they 
could  not  tell  whether  it  was  to  the  wood  in  front,  or  to 
the  right,  or  to  the  left.  General  Foreman  was  present  as 
they  moved  across  Mr.  Ray's  field,  and  he  saw  General 
Lee  ride  up  to  the  retiring  troops  and  order  them  to  re 
treat  with  more  haste.1 

Major  Fishbourne  testified  that  when  General  Wayne 
and  he  had  got  within  a  mile  of  the  court-house  the 
enemy  were  moving  toward  Middletown,  with  a  body  of 
horse  in  their  rear.  General  Wayne  ordered  Major  Fish- 
bourne  to  go  back  to  General  Lee  and  inform  him  of  this, 
begging  him,  at  the  same  time,  to  forward  the  troops.  He 
went  to  General  Lee  and  told  him  what  General  Wayne 
had  directed  him  ;  to  which  the  general  made  no  reply, 
but  rode  toward  the  troops.  Major  Fishbourne  returned 
to  General  Wayne  just  as  Butler's  detachment  was  moving 
toward  the  enemy's  left  flank  :  the  enemy's  horse  having 
made  a  charge  upon  him,  Butler  formed  his  regiment  and 
gave  them  a  volley,  upon  which  they  retired.  General 
Wayne  then  sent  him  again  to  General  Lee  to  inform  him 
that  the  enemy  were  retreating,  and  to  request  him  to 
send  forward  the  troops.  When  he  delivered  this  message, 
General  Lee  said,  "  Pho !  pho !  it  is  impossible !"  and 
asked  him  who  had  sent  him,  but  made  no  further  reply ; 
whereupon  Major  Fishbourne  returned  to  General  Wayne. 

1  General  Foreman's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial. 


1778.]  AXD    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  381 

Colonel  Butler's  detachment  was  ordered  by  General 
Wayne  to  file  off  to  the  left  into  a  piece  of  woods,  after 
which  General  Wayne  crossed  the  morass  and  met  Gen 
eral  Scott.  They  ordered  Major  Fishbourne  and  Major 
Byles  to  go  once  more  to  General  Lee,  to  say  to  him  that 
the  enemy  were  retreating,  and  to  beg  him,  for  God's  sake, 
to  send  on  the  troops.  To  this  message  General  Lee 
merely  answered  that  he  would  see  General  Wayne  him 
self.  Major  Fishbourne  testified,  in  answer  to  a  ques 
tion  by  the  court,  that  General  Lee  did  not  see  General 
Wayne,  to  his  knowledge. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Meade  testified  that  he  was  with 
General  Washington,  who,  upon  hearing  the  first  sound 
of  firing,  sent  him  forward  to  General  Lee  to  inquire 
"  how  matters  stood."  Whilst  he  was  on  his  way  he  met 
some  troops  retreating  in  disorder,  their  front  being  a 
good  deal  scattered  ;  as  he  advanced,  however,  he  found 
much  better  order,  and,  falling  in  with  the  Marquis  de 
La  Fayette,  he  asked  him  where  General  Lee  was.  The 
Marquis  directed  him  to  a  house  called  Carr's  house, 
where  he  saw  the  general.  Upon  saying  to  him  that 
General  Washington  had  sent  for  information  as  to  the 
situation  of  matters,  General  Lee  replied  that  "they 
were  all  in  confusion."  Thereupon  Colonel  Meade  re 
peated  that  General  Washington  would  be  glad  to  know 
the  particulars,  and  that  he  would  communicate  imme 
diately,  through  a  young  gentleman  then  present,  any 
thing  that  General  Lee  might  say  ;  to  which  Lee  an 
swered  again  that  the  troops  were  all  in  confusion,  and 
that  he  had  nothing  to  say.  Colonel  Meade  further 
testified  that  he  did  not  hear  General  Lee  give  any 
orders  to  his  troops  whilst  he  was  near  him,  and  that 
no  steps  were  taken  either  by  him  or  by  any  of  his 
officers,  during  that  time,  to  restore  order  among  the 
troops ;  that  General  Lee  was  sitting  upon  his  horse  and 
doing  nothing. 


382  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Harrison,  of  General  Washington's 
suite,  testified  that  he  offered  his  services  to  General 
Washington  "to  go  forward  and  bring  him  a  true  ac 
count  of  the  situation  of  matters."  After  riding  a  short 
distance,  he  came  upon  a  party  of  Colonel  Grayson's  regi 
ment,  and  asked  an  officer  of  it,  Captain  Jones,  the  cause 
of  the  retreat,  whether  it  was  general,  or  whether  it  was 
only  a  particular  part  of  the  troops  that  were  coming  off, 
and  was  answered  that  "  yonder  were  a  great  many  more 
troops  in  the  same  situation."  Continuing  upon  his 
errand,  he  soon  after  fell  in  with  Colonel  William  Smith, 
whom  he  asked  what  was  the  cause  of  the  retreat  of  the 
troops,  adding  that  he  had  come  forward  to  gain  infor 
mation.  Colonel  Smith  answered  that  he  could  not  tell 
the  cause,  but  that  he  had  lost  only  one  man.  Colonel 
Harrison  continued  down  the  line,  determined  to  go  to  the 
rear  of  the  retreating  troops,  when  he  met  Colonel  Ogden, 
of  whom  he  asked  the  same  question,  whether  he  could 
give  any  information  as  to  why  the  troops  were  retreating. 
Colonel  Ogden,  who  appeared  to  be  "  exceedingly  exas 
perated,"  answered,  "  By  God,  they  are  flying  from  a 
shadow !"  Colonel  Harrison  next  met  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Rhea,  of  New  Jersey,  who  was  leading  a  regiment,  and 
who  replied  to  his  inquiry  that  he  was  greatly  concerned 
because  he  had  no  place  assigned  to  him  where  his  troops 
were  to  halt ;  he  was  "  very  much  agitated,"  and  expressed 
strongly  his  disapproval  of  the  retreat.  And  so  Colonel 
Harrison  met,  successively,  as  he  advanced,  General  Max 
well,  General  Scott,  Colonel  Stewart,  and  finally  General 
Wayne ;  the  latter  of  whom  gave  it  as  his  opinion  that  it 
was  impossible  to  tell  the  cause  of  the  retreat. 

In  the  mean  time,  General  Washington,  with  the  main 
body  of  the  army,  was  moving  forward,  according  to  the 
plan  he  had  announced  the  day  before,  to  support  Gen 
eral  Lee's  detachment  as  soon  as  he  should  receive  infor 
mation  that  an  attack  had  been  made  upon  the  enemy. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MONMOUTH.  383 

He  advanced  beyond  the  meeting-house  near  Monmouth 
to  the  junction  of  the  roads,  where  he  halted  for  a  short 
time  to  direct  the  disposition  of  the  army,  and  ordered 
the  wing  under  General  Greene  to  go  to  the  right  to 
prevent  the  enemy  from  turning  the  right  flank.1  Upon 
proceeding  again,  and  having  marched  about  five  miles 
since  starting,  General  Washington  was  amazed  to  find 
the  advanced  corps  coming  toward  him  in  retreat.2  The 
first  information  of  this  that  he  had  was  when  he  met 
a  fifer  coming  down  the  road,  who  appeared  to  be  greatly 
frightened.  General  Washington  asked  him  whether 
he  was  a  soldier  of  the  army,  and  why  he  was  return 
ing  in  that  manner.  The  fifer  answered  that  he  was 
a  soldier,  and  that  the  troops  who  had  been  advanced 
were  now  retreating.  The  Commander-in-Chief  was  so 
surprised  and  offended  at  this  reply,  which  he  did  not 
believe,  that  he  ordered  the  man  under  arrest  and  told 
him  he  should  be  flogged  if  he  spread  such  reports  in  the 
army.  But,  upon  his  having  ridden  a  few  paces  farther, 
he  met  two  or  three  persons  more  on  the  road,  of  one  of 
whom,  who  wore  a  uniform,  he  inquired  where  they  had 
come  from  and  whether  they  belonged  to  the  army ;  to 
which  he  answered  that  they  did,  and  that  the  whole  ad 
vanced  corps  was  retreating.  The  General  could  not  even 
then  believe  what  they  said,  for  he  could  conceive  no 
reason  for  a  retreat,  and  he  had  heard  no  firing  except 
the  sound  of  a  few  cannon  a  considerable  length  of  time 
before.  Nevertheless  he  sent  Colonel  Harrison  ahead,  as 
we  have  seen,  and  continued,  with  the  greatest  anxiety, 
to  advance.  When  he  had  gone  beyond  the  meeting 
house  nearly  to  the  edge  of  the  morass  which  afterward 
divided  the  hostile  armies  during  the  day,  he  met  two 
regiments  retreating,  Colonel  Grayson's  and  Colonel  Pat- 

1  Colonel  Harrison's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial. 

2  General  Washington  to  Congress,  1st  July,  1778  :   Sparks,  Writings  of 
Washington,  v.  425. 


384  RETREAT    OF   THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

ton's.  The  General  asked  one  of  the  officers  whether  the 
whole  advanced  corps  was  retreating.  He  replied  that 
he  believed  it  was ;  and  he  had  scarcely  spoken  when 
the  heads  of  the  columns  of  the  advanced  corps  began 
to  appear.  The  first  officers  whom  the  General  met 
were  Colonel  Shreve  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Khea,  at 
the  head  of  Colonel  Shreve's  regiment.  Greatly  alarmed, 
the  General,  seeing  the  advanced  troops  fall  back  upon 
the  army  without  the  least  notice  having  been  sent  to 
him,  asked  Colonel  Shreve  the  meaning  of  the  retreat. 
Colonel  Shreve  replied,  significantly,  that  he  had  been 
ordered  to  retreat,  though  he  did  not  say  by  whom. 
At  the  rear  of  the  regiment  was  Major  Howell,  who  ex 
pressed  himself  with  great  indignation  at  the  retreat  and 
said  he  had  never  seen  anything  like  it. 

A  moment  of  intense  interest  followed  almost  imme 
diately  upon  this,  when  at  the  head  of  the  next  column 
appeared  General  Lee  himself.  General  Washington 
rode  up  to  him,  and,  with  very  evident  astonishment, 
demanded,  "  What  is  the  meaning  of  this  ?"  To  which 
Lee,  in  great  embarrassment  at  the  General's  question, 

could  only  reply,  "  Sir,  sir "  Thereupon  General 

Washington  repeated  it,  and  Lee  answered  that  his  infor 
mation  had  been  confused,  and  that  he  did  not  choose  to 
attack  the  British  army  with  troops  in  such  a  situation ; 
besides,  that  the  whole  undertaking  had  been  contrary 
to  his  opinion  and  advice.  General  Washington  replied 
that  no  matter  what  General  Lee's  opinion  might  be,  he 
expected  his  orders  to  be  obeyed ;  and  with  that  he  left 
him  and  rode  toward  the  rear  of  the  retreating  troops.1 

General  Washington  had  ridden  only  a  short  distance 
when  he  met  his  aide,  Colonel  Harrison,  returning  from 
the  rear,  who  reported  to  him  that  the  British  army  was 
within  fifteen  minutes'  march  of  the  place  where  they 

1  Colonel  Tilghman's  and  Dr.  McHenry's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  385 

stood,  which  was  the  first  intimation  the  General  had 
of  their  coming  on  so  rapidly.  This  made  immediate 
action  absolutely  necessary,  and,  although  he  was  not 
acquainted  with  the  country  at  that  particular  point, 
General  Washington  seized  upon  a  position  at  a  narrow 
defile  with  a  morass  in  front  of  it,  as  an  advantageous 
one  from  which  to  give  the  enemy  the  first  check ;  which 
selection  proved  extremely  fortunate  in  the  action  that 
followed.  Calling  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ramsey  and  Col 
onel  Stewart  to  him,  he  said  to  those  officers  that  he 
should  rely  upon  them  to  check  the  enemy's  advance  ; 
whereupon  they  formed  their  regiments  behind  a  fence  in 
front  of  the  position,  whilst  General  Wayne,  who  by  this 
time  had  come  up  and  who  was  exceedingly  anxious  to 
establish  the  resistance,  began  to  form  the  battalions ; 
General  Washington  observing  to  him  that  he  would  ride 
back  in  the  mean  time  and  arrange  the  disposition  of  the 
army  whilst  these  troops  held  the  advance  against  the 
enemy. 

The  British  cavalry  came  on  in  full  charge  with  excel 
lent  order  to  within  forty  paces,  when  they  were  met 
by  a  general  discharge  from  the  two  regiments  already 
formed,  which  broke  them  and  caused  them  to  fall  back. 
To  them  succeeded  the  grenadiers,  who  now  came  on  to 
the  attack ;  they  were  received  in  the  same  manner  by 
the  advanced  battalions,  and  an  exceedingly  hot  contest 
ensued,  which  resulted  in  great  slaughter  among  the 
grenadiers. 

This  check  of  the  enemy  in  front  gave  time  for  the 
formation  of  the  main  army,  which  General  Washington 
disposed  to  excellent  advantage,  with  the  left  wing  under 
the  command  of  Lord  Stirling  and  the  second  line  under 
the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  upon  an  eminence  and  in 
a  wood  a  little  to  the  rear,  covered  by  a  morass  in  front ; 
on  this  eminence  were  placed  some  batteries  which  played 
upon  the  enemy  with  great  effect,  and,  seconded  by  in- 

VOL.  I.— 25 


386  RETREAT   OF   THE   BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

fantry  detached  for  the  purpose,  effectually  put  a  stop  to 
their  advance.1  General  Greene,  who  had  previously  been 
ordered  to  file  off  by  the  new  church,  two  miles  from 
Englishtown,  into  the  Monmouth  road,  now  came  upon 
the  ground  where  the  Commander-in-Chief  was  forming 
the  army,  and  took  an  advantageous  position,  in  command 
of  the  right  wing. 

The  British  troops,  thus  effectually  halted  in  front,  made 
an  effort  to  turn  the  left  flank  of  the  American  position, 
but  were  driven  back ;  they  also  directed  their  energy 
against  the  right  wing,  but  were  obliged  to  retire  before 
the  troops  of  General  Greene,  whose  artillery  shattered 
their  ranks  and  did  great  damage  to  those  in  front 
of  the  left  wing.  The  grenadiers  returned  several  times 
with  stubborn  determination  to  the  charge,  but  each  time 
fell  back  again  before  a  well-directed  fire ;  until,  finally, 
General  Wayne  advanced  with  a  body  of  troops  who 
pressed  them  so  severely  in  front  that  they  were  com 
pelled  to  retire  behind  the  defile  where  the  first  stand 
had  been  taken  at  the  beginning  of  the  action.  The  day 
was  by  this  time  drawing  to  its  close,  and,  when  evening 
came  on,  the  two  armies  occupied  their  respective  posi 
tions  upon  either  side  of  this  defile,  the  British  with  both 
their  flanks  secured  by  thick  woods  and  morasses,  while 
their  front  could  be  approached  only  through  the  pass. 

In  spite  of  the  strong  position  of  the  enemy,  however, 
General  Washington  determined  to  attack  them ;  and, 
with  this  view,  he  ordered  General  Poor  with  his  brigade 
and  the  Carolina  brigade  to  move  toward  their  right,  and 
General  Woodford  to  their  left,  while  he  stationed  his  artil 
lery  in  such  a  manner  as  to  open  upon  them  in  front. 
The  difficulties  of  carrying  out  this  manoeuvre  made  it 
impossible  to  complete  it  before  dark.  The  Americans 
remained  upon  the  ground  all  night,  ready  to  move,  as 

1  Washington  to  Congress,  1st  July,  1778,  ut  supra. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  387 

they  had  been  ordered  to  do,  in  the  morning.  But  when 
day  broke  there  was  no  enemy  in  sight :  the  British  army 
had  moved  off  under  cover  of  the  darkness. 

Sir  Henry  Clinton's  report  of  the  affair  stated  his  re 
treat  to  have  taken  place  as  follows : l 

"  I  made  a  disposition  of  attack  on  the  plain,  but,  before  I  could 
advance,  the  enemy  fell  back  and  took  a  strong  position  on  the 
heights  above  Freehold  Court-House.  The  heat  of  the  weather 
was  intense,  and  onr  men  already  suffered  from  fatigue.  But  our 
circumstances  obliged  us  to  make  a  vigorous  exertion.  The  Brit 
ish  Grenadiers  with  their  left  to  the  village  of  Freehold,  and  the 
Guards  on  the  right  of  the  Grenadiers,  began  the  attack  with  such 
spirit,  that  the  enemy  gave  way  immediately.  The  second  line  of 
the  enemy  stood  the  attack,  with  great  obstinacy,  but  were  like 
wise  completely  routed.  Then  they  took  a  third  position,  with  a 
marshy  hollow  in  front,  over  which  it  would  have  been  scarcely 
possible  to  have  attacked  them.  However,  part  of  the  second  line 
made  a  movement  to  the  front,  occupied  some  ground  on  the 
enemy's  left  flank,  and  the  light  infantry  and  Queen's  Eangers 
turned  their  left. 

"By  this  time  our  men  were  so  overpowered  with  fatigue  that 
I  could  press  the  affair  no  further  ;  especially  as  I  was  confident 
the  end  was  gained  for  which  the  attack  had  been  made.  I  ordered 
the  light  infantry  to  rejoin  me  ;  but  a  strong  detachment  of  the 
enemy  having  possessed  themselves  of  a  post  which  would  have 
annoyed  them  in  their  retreat,  the  33d  Regiment  made  a  move 
ment  towards  the  enemy,  which,  with  a  similar  one  made  by  the 
First  Grenadiers,  immediately  dispersed  them. 

"I  took  the  position  from  whence  the  enemy  had  been  first 
driven,  after  they  had  quitted  the  plain,  and  having  reposed  the 
troops  till  ten  at  night,  to  avoid  the  excessive  heat  in  the  day,  I 
took  advantage  of  the  moonlight  to  rejoin  Lieutenant-General 
Knyphausen,  who  had  advanced  to  Nut  Swamp,  near  Middle- 
town." 

General  Washington  in  his  report  to  Congress  says, — 

"In  the  mean  time  the  enemy  were  employed  in  removing  their 
wounded,  and  about  twelve  o'clock  at  night  marched  away  in  such 

1  Sir  Henry  Clinton  to  Lord  George  Germain,  5th  July,  1778. 


388  RETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

silence,  that,  though  General  Poor  lay  extremely  near  them,  they 
effected  their  retreat  without  his  knowledge.  They  carried  off  all 
their  wounded,  except  four  officers  and  about  forty  privates,  whose 
wounds  were  too  dangerous  to  permit  their  removal. 

1 '  The  extreme  heat  of  the  weather,  the  fatigue  of  the  men  from 
their  march  through  a  deep  sandy  country,  almost  entirely  desti 
tute  of  water,  and  the  distance  the  enemy  had  gained  by  march 
ing  in  the  night,  made  a  pursuit  impracticable  and  fruitless.  It 
would  have  answered  no  valuable  purpose,  and  would  have  been 
fatal  to  numbers  of  our  men,  several  of  whom  died  the  preceding 
day  with  heat." 

Sir  Henry  Clinton  marched  through  New  Jersey  with 
out  further  incident  and  crossed  his  troops  at  Sandy  Hook  ; 
whilst  the  Continental  army  proceeded  in  the  direction  of 
the  Hudson  River. 

The  conduct  of  General  Washington  on  the  field  of 
Monmouth  illustrates  in  a  rare  manner  his  eminent 
soldierly  qualities.  When  he  came  suddenly  upon  the 
disjointed  masses  of  his  advanced  troops  falling  back  in 
disorder  and  confusion  upon  the  main  body  of  his  army, 
the  position  was  extremely  critical ;  the  steady  advance 
of  the  British  grenadiers  and  of  the  guards  had  brought 
them  almost  within  sight  of  the  flying  battalions,  and 
the  contagion  of  this  unaccountable  retreat  threatened 
to  spread  in  every  direction  and  to  produce  irreparable 
damage.  Washington  controlled  the  situation  instantly. 
His  presence  inspired  every  man  with  courage ;  his  admi 
rable  self-possession  called  forth  an  immediate  response 
in  the  breasts  of  the  soldiers ;  and  his  determination  not 
to  yield  a  single  step  before  the  enemy  changed  the  course 
of  the  battle  and  saved  the  army  from  defeat. 

His  question  to  General  Lee  upon  first  arriving  at  the 
scene  of  the  retreat  was  one,  it  is  true,  of  indignation  and 
surprise ;  but  it  justly  called  Lee  to  account  for  what  had 
occurred  upon  his  responsibility,  it  was  made  with  per 
fect  self-control,  and  its  severity  of  manner  was  that  of 
a  superior  who  had  the  right  to  ask  and  to  know.  There 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  389 

is  no  evidence  of  his  having  expressed  violent  feeling 
toward  Lee  or  of  his  having  reproached  him  with  angry 
words ;  indeed,  the  voluminous  testimony  bearing  upon 
this  incident  which  was  subsequently  taken  at  General 
Lee's  trial  is  remarkably  uniform  as  to  the  composure  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  dignity  of  his  attitude 
throughout. 

Having  made  a  disposition  of  his  troops  upon  the  very 
ground  where  he  met  them,  which  the  rapid  approach  of 
the  enemy  rendered  necessary,  he  arrested  their  retreat 
with  the  touch  of  the  master-hand,  almost  at  the  moment 
of  disaster. 

Those  who  were  near  Washington  on  that  day  spoke 
with  admiration  of  the  ability  he  displayed.  Alexander 
Hamilton  said 1  that  America  owed  a  great  deal  to  Gen 
eral  Washington  for  that  day's  work ;  for  a  general  rout, 
dismay,  and  disgrace  would  have  attended  the  whole 
army  in  any  other  hands  but  his.  "  By  his  own  good 
sense  and  fortitude  he  turned  the  fate  of  the  day.  ...  I 
never  saw  the  General  to  so  much  advantage."  And 
Lieutenant-Colonel  John  Laurens,  who  was  then  upon 
the  General's  staff,  wrote  to  his  father,  the  President  of 
Congress,2  that  his  love  and  esteem  for  his  Commander 
had  been  greatly  increased  by  his  conduct  in  this  battle, 
adding,  "  The  merit  of  restoring  the  day  is  due  to  the 
General." 

That  the  battle  of  Monmouth  was  not  a  disaster  to 
the  American  arms  was  in  itself  a  distinct  gain,  equal, 
at  that  moment,  to  a  victory.  But  it  was  even  more 
than  this ;  for,  although  Sir  Henry  Clinton  claimed  the 
victory  in  his  report  to  the  War  Office,  which  was  not 
unnatural  from  his  stand-point,  because  each  army  occu 
pied  its  ground  when  night  came  on,  and  it  was  very 

1  Letter  to  Elias  Boudinot,  5th  July,  1778. 

2  Letter  to  Henry  Laurens,  2d  July,  1778  :  Simrns,  Correspondence  of  John 
Laurens,  p.  200. 


390  RETREAT    OF   THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

necessary  at  that  period  of  the  war  for  the  British  com 
mander  to  send  to  England  the  most  favorable  news  he 
could  report  within  the  bounds  of  reason,  yet  the  Brit 
ish  army  had  unquestionably  withdrawn  under  cover  of 
the  night,  and  that  result,  in  its  moral  effect  throughout 
America,  was  tantamount  to  a  victory  in  the  field. 

The  spirit  of  the  troops  was  excellent,  and  they  fought 
with  great  bravery  from  the  moment  that  General  Wash 
ington  re-formed  them  and  arrested  the  backward  move 
ment;  they  obstinately  withstood  the  enemy  in  the  en 
counter  that  took  place  at  the  narrow  defile  on  the  edge 
of  the  morass ;  and  their  well-directed  fire  did  great 
injury  to  the  British  grenadiers,  many  of  whom  fell  at 
this  point,  among  them  the  Honorable  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Monckton,  commander  of  the  second  battalion  of  the 
grenadiers,  a  gallant  officer,  whose  loss  was  greatly  la 
mented  in  England.  His  body  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  Continental  soldiers,  by  whom  it  was  afterward  buried 
with  the  honors  of  war.1 

The  conduct  of  General  Lee  appears  to  have  been  bad 
throughout  the  day,  as  well  after  the  stand  was  made  as 
during  the  retreat  which  he  designed  and  executed.  He 
did  not  attempt  to  redeem  himself,  either  by  personal 
bravery  or  by  his  efforts  to  check  the  enemy,  even  after 
he  had  been  publicly  reproved  upon  the  field  by  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief.  Whilst  General  Wayne  was  assisting 
to  form  the  battalions,  under  direction  of  General  Wash 
ington,  General  Lee  approached  him  and  asked  why  he 
was  forming  the  troops  there,  under  fire  of  the  enemy's 
cannon  and  exposed  to  the  enemy's  cavalry  ;  to  which 
General  Wayne  answered  that  it  was  by  the  positive  order 
of  General  Washington ;  whereupon  General  Lee  replied 
that  he  had  nothing  more  to  say.2 

1  John  Laurens  to  Henry  Laurens,  2d  July,  1778.      Lieutenant-Colonel 
Monckton' s  grave  may  still  be  seen  in  the  little  churchyard  near  Freehold. 

2  General  Wayne's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE    OF    MONMOUTH.  391 

It  is  true  that,  after  General  Washington  had  disposed 
the  battalions  in  front,  and  when  he  was  about  to  return 
to  the  main  body  of  the  army  in  order  to  arrange  its  posi 
tion  to  meet  the  sudden  change  of  circumstances,  he  turned 
to  General  Lee  and  asked  him  whether  he  would  resume 
command  ;  to  which  Lee  replied  that  he  would,  and  added 
that  he  should  not  be  the  first  man  to  leave  the  ground. 
Whether  this  declaration  arose  from  a  consciousness  of 
shame  at  a  sudden  call  to  duty,  or  whether  he  designed  it 
for  some  purpose  of  his  own,  it  is  impossible  to  determine. 
At  all  events,  he  did  not  keep  his  word. 

Colonel  Alexander  Hamilton  says  that  he  was  near 
General  Lee  for  some  time  afterward,  during  which  he  did 
not  hear  him  direct  any  measure  to  be  taken  to  answer 
that  purpose,  nor  did  he  see  him  take  any  measures 
himself.1 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Fitzgerald,  who  was  also  present 
at  that  moment,  testified  that  he  saw  General  Washing 
ton  ride  back  to  form  the  main  line  ;  also  that  he  was  in 
the  advanced  position,  near  General  Lee,  who  appeared 
serious  and  thoughtful,  but  that  he  heard  no  orders  given, 
nor  did  he  see  him  form  any  plan  to  check  the  enemy ;  he 
was  there  when  General  Lee  retired  from  the  field,  which 
was  not  more  than  twenty  minutes  or  half  an  hour  later. 
In  the  mean  time  a  heavy  fire  began  between  the  troops 
formed  under  Colonel  Stewart  and  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Ramsey  and  the  advanced  troops  of  the  British  army,  in 
the  skirt  of  the  woods,  under  which  the  former  were 
obliged  to  give  way  and  were  closely  pressed  by  the  enemy 
until  a  detachment  under  Colonel  Livingston  came  to 
their  relief.  At  that  point  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fitzgerald 
returned  to  the  rear  of  Lord  Stirling's  line,  the  left  wing 
of  the  main  army,  and  he  saw  General  Lee  there  then.2 

Dr.  McHenry  saw  General  Lee  where  Lord  Stirling's 

1  Colonel  Hamilton's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial. 

2  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fitzgerald's  Testimony,  ibid. 


392  KETREAT    OF    THE    BRITISH    ARMY,  [1778. 

line  was  formed,  a  short  time  after  Colonel  Stewart  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Ramsey  had  given  way.  He  was 
then  saying  to  General  Washington  that  effects  such  as 
happened  that  day  would  always  be  the  consequence  of  a 
great  superiority  in  cavalry.  General  Lee  retired  still 
farther  immediately  after  this ;  for  Dr.  McHenry,  who 
had  been  sent  to  the  rear  to  look  after  the  baggage  in 
case  the  result  of  the  engagement  should  be  unfavorable 
to  the  Americans,  saw  him  at  Englishtown.  He  was 
sitting  on  his  horse,  observing  to  a  number  of  gentle 
men  who  stood  about  him  that  it  was  madness  to  make 
attempts  against  the  enemy  where  they  possessed  so  great 
a  superiority  in  cavalry,  and  that,  under  the  circum 
stances,  the  Americans  could  not  be  successful.1 

Baron  Steuben,  who  was  hastening  to  the  front  with 
reinforcements  which  he  had  been  ordered  to  bring  up, 
met  General  Lee  at  Englishtown,  whereupon  Lee  asked 
whither  he  was  going.  The  Baron  told  him  that  he  had 
been  ordered  forward  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and 
that  the  enemy  were  retiring  in  confusion.  Upon  the 
word  "  confusion/'  General  Lee  took  him  up  and  said 
that  the  British  were  only  resting  themselves,  adding 
that  he  was  quite  sure  there  was  some  mistake  about  those 
troops  having  been  ordered  forward.2  His  evident  pur 
pose  was,  even  up  to  the  last  moment,  to  defeat,  by  every 
means  within  his  power,  any  measure  that  threatened 
injury  to  the  British  force.3 

For  his  conduct  at  the  battle  of  Monmouth,  General 
Lee  was  tried  before  a  court-martial  which  was  convened 
at  Brunswick,  on  the  4th  of  July,  under  the  presidency 
of  Lord  Stirling,  and  which  was  composed,  besides  the 
president,  of  four  brigadier-generals  and  eight  colonels 
of  the  Continental  army. 

1  Dr.  McHenry 's  Testimony,  Lee's  Trial. 

2  Baron  Steuben' s  Testimony,  ibid. 

3  See  Appendix  C. 


1778.]  AND    BATTLE   OF    MOXMOUTH.  393 

The  charges  against  General  Lee  were : 

"  First :  For  disobedience  of  orders,  in  not  attacking 
the  enemy  on  the  28th  of  June,  agreeable  to  repeated 
instructions. 

"  Secondly  :  For  misbehaviour  before  the  enemy  on  the 
same  day,  by  making  an  unnecessary,  disorderly  and 
shameful  retreat. 

"  Thirdly :  For  disrespect  to  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
in  two  letters  dated  the  1st  of  July  and  the  28th  of 
June." 

After  an  exceedingly  patient  and  thorough  inquiry, 
during  which  the  court  met  at  various  places  along  the 
line  of  march  of  the  army  to  the  Hudson  River,  General 
Lee  was  condemned,  on  the  12th  of  August,  "for  dis 
obedience  of  orders,  in  not  attacking  the  enemy  on  the 
28th  of  June,  agreeable  to  repeated  instructions ;  for  mis 
behaviour  before  the  enemy  on  the  28th  of  June,  by 
making  an  unnecessary,  and,  in  some  few  instances,  a 
disorderly  retreat ;  for  disrespect  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  in  two  letters  dated  the  1st  of  July  and  the  28th 
of  June." 

He  was  sentenced  by  the  court  "to  be  suspended  from 
any  command  in  the  armies  of  the  United  States  of  North 
America,  for  the  term  of  twelve  months." 

This  sentence  was  approved  by  Congress,  and  was  or 
dered,  by  a  resolution  passed  on  the  5th  of  December, 
1778,  to  be  carried  into  execution.1 

1  Journals  of  Congress,  5th  December,  1778. 


394  EXPEDITION   OF   THE   COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 


CHAPTER    XII. 

THE   EXPEDITION   OF    THE   COMTE   D^ESTAING. 

A  PERIOD  of  the  American  Revolution  had  now  been 
reached  when  the  presence  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
in  this  country  acquired  a  different  influence  from  what 
it  had  hitherto  possessed,  and  became  a  matter  of  much 
greater  importance  than  it  had  been  before.  This  was 
the  result  of  the  introduction  into  the  struggle  of  a  new 
element,  by  means  of  which  his  personality  and  his  in 
dividual  influence  were  brought  into  play  in  a  manner 
which  reflected  most  honorably  upon  his  devotion  to  the 
American  cause,  and  which  resulted  in  lasting  and  valu 
able  service  to  the  United  States.  This  new  element 
was  the  armed  participation  of  France  in  the  War  of 
Independence  and  the  actual  presence  in  America  of 
French  ships  of  war  and  French  soldiers. 

The  arrival  of  the  Comte  d'Estaing  changed  the  char 
acter  of  the  war  in  this  respect,  that  it  closed  the  period 
during  which  the  American  people  faced  their  enemies 
single-handed  in  the  contest  for  liberty.  It  brought  a 
strong  ally  to  their  assistance  upon  the  sea ;  it  was  the 
forerunner  of  effective  aid  on  land;  and  it  led  to  the 
open  avowal,  as  well  as  to  the  considerable  enlargement,  of 
that  support  for  which  we,  as  a  nation,  owe  an  everlasting 
debt  of  gratitude  to  France.  From  the  moment  that  the 
sailing  of  his  fleet  for  America  was  known,  and  that  its 
destination  and  purpose  were  placed  beyond  doubt  by  the 
arrival  of  M.  d'Estaing  in  American  waters,  the  treaty  of 
alliance  became  fully  operative  and  the  interest  of  the 
French  people  was  definitively  fixed  upon  the  establish- 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF   THE   COMTE    D'ESTAING.  395 

ment  of  American  Independence.  Their  national  strength 
was  brought  to  supplement  our  weakness  before  the  over 
powering  superiority  of  Great  Britain  in  wealth  and 
munitions  of  war ;  their  soldiers  and  sailors  thenceforth 
saluted,  and  fought  for,  the  American  flag ;  their  prestige 
as  a  great  people  who  had  now  become  our  allies  gave  us 
a  new  title  to  recognition  among  the  nations,  upon  our 
first  introduction  to  the  world. 

The  critical  situation  which  developed  in  the  affairs 
of  America  and  France  by  reason  of  the  succession  of 
misfortunes  that  met  the  Comte  d'Estaing  at  every  turn, 
and  that  ultimately  defeated  his  purposes,  during  the  cam 
paign  of  the  summer  of  1778,  threatened  for  a  moment 
to  deprive  us  at  the  outset  of  all  these  advantages,  by  a 
misunderstanding  between  ourselves  and  our  ally.  Dis 
appointment,  on  the  one  hand,  which  was  all  the  heavier 
by  reason  of  the  bright  hopes  that  had  been  suddenly 
destroyed ;  the  sense  of  injury,  on  the  other,  in  the 
minds  of  men  who  felt  aggrieved  by  criticism  whilst  they 
were  honorably  performing  their  duty  as  they  understood 
it ;  differences  of  opinion,  recriminations,  traces  of  sus 
picion,  perhaps  of  jealousy, — all  arising  from  a  combina 
tion  of  circumstances  which  human  foresight  could  not 
control, — strained  dangerously  the  relations  between  two 
sets  of  people  who,  at  best,  knew  one  another  but  very 
slightly,  whose  language,  customs,  and  manners  were 
totally  different,  and  whose  traditions  were  not  derived 
from  sources  of  sympathy  or  kindred. 

The  failure  of  the  expedition  of  the  Comte  d'Estaing 
at  this  critical  period  of  the  history  of  the  United  States 
was,  in  every  sense,  an  extraordinary  example  of  ill  luck. 
Fate  itself  seemed  to  have  entered  into  the  contest  against 
the  French  admiral,  and,  with  unremitting  spite,  to  have 
met  him  step  by  step,  as  if  to  deprive  him  of  his  success 
and  cheat  him  of  his  glory,  to  turn  him  aside  from  his 
path,  and  to  compel  him  at  last,  worn  out  by  disappoint- 


396  EXPEDITION    OF   THE   COMTE   D^ESTAING.  [1778. 

ment,  to  sail  away  from  our  coasts,  having  accomplished 
scarcely  anything  of  the  purpose  for  which  he  had  come. 
And  yet,  in  examining  his  campaign  in  the  light  of  his 
own  narrative,  as  well  as  in  that  of  such  official  docu 
ments  as  still  remain  to  us,  the  one  feature  which  makes 
itself  strikingly  evident  to  the  student,  aside  from  the  con 
stant  recurrence  of  unavoidable  accidents,  is  the  earnest 
desire  of  the  Comte  d'Estaing  to  be  of  service  to  America. 
But,  notwithstanding  this,  his  mishaps  involved  interests 
of  such  serious  import  to  the  country  at  that  time,  which 
he  had  been  counted  upon,  in  connection  with  the  Con 
tinental  army,  to  foster  and  improve,  that  men's  minds 
were  inflamed  almost  to  anger ;  and,  among  a  people  who 
discussed  public  questions  with  a  freedom  of  speech  which 
at  that  time  was  not  common  in  other  parts  of  the  world, 
the  range  of  criticism  came  close  to  the  limit  of  bitter 
ness  and  brought  about  a  situation  which  was  a  source 
of  grave  anxiety  to  all  true  friends  of  American  liberty. 
We  owe  it  to  the  mature  wisdom  and  the  soothing  influ 
ence  of  General  Washington  in  this  time  of  impending 
trouble,  as  well  as  to  the  generous  personal  conduct  of 
the  Comte  d'Estaing  himself,  that  the  crisis  was  passed 
without  lasting  injury ;  and  it  was  happy  for  America, 
at  that  moment,  that  it  counted  among  its  defenders  a 
man  whose  devotion  to  its  cause  had  already  won  for  him 
the  confidence  of  the  nation,  and  who  at  this  juncture 
came  forward  to  stay  the  tide  of  feeling,  to  explain  mis 
conceptions,  to  smooth  the  path  that  led  to  unity,  and 
finally  to  bring  about  a  complete  reconciliation :  that  man 
was  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette. 

The  negotiations  of  La  Fayette  with  M.  d'Estaing  kept 
open  the  avenues  of  communication  between  the  French 
admiral  and  the  American  people ;  his  knowledge  of 
American  affairs,  and  his  acquaintance  with  our  national 
character,  enabled  him  to  present  the  situation  in  its  true 
light  very  frequently  where  otherwise  it  would  have  been 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D^ESTAING.  397 

misconceived ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  his  rank  and  his 
position  as  a  French  nobleman,  a  compatriot,  and  a  relative 
of  M.  d'Estaing  himself,  gave  him  access  not  only  to  the 
admiral  but  to  all  the  captains  and  officers  of  the  fleet,  such 
as  no  other  man  could  then  have  had.  He  was  for  a  time 
the  ambassador  to  whom  both  parties  trusted.  His  man 
agement  of  the  delicate  questions  submitted  to  him  for 
solution  is  marked  with  such  excellent  judgment  and  so 
much  discretion  that  it  is  difficult,  in  following  his  course, 
to  realize  that  the  person  with  whom  we  are  dealing  was 
barely  twenty-one  years  of  age.  His  intense  love  for 
France  is  apparent  at  every  step ;  his  desire  to  avenge 
her  wrongs  upon  her  hereditary  enemy,  and  the  thought 
of  her  glory,  filled  his  mind  with  enthusiasm ;  for  this  he 
would  willingly  have  given  his  life,  and  he  hailed  with 
delighted  anticipation  the  companionship  of  Frenchmen 
upon  the  soil  of  America.  The  disappointment  which 
followed  fell  more  heavily  upon  him,  perhaps,  than  upon 
any  other  individual ;  it  left  him,  at  times,  almost  in  de 
spair  at  the  discomfiture  of  the  people  whom  he  loved  the 
best,  on  the  one  hand,  and  at  the  consequent  loss  of  op 
portunity  entailed  upon  the  country  of  his  adoption,  on 
the  other.  The  expressions  of  anger  which  he  heard 
about  him  in  the  American  camp  aroused  his  patriotism, 
and  he  suffered  with  all  the  sensitiveness  of  a  Frenchman 
from  the  wound  inflicted  by  the  least  shadow  of  suspicion 
cast  upon  the  honor  of  his  countrymen  ;  in  a  tumult  of 
feeling,  he  was  ready  to  draw  his  sword  to  defend  himself 
and  them  against  criticism,  and  yet  at  the  same  moment, 
with  admirable  self-control,  he  turned  to  allay,  in  the 
interests  of  peace,  the  feeling  of  anger  aroused  in  the 
minds  of  his  compatriots  by  similar  provocation. 

A  Frenchman  in  his  views,  in  his  sentiments,  and  in 
his  aspirations,  his  position  was  one  of  the  most  difficult 
conceivable,  because  it  constantly  threatened  him  with  a 
rupture  between  his  natural  attachment  and  his  present 


398  EXPEDITION   OF   THE   COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 

allegiance.  It  is  the  greatest  claim  to  credit  that  can  be 
made  in  his  behalf,  that  throughout  this  incident  La  Fay- 
ette  never  for  a  moment  forgot,  or  failed  to  defend,  the 
honor  and  the  interests  of  America. 

The  expedition  which  had  given  rise  to  these  difficult 
questions  in  America  was  the  first  step  taken  by  the  Cab 
inet  of  King  Louis  XVI.  toward  carrying  out,  upon  the 
part  of  France,  the  treaty  of  alliance  entered  into  with 
the  Commissioners  of  the  United  States  on  the  6th  of 
February,  1778.  The  King's  assent  having  been  ob 
tained  to  the  commencement  of  active  operations,  orders 
were  immediately  given  for  the  preparation  of  a  fleet; 
and  within  forty-eight  hours  after  the  signing  of  the 
treaty  the  chief  officer  of  the  squadron  had  been  selected, 
in  the  person  of  Lieutenant-General  the  Comte  d'Estaing, 
upon  whom  a  letter  from  the  King's  hand  conferred  the 
title  of  Vice- Admiral  in  the  Seas  of  Asia  and  America 
and  supreme  command  of  the  fleet  designed  to  operate 
against  Great  Britain  in  the  interests  of  the  United 
States.1  This  gentleman,  who  was  at  that  time  approach 
ing  the  age  of  fifty  years,  was  an  officer  of 'the  French 
army,  in  which  his  distinguished  services,  particularly  in 
the  wars  of  India,  in  connection  with  which  he  had  twice 
been  a  prisoner  in  England,  had  given  him  a  high  repu 
tation  at  home  for  bravery  and  for  ability  as  a  soldier ; 
he  had  already  spent  two  years  in  the  West  Indies  during 
the  administration  of  M.  de  Choiseul,  and  had  acquired 
there  a  considerable  familiarity  with  political  questions 
relating  to  American  affairs.  He  was  especially  in  favor 
with  the  King,  whose  personal  friendship  he  enjoyed  by 
reason  of  an  attachment  which  grew  out  of  the  relation 
ship  of  M.  d'Estaing  to  the  father  of  Louis  XVI.,  the  late 
Dauphin,  with  whom  he  had  been  educated  and  whose 
companion  he  had  been  in  his  youth. 

1  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  175-176. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF   THE    COMTE    D'ESTAING.  399 

Although  he  had  previously  served  chiefly  on  land, 
he  had  commanded  vessels,  but  he  had  never  been  in 
trusted  with  responsibility  as  a  naval  officer  alone  in 
charge  of  a  fleet ;  which  fact,  while  there  was  ample  pre 
cedent  in  the  French  naval  history  of  army  officers  com 
manding  at  sea,  gave  serious  offence  in  the  service  and 
excited  hostility  toward  him  among  the  captains  who  were 
ordered  to  serve  under  him.  This  opposition  hampered 
him  considerably,  no  doubt,  from  the  outset ;  it  became 
apparent  at  various  times  during  the  expedition,  and  it 
led  to  bitter  criticism  and  complaint  after  he  returned  to 
France. 

Charles-Henri-Theodat  d'Estaing,  Comte  d'Estaing  du 
Saillans,  was,  like  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  a  native 
of  the  province  of  Auvergne.  His  family,  like  that  of 
La  Fayette  also,  was  one  of  the  ancient  houses  of  the 
realm,  of  long-established  power  in  its  native  province 
and  of  influence  among  the  nobility,  by  reason  of  fre 
quent  service  rendered  to  the  King.  He  was  born  in 
1729,  at  the  chateau  of  Ravel,  an  old  feudal  domain,  sit 
uated  upon  the  road  from  Thiers  to  Clermont-Ferrand. 
His  father  was  the  Marquis  d'Estaing,  Lieutenant-General 
of  the  King's  armies ;  his  mother  was  a  lady  of  the  house 
of  Colbert  de  Maulevrier.  By  connections  of  intermar 
riage  he  was  related  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  with 
whom,  by  a  strange  chance,  he  was  about  to  play  so  im 
portant  a  part  in  the  war  in  America. 

Immediately  upon  his  appointment  by  the  King,  M. 
d'Estaing  set  about  preparing  his  expedition  to  put  to 
sea.  Proceeding  to  Toulon,  he  collected  his  fleet,  and  in 
the  course  of  two  months  was  ready  to  sail,  with  twelve 
ships  of  the  line  and  fourteen  frigates,  fully  manned  and 
equipped,  with  an  additional  force  of  troops  at  his  dis 
posal,  consisting  of  one  thousand  men. 

Besides  his  military  and  naval  command,  he  had  with 
him  as  passengers  for  America  M.  Conrad  Alexandre 


400  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 

Gerard  de  Rayneval,  the  first  minister  of  France  to  the 
United  States,  Mr.  Silas  Deane,  who  was  returning  at  the 
request  of  Congress,  and  five  or  six  officers  of  the  Ameri 
can  navy,  who  were  to  aid  the  admiral  in  his  approach  to 
the  American  coast  and  in  his  landing.  Having  hoisted 
his  flag  upon  the  Languedoc,  one  of  the  finest  vessels  of 
the  royal  navy,  he  set  sail  from  Toulon  on  Monday,  the 
13th  of  April,  1778.1 

As  it  was  important  to  conceal  from  the  agents  of  the 
British  Government  the  departure  of  M.  Gerard,  who  as 
sumed  for  this  occasion  the  name  of  M.  de  Munster  (the 
King  having  conferred  upon  him  the  title  of  Comte  de 
Munster,  from  a  fief  in  Lorraine),2  and  of  the  American 
officers,  he  and  they  were  at  first  embarked  upon  a  vessel 
which  cleared  for  Antibes,  with  the  understanding  that 
they  should  join  the  fleet  when  it  was  off  Hyeres ;  and 
the  expedition  itself  left  the  port  of  Toulon  with  the  an 
nouncement  that  it  was  sailing  for  Brest.  The  officers  of 
the  different  vessels  supposed,  indeed,  that  this  was  true, 
or  that  they  were  proceeding,  at  least,  to  a  similar  desti 
nation  ;  for  they  were  under  sealed  orders  which  were 
not  to  be  opened  until  they  had  passed  the  Straits  and  got 
under  way  in  the  Atlantic  Ocean, — no  one  having  been 
admitted  to  the  secret  of  the  purpose  of  the  expedition 
but  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  M.  Gerard,  and,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  Mr.  Deane  and  the  American  naval  officers. 

Adverse  winds  and  storms  met  the  fleet  at  the  com 
mencement  of  the  voyage,  hindering  it  to  such  a  degree 
that  not  until  the  17th  of  May,  thirty-four  days  later, 
was  it  enabled  to  make  its  way  out  of  the  Mediterranean, 
after  an  incessant  contest  with  its  evil  fortune,  which 
scarcely  ever  left  it  free  of  impediment  from  that  time 
forward. 

1  Conde  de  Aranda  to  the  Conde  de  Floridablanca,   17th  April,   1778 ; 
Espagne,  t.  589,  No.  31 :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  181. 

2  Doniol,  iii.  181. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D^ESTAIXG.  401 

Three  days  afterward,  whilst  the  fleet  was  heading  to 
the  westward  under  full  sail,  the  admiral  directed  signals 
to  be  given  to  his  captains,  instructing  each  one  to  break 
the  seals  of  the  package  which  contained  his  orders,  and 
then  for  the  first  time  the  secret  which  had  been  perfectly 
kept  was  disclosed,  that  the  purpose  of  the  expedition  was 
to  take  part  in  the  American  War  of  Independence. 
With  great  solemnity,  the  Comte  d'Estaing  attended  a 
mass  celebrated  at  that  moment,  in  view  of  the  occasion, 
on  board  the  Languedoc,  surrounded  by  his  staff  in  full 
uniform,  and  accompanied  by  M.  Gerard  de  Rayneval, 
now  presented  as  the  minister  of  France  to  the  United 
States,  who  stood  beside  the  admiral ;  and  a  war-vessel, 
La  Flore,  which  had  accompanied  the  fleet  for  that  pur 
pose,  was  detached  with  orders  to  return  to  France  and 
carry  the  news  to  King  Louis  XVI. 

This  was  substantially  the  declaration  of  war  upon  the 
part  of  France  against  Great  Britain  in  the  interest  of 
the  United  States  of  America.  And  whilst  the  enthusi 
asm  of  the  moment  spread  from  ship  to  ship  amid  cries 
of  "  Vive  le  Roi  /"  these  loyal  Frenchmen  felt  with  joy 
that  the  moment  had  arrived  when  the  indignity  of  a 
similar  declaration  against  their  own  country  made  by 
England,  in  the  year  17'")O,  was  about  to  be  avenged. 

To  cross  the  ocean  before  the  British  fleet  under  Ad 
miral  Byron  could  reach  America  with  reinforcements ;  to 
blockade  the  Delaware  River  and  to  capture  Lord  Howe ; 
to  destroy  the  British  army  in  America,  and  then  to  repay, 
in  the  West  Indies,  the  long  list  of  injuries  suffered  by 
France  at  the  hands  of  her  rival,  were  anticipations  of 
glory  which  animated  every  man.  The  instructions  given 
to  the  Comte  d'Estaing  by  the  King  of  France  directed 
him,  first,  to  come  to  anchor  in  the  Delaware  River ;  for 
which  purpose,  in  view  of  possible  immediate  hostilities  at 
that  point,  ti  precise  description  was  given  him  of  the 
British  naval  armament  in  America.  He  had  full  power 

VOL.  I.— 20 


402  EXPEDITION    OF    THE   COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 

to  take  whatever  measures  should  appear  in  his  judgment 
to  be  necessary  or  proper  according  to  the  attendant  cir 
cumstances.  He  was  to  burn  all  captured  vessels  which 
could  not  serve  to  strengthen  his  fleet,  and  to  disembark 
all  prisoners  under  promise  from  the  American  Govern 
ment  not  to  release  them  until  the  King's  assent  had 
been  obtained.  He  was  to  attack  the  enemy  in  any  place 
where  he  could  do  them  the  greatest  injury  and  where 
he  could  best  advance  the  interests  of  the  King  and  the 
glory  of  his  arms ;  he  was  to  act  alone  or  in  concert  with 
the  United  States  as  he  might  deem  best ;  and  his  power 
was  enlarged  by  supplementary  orders  under  which  he 
might  attack  the  English  not  only  in  the  Delaware  but 
at  New  York  or  any  other  port  of  North  America.  He 
was  not  to  attempt  to  make  any  establishment  by  con 
quest  on  the  continent  of  America ;  though  he  was  at 
liberty  to  take  possession  of  some  island  which  might 
be  serviceable  to  commerce  or  useful  as  a  fishing-station, 
such  as  Newfoundland,  acquiring  it  either  by  force  of 
arms  or  by  negotiation  with  the  United  States.  He  was 
to  keep  himself  informed  of  the  hostile  projects  of  the 
United  States,  and  to  assist  them  if  they  had  any  design 
upon  Nova  Scotia,  though  in  that  event  he  was  to  stip 
ulate  beforehand  for  fishing  privileges  for  France  and  a 
like  concession  on  behalf  of  Spain ;  he  should  revive  as 
far  as  possible  the  ancient  attachment  of  the  inhabitants 
of  Nova  Scotia  for  the  King  of  France, — not,  however, 
with  a  view  of  establishing  the  King's  authority  there,  but 
to  aid  in  securing  rights  of  fishing  and  to  recruit  sailors 
into  the  French  service.  In  case  he  should  find,  upon 
reaching  America,  that  the  British  naval  force  was  supe 
rior  to  his  own,  he  was  to  go  to  Boston  or  to  one  of  the 
French  islands  for  safety.  He  was  to  obtain  provisions 
and  supplies  at  Boston,  and  provisions  for  six  months 
were  to  be  sent  to  him  from  Martinique. 

In  some  respects  the  most  interesting  of  the  items  con- 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    DJESTAIXG.  403 

tained  in  these  instructions  to  the  Cornte  d'Estaing,  cer 
tainly  the  most  important  in  our  day,  from  an  historical 
point  of  view,  as  bearing  upon  the  intentions  of  France 
in  the  part  she  took  in  the  American  Revolution,  is  that 
relating  to  Canada ;  because  it  has  not  infrequently  been 
asserted  that  one  of  the  objects  which  the  French  Cabinet 
had  in  view  in  aiding  this  country  was  the  recon quest 
of  that  province  and  the  re-establishment  of  French  do 
minion  in  America.  The  Comte  d'Estaing  was  expressly 
prohibited  from  taking  any  part  in  the  conquest  of  Canada 
otherwise  than  by  cruising  in  its  waters  or  making  attacks 
upon  British  posts.  He  had  authority,  however,  in  case 
he  should  be  convinced  that  the  United  States  were  about 
to  succeed  in  taking  Canada,  to  promise,  both  to  the 
Canadians  themselves  and  to  the  Indians  of  that  country, 
the  protection  of  the  King  of  France  if  they  would  re 
nounce  the  supremacy  of  Great  Britain.  M.  d'Estaing's 
own  language  in  this  connection  is  as  follows :  "  While  I 
am  directed  to  aid  the  expedition  against  Canada,  and 
although  I  am  informed  that  His  Majesty  will  not  hold 
me  strictly  to  the  conduct  prescribed  in  the  former  in 
structions,  every  expression  indicates  the  repugnance  of 
the  King  toward  that  enterprise." 

The  voyage  of  the  fleet  was  a  long,  dangerous,  and 
fatiguing  one ;  the  vicissitudes  of  storm  and  sea  were  so 
great,  indeed,  that  it  was  considered  a  triumph  in  itself 
that  the  admiral  was  able  to  conduct  his  expedition  to 
America  without  serious  damage  to  his  vessels  or  loss 
of  men.  It  was  the  7th  of  July  when  he  finally  cast 
anchor  in  the  Delaware,  after  having  been  at  sea  more 
than  eighty  days,  since  the  loth  of  April,  when  he  had 
set  sail  from  Toulon,  as  we  have  seen.  His  first  com 
munication  with  the  shore  was  a  disappointment  to 

1  "Extraits  cle  mes  instructions  du  27  mars,  1778,"  and  "  Extrait  dn  sup 
plement  de  mes  instructions  du  ler  avril,  1778,"  Archives  do  la  Marine,  B* 
143,  fol.  9  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  237. 


404  EXPEDITION   OF    THE    COMTE    D?ESTAING.  [1778. 

Lira :  it  brought  the  news  that  the  British  had  evacuated 
Philadelphia  and  that  their  fleet  had  left  the  Delaware ; 
therefore  that  part  of  his  undertaking  which  related  to 
the  blockading  of  Lord  Howe  had  failed,  whereas  if  he 
had  arrived  but  a  few  weeks  earlier  he  might  have  ac 
complished  his  purpose.  There  remained  now  nothing 
to  do  but  to  set  Mr.  Dearie  and  M.  Gerard  ashore,  and, 
after  communicating  with  Congress  and  with  General 
Washington  as  quickly  as  possible,  to  make  up  for  the 
loss  of  this  first  opportunity  by  some  action  against  the 
British  which  should  be  the  source  at  once  of  gratifica 
tion  to  the  Americans  and  of  glory  to  the  arms  of  France. 
M.  d'Estaing  hastened,  therefore,  to  announce  himself 
and  to  declare  his  readiness  to  serve  the  United  States, 
by  the  following  letter,  which  he  addressed  on  the  8th 
of  July  to  General  Washington : 

"Sm, — I  have  the  honor  to  announce  to  your  Excellency  the 
arrival  of  the  squadron  of  the  King.  Charged  as  I  ani  by  His 
Majesty  with  the  glorious  duty  of  giving  to  his  allies,  the  United 
States  of  America,  an  emphatic  proof  of  his  affection,  I  shall 
have  attained  my  greatest  happiness  if  I  succeed  in  this.  My 
pleasure  is  greatly  increased  by  the  good  fortune  by  which  I  am 
permitted  to  act  in  concert  with  a  general  like  your  Excellency. 
The  talents  and  the  great  actions  of  General  Washington  have 
assured  for  him  in  the  eyes  of  all  Europe  the  truly  sublime  title 
of  the  Liberator  of  America. 

11 1  beg  you,  sir,  to  accept  the  homage  which  every  man,  which 
every  soldier,  owes  to  you ;  and  permit  me,  at  the  outset,  with 
military  and  naval  frankness  to  solicit  a  friendship  which  is 
so  nattering  to  me  as  yours.  I  shall  endeavor  to  prove  myself 
worthy  of  it  by  my  respectful  devotion  to  your  country  ;  this 
is  prescribed  for  me  in  my  orders,  and  it  accords  with  the 
impulses  of  my  heart."  l 

The  arrival  of  the  French  fleet  had  been  reported  to 
General  AVashington  before  he  received  the  admiral's 

1  Archives  de  la  Marine,  B4  146,  fol.  53  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la 
France,  iii.  322. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D*ESTAIXG.  405 

letter,  and  he  had  taken  immediate  steps  to  express  to 
him  a  proper  welcome  and  to  supply  him  with  such  in 
formation  as  he  might  naturally  require  upon  first  coming 
to  shore  in  a  country  with  which  he  was  not  acquainted. 
From  his  head-quarters  at  Paramus  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  despatched  his  aide-de-camp  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Laurens  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing  with  a  letter  dated  the 
14th  of  July,1  in  which,  after  congratulating  him  upon 
his  arrival,  he  informed  him  that  he  was  then  with  the 
main  body  of  the  army  twenty  miles  from  the  North 
River,  which  he  intended  to  cross  as  soon  as  possible, 
about  fifty  miles  above  New  York,  after  which  he  pur 
posed  to  move  down  upon  the  enemy's  lines  in  order  to 
give  them  all  the  uneasiness  in  his  power.  He  assured 
the  Comte  d'Estaing  that  he  should  upon  every  occasion 
feel  the  strongest  inclination  to  facilitate  such  enterprises 
as  the  latter  might  consider  advisable,  and  added  that 
he  might  safely  confide  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Laurens 
any  measures  or  information  which  he  might  wish  to 
communicate. 

In  the  mean  time  M.  d'Estaing  despatched  one  of  his 
trusted  officers,  Major  de  Choin,  with  a  letter  to  Congress 
announcing  his  readiness  to  co-operate  with  the  United 
States.  He  sent  by  him  also  a  duplicate  of  his  letter  of 
the  8th  of  July  to  be  delivered  to  General  Washington, 
and  he  recommended  M.  de  Choin  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  for  the  clearness  of  his  intelligence  and  the  pre 
cision  with  which  he  would  be  able  to  convey  the  ideas 
of  the  admiral  upon  the  subject  of  their  co-operation  and 
the  continuance  of  the  war. 

General  Washington  replied  cordially,  upon  the  receipt 
of  this  communication  by  the  hand  of  Major  de  Choin, 
from  the  camp  at  Haverstraw  Bay,  on  the  17th  of  July, 
to  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  as  follows : 2 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  1. 

2  Ibid.,  vi.  o. 


406  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D?ESTAING.  [1778. 

"SiR, — I  had  the  honor  of  receiving,  the  night  of  the  14th 
instant,  your  very  obliging  and  interesting  letter  of  the  13th 
dated  off  Sandy  Hook,  with  a  duplicate  of  another  dated  the  8th 
at  Sea.  The  arrival  of  a  fleet,  belonging  to  his  Most  Christian 
Majesty,  011  our  coast,  is  an  event  that  makes  me  truly  happy ; 
and  permit  me  to  observe,  that  the  pleasure  I  feel  on  the  occasion 
is  greatly  increased  by  the  command  being  placed  in  a  gentleman 
of  such  distinguished  talents,  experience,  and  reputation,  as  the 
Count  d'Estaing.  I  am  fully  persuaded,  that  every  possible  ex 
ertion  will  be  made  by  you  to  accomplish  the  important  purposes 
of  your  destination  ;  and  you  may  have  the  firmest  reliance,  that 
my  most  strenuous  efforts  shall  accompany  you  in  any  measure, 
which  may  be  found  eligible.  I  esteem  myself  highly  honored  by 
the  desire  you  express,  with  a  frankness  which  must  always  be 
pleasing,  of  possessing  a  place  in  my  friendship.  At  the  same 
time  allow  me  to  assure  you,  that  I  shall  consider  myself  par 
ticularly  happy,  if  I  can  but  improve  the  prepossessions  you  are 
pleased  to  entertain  in  my  favor,  into  a  cordial  and  lasting  amity. 

"On  the  first  notice  of  your  arrival,  and  previous  to  the 
receipt  of  your  letter,  I  wrote  to  you  by  Lieutenant- Colonel 
Laurens,  one  of  my  aids-de-camp,  whom  I  charged  to  explain  to 
you  such  further  particulars,  as  were  not  contained  in  my  letter, 
which  might  be  necessary  for  your  information,  and  to  whom  it 
was  my  wish  you  should  confide  your  situation,  in  any  meas 
ures  of  concert  or  cooperation,  which  may  be  thought  to  advance 
the  common  cause.  Major  Chouin,  who  arrived  this  day  at  my 
quarters,  has  given  me  a  very  full  and  satisfactory  explanation  on 
this  head  ;  and  in  return  I  have  freely  communicated  to  him  my 
ideas  of  every  matter  interesting  to  our  mutual  operations.  These, 
I  doubt  not,  he  will  convey  to  you,  with  that  perspicuity  and  in 
telligence,  which  he  possesses  in  a  manner,  that  amply  justifies 
the  confidence  you  have  reposed  in  him. 

"You  would  have  heard  from  me  sooner  in  answer  to  your 
letter,  but  I  have  been  waiting  for  M.  de  Chouiii's  arrival  to 
acquaint  me  with  your  circumstances  and  intentions,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  I  have  been  employed  in  collecting  information  with 
respect  to  several  particulars,  the  knowledge  of  which  was  essen 
tial  to  the  formation  of  our  plans.  The  difficulty  of  doing  justice 
by  letter  to  matters  of  such  variety  and  importance,  as  those 
which  now  engage  our  deliberations,  has  induced  me  to  send  to 
you  Lieutenant- Colonel  Hamilton,  another  of  my  aids,  in  whom 
I  place  entire  confidence.  He  will  be  able  to  make  you  perfectly 
acquainted  with  my  sentiments,  and  to  satisfy  any  inquiries  you 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D'ESTAING.  407 

may  think  proper  to  propose  ;  and  I  would  wish  you  to  consider 
the  information  he  delivers  as  coming  from  myself. 

"Colonel  Hamilton  is  accompanied  by  Lieutenant- Colonel 
Fleury,  a  gentleman  of  your  nation,  who  has  distinguished  him 
self  by  his  zeal  and  gallantry  in  the  present  war  with  England. 
He  has  also  with  him  four  captains  of  vessels,  whom  I  hope  you 
will  find  very  useful,  from  their  knowledge  of  the  coast  and  har 
bours,  and  two  persons,  who  have  acted  a  considerable  time  in 
the  capacity  of  pilots,  and  in  whose  skill,  expertness,  and  fidelity, 
from  the  recommendations  I  have  had,  I  believe  you  may  place 
great  dependence.  I  am  still  endeavouring  to  provide  others  of 
this  description,  who  shall  be  despatched  to  you,  as  fast  as  they 
can  be  found. 

"With  the  most  ardent  desire  for  your  success,  and  with  the 
greatest  respect  and  esteem,  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  &c." 

The  Comte  d'Estaing,  finding  that  there  were  no  longer 
any  British  forces  for  him  to  contend  with,  either  in  the 
Delaware  River  or  at  Philadelphia,  had  proceeded  to  sea 
again  on  the  8th  of  July,  and  was,  at  the  time  he  received 
this  letter  from  General  Washington,  cruising  off  Sandy 
Hook,  where  he  had  arrived  on  the  12th,  and  awaiting 
pilots  who  should  conduct  his  fleet  across  the  bar.  His 
mind  was  now  made  up  to  achieve  an  immediate  success 
for  the  French  arms  and  to  perform  a  service  which  should 
distinguish  their  alliance  with  the  United  States,  by  a 
spirited  attack  upon  New  York. 

Before  leaving  the  Delaware,  the  admiral  took  leave 
of  M.  Gerard  de  Rayneval,  the  French  Envoy,  who  dis 
embarked  as  quickly  as  possible  in  order  to  reach  Phila 
delphia  to  present  himself  to  Congress  and  to  deliver  his 
messages  of  friendship  from  the  King.  Leaving  the 
flag-ship,  the  Languedoc,  on  the  8th  of  July,  M.  Gerard 
went  aboard  one  of  the  French  frigates,  La  Chimere, 
which  was  to  convey  him  to  Philadelphia  ;  but  upon  their 
way  up  the  river  they  encountered  an  adverse  north  wind, 
which  prevented  the  Chimere  from  passing  the  chevaux- 
dc-frise  which  still  partially  obstructed  the  channel,  and 
the  commander,  Captain  de  Saint-Cesaire,  set  him  ashore 


408  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE   D?ESTAING.  [1778. 

at  Chester,  whence  he  proceeded  to  the  city  by  land. 
News  of  the  arrival  of  M.  Gerard  had  already  been 
brought  to  Congress,  among  the  members  of  which,  as 
well  as  throughout  the  city,  it  aroused  the  keenest  in 
terest  ;  and  measures  were  taken  at  once  to  welcome  the 
King's  representative  and  to  receive  him  with  the  dignity 
becoming  to  his  station  and  his  mission.  Congress  sent  a 
deputation  of  four  of  its  members,  at  the  head  of  which 
was  John  Hancock,  to  Chester,  where  they  were  received 
upon  their  arrival  aboard  the  frigate  La  Chimere  with 
the  same  honors  that  had  been  prescribed  by  the  Comte 
d'Estaing  for  M.  Gerard  himself,  and  one  of  the  members 
of  Congress  delivered  an  address  of  welcome ;  after  which 
M.  Gerard  accompanied  them  to  the  landing  and  was 
seated  in  the  carriage  of  Mr.  Hancock,  with  whom  he 
drove  to  Philadelphia. 

Upon  his  approach  to  the  city,  the  troops  were  drawn 
up  on  each  side  of  the  streets  through  which  he  passed, 
and  salutes  were  fired  by  the  artillery  during  his  progress. 
He  was  escorted  to  the  residence  of  General  Arnold,  at 
that  time  the  commanding  officer  in  the  city,  and  was  in 
vited  to  lodge  with  him  until  proper  accommodations  could 
be  provided  for  him  elsewhere.  The  reception  given  him 
delighted  Gerard,  who  wrote  home  with  enthusiasm  of  the 
attentions  shown  most  freely  by  all  classes  of  the  com 
munity  ;  and  no  doubt  his  reports  had  an  important  effect 
upon  the  relations  between  the  United  States  and  France. 
They  unquestionably  strengthened  the  alliance,  by  the 
assurance  they  gave  of  sympathy  and  cordial  friendship, 
for  Gerard  declared  in  his  letters  to  the  Comte  de  Ver- 
gennes  that  the  kindness  of  the  American  people  was  so 
great,  even  upon  the  part  of  "the  most  phlegmatic"  of 
them,  that  he  could  not  describe  it,  for  fear  of  being  sus 
pected  of  exaggeration.1 

1  Etats-Unis,  t.  4,  No.  19  :  Doniol   La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  303. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE   COMTE    D^ESTAIXG.  409 

The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was,  at  the  time  of  the 
arrival  of  the  French  fleet,  with  General  Washington, 
who  was  marching  with  his  main  army,  in  three  divisions, 
of  which  La  Fayette  commanded  one,  through  New  Jersey 
toward  the  Hudson  River ;  and  he  had  arrived  at  the 
camp  at  Paramus,  whence  they  were  just  about  to  cross 
the  Hudson,  on  the  14th  of  July,  the  same  day  upon 
which  the  Commander-in-Chief  wrote  his  first  letter  to 
the  Comte  d'Estaing,  which  was  despatched  by  Lieuten 
ant-Colonel  Laurens,  as  we  have  seen  above. 

La  Fayette  hastened  to  send  a  message  of  welcome  to 
his  countrymen,  in  which  he  expressed  something  of 
the  happiness  and  pride  with  which  his  heart  was  full 
to  overflowing.  He  wrote,  on  the  14th,  a  letter  to  the 
Comte  d'Estaing,  which  appears  to  have  been  carried  by 
Colonel  Laurens,  and  which  has  an  especial  interest  from 
the  postscript,  added,  as  he  says  himself,  at  the  request  of 
General  Washington,  in  which  he  mentions  several  cir 
cumstances  of  a  personal  nature  and  refers  to  certain 
recollections  of  his  home  and  his  family  in  Auvergne, 
in  order  to  assure  M.  d'Estaing  of  the  authenticity  of 
his  communication,  and  to  give  greater  credence  to  the 
mission  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Laurens,  as  well  as  a  proof 
of  the  genuineness  of  the  despatches  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  himself.  He  went  even  further,  to  impress  the 
Comte  d'Estaing  with  the  genuineness  of  his  letter,  and 
signed  it,  as  he  never  did  any  other,  with  his  full  name 
and  title  :  "  Gilbert  du  Motier,  M8  de  Lafayette." 

This  letter  is  the  beginning  of  a  correspondence  between 
him  and  the  admiral,  relating  to  the  successive  incidents 
of  the  campaign,  which  extended  from  the  first  greeting 
until  the  time  when  the  French  fleet  sailed  for  the  West 
Indies  in  October ;  and  although  we  do  not  possess  the 
replies  written  by  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  the  traces  of 
which  are  evident,  however,  from  allusions  to  various 
subjects  that  were  under  discussion  between  them,  these 


410  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 

letters  of  La  Fayette,  taken  by  themselves,  are  exceed 
ingly  interesting  from  the  fact  that  they  are,  in  relation  to 
much  that  is  contained  in  them,  our  only  sources  of  infor 
mation  contemporaneous  with  the  events  themselves.  As 
testimony  bearing  upon  the  incidents  of  that  period  of 
the  Revolution  given  by  one  of  the  principal  actors,  they 
have  for  us  the  value  of  historical  documents.  M.  de  La 
Fayette,  in  writing  his  memoirs  many  years  after  that 
time,  passed  too  lightly  over  this  part  of  his  narrative, 
the  details  of  which  were  probably  no  longer  fresh  in  his 
mind,  and  the  reader  of  his  extremely  interesting  descrip 
tion  of  the  events  in  which  he  took  part  in  America  must 
always  feel  with  regret  the  loss  to  American  history  of  the 
fuller  account  which  he  might  have  written,  and  which  he 
was  so  well  prepared,  by  his  personal  experience  and  his 
literary  attainments,  to  write,  upon  his  return  to  France 
after  the  war.1 

La  Fayette's  first  letter  to  the  Comte  cPEstaing  was  as 
follows : 

"  AT  THE  CAMP  NEAR  PARAMUS,  this  14th  of  July,  1778. 
"  I  have  learned  with,  very  great  pleasure,  Monsieur  le  Comte, 
of  the  arrival  of  a  French  fleet  upon  the  coast  of  America ;  I 
have  also  an  equal  pleasure  in  knowing  that  you  command  it ; 
and  this  last  gives  me  promise  of  another,  still  greater,  which  is, 
to  hear  the  news  of  a  victory  more  important  at  this  juncture,  in 
my  opinion,  than  any  other  victory  could  ever  have  been.  I 
rejoice  to  think  that  you  are  about  to  deal  the  first  blow  to  an 
insolent  nation,  because  I  know  that  you  will  rightly  value  the 

1  This  series  of  letters,  numbering  twenty-seven  in  all,  of  dates  succeeding 
one  another  from  the  14th  of  July  to  the  20th  of  October,  1778,  was  discov 
ered  recently  in  the  Archives  of  the  French  Navy,  at  Paris  (Archives  de 
la  Marine,  B4,  folios  144  et  suivants),  by  M.  Henri  Doniol,  the  distinguished 
author  of  the  "  Histoire  de  la  Participation  de  la  France  a  FEtablissement 
des  Etats-Unis  d'Amerique,"  who  immediately  appreciated  their  value,  and 
by  whom  they  were  published  in  extenso,  in  the  "  Revue  d' Histoire  diploma 
tique,"  sixieme  annee,  No.  3,  in  1892.  They  appear  to  have  been  deposited 
in  the  Naval  Department  by  the  Comte  d'Estaing  with  the  other  papers 
relating  to  his  expedition,  and  their  existence  was  probably  unknown  to  M. 
de  La  Fayette  himself,  as  also  to  the  members  of  his  family  who  published 
his  "MSmoires,  Correspondance  ct  Manuscrits,"  after  his  death,  in  1837. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D'ESTAIXG.  411 

pleasure  of  humiliating  it  and  because  you  are  sufficiently  ac 
quainted  with  it  to  hate  it.  I  have  the  honor  of  being  united 
with  you  in  this  sentiment  as  well  as  by  the  ties  of  kindred  and 
by  our  common  origin  as  Auvergnats,  and  there  is  no  considera 
tion  in  the  world  that  is  wanting  to  make  me  wish  for  your  suc 
cess  with  an  ardor  which  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  express.  It  is 
of  the  highest  importance  at  this  moment,  for  more  reasons  than 
one,  and  I  trust,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  that  I  shall  soon  see  that 
feeling  toward  you  renewed  and  justified  which  I  saw  the  English 
honor  you  with  in  London. 

"The  news  of  your  arrival,  which  I  had  already  heard  from 
K"ew  York,  was  confirmed  last  evening  by  a  letter  to  me  from 
the  President  of  Congress.  I  have  just  replied  to  him  by  a  mes 
senger,  and  I  have  urged  him,  as  earnestly  as  possible,  not  to  lose 
a  moment  in  giving  you  all  the  news  and  all  the  information  that 
you  may  be  in  need  of. 

"  General  Washington  will  do  everything  within  his  power  to 
this  end,  and  you  will  receive  a  letter  from  him  at  the  same  time 
with  this.  You  may  count  upon  him  as  a  man  devoted  to  the 
French  alliance,  and  as  the  man  who,  above  all  others  upon  this 
continent,  is  disgusted  with  England. 

"I  shall  rely  upon  him  to  send  you  the  news  that  I  possess; 
for  we  have  communicated  to  each  other  all  the  information  that 
each  of  us  had,  and  I  could  not  add  anything  more.  I  have  sent 
certain  intelligent  people  to  New  York,  who  are  sufficiently  in 
the  confidence  of  the  English,  and  I  have  promised  them  large 
rewards  if  they  will  bring  me  an  exact  list  of  all  the  vessels  that 
have  sailed  or  are  about  to  sail,  with  any  other  matter  which  I 
think  you  would  be  glad  to  know.  If  I  hear  of  anything  im 
portant,  I  shall  not  lose  a  moment  in  communicating  it  to  you  by 
every  possible  means. 

"You  will  probably  have  heard  of  the  evacuation  of  Philadel 
phia,  of  the  march  of  General  Clinton  across  Jersey,  of  the  action 
in  which  General  Washington  won  the  double  advantage  of  re 
taining  the  battle-field  itself  and  of  inflicting  a  much  greater  loss 
upon  the  other  side ;  that  march  through  Jersey  must  have  cost 
the  English,  in  desertion,  in  sickness,  etc.,  very  nearly  two  thou 
sand  men.  As  soon  as  they  had  embarked  I  sent  word  to  the 
Islands  upon  two  different  occasions,  as  M.  de  Bouille  had  re 
quested  me  to  do.  You  will  certainly  be  informed  that  the  Eng 
lish  have  shipped  all  the  sailors  in  their  port  and  have  armed  all 
their  vessels  for  action,  in  order  to  go  out  and  meet  you.  They 
have  even  printed  this  in  their  gazette  ;  and  a  spy  has  reported 


412  EXPEDITION    OF    THE   COMTE    D^ESTAING.  [1778. 

to  me  that  the  companies  of  grenadiers  and  chasseurs  have 
received  orders  to  join  their  regiments,  which  looks  like  an 
intention  to  embark ;  he  says  also  that  the  whole  army  is  in 
structed  to  hold  itself  in  readiness.  It  would  be  a  great  pity  if 
they  escaped  so  cheaply ;  for  if  you  were  to  defeat  their  fleet, 
and  if  Admiral  Keppel  were  to  be  stopped  on  his  way  here,  they 
would  be  in  an  extremely  ugly  situation.  I  leave  it  to  the  Gen 
eral  of  the  army  to  inform  you  of  his  plans  ;  I  shall  merely  say 
that  we  intend  to  cross  the  North  Eiver  and  to  threaten  New 
York  in  order  to  prevent  them  from  stripping  themselves  of 
their  vessels.  The  moment  that  the  French  flag  is  seen  in  the 
direction  of  Canada,  the  half  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  savages 
will  take  sides  with  us. 

1  i  If,  in  talking  to  you  of  public  affairs,  Monsieur  le  Cointe,  I 
were  to  take  up  time  in  mentioning  my  own  matters,  I  should 
tell  you  how  embarrassing  is  my  position  here  ;  for,  however 
agreeable  it  is  to  me  to  be  in  America,  I  have  always  thought, 
and  I  have  often  said  so,  and  written  it,  here,  I  should  rather  be 
a  soldier  serving  under  the  French  flag  than  to  be  a  general 
officer  anywhere  else.  My  purpose  is,  to  leave  at  once  for  the 
Islands,  for  Europe,  even  for  India,  if  in  any  one  of  these  three 
portions  of  the  world  we  are  going  to  make  war.  I  do  not  expect 
to  receive  any  orders  ;  for  I  presume  there  is  enough  to  be  done 
without  paying  attention  to  me,  but  all  that  I  want  to  know  is, 
whether  war  has  been  declared  in  Europe. 

"  If  I  were  not  in  hope  that  we  shall  be  able  to  act  in  conjunc 
tion  with  the  fleet,  I  should  go  aboard  the  first  vessel  I  could  find 
and  I  should  ask  your  permission  to  follow  you  in  the  rear,  but 
as  near  to  you  as  I  could  go,  that  I  might  be  a  witness  of  your 
success.  The  army  is  marching  in  three  divisions  ;  the  one  which 
I  command  will  be  the  last  to  cross  the  river,  and  I  hope  to  be 
upon  the  other  side  the  day  after  to-morrow.  I  shall  have  the 
honor  of  writing  to  you  from  there.  The  President  of  Congress 
has  sent  me  a  printed  letter,  which  doubtless  has  reached  you 
also,  but  I  shall  enclose  to  you  a  copy  of  it  with  mine. 

"If  I  can  be  of  service  to  you,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  command 
me  5  the  more  you  give  me  to  do  for  you  the  happier  you  will 
make  me.  The  opportunity  of  being  useful,  even  in  the  smallest 
matter,  to  my  native  land,  which  is  dearer  to  me  every  day  that 
I  realize  its  excellence  above  all  other  countries,  will  always 
give  me  the  greatest  happiness,  and  I  shall  also  feel  an  especial 
pleasure  in  proving  to  you  my  desire  to  assist  you. 

"I  hope  you  may  defeat  them,  Monsieur  le  Comte  ;  I  hope  you 


1778.]  EXPEDITION   OF    THE    COMTE    D*ESTAING.  413 

may  send  them  to  the  bottom,  that  you  may  lay  them  as  low  now 
as  they  have  been  insolent  before.  I  hope  you  may  now  begin 
the  great  work  of  their  destruction,  which  shall  place  their  nation 
under  the  feet  of  our  own.  I  hope  you  will  show  them,  to  their 
cost,  what  a  Frenchman  can  do, — a  Frenchman  and  an  Auvergnat ! 
That  you  may  do  them  as  much  injury  as  they  wish  to  do  us,  is 
the  sincere  wish  of  him  who,  craving  your  pardon  for  the  length 
of  his  letter,  has  the  honor  to  be,  with  the  greatest  desire  to 
merit  some  part  in  your  friendship,  and  with  the  most  respectful 
attachment,  Monsieur  le  Conite,  your  very  humble  and  very  obe 
dient  servant, 

"THE  M19  DE  LAFAYETTE. 


i, . 


P.S.  I  have  this  moment  arrived  at  the  head -quarters, 
Monsieur  le  Conite,  and  I  learn  with  extreme  pleasure  that  you 
are  now  in  a  position  to  embarrass  seriously  the  plans  of  Gen 
eral  Clinton  and  of  Lord  Howe.  I  trust  that  this  will  end  in  a 
very  brilliant  manner.  General  Washington  is  about  to  send  you 
Colonel  Laurens,  his  aide-de-camp,  to  carry  his  despatches.  That 
is  a  secret  which  he  has  not  confided  to  any  one  except  me,  for 
fear  of  accident,  but  he  wishes  me  to  send  you  at  the  same  time 
some  sign  by  which  you  will  recognize  the  authenticity  of  this 
message.  I  do  not  believe  that  you  know  my  handwriting,  but 
when  I  refer  to  our  lands  in  Auvergne,  to  my  chateau  of  Cha- 
vaniac,  to  the  fine  estate  of  Pont-du-Chateau  and  the  excellent 
salmon-fishing  that  belong  to  M.  de  Montboissier  ;  when  I  mention 
Madame  de  Chavaniac  and  Mile,  du  Motier,  my  aunts,  as  well  as 
the  marriage  of  my  cousin  with  M.  d'Abos;  these  little  family 
details  will  enable  you  to  recognize  me  as  a  genuine  Auvergnat. 
I  wish  also  that  you  would  soon  acquaint  us  with  your  hand 
writing,  or  with  a  cipher  that  will  protect  us  from  being  caught 
by  some  deception.  Allow  me  to  present  to  you  Colonel  Laurens, 
a  confidential  aide-de-camp  of  General  Washington,  and  the  son 
of  the  President  of  Congress.  He  is  a  young  gentleman  of  in 
telligence  and  of  attainments,  who  has  the  most  ardent  love  for 
his  country.  You  will  give  the  General  and  the  Congress  great 
pleasure  by  receiving  him  witli  distinction,  and  it  will  have  a  good 
effect  in  many  wai/s.  You  may  talk  to  him  confidentially  of  any 
thing  that  you  may  think  proper  to  communicate  to  General 
Washington,  because  it  is  quite  as  if  you  were  speaking  to  the 
General  himself,  who  intrusts  to  him  his  most  important  secrets. 

"Adieu,  Monsieur  le  Conite;  here  is  along  letter  indeed.  I 
trust  that  Colonel  Laurens  will  bring  us  back  the  news  of  some 
successful  movement  or  the  proposition  of  some  plan  that  gives 


414  EXPEDITION    OF   THE    COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 

promise  of  brilliant  results  and  in  connection  with  which  I  may 
be  happy  enough  at  last  to  shed  my  blood  for  my  country  and  to 
be  acknowledged  by  her. 

"I  shall  end  this  enormous  epistle  by  signing  my  name  in  full, 
" GILBERT  DU  MOTIER,  Ms  DE  LAFAYETTE.'' 

A  few  days  later  he  wrote  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  in 
order  to  present  to  him,  in  the  same  manner,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Alexander  Hamilton,  whom  General  Washington 
was  sending,  as  we  have  seen,  with  his  second  letter,  to 
the  French  admiral  i1 

"AT  THE  HEAD  QUARTERS,  NEAR  KINGS  FERRY,  17  July,  1778. 

"I  have  already  had  the  honor  of  writing  to  you,  Monsieur 
le  Comte,  a  long  letter,  of  which  the  greater  part  was  probably 
tedious,  and  for  which  I  beg  to  apologize  again.  My  delight  at 
knowing  that  you  are  here,  and  my  desire  to  assure  you  of  a 
devotion  on  my  part  which  I  earnestly  wish  may  be  useful  to 
you,  led  me  to  take  up  my  pen,  and  General  Washington  obliged 
me  to  add,  to  a  letter  that  was  already  too  long,  a  quantity  of 
details  which  certainly  must  have  made  it  ridiculous ;  but  he 
greatly  feared  that  you  would  doubt  the  genuineness  of  his  de 
spatches,  and,  as  he  knew  that  I  have  the  honor  to  belong  to  your 
house  and  to  the  province  in  which  it  originated,  he  insisted  that 
I  should  recite  my  name,  my  surname,  etc.,  as  well  as  other  par 
ticular  details  which  not  only  the  English  do  not  know,  but  with 
which  I  am  not  sure  that  you  are  very  well  acquainted  yourself. 

"I  take  the  liberty  to-day  of  writing  two  words  to  you  in 
order  to  present  to  you  Colonel  Hamilton,  aide-de-camp  to  Gen 
eral  Washington,  who  is  intrusted  with  important  despatches  and 
who  asked  to  be  introduced  to  you  by  me.  The  proofs  of  his 
ability  which  the  General  has  had,  as  well  as  his  friendship 
toward  him  and  his  confidence  in  him,  have  placed  him  in  a  posi 
tion  to  know  all  the  circumstances  of  our  present  situation  ;  and 
his  own  knowledge,  added  to  a  quickness  of  perception  which  is 
by  no  means  common,  will  enable  him,  I  think,  to  satisfy  you 
in  regard  to  all  the  information  which  it  is  possible  to  give 
you.  I  shall  not  add  any  matter  of  that  kind  here ;  it  is  all 
contained  in  the  General's  letter,  or  it  has  been  communicated 
to  Mr.  Hamilton,  who  is  perhaps  the  most  capable  man  of  the 
whole  army  to  convey  it  to  you. 

1  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  sixieme  annee,  No.  3,  p.  407. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D*ESTAIXG.  415 

"  Whatever  may  be  the  operations  that  you  determine  upon, 
permit  me  to  renew  my  most  ardent  wishes  for  their  success, 
which  are  inspired  not  only  by  the  adoration  of  our  native  land 
which  proceeds  from  my  heart,  and  which  every  man  worthy  of 
the  honor  of  being  a  Frenchman  must  feel,  but  also  by  an  especial 
interest  which  I  take  in  your  glory.  It  would  be  the  highest 
degree  of  pleasure  for  me  if  I  were  permitted  to  be  a  witness  of 
this,  before  the  receipt  of  orders,  or  the  absence  of  orders,  obliged 
me  to  join  the  French  standard  in  another  part  of  the  world. 

"I  have  the  honor  to  be,  with  the  most  respectful  attachment, 
Monsieur  le  Cointe,  your  very  humble  and  very  obedient  servant, 

' i  LAFAYETTE. 

"P.S.  Monsieur  de  Chouin,  who  arrived  from  Philadelphia 
this  morning,  is  writing  to  you  at  this  moment,  and  I  believe 
his  presence  is  very  useful  here.  Of  the  different  projects  that 
have  been  suggested  to  you,  that  of  entering  New  York,  if  it  is 
possible,  has  such  immense  advantages  over  the  rest  that  I  doubt 
not  you  will  prefer  it,  and  I  am  persuaded  that  you  should  a$k 
especially  to  be  supported  either  by  the  whole  or  by  some  part 
of  our  army  at  all  points  where  its  aid  may  be  of  service  to  you." 

Whilst  these  letters  and  the  despatches  were  on  their 
way  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing  by  the  hands  of  Colonel  Lau- 
rens  and  Colonel  Alexander  Hamilton,  the  French  fleet 
was  in  a  situation  which  was  growing  more  difficult  every 
day.  After  a  voyage  which  had  kept  them  at  sea  for 
three  months,  the  ships  were  almost  out  of  provisions ; 
the  flour  that  still  remained  was  spoiling,  and  there  was 
scarcely  any  water  left  to  drink.  The  mission  of  Major 
de  Choin  to  Congress  was  largely  for  the  purpose  of  ex 
plaining  these  necessities  and  of  obtaining  fresh  supplies, 
if  possible ;  but,  after  considerable  delay  attendant  upon 
his  journey,  which  occupied  two  days  and  two  nights  be 
fore  he  reached  Philadelphia,  and  the  loss  of  two  days 
more  before  he  could  see  the  President  of  Congress,  he 
was  obliged  to  report  that  he  had  met  with  very  meagre 
success.  For,  in  spite  of  the  cordial  willingness  of  the 
Congress  and  of  the  people  of  Philadelphia  to  come  to 
his  assistance,  the  city  was  almost  stripped  of  every  sort 


416  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D?ESTAING.  [1778. 

of  provision,  and  the  country  about  it,  which  had  felt 
the  ravages  of  the  war,  produced  little  or  nothing.  M. 
Gerard,  the  French  minister,  reported  that,  while  it  was 
impossible  to  make  more  strenuous  efforts  in  regard  to 
everything  that  concerned  the  French  fleet  than  he 
saw  being  made  in  Philadelphia,  the  resources  at  hand 
available  for  the  purpose  were  almost  null.  So  that  the 
admiral  had  a  double  reason  in  leaving  the  Delaware,— 
namely,  to  meet  the  enemy  and  to  replenish  the  water 
and  supplies  at  Sandy  Hook.1 

He  was  without  pilots  who  knew  the  coast,  and  he  had 
no  means  of  communicating  with  the  shore,  which,  in 
deed,  was  rendered  especially  difficult  by  the  fact  that  the 
British  outposts  threatened  any  landing  party,  while  he 
and  all  his  people  were  total  strangers  to  the  country.  As 
he  lay  with  his  fleet  outside  of  Sandy  Hook,  his  anchorage 
was  extremely  difficult ;  he  was  exposed  to  the  roughness 
of  the  sea,  which  caused  his  cables  to  cut  very  quickly, 
and  he  was  in  danger  of  being  driven  upon  the  shore 
at  any  moment  if  a  gale  were  to  overtake  him  in  that 
position.  In  the  mean  time,  whilst  his  officers  and  men 
were  patiently  enduring  their  hardships  in  the  hope  that 
each  succeeding  day  would  bring  them  the  opportunity 
they  sought  of  engaging  with  the  common  enemy  for  the 
liberties  of  America  and  for  the  glory  of  France,  they 
were  perfectly  helpless  unless  they  could  co-operate  with 
the  Continental  army  in  the  development  of  a  plan  of 
campaign  which  might  be  agreed  upon ;  and  it  had  now 
become  an  absolute  necessity  to  obtain  in  some  manner  a 
means  of  communication  with  Congress  and  with  General 
Washington.  In  the  face  of  the  difficulties  and  dangers 
by  which  he  was  surrounded,  the  personal  conduct  of  the 
admiral  upon  this  occasion  is  of  more  than  common  inter- 

1  D'Estaing's  Official  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  French  Navy, 
Archives  de  la  Marine,  B4  141,  folios  227  et  suiv. :  Doniol,  La  Participation  cle 
la  France,  iii.  447. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D'ESTAIXG.  417 

est  as  an  historical  incident  in  connection  with  his  un 
fortunate  expedition  to  America,  for  which  he  has  been 
freely  criticised  and  found  fault  with  at  home  and  abroad, 
because  what  followed  affords  us  one  of  those  rare  glimpses 
into  the  merits  of  human  action  which  of  themselves  go 
far  toward  reflecting  the  character  of  men,  and  proves 
beyond  doubt,  if  other  proof  were  lacking,  that  M.  d'Es- 
taing  was  an  earnest  soldier  and  a  man  of  courage.  He 
announced  that,  as  he  was  unwilling  to  expose  any  man 
under  his  command  to  dangers  that  he  was  not  ready 
to  share,  and  in  view  of  the  critical  situation  of  the  fleet, 
he  had  determined  to  go  ashore  himself.  Setting  out, 
therefore,  in  a  row-boat  with  a  small  force  of  soldiers  and 
sailors,  who  accompanied  him  in  boats,  he  made  his  way 
through  extremely  rough  water  to  the  Shrewsbury  River, 
the  entrance  to  which  lie  discovered  after  great  difficulty 
and  at  the  cost  of  the  lives  of  one  of  his  officers  and  a 
number  of  sailors  and  the  destruction  of  several  boats. 

As  a  result  of  this  effort,  he  was  fortunate  enough  to 
meet  with  Lieutenant-Colonel  Laurens,  who  bore  with 
him  the  letters  of  General  Washington  and  of  the  Marquis 
de  La  Fayette,  and  from  whom  he  obtained,  to  his  great 
relief,  the  information  he  sought  as  to  the  General's  plans 
of  operation,  with  the  welcome  news  that  measures  were 
then  being  carried  out  to  furnish  him  with  water  and 
provisions,  as  well  as  with  pilots  to  conduct  his  ships 
into  New  York  harbor.  Shortly  afterward,  Colonel  Alex 
ander  Hamilton  arrived  with  further  letters  from  head 
quarters,  and  united  with  Colonel  Laurens  witli  unremit 
ting  industry  to  further  the  interests  of  the  fleet  and  to 
collect  suitable  pilots  for  the  ships.  A  small  quantity  of 
fresh  water  was  conveyed  aboard,  in  spite  of  the  difficulty 
of  transportation,  and  a  supply  of  provisions  sufficient 
to  prevent  absolute  want  among  the  crews,  who  were  now 
suffering,  in  the  midst  of  their  other  difficulties,  with  the 
scurvy,  which  had  broken  out  virulently  among  them. 

VOL.  I.— 21 


418  EXPEDITION   OF    THE    COMTE    D'ESTAIXG.  [1778. 

The  most  serious  want  at  the  moment  was  that  of  pilots 
who  knew  the  channel :  many  who  had  been  employed  by 
the  British  refused  their  services,  and  nearly  all  who  could 
be  found  near  New  York  were  so  disaffected  that  they  had 
no  desire  to  aid  the  French  admiral.  The  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette  succeeded  at  last  in  inducing  one  of  them  who 
had  brought  Lord  Howe's  vessels  into  port  to  consent  to 
act,  though  greatly  against  his  will  and  not  until  La  Fay 
ette  had  promised  to  send  him  in  a  carriage,  on  account 
of  an  illness  which  he  probably  exaggerated  in  order 
to  escape  this  duty.1  La  Fayette  wrote  to  the  Comte 
d'Estaing,  from  King's  Ferry,  on  the  18th  of  July,  and 
sent  his  aide-de-camp,  Mr.  Nevill,  to  carry  the  letter  and 
to  announce  to  the  admiral  the  coming  of  this  pilot.2 

Thus,  while  the  President  of  Congress,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  Colonel  Hamilton, 
Colonel  Laurens,  and  very  many  others  loyal  to  the 
American  cause,  were  employing  every  possible  means  to 
unite  the  Continental  forces  and  those  of  our  allies,  com 
munication  was  established,  plans  were  agreed  upon,  and 
the  prospect  of  victory  grew  bright.  The  Comte  d'Es- 
taing's  fleet  was  greatly  superior  in  armament,  and  in 
the  number  of  men  it  carried,  to  that  of  the  British  ad 
miral.  It  was  ready  for  immediate  action,  M.  d'Estaing's 
theory  of  naval  warfare  being  that  the  advantage  would 
be  gained  by  a  sudden  appearance  before  the  place  to  be 
attacked  and  by  a  rapid  stroke  which  should  allow  no 
time  for  preparing  defence  ;  and  the  great  French  men- 
of-war  lay  just  outside  of  New  York  harbor,  where  the 
English  flag  could  plainly  be  seen  floating  from  the  masts 
of  hundreds  of  vessels  of  various  kinds. 


1  Major  de  Choin  wrote  to  the  admiral  that,  "with  the  best  countenance 
in  the  world,  he  refuses  to  go  ahoard  of  you,  under  pretext  of  a  fever,  which 
I  wish  I  had  in  his  place,  if  it  be  true  that  he  has  it." 

2  La  Fayette  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  18  July,  Eevue  d'Histoire  diploma 
tique,  ut  supra,  p.  407. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D^ESTAING.  419 

For  one  moment  the  case  of  the  British  in  America 
seemed  desperate ;  but  the  next  instant  the  Comte  d'Es- 
taing's  ill  luck  intervened  to  respite  them  from  impend 
ing  evil.  It  was  the  unanimous  decision  of  the  pilots 
that  the  larger  of  the  French  ships  drew  too  much  water 
to  admit  of  their  being  taken  across  the  bar ;  and,  how 
ever  unwelcome  this  news  was  to  the  French  captains,  it 
was  found,  to  their  intense  disappointment,  that  it  was 
true.  The  Comte  d'Estaing,  unwilling  to  admit  the  pos 
sibility  of  a  reverse  so  absolutely  destructive  of  all  his 
hopes,  after  having  offered  fifty  thousand  French  ecus  to 
any  pilot  who  should  take  them  over,  made  the  soundings 
of  the  channel  himself,  and  was  forced  to  admit  that  he 
must  abandon  the  attempt.1  His  heavy  ships  of  seventy- 
four,  like  the  Languedoc,  drew  two  or  three  feet  more  than 
the  English  men-of-war  of  the  same  class,  which,  he  was 
assured  by  the  pilots,  never  crossed  the  bar  without  re 
moving  some  of  their  guns ;  and  of  course  he  could  not 
afford  to  do  that  in  the  face  of  an  enemy.  Therefore, 
after  having  lain  for  eleven  days  at  the  entrance  to  the 
harbor,  he  reluctantly  admitted  that  he  could  not  hope 
to  win  a  victory  at  New  York ;  and,  with  the  sad  reflec 
tion  that  "it  is  terrible  to  be  within  sight  of  your  object 
and  yet  to  be  unable  to  attain  it,"  he  weighed  anchor 
and  once  more  put  to  sea.  In  addition  to  the  dangers 
which  made  his  position  off  Sandy  Hook  untenable  was 
the  news  which  Congress  sent  an  American  vessel  to 


1  "  Lcs  marges  dcs  mortes  caux  quc  la  cartte  dc  la  do  la  War  specific,  tandis 
que  celle  de  la  riviere  d' Hudson  se  tait  sur  cet  objet  important,  ne  sont  que 
de  quatre  pieds  et  demi  anglais  qui  valient  4  pieds  2  ponces  9  lignes  francais. 
Ce  total  ne  donnerait  done  a  la  mer  hautte  qu  23  pieds  11  pouces.  Le  tirant 
d'eau  du  Languedoc  est  de  22  pieds  six  ixnices  ;  celui  du  Tonnant  est  de  23 
pieds  10  pouces,  et  tons  les  vaisseaux  de  74  de  1'escadre  tirent  de  21  a  22 
pieds  d'eau  ;  eux  seuls  peuvent  avoir  quelleque  superiority  sur  le  nombre 
des  vaisseaux  de  64  et  de  cinquante  qu'ont  les  Anglais." — Correspondence 
between  the  Comte  d'Estaing  and  M.  Gerard,  on  board  the  Languedoc,  at 
Sea,  22d  June,  1778  ;  Archives  de  la  Marine,  B*  143,  fol.  12  :  Doniul,  La  Par 
ticipation  de  la  France,  iii.  243. 


420  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 

convey  to  him,  and  which  reached  him  there,  of  the  sail 
ing  from  England  of  the  strong  British  armament  under 
Admiral  Byron,  who  might  be  expected  very  shortly  to 
arrive,  and  if  this  force  were  united  with  that  of  Lord 
Howe  the  two  would  present  so  formidable  an  array  that 
M.  d'Estaing  could  not  hope  to  compete  with  them. 

The  plan  which  General  Washington  proposed  in  the 
event  of  failure  at  New  York — which  he  appears  to  have 
anticipated  from  the  reports  he  had  received  as  to  the 
impediment  likely  to  be  presented  to  the  larger  French 
ships  of  the  line  by  the  shallow  water  on  the  bar — was  an 
attack  upon  Newport,  where  the  British  had  established 
a  garrison  of  six  thousand  men,  with  several  vessels  in 
the  harbor.  The  capture  of  this  point  in  co-operation 
with  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States,  whilst  General 
Washington,  from  his  position  at  White  Plains,  should 
threaten  Sir  Henry  Clinton  and  prevent  him  from  ex 
posing  New  York  by  sending  reinforcements,  and  the 
destruction  of  the  British  frigates  anchored  at  Newport, 
would  have  been  an  achievement  of  which  the  allies 
might  well  feel  proud,  and  would  have  been  a  serious 
blow  to  British  supremacy  in  America.  M.  d'Estaing  an 
nounced  to  General  Washington  through  Colonel  Ham 
ilton,  whom  he  had  detained  until  a  definite  conclusion 
should  be  reached,  that  he  should  now  prepare  for  the 
attack  upon  Newport,  an  operation  which  had  the  double 
advantage  of  bringing  his  forces  into  direct  communica 
tion  with  those  of  the  American  army  and  of  according 
exactly  with  the  tenor  of  the  instructions  which  he  had 
brought  with  him  from  France.  He  sailed  from  Sandy 
Hook  on  the  23d  of  July,  just  as  the  indications  of  an 
approaching  storm  would  have  obliged  him  to  weigh 
anchor  in  any  event ;  and  on  the  29th  of  the  month  he 
arrived  before  Khode  Island  with  his  fleet  drawn  up  in 
order  of  battle  ready  to  force  a  passage  into  Newport, 
and  came  to  anchor  outside  of  Brenton's  Ledge,  five 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE   COMTE    D'ESTAING.  421 

miles  below  the  town.  Upon  the  receipt  by  General 
Washington  of  the  letter  which  M.  d'Estaing  had  sent 
him  by  the  hand  of  Colonel  Alexander  Hamilton,  from 
the  Languedoc,  before  leaving  Sandy  Hook,  he  wrote 
to  the  admiral  as  follows  : l 

"HEAD  QUARTERS,  22  July,  1778. 

"SiR, — I  this  moment  received  the  letter,  which  you  did  me 
the  honor  of  writing  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hamilton.  I  cannot 
forbear  regretting  that  the  brilliant  enterprise,  which  you  at  first 
meditated,  was  frustrated  by  physical  impossibilities  ;  but  I  hope 
that  something  equally  worthy  of  the  greatness  of  your  senti 
ments  is  still  in  reserve  for  you.  Upon  the  report  made  to  me 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Laurens,  of  the  depth  of  water  at  Sandy 
Hook,  and  the  draught  of  your  ships  of  the  line,  I  thought  that 
no  time  was  to  be  lost  in  marching  a  reinforcement  to  General 
Sullivan,  that  he  might  be  in  a  situation  for  a  vigorous  cooper 
ation.  I  am  happy  to  find,  that  we  coincided  so  exactly  in  the 
importance  of  this  expedition. 

"Mr.  Laurens,  who  will  have  the  honor  of  delivering  you  this, 
will  inform  you  of  my  opinion  relative  to  the  stationing  of  a  ship 
of  the  line  in  the  Sound,  as  well  as  of  other  particulars,  which  I 
have  communicated  to  him.  I  shall  not  therefore  employ  your 
attention  farther  than  to  assure  you,  that  you  have  inspired  me 
with  the  same  sentiments  for  you,  which  you  are  so  good  as  to 
entertain  for  me,  and  that  it  will  be  my  greatest  happiness  to  con 
tribute  to  the  service  of  our  great  ally  in  pursuing  our  common 
enemy,  and  to  the  glory  of  an  officer,  who  has  on  every  account 
so  just  a  claim  to  it,  as  the  Count  d'Estiiing." 

The  Commander-in-Chief  had  sent  orders  to  General 
Sullivan,  who  at  this  time  commanded  in  Rhode  Island, 
directing  him  to  apply,  in  the  most  urgent  manner,  to 
the  States  of  Rhode  Island,  Massachusetts,  and  Connec 
ticut,  to  make  up  a  body  of  live  thousand  men,  inclu 
sive  of  those  he  already  had  with  him,  in  order  to  be 
ready  at  all  points  and  for  all  events ;  also  to  establish 
suitable  magazines  of  provisions  and  to  collect  proper 
boats  for  a  descent. 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  12. 


422  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D?ESTAING.  [1778. 

He  also  determined  to  send  forward  as  a  reinforcement 
to  General  Sullivan  such  a  part  of  his  Continental  troops 
as  he  could  reasonably  spare  without  weakening  too 
greatly  his  own  position,  and  to  intrust  the  command  of 
it  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette.  Accordingly  he  issued 
to  La  Fayette  the  following  order  i1 

"WHITE  PLAINS,  22  July,  1778. 

"  SIR, — You  are  to  have  the  immediate  command  of  that  detach 
ment  from  this  army,  which  consists  of  Glover's  and  Varnum's 
brigades,  and  the  detachment  under  the  command  of  Colonel 
Henry  Jackson.  You  are  to  march  them,  with  all  convenient 
expedition  and  by  the  best  routes,  to  Providence  in  the  State  of 
Ehode  Island.  When  there,  you  are  to  subject  yourself  to  the 
orders  of  Major- General  Sullivan,  who  will  have  the  command  of 
the  expedition  against  Newport,  and  the  British  and  other  troops 
in  their  pay  on  that  and  the  islands  adjacent. 

"If  on  your  march  you  should  receive  certain  intelligence  of 
the  evacuation  of  Ehode  Island  by  the  enemy,  you  are  immedi 
ately  to  countermarch  for  this  place,  giving  me  the  earliest  advice 
thereof.  Having  the  most  perfect  reliance  on  your  activity  and 
zeal,  and  wishing  you  all  the  success,  honor,  and  glory,  that  your 
heart  can  wish,  I  am,  with  the  most  perfect  regard,  yours,  &c.77 

It  is  very  likely  that  La  Fayette  had  solicited  this 
command,  or,  at  least,  that  he  had  sought  from  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  an  opportunity  to  serve  with  whatever 
detachment  of  the  army  should  be  sent  to  co-operate  with 
the  French  troops,  although  our  documents  do  not  prove 
this.  At  all  events,  he  eagerly  accepted  the  command 
now  offered  him,  and,  exhilarated  by  the  prospect  of  the 
glorious  results  which  appeared  to  be  but  a  little  way 
off,  he  started  with  his  men  for  Providence, — his  only 
source  of  discomfort  being  the  fear  that  he  might  arrive 
too  late  for  the  action.  Just  before  setting  out,  he  wrote 
the  following  letter  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing  :2 


1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  8. 

2  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  ut  supra,  p.  407. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION   OF   THE    COMTE    D'ESTAIXG.  423 

"AT  THE  HEAD  QUARTERS,  22  July. 

"I  have  this  moment  received,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  the  letter 
that  you  have  done  me  the  honor  to  write  to  me  by  Mr.  KeviH. 
Colonel  Hamilton  has  not  yet  arrived.  The  kindness  you  have 
shown  to  me  inspires  me  with  an  earnest  desire  to  merit  your 
esteem  and  some  part  also  of  your  friendship.  You  have  used 
expressions  of  compliment  toward  me  which,  even  after  making 
the  proper  deductions  on  behalf  of  your  politeness,  are  still  ten 
thousand  times  too  great  for  my  slender  deserts.  But,  at  the  risk 
of  sinking  in  your  estimation  after  you  have  come  to  know  me 
more  fully,  my  feelings  toward  you  so  far  control  my  self-esteem 
that  I  am  delighted  at  the  hope  of  seeing  you  soon  and  of  fight 
ing  under  your  eye. 

"Mr.  Laurens  will  tell  you  where  I  am  going  and  what  I  am 
doing,  and  your  Frenchman's  heart  will  feel  how  happy  I  am. 
I  am  leaving  my  detachment  at  White  Plains  with  very  sincere 
pleasure,  to  command  the  detachment  of  which  you  will  hear. 
You  have  filled  me  with  joy,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  by  holding  out 
to  me  the  flattering  hope  that  I  shall  go  into  action  with  the 
infantry  that  you  have  on  board.  I  have  never  heard  any  news 
since  I  came  into  the  world  that  gave  me  greater  pleasure.  I 
am  setting  out  with  this  flattering  anticipation  ;  and  I  am  most 
anxious  to  deserve  the  friendship  and  esteem  of  our  gallant  and 
beloved  countrymen.  I  have  never  before  realized  the  charm 
of  our  profession,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  as  I  do  now  that  I  am  to  be 
allowed  to  practise  it  in  company  with  Frenchmen.  I  have  never 
wished  so  much  for  the  ability  that  I  have  not,  or  for  the  experi 
ence  that  I  shall  obtain  in  the  next  twenty  years,  if  God  spares 
my  life  and  allows  us  to  have  war.  No  doubt  it  is  amusing  to 
you  to  see  me  presented  as  a  general  officer  ;  I  confess  that  I  am 
forced  myself  to  smile  sometimes  at  the  idea,  even  in  this  country, 
where  people  do  not  smile  so  readily  as  we  do  at  home. 

"I  beg  you,  in  the  name  of  your  own  love  of  glory,  do  not 
begin  the  operations  before  we  arrive  ;  I  shall  hasten  the  march  of 
my  troops  as  much  as  possible.  I  am  bound  to  stay  with  them, 
otherwise  I  should  precede  Mr.  Laurens.  This  reinforcement  will 
go  far  toward  assuring  our  success,  as  you  will  see  by  the  account 
that  is  to  be  given  to  you.  I  declare  that  if  I  were  to  arrive  too 
late  I  should  want  to  go  and  hang  myself. 

"Adieu,  Monsieur  le  Comte.  I  am  very  much  hurried  ;  I  am 
not  given  time  enough  to  finish  my  scribbling,  still  less  to  write  in 
cipher ;  for  General  Washington  is  anxious  to  see  his  aide-de 
camp  set  out.  The  last  words  in  your  letter  are  entirely  in  accord 


424  EXPEDITION    OF    THE   COMTE    D'ESTAESTG.  [1778. 

with  my  wishes,  and  I  have  an  idea  upon  this  subject  which  I 
shall  humbly  ask  your  permission  to  submit  when  we  are  able  to 
see  each  other. 

' i  I  love  you  tenderly,  Monsieur  le  Cornte ;  you  are  the  man 
whom  I  should  have  asked  for  at  the  head  of  this  fleet,  and  the 
man  who  satisfies  my  heart ;  though  this  does  not  prevent  rue 
from  entertaining  the  consideration  and  respect  for  you  which 
I  owe  you  for  so  many  reasons.  In  the  mean  time,  as  a  result 
of  this  respect  and  of  the  honor  and  gratification  it  is  to  me  to 
obey  you,  I  shall  conclude  by  assuring  you  simply  of  my  very 
sincere  attachment  and  of  my  very  sincere  wishes  for  success  and 
for  the  glory  of  the  French  name." 

Two  days  later,  when  he  was  upon  his  march  toward 
Providence,  he  wrote  again  to  M.  d'Estaing  a  letter  which 
he  sent  by  Mr.  Nevill : l 

11  AT  STAMPFORT,  16  miles  from  White  Plains, 
"24  July,  1778,  at  noon. 

"This  letter  is  intrusted,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  to  the  same  mes 
senger  who,  uniting  to  his  ordinary  zeal  the  strongest  gratitude 
for  the  kindness  you  have  done  him  the  honor  to  show  him, 
will  not  delay  in  handing  it  to  you.  You  have  received  one  by 
the  hand  of  Mr.  Laurens,  written  in  haste,  in  which  I  informed 
you  of  all  the  happiness  I  am  anticipating,  and  of  the  flattering 
prospects  which  will  support  me  during  niy  journey,  provided 
that  you  consider  our  detachment  worth  being  waited  for,  which  I 
hope  most  earnestly.  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  to  you  herewith 
a  letter  which  was  sent  to  me  last  night  by  your  correspondent. 

"I  was  detained  for  two  days  at  the  head- quarters  waiting  for 
Mr.  Hamilton,  and,  as  he  may  have  been  delayed  by  some  acci 
dent,  I  decided  to  start  before  his  coining,  in  order  not  to  retard 
my  own  arrival  and  that  of  my  companions  at  the  destination 
where  I  am  burning  to  be.  I  was  unable  to  take  leave  of  Gen 
eral  Washington  until  very  late  yesterday.  The  troops  are  thirty 
miles  beyond  this  place,  in  advance  of  me,  and  I  am  going  to 
join  them  in  order  to  hasten  them.  I  have  written  to  the  officer 
in  command  at  the  place  where  Mr.  Nevill  is  going,  to  ask  him  to 
use  every  means  to  enable  him  to  reach  you  ;  he  will  return  and 
bring  me  word  from  you,  unless  you  have  other  orders  for  him. 
The  subject  about  which  I  have  spoken  to  you  in  my  first  ciphers 

1  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  ut  supra,  p.  409. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D^ESTAIXG.  425 

causes  me  the  greatest  solicitude,  and  I  confess  to  you  that  I  shall 
not  have  a  moment's  peace  until  he  comes  back  to  reassure  me.  I 
have  proposed  to  General  Sullivan  that,  if  he  is  in  a  hurry,  I  shall 
join  him  with  the  most  active  men  from  the  different  regiments. 

"Mr.  de  Chouin  will  certainly  have  informed  you  that  some 
vessels  were  seen  two  days  ago  which  alarmed  us  upon  certain 
accounts  that  you  will  readily  understand  ;  but  we  have  heard 
nothing  further,  and  we  hope  that  these  gentlemen  are  too  much 
occupied  to  think  of  everything.  I  flatter  myself  that  in  a 
very  few  days  I  shall  be  at  the  end  of  my  journey. 

"The  more  I  think  of  the  word  you  have  sent  me,  Monsieur  le 
Comte,  the  happier  I  am.  I  have  expressed  to  M.  de  Chouin  an 
idea  which  he  believes  to  be  in  accord  with  what  he  knows  to  be 
your  purpose,  and  I  am  extremely  proud.  I  promise  you  to  use 
the  greatest  discretion  toward  both  the  Americans  and  the  French 
men  ;  it  is  a  measure  much  more  necessary  here  than  anywhere 
else,  for  very  many  reasons. 

"  Adieu,  Monsieur  le  Comte.  I  trust  I  may  soon  hear  from  you 
and  receive  a  confirmation  of  the  flattering  hopes  of  which  my 
heart  is  full.  Why  can  I  not  march  as  fast  as  my  thoughts,  or  at 
least  as  fast  as  you  can  go  into  action  and  win  the  victory  f  I  shall 
have  the  honor  of  writing  to  you  again  within  two  or  three  days. 
Nothing  has  assured  me  of  your  kindness  toward  me,  I  make  bold 
to  say,  of  your  friendship,  so  much  as  the  amusing  criticisms  that 
you  make  of  my  talents  as  a  general.  I  have  no  greater  ambition, 
Monsieur  le  Comte,  than  to  appear  to  you  worthy  of  being  a 
French  soldier  and  of  serving  as  such  under  your  orders. 

"As  obedience  and  respect  are  two  of  the  three  forms  of 
homage  which  my  heart  loves  to  present  to  you,  I  shall  content 
myself  here  with  offering  you  my  warm  attachment. 

"LAFAYETTE. 


"I  beg  you  to  excuse  the  awkwardness  and  the  bad  construc 
tion  of  my  ciphers ;  I  am  very  new  at  this  business,  and  I  fear 
I  have  made  them  as  unintelligible  to  you  as  they  would  be  to 
Mylord  Howe. 

"I  saw  a  gentleman  yesterday  who  had  seen  another  who  told 
him  that  he  had  seen  a  French  vessel  which  had  come  to  Boston 
in  thirty-six  days,  by  which  he  had  learned  that  Admiral  Keppell 
had  been  to  inspect  the  English  fleet  which  it  was  intended  to 
assign  to  him,  and  that  he  had  found  it  in  so  bad  a  condition, 
both  as  to  the  vessels  themselves  and  as  to  the  class  of  sailors  who 
were  on  board,  that  he  had  refused  the  command." 


426  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 

In  the  mean  time,  General  Washington  had  decided, 
upon  reflection,  after  La  Fayette  had  set  out  with  his 
detachment,  that  the  operation  would  be  strengthened 
and  its  chances  of  success  increased  if  Major-General 
Greene  were  assigned  to  take  part  in  it,  not  only  because 
of  his  confidence  in  that  officer's  devotion  and  skill,  and 
of  the  close  friendship  that  existed  between  him  and 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  but  also  because  Greene  was  a 
native  of  Rhode  Island  and  his  familiarity  with  its  situ 
ation  and  its  resources  would  be  of  very  great  service. 
General  Greene  himself  was  extremely  anxious  to  take 
part  in  this  expedition  now  about  to  be  made  almost 
within  sight  of  his  home,  which  he  had  not  seen  for  more 
than  three  years,  having  been  for  that  time  in  constant 
active  service  with  the  Continental  army ;  and  while  his 
duties  as  Quartermaster-General  would  be  likely  to  bring 
him  into  close  connection  with  the  operations,  he  was  not 
satisfied  with  merely  that  share  in  the  promised  success, 
but  desired  to  be  present  in  his  capacity  also  of  a  com 
manding  officer.1 

General  Washington  acceded  to  General  Greene's  wish, 
therefore ;  but,  as  there  were  no  troops  who  could  properly 
be  spared  from  the  ranks  of  the  main  army  for  this  pur 
pose,  the  only  way  by  which  this  could  be  accomplished 
was  to  give  him  command  of  part  of  the  troops  already 
detached  for  service  in  Rhode  Island,  dividing  the  com 
mand  which  had  been  assigned  to  the  Marquis  de  La 
Fayette.  The  Commander-in-Chief  wrote  accordingly  to 
La  Fayette  to  announce  to  him  this  disposition  of  the 
forces,  in  an  interesting  letter  which  strikingly  illus 
trates  the  tender  consideration  which  Washington  always 
entertained  for  the  feelings  of  the  younger  man.  This 
letter,  which  was  carried  by  General  Greene,  was  as 
follows : 2 

1  Greene's  Life  of  Greene,  vol.  ii.  chap.  iii. 

2  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  22. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    D*ESTAING.  427 

"HEAD  QUARTERS,  WHITE  PLAINS, 
"27  July,  1778. 

"DEAR  MARQUIS,— 

"This  will  be  delivered  to  you  by  Major-General  Greene,  whose 
thorough  knowledge  of  Ehode  Island,  of  which  he  is  a  native, 
and  the  influence  he  will  have  with  the  people,  put  it  in  his  power 
to  be  particularly  useful  in  the  expedition  against  that  place  ;  as 
well  in  providing  necessaries  for  carrying  it  on,  as  in  assisting  to 
form  and  execute  a  plan  of  operations  proper  for  the  occasion. 
The  honor  and  the  interest  of  the  common  cause  are  so  deeply 
concerned  in  the  success  of  this  enterprise,  that  it  appears  to  me 
of  the  greatest  importance  to  omit  no  step,  which  may  conduce  to 
it  5  and  General  Greene  on  several  accounts  will  be  able  to  render 
very  essential  services. 

"These  considerations  have  determined  me  to  send  him  on  the 
expedition,  in  which,  as  he  could  not  with  propriety  act  nor  be 
equally  useful  merely  in  his  official  capacity  of  quartermaster- 
general,  I  have  concluded  to  give  him  a  command  in  the  troops  to 
be  employed  in  the  descent.  I  have  therefore  directed  General 
Sullivan  to  throw  all  the  American  troops,  both  Continental,  State, 
and  militia,  into  two  divisions,  making  an  equal  distribution  of 
each,  to  be  under  the  immediate  command  of  General  Greene  and 
yourself.  The  Continental  troops  being  divided  in  this  manner 
with  the  militia,  will  serve  to  give  them  confidence,  and  probably 
make  them  act  better  than  they  would  alone.  Though  this 
arrangement  will  diminish  the  number  of  Continental  troops 
under  you,  yet  this  diminution  will  be  more  than  compensated  by 
the  addition  of  militia ;  and  I  persuade  myself  your  command 
will  not  be  less  agreeable,  or  less  honorable,  from  this  change  in 
the  disposition.  I  am,  with  great  esteem  and  affection,  dear  Mar 
quis,  your  most  obedient  servant." 

The  spirit  in  which  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  re 
ceived  this  announcement  does  great  honor  to  his  charac 
ter.  It  came  to  him  when  his  most  sensitive  feelings 
were  engaged  in  his  command.  We  have  witnessed  the 
delight  with  which  he  approached  the  French  admiral, 
and  the  enthusiasm  with  which  he  looked  forward  to 
the  occasion  when  he  should  act  in  concert  with  his 
countrymen  under  the  standard  of  his  King ;  we  realize 
very  easily  the  pride  with  which  he  was  about  to  present 


428  EXPEDITION   OF    THE    COMTE    D?ESTAING.  [1778. 

himself  to  the  admiral  as  an  officer  of  the  American 
army  intrusted  with  the  detachment  sent  to  co-operate 
with  him,  the  young  soldier  of  Metz  who  had  left  his 
country  but  a  short  time  previously  in  danger  of  censure 
for  a  step  which  the  Government  discountenanced  and 
which  his  nearest  and  best  counsellors  disapproved  of, 
now  a  major-general,  with  honor  and  recognized  position 
in  the  country  whose  cause  he  had  adopted,  and  sent  in 
a  certain  sense  as  a  representative  of  the  United  States  to 
meet  the  allied  troops  of  France.  This  was  a  situation 
in  which  it  was  not  agreeable  to  him  to  share  his  glory 
with  another.  Yet  he  replied  to  General  Washington 
with  a  graceful  acquiescence  to  his  wishes,  in  a  letter 
dated  at  Providence  on  the  6th  of  August,  1778  :  l 


GENERAL,  —  I  have  received  your  excellency's  favour 
by  General  Greene,  and  have  been  much  pleased  with  the  arrival 
of  a  gentleman  who,  not  only  on  account  of  his  merit,  and  the 
justness  of  his  views,  but  also  by  his  knowledge  of  the  country 
and  his  popularity  in  this  State,  may  be  very  serviceable  to  the 
expedition.  I  willingly  part  with  the  half  of  my  detachment, 
though  I  had  a  great  dependence  upon  them,  as  you  find  it  con 
venient  to  the  good  of  the  service.  Anything,  my  dear  General, 
you  will  order,  or  even  wish,  shall  always  be  infinitely  agreeable 
to  me,  and  I  will  always  feel  happy  in  doing  anything  which 
may  please  you,  or  forward  the  public  good.  I  am  of  the  same 
opinion  as  your  excellency,  that  dividing  our  continental  troops 
among  the  militia,  will  have  a  better  effect  than  if  we  were  to 
keep  them  together  in  one  wing. 

'  '  You  will  receive,  by  General  Sullivan,  an  account  of  his  dis 
positions,  preparations,  &c.  ;  I,  therefore,  have  nothing  to  add, 
but  that  I  have  been  on  board  of  the  Admiral  the  day  before  yes 
terday.  I  saw  among  the  fleet  an  ardour  and  a  desire  of  doing 
something,  which  would  soon  turn  into  impatience,  if  we  don't 
give  them  a  speedy  occasion  of  fighting.  The  officers  cannot 
contain  their  soldiers  and  sailors,  who  are  complaining  that  they 
have  been  these  four  months  running  after  the  British,  without 
getting  at  them  5  but  I  hope  they  will  soon  be  satisfied. 

1  La  Fayette's  Correspondence,  American  edition,  i.  183. 


1778.]  EXPEDITION    OF    THE    COMTE    DJESTAIXG.  429 

"The  Count  d'Estaing  was  very  glad  of  my  arrival,  as  he 
could  open  freely  his  mind  to  me.  He  expressed  the  greatest 
anxiety  on  account  of  his  wants  of  every  kind,  provisions,  water, 
&c.  ;  he  hopes  the  taking  of  Rhode  Island  will  enable  him  to  get 
some  of  the  two  above-mentioned  articles.  The  admiral  wants  me 
to  join  the  French  troops  to  these  I  command,  as  soon  as  possible. 
I  confess  I  feel  very  happy  to  think  of  my  co-operating  with 
them,  and,  had  I  contrived  in  my  mind  an  agreeable  dream,  I 
could  not  have  wished  a  more  pleasing  event  than  my  joining  my 
countrymen  with  my  brothers  of  America,  under  my  command, 
and  the  same  standards.  When  I  left  Europe,  I  was  very  far 
from  hoping  such  an  agreeable  turn  of  our  business  in  the 
American  glorious  revolution. 

"  Though  I  have  no  account,  neither  observations,  to  give  your 
excellency,  as  I  am  here  a  man  of  war  of  the  third  rate,  I  will,  after 
the  expedition,  scribble  some  lines  to  you,  and  join  to  the  account 
of  General  Sullivan,  the  assurance  that  I  have  all  niy  limbs,  and 
that  I  am,  with  the  most  tender  affection,  and  entire  confidence, 
yours,  with  high  respect, 

"  LAFAYETTE." 

This  letter  gave  very  great  pleasure  to  General  Wash 
ington  :  it  enabled  him  to  gratify  the  desire  of  General 
Greene,  whose  wish  for  a  command  in  Rhode  Island  was 
paramount,  by  reason  of  his  years  of  service  in  the  army, 
his  seniority  as  a  major-general,  and  his  character  as  a 
man  and  a  soldier  whom  Washington  loved  and  respected; 
and  it  brought  him  the  assurance  of  the  cheerful  obedi 
ence  upon  the  part  of  La  Fayette  to  which  their  relations 
entitled  him,  and  which  he  hoped  for,  even  under  cir 
cumstances  which  he  knew  to  be  trying  to  a  man  of  so 
sensitive  a  nature.  He  wrote  to  him,  immediately  upon 
the  receipt  of  it,  from  White  Plains,  on  the  10th  of 
August,  as  follows  : l 

"MY  DEAR  MARQUIS, — Your  favor  of  the  6th  instant,  which 
came  to  my  hands  yesterday,  afforded  a  fresh  proof  of  the  noble 
principles  on  which  you  act,  and  has  a  just  claim  to  my  sincere 


1  s 


>parks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  27. 


430  EXPEDITION    OF   THE    COMTE    D'ESTAING.  [1778. 

and  hearty  thanks.  The  common  cause,  of  which  you  have  been 
a  zealous  supporter,  would,  I  knew,  be  benefited  by  General 
Greene's  presence  at  Ehode  Island,  as  he  is  a  native  of  that  State, 
has  an  interest  with  the  people,  and  a  thorough  knowledge  of  the 
country ;  and  therefore  I  accepted  his  proffered  services ;  but  I 
was  a  little  uneasy,  lest  you  should  conceive  that  it  was  intended 
to  lessen  your  command.  General  Greene  did  not  incline  to  act 
in  a  detached  part  of  the  army,  merely  as  quarter  master- general ; 
nor  was  it  to  be  expected.  It  became  necessary,  therefore,  to  give 
him  a  detached  command,  and  consequently  to  divide  the  Conti 
nental  troops.  Your  cheerful  acquiescence  in  the  measure,  after 
being  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  brigades  which  marched 
from  this  army,  obviated  every  difficulty,  and  gave  me  singular 
pleasure. 

1 L I  am  very  happy  to  find,  that  the  standards  of  France  and 
America  are  likely  to  be  united  under  your  command  at  Ehode 
Island.  I  am  persuaded,  that  the  supporters  of  each  will  be  emu 
lous  to  acquire  honor,  and  promote  your  glory  upon  this  occasion. 
The  courier  to  Count  d'Estaing  is  waiting.  I  have  only  time 
therefore  to  assure  you,  that  with  the  most  perfect  esteem  and 
exalted  regard  I  have  the  honor  to  be,  my  dear  Marquis,  your 
obedient  and  affectionate  servant." 


1778.]        OPERATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         431 


CHAPTER    XIII. 

OPERATIONS   OF   THE   ALLIED    FORCES   AT    NEWPORT. 

AFTER  a  rapid  march  of  two  hundred  and  forty  miles, 
during  which  his  anxiety  to  arrive  led  him  to  neglect  no 
means  of  hastening  his  footsteps,  La  Fayette  reached 
Providence,  with  his  detachment  of  two  thousand  men, 
on  the  4th  of  August.  He  found  the  fleet  there,  as  he 
had  expected,  and  he  learned  that  every  possible  effort 
was  being  made  in  Rhode  Island  and  in  the  other  New 
England  States  to  assemble  the  militia,  but  that,  up  to 
that  time,  General  Sullivan  had  but  a  comparatively  small 
part  of  the  ten  thousand  men  whom  he  had  expected  for 
his  share  in  the  operation  at  Newport,  and  that,  as  it  was 
his  plan  that  the  fleet  and  the  army  should  act  together, 
another  unfortunate  delay  must  occur,  although  the  Comte 
d'Estaing  was  quite  ready  to  move  to  the  attack  as  soon 
as  he  should  be  informed  that  it  was  the  desire  of  the 
American  commander  to  have  him  do  so.  The  French 
officers,  who  earnestly  wished  to  act  at  once,  were  ex 
ceedingly  disappointed  at  this  new  obstacle  in  the  way 
of  their  success ;  their  impatience  was  increased  by  the 
sufferings  aboard  the  ships,  where  the  scurvy  was  carrying 
off  very  considerable  numbers  of  men,  and  the  lack  of 
fresh  water  and  provisions  terribly  reduced  the  strength 
of  the  crews.  Soon  after  the  fleet  came  to  anchor,  General 
Sullivan  went  aboard  the  flag-ship,  and,  after  explaining 
his  position  to  the  admiral,  asked  for  more  time  in  which 
to  make  his  preparations  for  the  attack.1 

1  Comte  d'Estaing  to  General  Washington,  3d  August,  1778  ;  Archives  de 
la  Marine,  B4  146,  fol.  57  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  370. 


432        OPERATIONS   OF   THE   ALLIES   AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

The  Comte  d'Estaing  concealed  under  a  polite  acqui 
escence  to  this  request  the  disappointment  he  felt  at  the 
discovery  that  the  army  with  which  he  had  come  to  co 
operate  "  was  still  at  home,"  l  or  that  at  least  the  greater 
part  of  it  had  not  yet  come  into  the  field.  He  consented, 
however,  to  wait,  with  a  determination  always  to  conform 
to  the  expressed  wishes  of  the  American  general,  at  what 
ever  cost  to  himself  and  his  men,  in  order  to  perform  his 
duty  toward  the  allies  of  the  King ;  and  he  replied  to 
General  Sullivan  that  he  understood  the  uncertainties  of 
war  sufficiently  well  to  know  that  soldiers  and  sailors  must 
be  ready  to  meet  any  circumstances  that  might  arise,  and 
that,  whether  the  expected  armament  should  arrive  from 
England,  or  not,  to  strengthen  the  enemy,  he  should  con 
tinue  to  do  everything  in  his  power  to  serve  the  common 
cause.  But  he  reminded  General  Sullivan  at  the  same 
time,  with  a  courteous  insistence  upon  the  necessity  of 
action,  that  every  additional  day  passed  by  the  fleet  in 
idleness  was  that  much  less  damage  to  the  enemy ;  the 
truth  of  which  was  shown  by  the  subsequent  discovery 
that  this  delay  had  given  them  an  opportunity  to  prepare 
very  important  measures  for  defence  which  materially 
changed  their  attitude  when  the  action  finally  took  place. 

The  whole  British  garrison  consisted  of  six  thousand 
men,  under  the  command  of  Major-General  Pigot,  the 
main  body  of  which  was  intrenched  in  Newport  itself, 
with  a  small  detachment  stationed  at  the  extreme  northern 
end  of  the  island,  in  some  works  which  had  been  thrown 
up  to  prevent  a  descent  from  the  adjacent  mainland ;  and 
three  regiments,  aggregating  fifteen  hundred  men,  were 
posted  upon  Canonicut  Island,  immediately  to  the  west. 
The  defences  upon  the  island  to  the  north  of  Newport 
were  composed  of  two  lines  of  outworks,  supported  by 
several  redoubts  connected  with  the  lines.  The  first  of 

1  Comte  d'Estaing' s  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  French  Navy,  ubi  supra. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         433 

these  lines  extended  from  Easton  Pond  near  to  Tomminy 
Hill,  and  then  turned  off  to  the  water  on  the  north  side 
of  Windmill  Hill.  It  was  defended  by  five  redoubts  in 
front.  The  second  line  was  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  mile 
within  this,  and  extended  from  the  sea  to  the  north  side 
of  the  island,  terminating  at  a  battery  called  the  North 
Battery.  On  the  south,  at  the  entrance  by  Easton's  Beach, 
was  a  redoubt  which  commanded  the  pass ;  and  there  was 
still  another  redoubt  about  twenty  rods  on  the  north.1 

There  are  three  entrances  from  the  sea  to  Rhode  Island, 
before  which  the  French  fleet  was  now  lying '  one  on  the 
east,  called  Seconnet,  or  the  Eastern  Passage ;  one  on  the 
west,  between  the  island  and  Canonicut,  called  the  main 
channel ;  and  one  on  the  west  of  Canonicut,  called  the 
West,  or  Narraganset,  Passage.  These  waters  were  de 
fended  by  several  British  frigates  and  a  number  of  small 
galleys  which  had  been  employed  as  an  additional  protec 
tion  to  the  garrison.  It  was  an  extremely  critical  moment 
for  General  Pigot  when  he  found  himself  threatened,  as 
he  then  was,  by  forces  enormously  superior  to  his  own ; 
indeed,  his  case  would  have  been  hopeless  if  he  had  been 
attacked  at  once.  The  French  men-of-war,  with  their 
heavy  armament,  could  readily  have  captured  the  frigates 
that  were  locked  in  the  channels  and  perfectly  helpless 
before  such  assailants ;  the  land  forces,  separated  as  they 
were,  would  have  been  weakened  immediately  by  the  cap 
ture  in  detail  of  fifteen  hundred  Hessians  posted  upon 
Canonicut  Island,  and  the  main  body  of  the  British  at 
Newport  would  have  been  dealt  with,  under  the  fire  of 
the  fleet  in  the  East  Passage  and  the  main  channel,  by 
the  land  forces  under  General  Sullivan.  He  had  then 
three  thousand  Continental  troops,  counting  those  who 
had  come  with  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  and  General 
Greene,  besides  some  fifteen  hundred  to  eighteen  hundred 

1  General  Sullivan  to  Congress,  31st  August,  1778  :  Ainory,  Life  of  Sulli 
van,  p.  85. 

VOL.  I.— «J8 


434         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          [1778. 

militia ;  and  the  admiral  could  have  landed  from  his 
ships  between  two  and  three  thousand  men  of  French 
infantry  and  sailors, — namely,  four  battalions  of  five 
hundred  men  each,  and  two  battalions  of  infantry.1 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  criticise  the  conduct  of  this 
campaign  without  incurring  the  danger  of  doing  injustice 
if  we  attempt  to  fix  the  responsibility  of  its  failure  upon 
any  one  of  the  men  who  were  earnestly  striving,  in  both 
detachments  of  the  allied  forces,  to  assure  its  success. 
The  tangled  chain  of  misfortunes  which  no  human  fore 
sight  could  have  prevented  leaves  a  constant  doubt  in  the 
mind  as  to  the  wisdom  or  lack  of  wisdom  of  the  plans, 
which  may  have  been  well  laid  and  might  have  resulted 
favorably  but  for  this ;  and  there  is  every  reason  to  be 
lieve  that  General  Sullivan  loyally  strove  for  the  welfare 
of  his  country  and  its  cause,  according  to  his  best  judg 
ment,  in  his  effort  to  make  the  assault  by  the  co-operation 
of  the  French  and  American  forces.  But  it  is  impossible 
to  doubt  that  the  most  favorable  moment  was  lost  by  him 
when  he  asked  the  Comte  d'Estaing  for  a  delay  which 
kept  the  whole  French  fleet  lying  idle  for  nine  days 
before  the  harbor  of  Newport. 

It  is  true,  indeed,  that  the  militia  were  being  collected 
with  all  diligence  from  their  homes,  and  were  being  hur 
ried  together  from  the  different  States  of  New  England ; 
but  it  must  be  taken  into  account  that  the  British  were 
not  idle  during  the  respite  thus  given  them,  and  that 
General  Pigot  took  every  possible  advantage  of  his  slen 
der  resources.  He  abandoned  the  island  of  Canonicut 
and  concentrated  his  strength  by  bringing  over  to  New 
port  the  fifteen  hundred  Hessians  who  had  been  stationed 
there ;  and  when  it  became  evident  that  preparations  for 


1  Colonel  Fleury  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  5th  August,  1778 :  Archives  de 
la  Marine,  B4 146,  folios  121-124  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii. 
373.  Journal  de  Campagne  du  Marseillais,  24th  July,  1778  :  Doniol,  ibid.,  iii. 
341. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS   OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         435 

the  assault  were  being  made,  he  either  burned  or  blew  up 
eight  British  vessels,  to  prevent  them  from  falling  into  the 
hands  of  the  allies.1 

Not  the  least  important  advantage  gained  by  General 
Pigot  from  this  unexpected  delay  was  the  opportunity 
given  to  the  British  spies,  whose  service  was  far  better 
organized  than  the  similar  means  of  obtaining  informa 
tion  in  the  Continental  army  at  Rhode  Island,  to  carry 
to  New  York  a  detailed  account  of  the  situation  from  day 
to  day,  by  which  Lord  Howe  was  enabled  to  arrive  with 
his  fleet  in  relief  of  the  garrison  at  the  very  moment 
when  the  combined  attack  wras  about  to  be  made.  Oddly 
enough,  the  American  commander  seems  to  have  left  out 
of  his  calculations  the  likelihood  that,  whilst  he  was  pre 
paring  with  careful  deliberation  to  invest  one  of  the 
strongest  British  positions  in  America  and  to  capture  one 
of  the  most  important  garrisons,  Sir  Henry  Clinton  and 
Admiral  Howe  were  aware  of  his  movements  and  would 
set  on  foot  a  counter-movement ;  and,  being  in  total  igno 
rance  of  their  purposes,  as  he  appears  to  have  supposed 
they  were  of  his,  the  arrival  of  the  British  fleet  struck 
him  with  amazement.  "  Unexpected,  miraculous,  and 
surprising  as  General  Sullivan  considered  the  appearance 
of  this  fleet,  which  he  has  done  me  the  honor  to  declare 
to  me  in  his  letter  of  the  10th  of  August,"  said  the  Comte 
d'Estaing,  "  nevertheless  its  existence  was  a  fact." 

In  the  mean  time,  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  whose 
feeling  toward  General  Sullivan  was  one  of  consideration 3 
and  respect  which  inspired  him  with  an  earnest  desire  to 


1  These  were  the  corvette  King  Fisher,  of  sixteen  guns,  and  two  galleys?, 
the  Spitfire  and  the  Lamb,  in  the  East  Passage  ;  the  frigates  Orpheus,  Lark, 
and  Juno,  each  of  thirty-two,  Cerberus,  twenty-eight,  and  Falcon,  fourteen,  in 
the  West  Passage.     (Comte  d'Estaing's  official  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
French  Navy,  ubi  supra.) 

2  Comte  d'Estaing  to  Congress,  26th  August,  1778  ;  Archives  de  la  Marine, 
B*  No.  146,  folios  60-69  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  384-392. 

8  See  La  Fayette' s  letter  to  Sullivan,  in  Amory's  Life  of  Sullivan,  p.  73. 


436         OPERATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

co-operate  with  him  in  arranging  the  details  of  the  assault, 
was  incessantly  engaged  in  conveying  from  the  shore  to 
the  fleet,  and  from  the  fleet  back  to  the  head-quarters,  in 
formation  and  messages,  counsels  to  the  French  officers 
which  his  acquaintance  with  America  and  American  cus 
toms  enabled  him  to  render  of  great  value  to  his  country 
men,  and  assurances  from  the  Comte  d'Estaing  of  his 
understanding  of,  and  acquiescence  in,  the  proposals  of 
General  Sullivan.  His  letters  of  the  5th  and  8th  of  Au 
gust  clearly  indicate  the  variety  of  subjects  which  occupied 
his  attention,  as  well  as  the  great  personal  activity  with 
which  he  performed  his  mission  as  ambassador  between 
the  allied  forces  :  the  distribution  of  the  troops  at  the  time 
of  the  attack,  the  supply  of  field  artillery,  of  boats  for 
landing,  of  water  for  the  ships,  of  bricks  with  which  to 
build  ovens  in  order  that  the  crews  might  bake  bread  out 
of  the  little  flour  that  still  remained  of  the  four  months' 
provisions  brought  from  France,  and  which  was  in  danger 
of  spoiling  if  it  were  not  soon  used, — these,  and  very 
many  other  details,  show  themselves  in  his  almost  daily 
correspondence  with  the  admiral. 

La  Fayette's  own  personal  relations  to  the  French  fleet 
were,  under  his  peculiar  circumstances,  the  cause  of  some 
uncertainty  to  him  upon  his  approach  to  it,  and  of  no  little 
anxiety  as  to  his  reception.  Having  left  France  under 
the  ban  of  the  lettre-de-cachet  which  he  had  wilfully  dis 
obeyed,  he  was  still  subject  to  the  King's  orders  given  to 
all  commanders  of  vessels  to  seize  him  and  bring  him  back 
a  prisoner ;  and,  if  the  letter  of  the  law  were  to  be  strictly 
followed,  he  might  be  looked  upon  as  a  deserter.  It  is 
true,  of  course,  as  we  have  already  seen,  that  the  French 
Government  had  no  desire  to  act  harshly  with  him.  To 
the  Comte  de  Vergennes  La  Fayette's  coming  to  America 
was  merely  an  escapade  that  called  for  no  very  serious 
attention  beyond  the  official  steps  which  reasons  of  state, 
in  the  international  relations  between  France  and  Great 


1778.]         OPERATIONS   OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         437 

Britain,  made  necessary  at  the  time.  His  reception  in  the 
United  States  and  his  career  as  an  American  officer  had 
already  made  him  a  hero  in  France,  and  the  declaration  of 
war  by  France  removed  the  responsibility  for  his  actions 
which  the  Cabinet  had  made  a  show  of  assuming  to  the 
British  Ambassador  at  Versailles.  Although  La  Fayette 
felt  that  the  pardon  of  the  King  would  probably  be  granted 
him  without  much  difficulty  upon  his  return,  he  deemed  it 
important  to  prepare  the  way  for  this  by  reporting  himself 
through  the  admiral  to  the  Secretary  of  War,  and  an 
nouncing  to  him  where  he  then  was,  with  the  request  that 
he  might  be  allowed  to  stay  in  America  as  long  as  the 
Comte  d'Estaing  was  here.1  But  M.  d'Estaing  had  no 
hesitation  in  giving  a  warm  welcome  to  this  young  noble 
man,  his  own  relative  and  countryman,  whose  generous 
nature  enlisted  his  entire  sympathy  and  of  whose  suc 
cess  he  was  undoubtedly  proud.  He  wrote  to  him  im 
mediately  upon  hearing  that  he  had  been  ordered  to  join 
the  forces  at  Newport,  in  a  letter  which  he  sent  from  the 
Languedoc  by  Major  Nevill  on  the  31st  of  July  :  "  I 
shall  await  you,  Monsieur  le  Marquis,  with  the  greatest 
impatience.  It  is  you  who  have  turned  public  opinion  in 
our  favor  and  who  are  now  bringing  us  aid ;  a  service  of 
prime  necessity.  You  will  be  able  to  restore  vitality  to 
us ;"  and,  assuming  that  La  Fayette  would  take  a  fore 
most  part  in  the  operations  about  to  be  undertaken,  he 
congratulated  him  in  advance :  "  You  will  have  won  a 
still  larger  share  of  glory  when  I  have  the  honor  of 
embracing  you  :  how  much  that  will  console  us  for !" 

Soon  after  his  arrival  at  Providence,  La  Fayette  left 
his  camp  and  went  to  present  himself  to  the  French  ad 
miral  aboard  the  flag-ship,  taking  with  him  such  of  the 


1  La  Fayette  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  31st  August:    Revue  d'Histoire 
diplomatique,  sixiome  ann£e,  No.  3,  p.  426. 

2  Archives  de  la  Marine,  B*  146,  fol.  55:   Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la 
France,  iii.  338. 


438         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          [1778. 

French  officers  as  were  then  serving  in  the  Continental 
army  and  happened  to  be  near  enough  to  accept  an  invi 
tation  to  accompany  him.  It  was  the  morning  of  the  4th 
of  August  when  he  made  this  visit,  an  interesting  note  of 
which  was  entered  in  the  Journal  of  the  Languedoc  kept 
by  the  Comte  de  Cambis,  one  of  M.  d'Estaing's  officers, 
and  is  still  preserved  in  the  Archives  of  the  French  Navy. 
Arriving  on  board  at  nine  o'clock  in  the  morning,  La 
Fayette  was  received  with  the  most  cordial  welcome  upon 
the  part  of  the  admiral,  with  salutations  and  warm  con 
gratulations  from  the  officers  of  the  ship,  and  with  re 
peated  cries  of  "  Vive  le  Roi  /"  by  the  crew.  He  spent 
the  day  there  until  five  in  the  afternoon,  filled  with  con 
tentment  at  being  surrounded  by  his  countrymen  once 
more,  talking  again  in  his  own  language  of  his  home,  his 
friends,  of  all  he  loved  best ;  and  when  he  returned  to 
shore  he  had  the  assurance  from  the  Comte  d'Estaing, 
which  gave  him  exquisite  happiness,  that  he  should  be 
given  command  of  a  detachment  of  the  landing  party  from 
the  fleet  in  connection  with  his  own  Continental  soldiers 
and  the  militia.  This  was  the  subject  to  which  he  alluded 
in  his  letters  to  M.  d'Estaing  which  we  have  already  seen, 
as  the  one  thing  he  earnestly  hoped  for  and  about  which 
he  was  impatient  to  be  reassured.  The  admiral  readily 
gratified  his  wish,  which  no  doubt  appealed  at  once  to  his 
heart  through  the  enthusiasm  of  the  young  soldier  and 
through  his  devoted  attachment  to  the  welfare  and  glory 
of  France ;  he  sympathized  with  him  in  his  desire  to  win 
honor  in  the  profession  in  which  he  himself  had  spent  long 
years  of  his  life,  and  which  La  Fayette  may  almost  be  said 
to  have  inherited  from  many  generations  of  his  ancestors 
who  had  been  warriors  under  the  standard  of  the  King. 

M.  d'Estaing  rightly  estimated  the  position  which  La 
Fayette  had  acquired  in  America.  Whilst  he  smiled  at 
the  generalship  of  a  man  of  twenty,  and  jocularly  alluded 
to  it  in  his  correspondence  with  him,  he  comprehended 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         439 

that  this  young  officer,  who  had  been  found  worthy  of 
the  close  friendship  of  General  Washington,  and  who  by 
his  zeal  in  the  cause  of  American  independence  had  won 
the  esteem  of  both  the  soldiers  and  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  occupied  a  position  of  importance  which 
was  likely  to  prove  of  valuable  service  to  France.  The 
admiral  felt  himself  bound  to  report  to  the  ministry  at 
home  the  step  he  had  taken  in  receiving  M.  de  La  Fay- 
ette  aboard  his  ship  in  spite  of  his  attitude  of  disobedience 
to  the  King,  justifying  it,  however,  by  the  assurance  that 
whilst  "  his  extreme  impatience  to  prove  that  he  had  come 
to  fight  the  English  in  order  that  he  might  the  better  learn 
to  serve  his  master  induced  me  to  receive  him  aboard  the 
Languedoc,  with  a  personal  satisfaction  mingled  with  some 
anxiety  upon  political  grounds,"  yet  "  no  one  is  in  a  better 
position  than  this  young  general  officer  to  become  an  addi 
tional  bond  of  unity  between  France  and  America.  He 
enjoys  here  the  highly  merited  consideration  which  is  due 
to  his  zeal,  his  gallantry,  and  his  wisdom." 

In  the  course  of  the  day  spent  by  La  Fayette  on  board 
the  Languedoc,  during  which  he  was  in  intimate  consulta 
tion  with  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  the  subject  of  the  coming 
attack  was  fully  discussed  by  them,  the  manner  of  making 
it,  the  methods  of  co-operation,  and  the  disembarkation 
of  the  French  troops,  as  well  as  the  minute  details  that 
required  attention  and  preparation  in  a  matter  of  so  great 
importance.  We  have  no  direct  account  of  the  inter 
view,  of  which,  indeed,  nothing  was  known,  and  which 
was  almost  forgotten,  as  one  of  the  incidents  of  the  time, 
until  the  fortunate  discovery  by  M.  Doniol  of  the  package 
of  letters  in  the  Archives  of  the  French  Navy,  already 
referred  to,  brought  to  light  the  communications  of  La 
Fayette  to  the  admiral  in  the  midst  of  these  operations, 
which  present  an  extremely  interesting  view  of  the  pur- 

1  Comte  d'Estaing's  official  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  French  Navy, 
ut  supra. 


440         OPERATIONS   OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          [1778. 

poses  of  M.  d'Estaing  himself,  of  his  ideas  as  they  are  re 
flected  by  answers  to  questions  asked  or  suggestions  made 
by  La  Fayette,  and  of  the  attitude  of  the  French  officers 
toward  the  plans  proposed  by  General  Sullivan.  The  first 
of  these  is  a  letter  of  La  Fayette,  from  Providence,  on  the 
day  after  he  had  been  aboard  the  Languedoc.  Upon  his 
leaving  the  flag-ship,  at  five  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the 
admiral  had  sent  him  on  board  the  frigate  Provence, 
which  was  ordered  to  sail  with  him  up  the  West  Passage 
and  to  set  him  ashore  at  a  convenient  point  from  which 
he  might  reach  Providence.  But  a  fog,  which  came  in 
shortly  after  his  departure,  delayed  the  Provence,  so  that 
it  was  late  in  the  evening  before  he  arrived  at  his  quarters. 
In  the  morning,  therefore,  he  wrote  as  follows : l 

"PROVIDENCE,  5th  August,  1778. 

"I  arrived  here  last  night,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  and  I  have 
spoken  earnestly  this  morning  upon  the  various  subjects  which 
you  did  me  the  honor  to  intrust  to  me,  and  in  regard  to  which  I 
should  be  more  positive  if  I  had  not  met  here  a.n  officer  whose 
commission  antedates  my  own,  in  the  person  of  General  Sullivan. 
He  has  sent  in  every  direction  to  collect  provisions,  some  of  which 
have  already  been  sent  forward  to  the  fleet ;  and  orders  have  been 
given  to  bake  biscuits  at  several  different  places.  A  man  has 
been  sent  to  you  who  will  point  out  a  better  place  to  obtain  water 
than  from  the  dried-up  wells  which  have  been  used  heretofore. 
You  will  also  receive  several  boats  loaded  with  barrels  of  water, 
which  will  bring  back  any  prisoners  of  whom  you  desire  to  be  re 
lieved  ;  a  search  is  about  to  be  made,  with  an  example  as  well,  I 
hope,  for  the  militiamen  who  robbed  those  whom  you  intrusted 
to  their  charge,  and  we  shall  try  to  disgust  them  with  this  English 
practice.  You  will  receive  the  field  pieces,  and  the  boats  will  be 
sent  you  as  well  as  the  horses.  Finally,  Monsieur  le  Conite,  in 
stead  of  six  thousand  bricks,  I  have  been  assured  that  you  will 
have  twenty  thousand  before  long.  Would  to  heaven  that  our 
troops  were  increased  in  the  same  proportion  as  these  bricks  ;  but 
it  seems  that,  instead  of  fourteen  thousand  men,  we  are  able  to 
count  upon  scarcely  ten  thousand  now,  and  these  have  not  all 

1  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  sixieme  annee,  No.  3,  p.  413. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         441 

come  in  ;  though  the  Continental  troops  are  going  to  join  to 
morrow  such  of  the  militia  as  may  be  at  the  common  rendezvous. 

"As  to  the  great  undertaking,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  that  in 
which  the  success  of  the  expedition,  the  satisfaction  of  the  fleet, 
as  well  as  of  the  land  troops,  indeed  all  the  advantages  that  we 
hope  for,  are  concerned,  I  cannot  boast  of  having  made  great 
progress  in  my  negotiation. 

"The  attack  at  a  single  point,  the  concentration  of  the  Ameri 
can  troops,  especially  of  the  Continental  forces,  the  rectangular 
movement  which  may  enclose  the  English,  are  the  methods  that 
meet  with  the  greatest  favor.  I  have  argued  that  if  the  enemy 
were  divided  in  a  similar  operation  they  would  be  much  less 
formidable ;  that  several  false  attacks  and  two  real  ones  would 
secure  for  us  this  advantage,  that  the  English  would  lose  in  recon 
noitring  the  time  which  they  should  employ  in  marching  and  in 
fighting  whenever  we  put  them  into  a  situation  to  commit  this 
folly  ;  and  that,  finally,  when  we  should  make  a  descent  we  should 
not  be  obliged  to  wait  until  we  were  nearly  all  ashore  before  dis 
embarking  our  best  forces,  as  would  be  the  case  under  the  plan 
now  proposed  to  our  troops. 

"I  have  also  said  that  if  it  were  too  much  to  give  you  a  wing 
of  the  army,  you  would  be  satisfied  with  a  detachment ;  that  you 
would  leave  to  General  Sullivan  the  greater  part  of  his  Continental 
troops ;  that  a  small  number  of  them  should  be  united  with  the 
militia,  making  two  or  three  thousand  men  altogether,  who,  by 
being  joined  with  the  French  troops,  would  thus  be  assured  of 
protection  and  of  a  constantly  reliable  example  ;  that  this  de 
barkation  would  be  made  under  the  fire  of  the  ships,  which 
would  enable  us  to  unite  with  them  in  the  same  manner  as  he 
should  unite  with  us  under  the  plan  of  operations  which  I  sub 
mitted  to  you.  You  will  observe  that,  if  he  does  not  accept 
the  plan  of  making  the  attack  upon  the  redoubts  at  two  points, 
he  still  does  not  lose  the  advantage  of  the  rectangle  in  question, 
but  will  even  give  to  it  a  more  regular  form  by  prolonging  your 
side. 

"Finally,  I  added  that  we  not  only  owe  to  the  fleet  this  whole 
expedition,  because  without  the  fleet  it  would  not  have  been  un 
dertaken,  but  that  it  is  the  support  from  the  fleet  which  will 
assure  our  success  at  the  moment  of  the  attack.  The  sound  and 
the  effect  of  your  thunders,  the  division  of  the  points  at  which  an 
attack  is  to  be  feared,  the  descent  under  your  fire  of  a  body  of 
troops  uncertain  in  number  but  recognized  to  be  considerable, 
whose  first  steps  will  disclose  to  the  enemy  that  there  are  French- 


442         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

men  among  them,  will  be  the  disturbing  spectacle  presented  to 
the  English,  and  which  they  will  be  relieved  of  if  we  follow  out 
slavishly  the  brilliant  plan  which  I  had  the  honor  to  present  to 
you. 

"But  my  ideas,  Monsieur  le  Cointe,  did  not  strike  either  Gen 
eral  Sullivan  or  General  Greene  as  I  could  have  wished.  You 
will  see  by  the  reply  of  the  former,  that,  if  he  sends  you  a  rein 
forcement,  it  will  be  of  so  little  importance  that  the  idea  would 
never  enter  his  head  that  I  should  prefer  it  to  the  command  of 
his  wing  of  six  thousand  men  because  it  secures  me  the  happiness 
of  serving  under  your  orders  as  a  companion  in  glory  of  the 
Frenchmen,  my  dear  countrymen.  Besides,  he  expects  that  you 
will  retain  command  of  this  whole  detachment ;  and  he  considers 
me  to  be  of  a  certain  usefulness  to  him,  which  I  do  not  compre 
hend  myself,  with  this  famous  left  wing. 

"But  I  have  not  omitted  to  say  that  the  French  fleet  is  pre 
pared  to  take  an  important  part  in  this  action  ;  that  our  landing 
party  ought  to  be  considered  of  great  value ;  that  after  we  have 
come  ashore  in  safety  there  will  be  no  objection  to  changing  the 
arrangement,  but  that,  if  there  is  to  be  danger  to  be  met,  the 
French  troops  have  the  right  to  participate  in  it,  and  that  this 
is  the  only  mark  of  recognition  for  which  they  ask ;  so  that,  in 
either  case,  the  descent  should  be  made  by  all  at  the  same  time, 
and  in  such  a  manner  that  each  party  might  be  in  a  position  to 
take  advantage  of  any  opportunity  to  distinguish  itself  that  for 
tune  might  offer  it.  I  am  aware  that  it  is  not  pleasant  to  some 
people  to  see  the  finest  scenes  in  the  play  taken  by  foreign  actors  ; 
I  feel  that  the  Frenchmen  will  somewhat  eclipse  their  neighbors 
and  that  the  best  dramatic  effects  will  probably  fall  to  their  share. 
General  Sullivan's  attack,  although  extremely  important  in  itself, 
would  be  rather  what  they  call  in  comedy  en  robe  de  chambre, 
compared  with  the  spectacle  which  your  fleet  and  your  troops 
would  present ;  but,  without  expecting  hearts  which  are  not 
French  to  beat  with  the  same  emotion  that  I  should  feel  myself 
at  the  sight  of  the  glory  won  by  my  countrymen,  I  should  be 
greatly  disappointed  if  they  were  not  allowed  the  advantage 
which  I  think  is  rightfully  theirs  of  being  brought  more  nearly 
into  the  place  which  they  ought  to  occupy  in  this  expedition. 

"General  Sullivan  has  no  objection,  after  the  landing  party 
shall  be  no  longer  under  your  immediate  orders,  to  permitting  it 
to  take  up  its  position  where  I  shall  have  the  honor  to  command. 
But  that  is  not  in  accordance  with  the  plan  which  you  were  kind 
enough  to  communicate  to  me.  The  idea  that  your  troops  should 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.        443 

come  ashore  after  the  descent  was  substantially  accomplished,  is 
not  acceptable  to  me  under  any  consideration.  As  to  the  number 
of  men  in  the  detachment  which  he  intends  for  you,  I  have  told 
him  that  I  should  like  to  command  it,  whether  it  were  great  or 
small,  and  that  the  pleasure  of  fighting  in  view  of  my  own  coun 
trymen  could  not  be  made  up  to  me  by  any  conceivable  wing ; 
and  that,  for  that  matter,  I  should  resume  command  of  the  num 
ber  of  troops  to  which  I  am  entitled  after  I  had  rejoined  him.  I 
confess  to  you  that  I  should  not  like  to  see  the  French  troops 
with  people  whose  foreign  hearts  could  not  appreciate  their  value. 

"This  part  of  my  letter  is  immensely  long,  Monsieur  le  Cointe, 
but  I  am  anxious  to  report  to  you  what  I  have  said,  what  has 
been  said  to  me  in  reply,  and  to  acquaint  you  with  the  impres 
sions  that  I  have  obtained.  Now  I  shall  ask  your  permission 
to  add  what  my  limited  acquaintance  with  this  country  leads  me 
to  hope  for.  Your  plan  appears  to  me  very  far  from  having 
failed.  If,  in  your  reply  to  General  Sullivan,  you  mention  it 
again  as,  in  your  judgment,  necessary  to  the  success  of  the  expe 
dition,  as  conforming  to  your  own  wishes  and  to  the  desires  of 
those  who  are  under  your  command  ;  and  if  you  add  to  this  your 
military  conclusions  and  insist  upon  them  with  firmness,  these 
gentlemen  will  find  it  easier  to  submit  than  to  answer  you  ;  and 
they  will  then  enlarge  the  detachment  which  they  intend  to  assign 
to  you.  The  number  has  not  been  definitely  fixed  in  General 
Sullivan's  letter.  Appear  to  be  certain  then,  at  least,  of  two 
thousand  men  of  whom  half  or  one-third  shall  be  Continental 
troops.  If  you  should  join  to  this  the  kindness  of  asking  that  I 
shall  command  them,  or  at  least  that  they  shall  be  offered  to  me,  I 
assure  you  that  my  choice  will  come  from  my  heart  and  that  I 
shall  have  reached  the  utmost  limit  of  my  desires. 

"This  militia,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  will  serve  at  least  to  make 
a  show,  to  make  a  noise,  and  to  inspire  fear,  whilst  your  French 
men  are  doing  the  damage  ;  their  method  of  fighting  is  so  dif 
ferent  from  that  with  which  we  have  lulled  the  Englishmen 
here  to  sleep,  that  those  in  Khode  Island  must  surely  be  aston 
ished  by  it. 

"I  shall  leave  to-morrow  for  the  town  where  the  troops  are 
going.  Next  Sunday  lias  been  fixed  upon  as  the  date  of  the  at 
tack  if  ice  arc  ready.  You  see  that  there  will  still  be  time  to  send 
you  a  reinforcement  if  you  reply  at  once.  This  letter  will  be  de 
livered  to  you  by  M.  de  Gouvion,  of  whom  I  have  already  spoken 
to  you,  and  whom  I  now  send  in  order  that  he  may  describe  to 
you  that  part  of  the  island  which  he  has  already  seen,  whilst 


444         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

he  will  be  able  at  the  same  time  to  reconnoitre  another  part  of  it. 
M.  de  Gouvion  is  liked  and  esteemed  by  everybody  most  capable 
of  forming  a  judgment  about  him.  He  is  accompanied  by  M.  de 
Noirmont,  a  French  officer  who  is  exceedingly  anxious  to  see  the 
fleet,  and  whom  I  have  the  honor  of  presenting  to  you. 

"  When  I  know  that  you  have  written  upon  the  subjects  which 
you  have  done  me  the  honor  to  mention  to  me,  I  may,  if  it  seems 
proper  to  you,  say  a  word  or  two  about  them  in  my  personal 
letters  to  the  President  of  Congress,  with  whom  my  relations  are 
very  good.  As  to  General  Washington,  I  shall  leave  it  to  you  to 
write  to  him,  and  he  will  surely  not  keep  the  matter  a  secret  from 
me  ;  all  I  wish  to  know  is  the  date  of  your  letters,  so  that  I  may 
arrange  accordingly. 

"  Pardon,  a  thousand  times  pardon,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  for 
having  detained  you  so  long ;  I  thought  that  by  writing  fast  I 
should  make  my  letter  short,  but  the  national  interests,  my  desire 
to  succeed  in  the  undertaking  which  you  intrusted  to  me,  the 
delight  which  I  should  feel  at  seeing  the  French  soldiers  in  a 
position  where  they  could  do  their  best, — all  these  things  spoke 
within  me  at  once,  and  it  has  not  been  easy  to  restrain  myself. 
I  shall  now  hasten  to  conclude  by  assuring  you,  Monsieur  le 
Comte,  how  greatly  I  appreciate  your  kindness  toward  me  and 
how  sincerely  and  tenderly  I  am  attached  to  you. 

"  LAFAYETTE. 

"I  have  had  the  honor  of  seeing  M.  de  Pleville  and  of  offering 
him  my  services  as  an  interpreter  and  a  citizen  of  Providence." 

We  have  at  present  no  means  of  discovering  precisely 
what  the  errand  was  upon  which  La  Fayette  had  gone  at 
the  request  of  M.  d'Estaing ;  their  conversations  have  not 
been  recorded,  so  far  as  we  know,  and  the  letters  of  the 
admiral  which  would  no  doubt  throw  light  upon  it  were 
probably  among  the  personal  documents  and  other  papers 
of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  which  were  destroyed  at 
Chavaniac  during  the  excesses  of  the  French  Revolution. 
It  is  evident,  however,  that  it  related  chiefly  to  the  plans 
of  the  campaign,  to  the  method  of  uniting  the  French 
and  the  American  troops,  and  especially  to  the  points  at 
which  the  attack  upon  Rhode  Island  should  be  made.  It 
appears  from  this  letter  of  La  Fayette,  of  the  5th  of 


1778.]          OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         445 

August,  that  both  General  Sullivan  and  General  Greene 
were  in  favor  of  making  a  landing  at  a  single  point  under 
fire  of  the  ships  and  an  immediate  assault  upon  the  gar 
rison  with  all  the  troops,  which  plan  the  admiral  did  not 
approve  of.  He  evidently  insisted  that  a  more  effective 
descent  could  be  made  by  simultaneous  operations  at  two 
points  at  least ;  after  which,  the  troops  being  once  safely 
ashore  upon  the  island,  the  whole  force  should  be  united 
for  an  assault  upon  the  enemy's  works  before  the  town  of 
Newport. 

It  may,  or  it  may  not,  have  been  as  a  result  of  La 
Fayette's  presentation  of  the  admiral's  opinion  to  General 
Sullivan  that  the  plan  finally  adopted  was  that  the  island 
should  be  approached  from  two  different  points  ;  but  it 
was  agreed  that  the  army  should  be  divided  into  two 
separate  bodies,  one  under  General  Greene  which  should 
cross  over  and  make  its  landing  from  Tiverton,  and  the 
other  under  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  composed  of  the 
French  marines,  infantry,  and  sailors,  and  such  Conti 
nental  troops  and  militia  as  should  have  been  assigned 
to  his  command,  which  should  cross  from  the  island  of 
Canonicut.  It  was  understood  that  the  fleet  should  have 
forced  the  Middle  Passage  at  the  proper  moment  and 
should  have  captured  the  British  troops  at  Canonicut, 
after  which  that  island  should  be  used  by  the  admiral  for 
his  base  of  operations.  Once  upon  Rhode  Island,  both 
divisions  of  the  army  would  have  united  in  the  assault 
upon  Newport.  It  was  not  considered  necessary  to  give 
serious  attention  to  the  small  British  force  posted  in  the 
works  at  the  northern  end  of  the  island,  because  they 
were  not  strong  enough  to  threaten  the  rear  of  the  army, 
and  after  the  town  had  been  captured  they  were  certain 
to  fall  into  the  hands  of  the  victors.  As  we  have  seen, 
however,  General  Pigot  rescued  his  men  from  Canonicut 
during  the  delay  which  occurred  whilst  the  American 
forces  were  being  got  in  readiness,  and  he  afterward  re- 


446         OPERATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          [1778. 

called  those  at  the  northern  end  of  Rhode  Island  ;  so  that 
this  part  of  the  plan  of  the  allies  was  defeated  before 
the  attack  began.  La  Fayette's  allusion  to  the  President 
of  Congress  and  to  General  Washington  relates  to  some 
thing  which  we  have  not  now  the  means  of  determining ; 
possibly  to  an  operation  to  be  undertaken  by  the  fleet 
against  some  of  the  British  provinces  or  the  islands  in  the 
West  Indies  after  the  capture  of  Newport.  Very  natu 
rally  his  earnest  desire  to  command  the  French  detach 
ment  was  uppermost  in  his  mind  and  in  his  correspond 
ence.  His  sympathies  were  with  his  countrymen  to  such 
a  degree  that  he  wanted  for  them  all  the  glory  that  it 
was  possible  to  obtain,  and  the  longing  of  his  heart  was 
to  share  it  with  them  and  to  be  recognized  at  home  as 
having  performed  his  duty  as  a  Frenchman.  His  pride 
in  the  national  greatness  of  France  made  all  else  subordi 
nate  in  his  mind  to  the  valor  and  prestige  of  his  country 
men.  If  our  own  country  occupied  but  the  second  place 
in  the  comparison,  at  this  distance  of  time  we  can  sympa 
thize  with  him  in  the  feeling  which  is  the  birthright  of 
every  loyal  man,  to  look  upon  his  own  national  cause  as 
the  best  cause,  his  own  flag  as  the  best  flag,  and  his  own 
countrymen  as  the  best  soldiers. 

By  General  Sullivan's  first  plan,  which  he  communi 
cated  to  the  admiral  upon  the  occasion  of  his  visit  to  the 
flag-ship  immediately  after  the  arrival  of  the  fleet,  it  was 
proposed  that  M.  d'Estaing  should  detach  a  proper  force 
to  enter  the  Eastern  and  Western  Channels  and  capture 
the  enemy's  ships  stationed  there ;  to  block  the  Main 
Channel  with  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  and  to  cut  off  the 
retreat  of  the  British  ships,  as  well  as  to  prevent  the 
arrival  of  reinforcements  for  the  garrison.  The  French 
ships  in  the  Eastern  and  Western  Channels  were  after 
ward  to  cover  the  descent  of  the  American  troops  from 
Tiverton  and  Bristol.  At  the  moment  of  the  attack,  the 
French  fleet  was  to  force  the  passage  into  Newport  harbor, 


1778.]         OPERATIONS   OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         447 

to  bombard  the  town,  and  to  disembark  the  marines  and 
infantry  at  the  most  suitable  point  to  second  the  American 
attack.1 

The  admiral  proceeded  at  once  to  execute  his  part  of 
this  operation  by  sending  into  the  Western  Passage  the 
ship  of  the  line  Sagittaire,  on  the  morning  of  the  30th 
of  July.  The  Sagittaire  ran  by  the  batteries  of  the 
enemy,  which  opened  fire  from  the  west  side  of  Ca- 
nonicut,  and,  having  returned  a  broadside,  she  proceeded 
to  her  station  without  receiving  any  injury.  Shortly 
afterward  an  explosion  at  the  enemy's  batteries  was  ob 
served,  which  induced  the  belief  that  they  had  been 
abandoned,  as  they  were  subsequently  found  to  have  been. 
The  admiral  also  ordered  two  frigates,  the  Aimable  and 
the  Alcmene,  with  the  (prize)  tender  Stanley,  to  enter 
the  Eastern  Passage ;  where,  upon  their  approach,  the 
enemy  set  fire  to  their  frigate  the  Kingfisher,  to  the 
Lamb,  and  to  the  Spitfire,  cutting  the  latter  adrift  to  act 
as  a  fire-ship.  The  Comte  de  Grasse-Limermont  was  or 
dered  to  the  command  of  a  boat  to  tow  the  Spitfire  off, 
in  the  performance  of  which  duty  he  was  in  imminent 
danger  ;  for  the  vessel  blew  up  after  his  grapnel  was  fixed, 
but,  fortunately,  injured  neither  him  nor  his  crew.  A 
French  officer,  M.  de  Dorset,  sent  aboard  the  Kingfisher 
to  extinguish  the  flames,  had  also  a  marvellous  escape ; 
her  magazine  blew  up  after  he  and  his  men  were  upon 
her  deck,  but  without  killing  or  wounding  any  of  them.2 

M.  d'Estaing  was  anxious  to  take  possession  of  Canoni- 
cut  Island  and  to  capture  its  garrison,  which  he  could 
have  done  during  a  general  assault  by  landing  troops 
upon  the  west  side  and  forcing  a  passage  into  the  main 
channel  with  his  large  ships,  so  as  to  cut  off  communica 
tion  between  Canonicut  and  Rhode  Island  and  prevent 


1  Simms,  Correspondence  of  J.  Lauren?,  p.  211. 

2  Comte  d'Estaing' s  official  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  French  Navy, 
ubi  supra. 


448         OPERATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          [1778. 

General  Pigot  from  throwing  reinforcements  across.  But 
in  order  to  accomplish  this  end  before  the  combined  attack 
he  would  have  had  to  sustain  alone  the  attack  from  the 
enemy's  batteries  on  Rhode  Island,  because  it  was  found 
impracticable  to  anchor  his  ships  anywhere  out  of  the 
reach  of  their  deliberate  fire.  Therefore,  as  General  Sul 
livan  was  not  ready  to  make  the  combined  assault  upon 
all  the  enemy's  positions,  the  admiral  was  obliged  to  aban 
don  this  attempt  and  to  wait  until  the  American  troops 
should  be  in  readiness  to  co-operate  with  him ;  and  upon 
the  following  day,  the  31st,  he  discovered,  by  a  patrol  sent 
out  to  reconnoitre,  that  the  British  had  evacuated  Canon- 
icut  Island.  The  Sagittaire,  having  been  reinforced  by 
the  Fantasque,  sailed  to  the  north  of  Canonicut,  where 
the  British  immediately  destroyed  their  frigates  Orpheus, 
Lark,  and  Juno,  of  thirty-two  guns,  the  Cerberus,  of 
twenty-eight,  and  the  corvette  Falcon,  of  fourteen. 

In  the  mean  time,  the  negotiations  with  General  Sul 
livan  were  so  far  successful  that  the  American  com 
mander  decided  to  send  a  detachment  to  support  the 
French  landing-party  when  the  general  attack  should  be 
made,  and  to  give  the  command  of  it,  at  the  request  of 
M.  d'Estaing,  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette.  Of  this 
we  have  the  proof  in  La  Fayette's  letter  to  the  admiral, 
as  follows : l 

"  AT  THE  QUARTERS  OF  GENERAL  SULLIVAN, 
"the  8th  of  August,  1778. 

"  You  will  see,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  by  General  Sullivan's  letter, 
that,  in  consequence  of  the  one  which  he  has  received  from  you 
this  morning,  he  will  send  a  detachment  to  join  your  troops,  and 
he  intends  to  give  me  the  command  of  it.  As  agreeable  as  this 
hope  is  to  me,  I  had  entirely  abandoned  it,  and  I  had  relin 
quished  my  desire  to  obtain  a  personal  advantage  which  you  re 
gard  as  contrary  to  the  general  good.  But,  as  your  letter  had 
already  produced  the  proper  effect,  I  concluded  that  my  refusal 
now  would  merely  complicate  this  matter  and  that  I  might  appear 

1  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  sixieme  annee,  No.  3,  p.  416. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.        449 

to  disturb  the  general  plan  by  my  own  fancies.  I  have  simply 
replied  that  my  attachment  to  America,  and  my  still  greater 
affection  for  my  countrymen,  make  my  situation  a  delicate  one. 
It  has  been  decided  that  it  is  suitable  to  send  me  with  this  de 
tachment,  although  it  is  disproportionate  to  the  command  which 
I  should  have  had ;  and  I  have  accepted  it  because  I  thought  I 
ought  to  do  so  for  many  reasons,  of  which  I  trust  you  will  not 
disapprove. 

1  i  We  shall  not  have  as  many  men,  by  far,  as  it  was  hoped  we 
should.  I  have  suspected  this,  and  it  renders  our  operation  in 
complete  because  the  plan  was  drawn  up  before  the  arrival  of  the 
troops.  General  Sullivan  had  to  recruit  an  army  ;  and  what  an 
army,  if  we  except  the  Continental  troops  !  You  must  expect 
to  see  some  curious  figures,  and  mine  at  the  head  of  them.  I 
shall  be  mortified,  not  if  these  gentlemen  are  not  well  trimmed, 
for  they  have  had  neither  the  time  nor  the  means  for  that,  but 
if  they  do  not  fight  as  well  as  one  can  expect  at  least  from  raw 
troops. 

"It  is  reported,  Monsieur  le  Cointe,  that  I  am  to  join  you  to 
morrow  afternoon,  when  the  enemy  will  have  an  opportunity  to 
see  us  at  their  ease  ;  Monday  appears  to  be  the  day  set  for  the 
attack,  if  all  u  ready.  That  on  the  west  will  succeed  certainly, 
and  the  reason  is  easy  to  imagine ;  my  detachment,  animated  by 
the  example,  will  follow,  will  show  itself,  will  fire,  and  that  will 
accomplish  something.  Our  junction  with  General  Sullivan  can 
not  be  deferred  very  long  ;  for,  once  we  are  upon  the  island,  the 
two  divisions  will  be  forced  to  advance,  and  that  will  be  the 
means  of  uniting  us.  1  do  not  think  you  will  have  reason  to  fear 
what  you  have  slightly  touched  upon  in  your  letter. 

"Send  me  word,  Monsieur  le  Cointe,  if  you  consider  it  indis 
pensably  necessary  for  me  to  stay  here  ;  for,  in  that  event,  my 
desire  to  follow  your  views  will  weigh  with  me  beyond  every 
other  consideration.  But,  if  you  will  do  me  the  honor  to  admit 
my  opinion,  I  dare  to  say  that  a  new  arrangement  under  present 
circumstances  would  be  likely  to  produce  a  bad  effect ;  and  it  is 
that  which  has  kept  me  silent  in  this  matter. 

"Adieu,  Monsieur  le  Comte  ;  I  am  obliged  to  end  my  letter, 
and  I  postpone  until  to-morrow  the  pleasure  of  a  longer  conver 
sation,  only  assuring  you  at  this  time  of  my  devoted  and  sincere 
attachment." 

It  is  evident  that,  while  the  Comte  d'Estaing  had  ac 
ceded  to  La  Fayette's  intense  desire  to  command  the  de- 

VOL.  I.— liU 


450         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          [1778. 

tachment  of  French  troops,  and  while  he  had  gone  so  far 
as  to  request  this  favor  from  General  Sullivan  in  behalf 
of  his  young  relative  and  friend,  his  own  mature  judg 
ment  in  similar  matters  had  led  him  to  caution  La  Fay- 
ette  not  to  press  his  demand  too  strongly,  but  rather  to 
accept  the  decision  of  General  Sullivan  even  at  the  cost  of 
personal  sacrifice,  if  that  should  be  necessary,  in  order  to 
aid  the  plans  of  co-operation  by  every  means  in  his  power, 
and  to  contribute  toward  the  success  of  the  undertaking. 
It  is  to  this  that  La  Fayette  referred  in  his  letter  when 
he  announced  to  the  admiral  that  he  had  been  offered  the 
command  and  had  accepted  it,  with  the  hope  that  his 
action  would  receive  M.  d'Estaing's  approval.  Undoubt 
edly  the  position  of  La  Fayette  was  an  exceedingly  deli 
cate  one,  in  which  nothing  but  the  greatest  caution  could 
preserve  him  from  criticism  or  from  the  jealousy  of  other 
officers,  aroused  by  the  suspicion  that  his  request  for  a 
particular  command  was  an  attempt  upon  his  part  to  as 
sume  a  more  prominent  share  in  the  expedition  than  he 
was  entitled  to.  His  active  spirit  and  his  enthusiasm  for 
the  glory  of  France  made  it  all  the  more  difficult  for 
him ;  and,  indeed,  he  did  not  escape  from  creating  the 
very  irritation  which  the  more  experienced  eye  of  the 
French  admiral  had  foreseen. 

The  delay,  and  the  more  or  less  unimportant  differ 
ences  of  opinion  between  the  French  and  the  American 
commanders  as  to  the  plan  of  landing  the  troops,  had 
produced  a  slight  tension  between  the  allies,  which,  of 
course,  was  not  apparent  in  the  friendly  relations  that 
were  constantly  maintained,  but  which  nevertheless  caused 
each  side  to  watch  the  movements  and  the  purposes  of 
the  other  with  somewhat  closer  scrutiny.  It  was  ex 
pected  at  first  that  the  Comte  d'Estaing  would  take  com 
mand  himself  of  the  French  troops  that  were  to  land  ;  and 
this  appears  to  have  been  his  intention,  if  the  American 
general  had  consented  to  detach  one  wing  of  his  army 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         451 

to  act  with  him,  or,  at  all  events,  a  force  large  enough 
to  make  up  a  command  suitable  to  the  dignity  of  a  lieu 
tenant-general  and  an  admiral  of  France.  When  it  was 
decided,  however,  to  send  him  merely  a  detachment  of  a 
thousand  men,  because  the  strength  of  General  Sullivan's 
army  would  not  permit  him  to  dispose  in  that  manner  of 
a  greater  force,  the  admiral  acquiesced  in  this  decision, 
but  asked  that  La  Fayette  should  have  the  command. 
He  objected  also,  as  we  have  seen  from  the  correspond 
ence  with  La  Fayette,  to  the  plan  proposed  by  General 
Sullivan,  that  the  landing  should  be  made  at  a  single 
point,  which  was  upon  the  east  side  of  the  island,  by  the 
American  forces  first,  under  cover  of  the  fire  of  the  French 
ships,  and  that  when  their  descent  had  been  effected  the 
French  troops  should  disembark  and  form  a  junction  with 
them. 

We  happen  to  have  evidence  of  the  feeling  toward  both 
La  Fayette  and  the  Comte  d'Estaing  in  the  American 
camp  at  that  time,  in  a  valuable  letter  of  Colonel  John 
Laurens,  written  to  his  father,  the  President  of  Congress, 
on  the  22d  of  August,1  in  which  he  recounted  the  inci 
dent  whilst  it  was  still  fresh  in  his  mind,  as  follows : 

"  According  to  the  first  plan  proposed  by  General  Sullivan,  the 
American  forces  were  to  land  on  the  east  side  of  Rhode  Island 
under  cover  of  the  fire  of  three  frigates  stationed  in  the  eastern 
channel  for  that  purpose.  A  signal  was  to  be  given  immediately 
as  our  boats  should  begin  to  cross,  and  another  when  the  descent 
should  be  eifected.  Upon  the  latter,  the  French  troops  were  to 
disembark  on  the  east  side  of  the  island,  and  a  junction  was  to  be 
formed  as  speedily  as  possible  ;  but  the  ambition  of  an  individual 
and  national  pride  discovered  insuperable  obstacles  to  this  disposi 
tion.  The  Marquis  de  Lafayette  aspired  to  the  command  of  the 
French  troops  in  conjunction  with  the  flower  of  Gen1  Sullivan's 
army.  In  a  visit  which  he  had  paid  to  the  fleet,  he  prevailed 
upon  the  Count  D'Estaing  to  write  upon  this  subject.  The  count 

1  The  Army  Correspondence  of  Colonel  John  Laurens  in  the  Years  1777-8, 
"SVm.  (jilmore  Simrns,  New  York,  1867,  p.  217. 


452         OPERATIONS   OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

intimated  in  his  letter  a  desire  that  some  good  American  troops 
shd  be  annexed  to  the  French,  adding  that  if  the  command  of  them 
were  given  to  M.  de  Lafayette  it  wd  be  a  means  of  facilitating 
the  junction  between  the  troops  of  the  two  nations,  as  he  was 
acquainted  with  the  service  of  both,  and  that  in  case  any  naval 
operations  shd  require  his  (the  count's)  return  on  board  the  squad 
ron,  the  Marquis  wd  naturally  take  the  command  in  his  absence, 
which  wd  prevent  many  difficulties  that  wd  arise  on  that  account. 
The  Marquis  strenuously  contended  that  a  considerable  detach 
ment  of  select  troops  ought  to  be  annexed  to  the  French.  The 
pride  of  his  nation  would  never  suffer  the  present  disposition  to 
take  place,  as  by  it  the  French  battalions  wd  land  under  cover  of 
the  American  fire,  and  play  a  humiliating  secondary  part. 

"The  arguments  against  gratifying  him  in  his  request  were 
these  :  General  Sullivan's  army  contained  a  very  small  proportion 
of  regular  troops  ;  it  was  necessary  that  a  main  body  capable  of 
resisting  the  enemy's  force  should  exist,  as  a  contrary  conduct  wd 
expose  either  division  to  a  total  defeat  or  a  vigorous  attack  from 
the  enemy.  The  Marquis,  however,  seemed  much  dissatisfied, 
and  his  private  views  withdrew  his  attention  wholly  from  the 
general  interest. 

"On  the  8th  General  Sullivan  received  a  letter  from  the  Ad 
miral,  in  which  he  says  that  the  disposition  for  disembarking  is 
militarily  impossible.  That  the  American  generals  were  now  for 
the  first  time  furnished  with  an  opportunity  of  discovering  the 
value  which  they  set  on  the  French  alliance,  by  the  number  and 
composition  of  the  troops  which  they  wd  annex  to  the  French. 
It  was  not  for  him  to  point  out  the  number,  but  he  wd  gladly  have 
it  in  his  power  to  give  an  account  both  to  the  Congress  and  his 
King  of  the  American  detachm1  which  should  be  sent  to  him. 
In  consequence  of  this  letter,  it  was  determined  that  Jackson's 
regiment,  and  as  many  good  militia  as  in  the  whole  wd  amount  to 
1,000  men  shd  be  sent  under  the  command  of  the  Marquis." 

This  account  given  by  Colonel  Laurens  accords  with 
the  statement  of  the  details  as  they  are  presented  in  the 
correspondence  of  La  Fayette,  and  in  such  of  the  Comte 
d'Estaing's  papers  as  refer  to  them  ;  it  is  imhued,  however, 
with  a  certain  personal  feeling,  the  expression  of  which 
was,  no  doubt,  justifiable  from  the  strictly  confidential 
nature  of  a  communication  of  a  son  to  his  father  upon 
subjects  which  interested  them  both,  and  it  presents  a 


1778.]        OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          453 

bias  which  weakens  it  somewhat  as  to  the  conclusions 
we  should  draw  from  it  if  we  consider  it  in  the  strictest 
sense  an  historical  document.  Colonel  Laurens,  to  whom 
La  Fayette  referred  in  the  most  generous  terms,1  appears 
not  to  have  had  a  strong  liking  for  La  Fayette,  of  whom 
he  wrote  with  a  touch  of  scorn  in  a  letter  upon  another 
subject,  as  we  shall  see  later ;  and  it  would  hardly  be  fair 
for  us,  with  the  cooler  judgment  of  to-day,  to  accept  with 
out  question  an  opinion  formed  amidst  the  storm  of  dis 
appointment  which  arose  after  the  failure  of  the  combined 
attack  upon  Newport,  in  which  this  young  officer  alludes 
to  "  the  ambition  of  an  individual  and  national  pride" 
in  a  manner  which  might  lead  an  incautious  observer  to 
regard  these  things  as  much  more  serious  obstacles  than 
they  were  in  fact.  Colonel  John  Laurens  was  one  of  the 
most  estimable  young  officers  of  the  Revolutionary  War : 
a  man  of  superior  cultivation,  of  sterling  patriotism,  and 
of  marked  personal  gallantry,  he  rendered  distinguished 
services  to  the  American  cause,  for  which,  to  the  grief  of 
the  army  and  of  the  nation,  he  laid  down  his  life.  His 
memory  must  always  be  held  in  honor  by  his  countrymen. 
At  the  period  of  which  we  are  now  treating,  however, 
he  was  but  twenty-one  or  twenty-two  years  of  age ;  and 
lie  thought  and  wrote  with  the  intense  feeling  of  youth. 
We  have  a  comprehensive  view  of  La  Fayette's  ambition 
to  command  the  French  troops,  in  his  own  letters  to  the 
admiral,  to  whom  he  freely  opened  his  heart  under  the 
circumstances  which  threw  him  into  contact,  in  a  foreign 
land,  with  his  compatriot  and  kinsman,  and  impelled  him 
to  a  confidence  that  was  absolute  in  matters  relating  to 
himself.  By  his  own  showing,  he  was  loyal  to  America 
throughout ;  there  was,  moreover,  nothing  inconsistent 
with  this  loyalty  in  his  ambition,  since  all  were  striving 
for  a  common  purpose  and  for  the  success  of  a  common 

1  La  Fayette's  letter  of  the  14th  of  July  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  supra. 


454          OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.        [1778. 

cause ;  and  when  he  had  been  warned  by  M.  d'Estaing 
that  his  wishes  might  arouse  opposition,  he  declared  that 
he  had  abandoned  them. 

He  shared  with  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  it  is  true,  the 
national  pride  which  demanded  that,  in  any  combined 
operation  which  might  be  undertaken,  the  French  troops 
should  have  a  post  similar  in  honor  and  equal  in  danger 
to  that  of  their  allies.  In  this  the  Comte  d'Estaing  was 
asking  nothing  more  than  the  courtesy  accorded  by  the 
usages  of  war  everywhere  in  the  civilized  world  in  his 
time.  He  could  not  otherwise  justify  himself  before  his 
country  and  his  King.  What  seemed  unmeaning  punc 
tilio  to  the  men  who  had  left  their  farms  and  workshops 
and  counting-houses  in  New  England  to  come  down  to 
fight  the  British  at  Newport  was  in  fact  but  the  working 
of  a  system  upon  which  standing  armies  were  trained  in 
European  countries,  and  upon  which  international  rela 
tions  were  supported,  a  system  which  had  grown  out  of 
the  custom  of  centuries  of  war  and  had  been  approved  by 
universal  consent.  The  Comte  d'Estaing  placed  himself 
and  his  forces  upon  an  exact  equality  with  the  American 
troops,  however  small  the  national  importance  of  the 
United  States  or  however  insignificant  their  army  in 
the  eyes  of  the  world  at  that  time,  and  he  considered 
himself  as  serving  under  the  orders  of  General  Sullivan, 
the  commander  of  the  expedition ;  this  was  a  duty  which 
he  owed  to  the  allies  of  his  King.  But  it  is  only  just,  in 
the  interest  of  a  true  understanding  of  historical  events, 
to  remember  that,  from  his  stand-point,  M.  d'Estaing  was 
making  a  concession  to  circumstances,  when  he  regarded 
the  formidable  armament  under  his  command,  with  the 
well-equipped  and  well-disciplined  soldiers  and  sailors  of 
France,  as  being,  in  a  military  sense,  upon  precisely  the 
same  level  with  a  few  thousand  Continentals  and  militia 
men,  many  of  whom  had  been  hastily  brought  from 
their  homes  whilst  he  was  lying  in  American  waters 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          455 

ready  to  fight,  and  when  he  subordinated  his  thirty 
years  of  experience  as  a  soldier  to  the  leadership  of  a 
New  Hampshire  lawyer  whom  accident  had  at  that  mo 
ment  placed  at  their  head.  It  will  be  well  to  remember 
this  side  of  the  case  in  considering  the  angry  discussion 
which  followed,  and  to  reflect  that  there  were  probably 
real  causes  of  grievance  between  these  two  sets  of  people, 
so  different  in  their  customs  and  their  understanding,  or 
conventional  grievances,  which  appeared  equally  serious 
with  real  ones,  upon  both  sides. 

Finally,  after  much  negotiation  between  the  Comte 
d'Estaing  and  General  Sullivan,  during  which  La  Fay- 
ette  had  gone  incessantly  from  the  shore  to  the  Lan- 
guedoc  and  from  the  Languedoc  back  to  the  camp,  the 
tedious  delay  was  overcome ;  and  on  the  8th  of  August 
everything  was  ready.  The  moment  for  the  attack  was 
definitively  fixed  and  understood  by  General  Sullivan 
for  the  morning  of  the  10th. 

La  Fayette  gave  an  interesting  account  of  the  troops  and 
the  preparations  in  a  letter  to  M.  d'Estaing,  as  follows : l 

u  I  have  just  seen  a  colonel  of  artillery  who  is  ordered  to  send 
us  some  cannon  of  respectable  calibre.  General  Greene,  the 
Quartermaster-General,  and  also  Major-General,  is  superintend 
ing  the  collection  of  the  boats,  and  I  think  he  will  ultimately 
command  the  militia  of  Providence,  his  native  place.  It  seems 
to  me  that  they  are  raising  a  great  number  of  this  kind  of  troops  ; 
those  of  New  England  have  the  reputation  of  being  very  brave, 
and  I  have  no  doubt  of  it,  but  I  think  they  will  find  a  great  dif 
ference  between  the  kind  of  war  they  have  been  making  up  to 
this  time  and  that  which  awaits  them  at  the  attack  upon  Khode 
Island.  Anything  that  requires  rapid  movement  does  not  suit 
them  at  all,  and  surely  General  Sullivan  understands  them  too 
well  not  to  make  use  of  them  in  the  manner  to  which  they  are 
best  adapted.  I  am  very  glad  to  see  him  in  command  here,  be 
cause  he  is  brave  and  enterprising." 

1  From  Norwich,  30th  July,  1778  :  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  sixieme 
anne"e,  No.  3,  p.  411. 


456         OPEKATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

OPEKATIONS     OF     THE     ALLIED     FOKCES    AT    NEWPORT. — 

(Continued.) 

THE  Comte  d'Estaing  had  prepared  his  landing-party, 
which  he  divided  into  four  battalions  of  five  hundred  men 
each,  composed  of  sailors  and  marines,  besides  the  French 
infantry  which  he  had  on  his  ships,  who  made  up  the 
whole  number  to  about  three  thousand  men.  The  sailors 
were  armed  with  muskets  such  as  were  carried  on  ship 
board,  which  for  this  occasion  were  provided  with  bayo 
nets  made  of  the  blades  of  cutlasses  from  which  the  hilts 
had  been  removed ;  these  were  inserted  between  the  ends 
of  the  barrels  and  the  wood  and  secured  by  a  strong  wrap 
ping  of  tarred  rope.1  Everything  being  in  readiness, 
then,  for  the  execution  of  the  combined  attack,  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  was  to  be  made  simultaneously  from 
Tiverton,  on  the  east  side,  by  the  American  troops,  and 
from  Canonicut,  on  the  west  side,  by  the  French  with  the 
detachment  of  Americans  sent  to  join  them,  under  the 
command  of  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  the  Comte  d'Es 
taing  entered  the  main  channel  on  the  8th  of  August. 
With  eight  of  his  ships  of  the  line  he  ran  by  the  bat 
teries  on  Rhode  Island,  which  immediately  opened  a  heavy 
fire  upon  him,  to  the  position  he  had  selected  at  the 
northern  part  of  the  channel,  whence  he  intended  to  send 
his  men  ashore  upon  Canonicut  to  form  for  the  attack 
and  to  unite  there  with  the  American  detachment.  He 
executed  this  manoeuvre  with  admirable  skill  and  with 

1  Journal  de  Campagne  du  Marseillais :    Doniol,  La   Participation  de  la 
France,  iii.  341. 


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1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         457 

entire  success :  so  that  on  the  night  of  Saturday,  the 
8th,  he  was  in  readiness  for  the  general  action  on  the 
following  Monday  morning.  He  was  strictly  carrying 
out  the  plan,  upon  his  part,  as  it  had  been  defined  by  the 
American  commander. 

On  Sunday  morning  he  began  at  seven  o'clock  to  dis 
embark  his  troops ;  and,  with  some  dozen  or  fifteen 
flat-boats  which  had  been  sent  to  him  for  the  purpose,  in 
connection  with  the  boats  carried  by  his  vessels,  he  was 
occupied  nearly  all  the  morning  in  transporting  his  men 
and  his  artillery  to  Canonicut.  As  soon  as  they  arrived 
ashore  they  were  drawn  up  in  order  and  drilled,  so  as  to 
accustom  them  somewhat  to  their  footing  upon  land,  which 
they  had  not  stepped  upon  then  for  nearly  four  months. 
At  eleven  o'clock  in  the  morning,  whilst  this  work  was  in 
progress,  and  at  the  moment  when  M.  d'Estaing  himself 
was  about  to  go  ashore  upon  Canonicut,  an  aide-de-camp 
arrived  from  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette,  to  announce 
that  General  Sullivan  had  not  waited  for  the  appointed 
time,  but,  as  he  saw  that  the  British  had  withdrawn  their 
troops  from  the  fortifications  at  the  northern  end  of  the 
island  when  the  French  vessels  were  coming  up  the 
channel,  he  had  hastened  to  cross  over  to  take  advantage 
of  the  position  they  had  abandoned ;  that  he  was  now 
upon  Rhode  Island  with  between  two  thousand  and  three 
thousand  men,  but  that,  as  he  had  no  artillery  and  was 
without  a  considerable  part  of  his  munitions  of  war,  he 
desired  the  assistance  of  the  admiral. 

This  news  struck  the  Comte  d'Estaing  with  amaze 
ment.  That  General  Sullivan  had  deliberately  broken  his 
agreement,  without  previously  notifying  him,  and  without 
consulting  with  him  as  to  the  possible  necessity  of  a 
change  of  policy,  was,  in  his  eyes,  an  act  of  discourtesy 
which  nothing  could  explain.  It  aroused  a  storm  of 
anger  among  the  officers  and  men  of  the  French  fleet, 
who  protested  loudly,  upon  every  side,  that  they  had 


458         OPERATIONS   OF   THE   ALLIES   AT   NEWPORT.         [1778. 

been  unfairly  treated,  and  that  the  dignity  of  France  had 
been  insulted  by  conduct  which  was  unjustifiable  and 
intolerable.  As  another  unfortunate  step  in  this  ill- 
starred  expedition,  this  event  destroyed  at  once  the  cor 
dial  relations  which  had  subsisted  between  the  allies  at 
the  outset ;  it  made  a  serious  breach  in  the  confidence 
with  which  each  side  regarded  the  other,  and,  without 
doubt,  it  had  an  important  bearing  upon  the  subse 
quent  actions  of  the  French  commander.  The  French 
men  began  to  look  with  suspicion  upon  their  English- 
speaking  friends,  as  wilful,  careless,  and  unreliable.  The 
Americans  considered  the  French  officers  as  over-sensi 
tive,  excitable,  and  absurdly  tenacious  of  their  scruples 
about  things  that  were  of  no  consequence.  The  ready 
pen  of  Colonel  John  Laurens  was  employed  to  inform 
the  President  of  Congress  that l  "  this  measure  gave  much 
umbrage  to  the  French  officers.  They  conceived  their 
troops  injured  by  our  landing  first,  and  talked  like 
women  disputing  precedence  in  a  country-dance,  instead 
of  men  engaged  in  pursuing  the  common  interest  of  two 
great  nations." 

The  question  has  frequently  been  discussed  by  the  his 
torians  of  this  campaign,  with  varying  degrees  of  censure 
upon  the  French  admiral,  and  an  historian  of  our  own 
day  has  expressed  the  opinion  that  "  D'Estaing  was  un 
reasonably  offended  at  not  being  previously  consulted. 
He  was  unduly  sensitive  and  punctilious,"  which  he  sup 
ports  by  the  perfectly  true  statement  that  "  the  war  was 
an  American  war  in  America,"  plainly  suggesting  the  in 
ference,  which  is  not  true,  that  therefore  the  Americans 
might  do  as  they  pleased.2 

The  fact  is,  however,  that,  under  the  circumstances  of 
his  presence  in  America  as  the  commander  of  the  King's 
fleet,  by  reason  of  his  cordial  support  of  the  American 

1  Simms,  Correspondence  of  John  Laurens,  p.  220. 

2  Amory's  Life  of  Sullivan,  p.  74. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS   OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          459 

cause  and  his  constantly  expressed  wish  to  further  the 
interests  of  the  United  States,  as  well  as  by  the  dignity 
of  his  own  rank  and  the  prestige  of  the  forces  which  he 
led,  the  Comte  d'Estaing  was  entitled  to  be  treated  upon 
all  occasions  with  the  highest  consideration. 

The  action  of  General  Sullivan,  although  insignificant 
as  to  its  practical  results  one  way  or  the  other,  was  a 
breach  of  professional  courtesy.  Considered  in  the  ab 
stract,  it  was  a  grave  personal  offence.  M.  d'Estaing  had 
waited  patiently  for  General  Sullivan,  under  circumstances 
which  were  distressing  in  the  extreme  both  to  himself  and 
to  all  the  men  of  his  fleet,  until  the  American  forces  should 
be  ready  to  act.  He  asked  for  no  especial  credit  for  this, 
because  he  looked  upon  it  as  one  of  the  uncontrollable  in 
cidents  of  war ;  but  he  believed  that  in  return  his  services 
would  be  recognized,  and  that  proper  respect  would  be 
shown  to  him  personally. 

After  all,  the  most  serious  result  of  this  incident,  and 
one  which  appears  to  have  been  lost  sight  of  by  most 
writers  upon  the  subject,  was  the  belief  in  the  mind  not 
only  of  the  Comte  d'Estaing  but  of  every  Frenchman 
in  the  fleet,  that  General  Sullivan  was  jealous  of  the 
French  prestige,  that  he  was  anxious  to  reap  the  glory 
of  the  action  at  Newport  for  himself,  and  that,  in  order 
to  make  it  appear  like  an  American  victory  with  the 
French  acting  a  secondary  part,  he  had  taken  an  unfair 
advantage  of  them  and  had  secretly  made  a  landing  upon 
Rhode  Island  before  they  knew  that  a  movement  was 
contemplated. 

We  have  no  reason  to-day  to  believe  that  this  is  true 
of  General  Sullivan,  or  that  his  intentions  were  other 
than  entirely  honorable.  But  the  movement  he  made  was 
unnecessary  at  that  moment,  and  the  position  he  gained 
by  it  was  absolutely  without  military  importance.  The 
British  general  abandoned  the  redoubts  at  the  northern 
end  of  the  island  because  they  were  capable  of  protecting 


460         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

only  a  very  small  force,  and  from  their  isolated  position 
they  could  not  have  been  held  by  him  after  the  French 
fleet  came  into  the  channel  and  the  Americans  were  pre 
paring  to  land  from  Tiverton ;  the  only  advantage  thus 
gained  by  him  was  that  he  secured  this  small  number  of 
men  from  being  made  prisoners  of  war  by  calling  them 
in  to  Newport.  General  Sullivan  took  the  abandoned  re 
doubts,  which  the  British  did  not  want,  and  which  were  of 
so  little  consequence  that  they  had  not  even  been  taken 
serious  account  of  in  the  American  plan  of  attack.1  They 
neither  threatened  his  position,  nor  aided  him  in  his  plans 
after  he  had  taken  them ;  nor  was  there  the  least  danger 
that  the  enemy  would  return  to  them ;  for  all  that  Gen 
eral  Pigot  wished  was  to  withdraw  his  troops  from  them. 
And,  in  his  precipitate  haste  to  land  upon  Rhode  Island, 
General  Sullivan  had  left  his  artillery  behind ;  so  that  he 
could  not  have  defended  himself  if  he  had  been  attacked, 
and  he  was  forced  to  call  upon  the  fleet  for  protection. 
He  threw  himself  open  to  the  angry  imputation  of  the 
French  officers,  that  his  motive  was  not  a  fair  one ;  he 
fatally  injured  their  good  will  toward  himself  personally, 
and  he  weakened  appreciably  their  enthusiasm  for  the 
American  cause. 

M.  d'Estaing,  however,  did  not  permit  his  personal 
feelings  upon  that  occasion  to  influence  him  against  any 
measure  that  lay  within  the  strict  limits  of  his  duty  or 
that  was  likely  to  be  of  service  to  the  common  under 
taking.  He  gave  orders  immediately  that  the  troops 
already  landed  upon  Canonicut  should  be  transferred 
from  there  to  Rhode  Island,  to  join  General  Sullivan, 
and  he  detailed  two  of  his  ships,  the  Fantasque  and  the 

1  "The  troops  were  not  to  amuse  themselves  with  attacking  the  works  in 
the  northern  part  of  the  Island  ;  but  a  sufficient  detachment  was  to  be  left 
to  be  a  guard  upon  the  troops  posted  in  those  works,  while  the  main  body 
was  to  advance  rapidly  to  the  attack  of  the  fort  and  redoubts,  which  imme 
diately  environ  the  town  of  Newport." — Simms,  Correspondence  of  John 
Laurens,  p.  211. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         461 

Sagittaire,  to  protect  their  passage.1  But,  unfortunately, 
at  the  moment  when  measures  were  being  taken  to  carry 
out  this  order,  and  whilst  the  Fantasque  and  the  Sagit 
taire  were  getting  under  way,  the  fog  which  had  hung 
over  the  entrance  to  the  harbor  since  early  morning 
lifted,  and  the  lookout  at  the  mast-head  of  the  Languedoc 
reported  a  large  fleet  of  war- vessels  flying  the  British 
flag  a  short  distance  out  from  the  main  channel,  consist 
ing,  so  far  as  could  be  determined  with  the  glasses,  of 
twenty-six  vessels,  of  which  at  least  fourteen  were  ships 
of  the  line.  This  was  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Howe,  who 
had  left  New  York  on  the  6th  of  August,  upon  informa 
tion  given  by  the  British  spies  of  what  was  taking  place 
at  Newport,  and  who  had  come  out  to  aid  the  garrison. 

The  situation  of  M.  d'Estaing  under  this  sudden  change 
of  circumstances  was  extremely  embarrassing  both  to  him 
self  and  to  all  his  commanders.  His  ships  were  separated 
in  the  three  channels,  he  was  shut  in  the  harbor  where 
it  would  be  exceedingly  difficult  to  manoeuvre  with  his 
larger  vessels  in  case  of  attack,  and  a  considerable  part 
of  his  force  was  already  ashore.  He  decided  at  once  that 
he  must  re-embark  his  men  and  prepare  for  action  ;  and 
therefore  he  ordered  all  the  marines,  sailors,  and  infantry 
on  Canonicut  Island  to  return  to  their  ships.  He  called 
a  council  of  war  on  board  the  Languedoc,  which  was  at 
tended  by  all  the  captains  of  the  fleet ;  and  it  was  deter 
mined  that,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  winds  were  at  that 
season  almost  constantly  unfavorable  to  vessels  going  out, 
all  the  French  vessels  should  be  brought  as  closely  to 
gether  as  possible  during  the  night  in  order  to  present 
their  concentrated  force  in  the  event  of  attack.  This 
manoeuvre  was  carried  out  with  partial  success,  and  upon 
the  following  morning  some  of  the  French  ships  were  still 
working  their  way  to  the  positions  assigned  to  them,  when 

1  Journal  of  the  Comte  de  Cambis  aboard  the  Languedoc  ;  Archives  de  la 
Marine,  B4  147,  fol.  17  :  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  375. 


462         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.        [1778. 

the  wind,  which  had  been  variable  from  the  west-southwest 
to  northwest,  suddenly  changed  and  blew  freshly  from  the 
north-northeast;  whereupon  the  French  admiral  deter 
mined  to  stand  out  with  his  whole  fleet  and  give  battle  to 
Lord  Howe,  considering  that  to  fight,  even  under  a  dis 
advantage,  would  be  better  than  to  stay  there  at  anchor. 
He  sent  word  of  this  determination  to  General  Sullivan, 
with  the  promise  that  as  soon  as  he  should  have  disposed 
of  the  British  fleet  he  would  return  to  Newport  and  aid 
him  again  in  the  attack. 

At  half-past  seven  in  the  morning  of  the  10th  of  Au 
gust,  he  gave  orders  to  the  fleet  to  clear  the  decks  for  ac 
tion  ;  and  at  half-past  eight,  to  get  under  way.  Under  a 
heavy  cannonade  from  the  batteries  upon  Rhode  Island, 
which  were  found  now  to  be  stronger  and  much  better 
served  than  when  he  had  entered,  he  ran  by  them  a 
second  time,  and  succeeded  in  clearing  all  his  ships  with 
out  serious  damage,  although  they  received  here  and 
there  a  shot,  and  without  losing  a  man  on  the  flag-ship. 
At  half-past  ten  they  had  passed  the  last  English  battery 
and  stood  out  to  sea,  having  left  as  a  protection  to  General 
Sullivan  three  frigates,  besides  the  Stanley  (prize)  in  the 
East  Channel  and  the  galley  Dauphin  in  the  West  Chan 
nel.  Upon  his  approach,  the  British  fleet  cut  their 
cables  and  stood  out  under  full  sail,  leaving  behind  many 
of  their  ships'  boats,  which,  in  their  haste  to  get  away, 
they  had  not  stopped  to  pick  up.1  All  this  took  place,  as 
La  Fayette  said,  in  describing  it,2  "  in  the  most  beautiful 
weather  in  the  world,  and  in  sight  of  both  the  English  and 
the  American  armies.  I  never  was  so  happy  as  upon  that 
day."  And  indeed  it  seemed  as  if  the  Comte  d'Estaing 
had  found  at  last  the  opportunity  he  so  ardently  sought, 
of  measuring  his  strength  with  the  British  and  of  per- 

1  M.  de  Cambis,  on  the  Languedoc,  ubi  supra. 

2  Letter  to  the  Due  d'Ayen,  llth  September,  1778 :   Correspondance  de 
La  Fayette,  i.  214. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          463 

forming  a  brilliant  action  for  the  glory  of  France  and  for 
the  cause  of  Independence  in  America. 

Lord  Howe's  fleet,  which  was  found  to  consist  of  thirty- 
six  sail,  of  which  nine  or  ten  appeared  to  be  smaller 
vessels,  probably  the  transports  upon  which  he  was  con 
voying  some  four  thousand  troops  to  reinforce  the  garri 
son  at  Newport,  continued  its  course  under  full  press  of 
canvas,  in  the  direction  of  New  York,  with  the  French 
fleet  pursuing,  throughout  that  day  and  the  ensuing  night ; 
and  upon  the  next  day  it  became  evident  that  the  Comte 
d'Estaing  was  gaining  the  advantage  of  position,  whilst  at 
the  same  time  he  was  overtaking  the  enemy.  About  four 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  he  gave  orders  for  a  general  attack, 
which  Admiral  Howe,  who  perceived  that  he  could  no 
longer  escape  it,  was  now  preparing  for,  when  suddenly 
the  sea  became  rough  and  a  gale  arose  of  almost  unex 
ampled  fury,  which  concealed  the  two  fleets  from  each 
other  in  the  darkness  that  accompanied  it,  separated  them 
from  each  other,  and  beat  upon  them  all  night  with  such 
violence  that  it  left  them  crippled  and  torn  when  daylight 
came,  so  that  neither  admiral  could  think  of  beginning 
the  combat,  but  each,  occupied  entirely  with  the  welfare 
of  his  own  fleet,  took  the  best  course  possible  to  bring  his 
ships  with  safety  into  port.  During  the  course  of  the 
night  the  French  admiral's  ship,  the  Languedoc,  had  lost 
all  her  masts,  and  finally  her  rudder  gave  way,  which  left 
her  tossing  helplessly  about  upon  the  sea ;  the  ship  of  the 
line  Cesar  was  entirely  lost  to  sight,  the  Marseillais  had 
lost  two  of  her  masts,  and  all  had  suffered  to  a  greater  or 
less  degree,  until  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  almost  in  despair 
at  the  misfortunes  which  pursued  him  everywhere  and  now 
threatened  to  overwhelm  him,  compared  himself  to  a  man 
who  had  had  both  arms  and  both  legs  cut  off  at  once.1 
Whilst  the  Languedoc  was  drifting  without  sail  or  rudder, 

1  The  Comte  d'Estuing's  official  Report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  French 
Navy,  ubi  supra. 


464         OPERATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

she  fell  into  the  course  of  a  British  frigate,  the  Renown, 
which  immediately  attacked  her,  bringing  its  guns  to  bear 
upon  her  at  the  stern  and  maintaining  its  position  in  such 
a  manner  that,  whilst  the  flag-ship's  guns  were  for  the 
most  part  unavailable,  the  British  shot  entered  at  the 
stern  and  swept  her  gun-deck  from  end  to  end.  Nothing 
could  have  saved  the  ship  from  capture  if  the  British 
captain  had  continued  the  action,  for,  as  M.  d'Estaing  said, 
there  "  would  soon  have  been  little  left  on  board  to  destroy 
except  the  officers  and  men ;"  but,  for  some  unexplained 
reason,  the  Renown  hauled  off  after  having  fired  three 
volleys,  and  continued  her  course. 

The  Marseillais,  ship  of  the  line,  was  similarly  engaged 
with  a  British  ship  of  fifty  guns,  the  Preston,  from  which 
she  sustained  a  warm  attack,  crippled  as  she  was,  but 
managed  to  disengage  herself  after  a  gallant  defence. 

Finally,  on  the  17th  of  August,  the  admiral  collected 
his  ships,  and,  placing  the  Languedoc,  upon  which  he  still 
remained,  in  tow  of  one  of  the  others,  he  prepared  for  the 
return  to  Newport  according  to  his  promise  made  to  Gen 
eral  Sullivan.  To  this  proposal  his  officers  were  almost 
unanimously  opposed ;  and  upon  being  called  to  a  council 
they  insisted  that  it  was  now  the  admiral's  duty,  in  view 
of  the  condition  of  the  fleet  and  under  the  provisions  of 
his  instructions,  to  sail  at  once  for  Boston,  where  the  ships 
might  be  repaired.  M.  d'Estaing  overruled  them,  how 
ever,  to  this  extent,  at  least,  although  their  contention 
showed  something  of  the  bitterness  which  no  doubt  arose 
from  their  jealousy  of  him  personally,  that  he  obliged 
them  to  return  to  Newport  first,  promising  them  that  he 
would  then  conduct  the  fleet  to  Boston.  "  All  the  opin 
ions,  very  many  arguments,  and  the  dictates  of  reason 
itself,"  he  said,  "  urged  me  to  steer  directly  for  that  port 
[Boston]  ;  it  was  the  rendezvous  established  in  my  sealed 
orders.  But  my  duty  before  all  else  was,  to  prove  to  the 
new  allies  of  His  Majesty  that  we  were  ready  to  sacrifice 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         465 

everything  in  order  to  keep  a  promise  that  we  had  once 
made.  Our  need  of  water,  and  the  uncertainty  as  to  what 
might  happen,  could  not  release  us  from  a  fixed  engage 
ment,  and  I  felt  that  I  must  inform  General  Sullivan  and 
assist  him,  by  the  presence  of  the  fleet,  either  to  conquer 
or  to  retreat.  And  so  we  came  to  anchor,  without  further 
accident,  before  Rhode  Island."1  Credit  was  not  given 
to  the  Comte  d'Estaing,  at  that  day,  for  this  determination 
to  keep  his  word  ;  nor  has  it  generally  been  remembered 
to  his  honor  by  the  writers  who  have  treated  the  subject 
in  later  times.  Men  were  blinded  by  disappointment  and 
angered  by  the  loss  of  an  opportunity  upon  which  such 
promising  hopes  had  rested  ;  and,  in  their  outbursts  of 
passion,  they  threw  upon  him  the  burden  of  responsibility 
for  all  their  ills.  However  willing  he  might  have  been  to 
resume  the  plan  of  attack  upon  Newport  where  he  had  left 
it  ten  days  before,  there  were  two  considerations  which  ma 
terially  changed  his  attitude  now  and  induced  him  to  pur 
sue  the  course  he  did :  one  was  his  greatly  weakened  con 
dition,  and  the  other  was  the  fear  that  the  fleet  of  Admiral 
Byron,  which  he  knew  had  left  England,  might  appear 
at  any  moment,  either  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  Lord 
Howe,  and  hold  him  at  its  mercy.  "  The  same  operation 
which  came  near  being  disastrous  to  us,"  he  said,  "  when 
we  had  our  full  strength,  would  have  been  all  the  more 
imprudent  to  undertake  now,  because  two  vessels  reported 
having  chased  some  ships  of  the  enemy  which  from  their 
armament  were  seen  to  be  certainly  a  part  of  the  squad 
ron  commanded  by  Admiral  Byron.  Besides,  in  order  to 
hope  for  success,  we  should  have  had  to  disarm  the  fleet, 
which,  if  it  had  been  blockaded  or  set  fire  to,  between 
positions  held  by  the  enemy,  would  inevitably  have  been 
lost ;  and  it  would  have  been  uselessly  sacrificed." 

1  Official  Report  of  the  Comte  d'Estaing  to  the  Secretary  of  the  French 

Navy,  ubi  supra. 
3  Ibid. 

VOL.  I.— 30 


466         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.        [1778. 

Having  thus  decided,  M.  d'Estaing  despatched  one  of 
the  officers  of  his  flag-ship,  the  Comte  de  Cambis,  aboard 
the  Senegal,  an  English  prize  taken  during  the  pursuit  of 
Lord  Howe,  to  inform  General  Sullivan  that  he  was  at  the 
entrance  to  the  channel  at  Newport,  but  that  he  did  not 
intend  now  to  go  in.  M.  de  Cambis  made  all  haste  to 
carry  this  message  from  the  admiral ;  and,  having  landed 
at  Point  Judith,  he  met  several  American  officers  anxiously 
waiting  there  for  news  of  the  fleet.  The  storm  which  had 
raged  upon  the  ocean  had  also  fallen  with  exceeding  vio 
lence  upon  the  country  about  Newport ;  the  heavy  rain 
had  drenched  the  troops,  whose  tents  were  quickly  blown 
down,  and  they  had  suffered  greatly  from  exposure  to 
which  most  of  them  were  not  accustomed.  Everybody 
was  alarmed  for  the  welfare  of  the  fleet,  which  it  was 
known  must  have  been  in  peril,  and  General  Sullivan  had 
placed  lookouts  along  the  coast  to  bring  him  any  tidings 
of  it  that  they  might  be  able  to  obtain.  It  was  one  of 
these  parties  that  M.  de  Cambis  fell  in  with ;  and,  in 
reply  to  his  questions,  he  learned  that  General  Sullivan 
was  still  upon  Rhode  Island.  M.  de  Cambis  wrote  a  letter 
to  him,  in  accordance  with  his  instructions,  which  he  sent 
by  one  of  the  American  officers,  in  which  he  announced 
to  him  "that  the  Comte  d'Estaing  had  sent  to  inform 
him  that  the  French  fleet  had  returned  to  Rhode  Island, 
in  compliance  with  the  promise  which  he  had  made,  but 
that  the  total  dismasting  of  two  of  his  principal  ships  by 
a  gale  which  had  come  upon  him  whilst  he  was  pursuing 
the  English  obliged  M.  d'Estaing  to  go  into  port  for  a 
short  time  in  order  to  make  repairs  and  to  put  himself  in 
condition  to  carry  on  the  operations  against  the  common 
enemy ;  that  therefore  the  fleet  would  not  come  nearer  to 
Rhode  Island,  because  M.  d'Estaing  feared  that  if  he  did 
so  he  should  not  be  able  in  the  crippled  condition  of  his 
vessels  to  come  up  sufficiently  to  the  prevailing  southwest 
winds  to  sail  around  Nantucket ;  and  he  begged  His  Ex- 


1778.]         OPERATIONS   OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          467 

cellency  General  Sullivan  to  send  notice  to  the  French 
corvette  and  the  three  frigates  which  were  in  the  Eastern 
Passage,  of  his  departure  for  Boston,  with  the  request  that 
they  should  join  him  there  immediately." 

Nothing  could  exceed  the  disappointment  and  discon 
tent  with  which  this  communication  was  received  in  the 
American  camp.  General  Sullivan  had  not  made  material 
progress  during  the  absence  of  the  fleet,  it  is  true,  but  he 
had  at  least  been  able  to  hold  his  own.  The  situation  of 
the  army  was  critical  now,  and,  whilst  he  felt  certain  of 
carrying  the  works  before  Newport  if  he  had  the  assist 
ance  of  the  allies,  there  was  little  hope  of  his  success  if  he 
should  be  left  to  fight  single-handed.  The  departure  of  the 
fleet  at  that  moment  seemed  to  the  Americans  unreasonable 
and  unjust ;  it  aroused  a  tumult  of  feeling,  in  the  midst  of 
which  many  passionate  things  were  said  and  many  acts 
committed  upon  our  side  in  which  we  were  not  always 
reasonable  or  always  just ;  and,  for  the  time,  the  sense  of 
loss  to  ourselves,  of  threatened  defeat,  of  mortification  be 
fore  the  eyes  of  the  expectant  country,  evoked  the  dormant 
race  feeling  which  all  had  hoped  was  forgotten.  It  was  an 
instant  of  very  serious  danger  for  America.  The  loss  of 
Newport  was  a  subject  to  be  treated  in  cooler  moments  as 
totally  insignificant,  compared  with  that  which  we  should 
have  sustained  in  the  rupture  of  our  alliance  with  France  ; 
for  the  Revolution  was  not  nearly  accomplished  in  that 
summer  of  1778,  and  we  still  stood  greatly  in  need  of  the 
countenance  and  support  of  the  French  nation  which  we 
received,  to  our  advantage  and  with  gratitude,  afterward. 
Fortunately,  there  were  wiser  counsels,  which  ultimately 
prevailed  and  counteracted  the  heedless  and  somewhat 
petulant  conduct  of  those  who,  under  the  stress  of  cir 
cumstances,  were  unable  to  see  beyond  the  limit  of  the 
then  present  time.  The  Comte  de  Cambis  brought  with 

1  Journal  of  the  Comte  de  Cainbis  aboard  the  Languedoe,  ubi  supra. 


468         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

him  a  letter  for  General  Sullivan,  written  on  the  Langue- 
doc  by  M.  d'Estaing  on  the  21st  of  August,  as  follows : l 

"Our  cables  were  cut,  and  the  fire  of  the  batteries,  which  we 
were  about  to  pass  to  attack  the  enemy's  squadron,  had  com 
menced,  when  I  received  the  letter,  which  you  did  me  the  honor 
to  write  on  the  9th  instant.  It  was  not  then  possible  for  me  to 
answer  it  otherwise  than  by  pursuing  the  English  fleet  and  pre 
venting  it  from  landing  any  succors.  The  Count  de  Cainbis  has 
been  charged  to  acquaint  you  with  my  present  situation,  and  of 
the  necessity  which  compels  me  to  go  to  Boston.  I  could  not 
myself  discharge  this  melancholy  duty,  because  with  a  vessel 
deprived  of  all  her  masts,  her  rudder  broken  and  unshipped,  one 
is  extremely  uncertain  of  his  destiny.  I  have  nevertheless  as 
yet  the  consolation  of  being  sufficiently  master  of  it  to  fulfil  the 
promise  verbally  made,  that  I  would  in  any  event  return  to  you, 
dead  or  alive.  This  promise,  and  the  advantage  which  our  mo 
mentary  presence  may  render  to  you,  have  caused  me  to  shut  my 
eyes  to  all  other  considerations.  In  this  perhaps  I  have  been  im 
prudent,  and  my  zeal  may  have  blinded  me.  I  have  thought  that 
I  could  not  run  too  great  a  hazard  to  prove,  in  the  name  of  the 
King,  how  much  His  Majesty  is  attached  to  his  allies  ;  but  I  should 
be  culpable  in  my  duty  to  America  herself,  if  I  could  forget  for  a 
moment  the  welfare  of  a  squadron  destined  for  her  defence.  I 
regretted  to  Colonel  Fleury  that  you  should  have  landed  on  the 
Island  a  day  before  the  time  agreed  upon  between  us,  and  I  should 
be  greatly  afflicted  to  know  that  you  are  in  danger.  I  was  in 
formed  that  you  had  then  only  two  thousand  men.  To  decide 
upon  your  motives  is  a  wrong  which  I  have  not  committed.  I 
have  refrained  from  censure  ;  and  the  twelve  thousand  men  now 
under  your  command  will  probably  prove  the  correctness  of  the 
step  by  a  success  which  I  desire  as  a  citizen,  and  an  admirer  of 
your  bravery  and  talents." 

This  letter  was  written,  but  had  not  yet  been  sent, 
when  M.  d'Estaing  received  one  from  General  Sullivan 
written  the  day  before,  as  soon  as  the  fleet  had  been 
sighted,  in  which  he  begged  him  to  join  in  an  attack 
upon  the  enemy.  The  admiral  replied  to  it  in  a  postscript 
declining  to  do  so,  upon  the  ground  of  the  disabled  and 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  44,  note. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          469 

dispersed  condition  of  his  fleet,  the  naval  strength  of  the 
enemy,  the  chance  that  reinforcements  might  reach  them 
at  any  moment,  and  the  positive  orders  of  the  King,  that 
in  case  of  disaster,  or  of  his  finding  the  enemy's  force 
superior  to  his  own,  he  should  go  for  safety  to  the  harbor 
of  Boston. 

General  Sullivan  now  turned  to  La  Fayette,  with  the 
hope  of  persuading  the  admiral  to  change  his  resolution 
and  come  into  Rhode  Island,  where  he  promised  that  pro 
visions  should  be  procured  for  his  ships,  and  abundance 
of  fresh  water,  and  even  that  new  masts  should  be  fur 
nished  him  and  all  the  repairs  made  that  were  necessary 
after  the  damage  done  to  his  fleet  by  the  storm.  La  Fay 
ette  set  out  immediately,  accompanied  by  General  Greene 
and  several  other  officers,  for  the  Languedoc,  upon  this 
errand,  which  he  fulfilled  with  great  earnestness  and  with 
a  sincere  wish  that  the  misunderstanding  which  he  already 
felt  very  keenly  himself  might  be  cleared  away,  in  order 
that  the  Americans  and  his  countrymen  might  again  be 
united.  He  urged  the  admiral  to  accede  to  General  Sulli 
van's  request  if  it  were  possible  for  him  under  any  circum 
stances  to  do  so,  or  at  least  to  send  a  force  of  infantry 
and  marines  to  take  part  in  the  attack.  This  latter  pro 
posal  the  Comte  d'Estaing  was  inclined  to  listen  to,  pro 
vided  the  garrison  could  be  carried  by  assault  within  two 
days ;  but  as  it  was  impossible  to  assure  him  of  that,  and 
as  he  was  unwilling  to  delay  his  voyage  to  Boston  for 
a  longer  time,  that  hope  for  aid  had  to  be  abandoned. 
Nevertheless,  upon  La  Fayette's  continued  entreaties,  he 
called  a  council  of  war  composed  of  all  his  captains,  to 
which  he  submitted  the  propositions  of  General  Sul 
livan.  They  were  unanimously  opposed  by  the  council, 
and  it  was  decided  that  the  fleet  should  proceed  at  once 
to  Boston. 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  determine  from  the  docu 
ments  now  in  our  possession  how  far  the  personal  inclina- 


470         OPERATIONS   OF   THE   ALLIES   AT   NEWPORT.         [1778. 

tion  of  M.  d'Estaing  impelled  him  to  remain  at  Newport, 
in  spite  of  the  distressed  condition  of  his  fleet,  to  take  the 
chances  of  escaping  the  arrival  of  a  superior  British  fleet 
and  to  help  General  Sullivan  in  the  proposed  attack.  The 
popular  belief  was,  at  the  time,  that  he  would  have  done 
so  if  his  officers  had  been  willing,  but  that  they  overruled 
him.  It  does  not  appear  likely,  however,  that  this  was 
the  case.  His  purpose  in  returning  to  Newport  was  the 
very  honorable  one  of  keeping  his  word  to  the  American 
general  and  at  the  same  time  supporting  him  by  his 
presence  if  he  desired  to  make  a  retreat  to  the  mainland. 
The  conciliatory  tone  of  his  letter  in  reference  to  General 
Sullivan's  movement  to  the  island  on  the  day  before  the 
one  agreed  upon  was  merely  the  courtesy  of  one  gen 
eral  officer  speaking  in  friendly  terms  to  another :  the 
lack  of  consideration  which  had  wounded  his  feelings 
upon  that  occasion  was  still  fresh  in  his  mind ;  and  while 
there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that,  if  his  forces  had  re 
mained  intact,  he  would  loyally  have  performed  his  part 
in  the  expedition  at  Newport,  yet  the  reflection  is  inevi 
table  in  studying  this  subject  that  circumstances  justi 
fied  him  in  complying  with  his  orders  to  go  to  Boston, 
and  there  was  now  no  inducement  for  him  to  go  out  of 
his  way  to  do  a  favor  for  General  Sullivan  by  performing 
an  extraordinary  service  from  which  that  gentleman  must 
reap  at  least  the  larger  share  of  the  honor  and  the  glory. 
M.  de  Cambis  reported  to  him  that  "  the  Americans  had 
done  nothing  as  yet,  and  that  the  siege  of  Newport  was  no 
further  advanced  than  the  day  we  left."  1  At  all  events, 
the  opinions  of  the  other  French  officers  were  definitively 
fixed,  whatever  the  admiral  may  have  thought.  The  in 
judicious  move  of  General  Sullivan  had  shaken  their 
confidence  in  the  promises  now  made  on  his  behalf  by 
La  Fayette,  and  M.  de  Cambis  wrote  in  his  journal,  what 

1  Journal  of  the  Comte  de  Cambis  on  the  Languedoc,  ubi  supra. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          471 

was  probably  an  exact  reflection  of  the  sentiment  on 
shipboard,  "  We  have  already  taken  too  great  risks  not  to 
be  wary  now  of  their  [the  Americans']  hopes  and  prom 
ises,  and  we  could  not  forget  the  unfortunate  situation 
from  which  only  an  extraordinary  accident  happily  rescued 
us  when  the  squadron  of  Lord  Howe  appeared  two  weeks 
before,  to  consent  to  put  ourselves  back  into  a  position 
that  would  have  been  all  the  more  critical  since  our  fleet 
was  weakened  by  the  absence  of  one  large  ship  and  by 
two  others  dismasted,  and  since  we  were  assured  by  the 
discoveries  of  the  Fantasque  and  the  Sagittaire  that  Ad 
miral  Byron's  fleet  had  arrived." 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  did  not 
share  this  feeling  with  his  countrymen  toward  his  com 
rades  in  America.  His  conduct  was  admirable  through 
out  all  these  negotiations,  in  which  he  still  continued  to 
take  the  principal  part  as  intermediary  between  the  two 
parties,  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  exerted  all  his 
powers  of  persuasion  to  induce  the  Comte  d'Estaing  to 
comply  with  General  Sullivan's  request,  not  only  whilst 
he  was  on  board  the  admiral's  ship,  but  also  after  he 
came  ashore  again,  in  his  communications  from  the  camp. 
In  his  devotion  to  the  American  cause  La  Fayette  evi 
dently  acted  at  the  request  of  General  Sullivan ;  and  he 
submitted  to  that  officer  the  letter  which  he  addressed 
to  the  Comte  d'Estaing  before  it  was  sent  off.  Upon  his 
return  from  visiting  M.  d'Estaing,  from  whom  he  had 
brought  a  communication  to  General  Sullivan,  he  wrote : l 

"Arr  THE  HEADQUARTERS  OF  GENERAL  SULLIVAN,  21st  August. 
"I  have  this  moment  arrived  here,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  and  I 
have  delivered  the  letter,  which  appeared  to  me  very  greatly  to 
disconcert  the  plans  of  those  who  were  most  interested  in  it. 
They  will  communicate  to  you,  at  greater  length,  both  their 
present  fears  and  their  hopes  which  they  now  see  destroyed ; 
though  it  seems  to  me  that  a  great  many  things  had  already  been 

1  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  sixieine  annee,  No.  3,  p.  418. 


472         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

expressed  in  General  Greene's  letter.  You  will  receive  one  from 
General  Sullivan  and  one  from  Mr.  Hancock,  and  I  am  requested 
to  add  one  to  these  also.  I  should  make  it  very  long  if  I  were 
now  to  repeat  all  that  I  took  the  liberty  of  saying  to  you  in  the 
conversations  you  have  been  kind  enough  to  hold  with  me  ;  but 
it  would  be  exceedingly  short  if  I  were  not  to  repeat  anything  at 
all.  At  all  events,  I  may  safely  say  that  I  have  never  seen  these 
gentlemen  so  positive  as  they  now  are  of  the  facilities  that  you 
will  find  here,  or  so  confident  of  our  success.  They  undertake 
to  answer  for  these  things  with  an  assurance  which,  I  must  con 
fess,  seems  attractive,  and  of  which  you  will  be  enabled  yourself 
to  judge,  for  I  have  advised  them  to  explain  their  position  with 
great  clearness.  It  is  reported  here  that  you  have  certainly  not 
gone  yet,  and  it  is  with  this  hope  that  these  gentlemen  are  writing 
to  you ;  you  understand  that  I  cannot  resist  sending  my  letter 
with  theirs,  but  I  beg  you  not  to  reply  to  it,  because  your  time  is 
of  so  much  importance  to  you  that  I  would  not  have  you  waste  it 
upon  me.  But  if  you  have  any  new  orders  to  give  me  I  earnestly 
beg  you  to  send  them  to  me,  and  I  shall  as  faithfully  perform  them. 
"I  have  received  to-day  the  most  positive  assurances,  from  the 
persons  who  are  writing  to  you,  in  regard  to  the  matters  upon 
which  J  was  in  doubt.  I  confess  that  if  I  accept  Mr.  Hancock's 
opinion,  I  have  my  misgivings  as  to  the  resources  you  will  find  at 
Boston.  Pardon  me,  Monsieur  le  Conite,  if  I  cause  you  unneces 
sary  regret,  or  if  I  fall  into  repetitions  which  are  equally  so ;  I 
trust  you  will  excuse  me  in  view  of  the  necessity  of  the  case,  and 
of  my  duty.  I  share  with  you  most  sincerely  your  feelings  upon 
this  occasion,  and  I  believe  myself  worthy  of  a  part  of  your  affec 
tion  because  of  the  sincerity  of  my  own.  Adieu,  Monsieur  le 
Comte.  My  tender  attachment  for  you  is  joined  with  the  bound 
less  love  that  I  bear  for  my  country  and  my  wishes  for  the  suc 
cess  of  our  arms,  and  I  shall  not  be  satisfied  until  I  am  able  to  go 
out  either  to  conquer  or  to  die,  with  you  and  under  your  command. 

"  LAFAYETTE. 

"General  Sullivan,  to  whom  I  have  read  the  greater  part  of 
this  letter,  approves  of  the  assurances  I  have  given  you  from  him, 
and  I  shall  leave  my  letter  with  him  to  be  forwarded  to  you.  In 
regard  to  certain  matters  of  which  I  am  necessarily  ignorant  my 
self,  I  am  obliged  to  base  our  hopes  upon  those  which  are  held 
out  to  me  by  the  people  whom  I  consult." 

This  was  certainly  as  strong  an  appeal  as  La  Fayette 
could  make  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing  under  the  circum- 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF   THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          473 

stances  which  governed  the  relations  of  the  two  men, 
since  he  was  but  a  youth  communicating  his  opinions  to  a 
man  who  was  by  many  years  his  senior,  an  untried  cap 
tain  in  the  French  service  venturing  to  discuss  military 
questions  with  the  lieutenant-general  and  admiral  of  the 
fleet.  No  doubt  his  personal  relations  with  M.  d'Estaing 
permitted  him  to  advance  in  this  direction  far  beyond 
the  limit  which  his  military  rank  would  have  prescribed, 
and  he  evidently  took  advantage  of  them  on  this  occasion 
to  exert  every  influence  at  his  command  to  aid  General 
Sullivan  and  to  strengthen  the  cause  of  Independence  in 
America. 

It  was  of  no  avail,  however,  for  the  council  of  war  had 
already  decided,  as  we  have  seen,  to  put  in  to  Boston ; 
and  during  the  night  of  the  21st  of  August,  the  day  upon 
which  La  Fayette's  letter  was  written,  the  fleet  weighed 
anchor  and  set  sail.  This  was  practically  the  end  of  the 
Comte  d'Estaing's  expedition  to  the  United  States  in 
1778.  We  have  followed  it  in  its  details  from  the  day 
when  the  fleet  set  sail  from  Toulon  ;  we  have  studied  its 
character  and  noted  its  vicissitudes ;  we  have  seen  with 
what  bright  prospect  the  French  standard  was  unfurled 
upon  the  high  seas  as  the  emblem  of  vengeance  against 
Great  Britain  and  of  victory  for  the  cause  of  freedom 
in  America,  and  finally  how  M.  d'Estaing's  hopes  had 
to  be  relinquished  when  victory  seemed  almost  within 
his  grasp.  The  best  that  can  be  said  of  the  expedition 
is,  that  it  was  a  disappointment.  It  left  unfulfilled  the 
anticipations  of  the  French  people,  by  whom  this  enter 
prise  was  looked  upon  as  a  new  source  of  national  glory ; 
it  left  a  feeling  of  discouragement  and  depression  in 
America  which  for  a  moment  caused  our  countrymen 
to  despair  of  their  ultimate  success  in  the  struggle  for 
liberty.  The  mortification  arising  from  our  sense  of 
failure  led  to  expressions  of  resentment  which,  while 
they  are  not  to  be  justified  or  approved  of,  are  perfectly 


474         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

intelligible  under  the  circumstances ;  indeed,  General 
Washington  pointed  out  to  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette 
that  they  "would  more  than  probably  have  fallen  in  a 
much  higher  degree  upon  a  fleet  of  our  own,  if  we  had 
one  in  the  same  situation." 

As  soon  as  General  Sullivan  was  convinced  that  the 
French  admiral  was  really  going  to  Boston,  he  drew  up  a 
formal  protest  addressed  to  him,  which  he  caused  to  be 
signed  by  all  his  general  officers  except  the  Marquis  de 
La  Fayette,  the  tone  of  which  reflected  rather  his  own 
passionate  disappointment  than  the  mature  judgment  of 
a  man  who  had  carefully  considered  the  circumstances 
before  him ;  and  he  hastily  despatched  Colonel  Laurens 
with  it  in  an  American  vessel,  to  overtake  the  fleet.  In 
addition  to  speaking  of  the  "  ruinous  consequences  which 
would  result  to  this  army  from  his  abandoning  the  harbor 
of  Newport  at  this  time,"  which  expression  was  included 
in  its  preamble,2  this  document  contained  the  following 
arguments  among  others  presented  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing 
against  his  going  away  : 

"  Fifthly,  Because  the  honor  of  the  French  nation  must  be  in 
jured  by  their  fleet  abandoning  their  allies  upon  an  island,  in  the 
midst  of  an  expedition  agreed  to  by  the  Count  himself.  This  must 
make  such  an  unfavorable  impression  on  the  minds  of  Americans 
at  large,  and  create  such  jealousies  between  them  and  their  hith 
erto  esteemed  allies,  as  will,  in  a  great  measure,  frustrate  the  good 
intentions  of  His  Most  Christian  Majesty  and  the  American  Con 
gress,  who  have  mutually  endeavored  to  promote  the  greatest 
harmony  and  confidence  between  the  French  people  and  the 
Americans.  .  .  . 

"Ninthly,  Because,  even  though  the  facts  pretended  were  fully 
proved,  and  it  became  necessary  for  the  fleet  to  proceed  to  Boston, 
yet  no  possible  reason  can  be  assigned  for  the  Count  d'Estaing's 
taking  with  him  the  land  forces  which  he  has  on  board,  and  which 


1  To  La  Fayette,  1st  September,  1778  :    Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington, 
vi.  49. 

2  See  the  full  text  in  Amory's  Sullivan,  p.  77. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         475 

might  be  of  great  advantage  in  the  expedition,  and  of  no  possible 
use  to  him  in  Boston.   .  .  . 

i '  We,  therefore,  for  the  reasons  above  assigned,  do,  in  the  most 
solemn  manner,  protest  against  the  measure,  as  derogatory  to  the 
honor  of  France,  contrary  to  the  intentions  of  His  Most  Christian 
Majesty  and  the  interest  of  his  nation,  and  destructive  in  the 
highest  degree  to  the  welfare  of  the  United  States  of  America,  and 
highly  injurious  to  the  alliance  formed  between  the  two  nations." 

It  is  evident  that  General  Sullivan  misinterpreted  the 
demands  of  the  situation,  as  well  as  the  character  of  the 
man  with  whom  he  was  dealing.  He  justified  the  writing 
of  this  communication  upon  the  ground  that  "  the  Count 
himself  wished  to  remain  with  us,  but  was  by  his  captains 
overruled  in  council." l  This,  if  true,  would  merely 
have  added  to  the  indiscretion  upon  his  part  of  having 
committed  such  an  act  the  error  of  judgment  by  which 
he  expected  through  a  personal  offence  toward  the  Comte 
d'Estaing  to  draw  him  away  from  his  own  officers,  with 
whom  he  naturally  sympathized  and  by  whose  opinions 
he  was  influenced.  Colonel  Laurens  overtook  the  flag 
ship  at  the  entrance  to  Boston  harbor,  and  performed  his 
graceless  mission  of  delivering  the  protest  to  the  admiral, 
who  said  in  reply  that  "  this  paper  imposed  on  the  com 
mander  of  the  King's  squadron  the  painful  but  necessary 
law  of  profound  silence." 

General  Washington,  who  plainly  saw  the  danger  that 
lay  in  this  unwary  step,  wrote  to  General  Sullivan,  from 
White  Plains,  on  the  1st  of  September,3 — 

"The  disagreement  between  the  army  under  your  command 
and  the  fleet  has  given  me  very  singular  uneasiness.  The  conti 
nent  at  large  is  concerned  in  our  cordiality,  and  it  should  be  kept 
up  by  all  possible  means,  consistent  with  our  honor  and  policy. 
First  impressions  you  know  are  generally  longest  remembered, 

1  Letter  to  Washington,  3d  September. 

2  Colonel  Laurens  to  General  Washington,  2d  September  :  Sparks,  Writings 
of  Washington,  vi.  46,  note. 

3  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  44. 


476          OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.        [1778. 

and  will  serve  to  fix  in  a  great  degree  our  national  character 
among  the  French.  In  our  conduct  towards  them  we  should  re 
member,  that  they  are  a  people  old  in  war,  very  strict  in  military 
etiquette,  and  apt  to  take  fire,  where  others  scarcely  seem  warmed. 
Permit  me  to  recommend,  in  the  most  particular  manner,  the  cul 
tivation  of  harmony  and  good  agreement,  and  your  endeavours  to 
destroy  that  ill  humor,  which  may  have  got  into  the  officers.  It 
is  of  the  greatest  importance  also,  that  the  soldiers  and  the  people 
should  know  nothing  of  the  misunderstanding,  or,  if  it  has  reached 
them,  that  ways  may  be  used  to  stop  its  progress  and  prevent  its 
effects. 

"I  have  received  from  Congress  the  enclosed,  by  which  you 
will  perceive  their  opinion  with  regard  to  keeping  secret  the  pro 
test  of  the  general  officers.  I  need  add  nothing  on  this  head.  I 
have  one  thing,  however,  more  to  say.  I  make  no  doubt  but  you 
will  do  all  in  your  power  to  forward  the  repair  of  the  Count's 
fleet,  and  render  it  fit  for  service,  by  your  recommendations  for 
that  purpose  to  those  who  can  be  immediately  instrumental." 

The  enclosure  mentioned  by  the  Commander-in-Chief 
in  the  last  paragraph  of  his  letter  related  to  the  action 
taken  by  Congress  upon  the  protest  sent  to  the  French 
admiral.  When  it  was  read  in  Congress,  in  connection 
with  the  correspondence  relating  to  it,  an  order  was  made 
that  their  contents  should  be  kept  secret,  but  that  the 
President  should  communicate  them  to  M.  Gerard,  the 
French  Minister,  informing  him  at  the  same  time  of  the 
injunction  of  secrecy.  It  was  also  ordered  that  General 
Washington  should  take  every  measure  in  his  power  to 
prevent  the  protest  from  being  made  public.1 

The  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  was  incensed  at  the  request 
that  he  should  attend  the  meeting  at  which  this  protest 
was  being  discussed  and  signed ;  for  he  regarded  that 
measure  as  an  insult  to  his  nation,  and  the  call  upon 
him  to  take  part  in  it  as  a  personal  indignity,  which 
wounded  him  where  he  was  most  sensitive,  in  his  loyal 
admiration  for  whatever  was  French. 

1  Secret  Journa1.  of  Congress,  i.  89. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF   THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         477 

He  wrote  to  M.  d'Estaing  on  the  22d  of  August,1 — 

i  i  You  are  about  to  receive  a  long  memoir  [the  protest],  Mon 
sieur  le  Comte,  and  I  shall  accompany  it  by  a  short  letter.  The 
condition  I  am  in,  the  different  feelings  that  animate  me,  and  the 
outbursts  of  impatience  to  which  I  have  given  way,  make  it  im 
possible  for  me  either  to  talk  to  you  or  to  write  with  a  quiet 
mind.  Can  you  believe  that  I  was  summoned  to  a  council  where 
a  protest  was  made  against  a  measure  taken  by  the  French  fleet ! 
I  told  these  gentlemen  that  my  native  land  is  dearer  to  me  than 
America,  that  whatever  France  does  is  right,  that  M.  le  Cte  d'  Es- 
taing  is  my  friend,  and  that  I  am  ready  to  support  these  opinions 
by  my  sword,  which  has  never  been  put  to  a  better  use.  I  added 
that  if  they  had  shown  very  little  delicacy,  upon  their  part,  in 
summoning  me,  I  should  use  little  also,  in  my  choice  of  expressions. 
They  all  apologized  and  said  that  they  were  far  from  requiring  me 
to  give  my  vote.  In  the  mean  time,  M.  le  Cointe,  fancy  my  situ 
ation  ;  for  from  this  time  forward  I  shall  be  in  fear  that  I  may 
have  to  resent  every  word  I  hear  spoken. 

1  i  I  confess  that  the  general  consternation  has  been  far  greater 
than  I  should  ever  have  thought  possible ;  it  was  impossible  to 
foresee  the  effect  which  your  departure  has  had  upon  men's 
minds.  Pardon  me,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  but  this  is  not  the  first 
time  that  I  have  transgressed  by  being  too  frank  ;  I  told  you  the 
other  day  all  that  I  knew, — I  shall  tell  you  now  what  I  see,  and 
much  more  than  I  expected.  My  heart  will  always  be  open  to  a 
man  whom  I  love  as  I  do  you. 

"  Adieu,  M.  le  Comte.  I  am  told  alarming  stories  about  the 
risks  you  run  in  going  to  Boston,  and  I  am  uneasy  about  it ;  I 
shall  have  no  peace  until  I  know  that  you  have  arrived.  If  I 
leave  the  Island  I  shall  go  to  that  city  immediately.  I  hope 
nobody  will  be  upon  Rhode  Island  after  I  leave,  and  that  we  shall 
not  have  to  regret  any  loss,  unless  I  have  had  a  chance,  at  least, 
to  share  in  the  danger.  The  last  boat  will  be  the  one  to  take  me 
over ;  and,  in  any  event,  I  beg  you  to  accept  the  homage  of  my 
admiration  for  your  virtue,  for  your  patriotism,  and  for  all  that 
makes  you  loved  and  respected  by  .  .  .  ' 

This  letter  is  extremely  interesting  as  a  reflection  of  La 
Fayette's  character  and  as  a  proof  that  in  the  midst  of 
this  conflict  of  feeling  which  arose  from  the  comments  all 

1  Revue  d'Histoire  diplomatique,  sixieme  annee,  No.  3,  p.  419. 


478         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

about  him  upon  the  action  of  his  countrymen,  whilst  he 
was  even  upon  the  point  of  drawing  his  sword  at  times 
in  reply  to  words  spoken  in  his  presence,  he  continued  to 
do  his  duty  conscientiously  as  an  American  soldier,  and 
remained  at  his  post  always  with  the  one  purpose  in 
view,  of  furthering  the  success  of  the  cause  of  liberty 
and  of  being  the  last  man  to  leave  whilst  there  was 
danger  to  be  incurred.  It  is  a  remarkable  example  of 
the  subordination  of  self  and  personal  interests  to  the 
higher  considerations  of  devotion  and  self-sacrifice  by 
which  one  is  bound  in  the  loyal  performance  of  duty. 
In  this  La  Fayette  was  a  thorough  soldier. 

In  the  mean  time,  General  Sullivan,  not  content  with 
the  demonstration  made  by  him  in  his  protest,  issued  a 
general  order  to  the  army,  on  the  24th  of  September,  in 
which  he  lamented  the  sudden  departure  of  the  fleet,  but 
added  that  "  he  [General  Sullivan]  yet  hopes  the  event 
will  prove  America  able  to  procure  with  her  own  arms 
that  which  her  allies  refused  to  assist  her  in  obtaining." 
La  Fayette,  angered  by  this  insinuation  of  abandonment, 
immediately  called  upon  General  Sullivan  and  demanded 
that  the  words  contained  in  his  order  should  be  retracted 
in  a  similar  order.  After  he  had  gone  back  to  his  quar 
ters,  the  general  returned  his  visit,  during  which  a  warm 
altercation  took  place  between  them,  which  threatened  to 
lead  to  a  duel.1  But,  as  a  result,  General  Sullivan  said, 
in  an  order  issued  by  him  on  the  26th  of  September, 
"  It  having  been  supposed  by  some  persons  that  by  the 
orders  of  the  24th  inst.  the  commander-in-chief  meant 
to  insinuate  that  the  departure  of  the  French  fleet  was 
owing  to  a  fixed  determination  not  to  assist  in  the  present 
enterprise ;  and  as  the  general  could  not  wish  to  give  the 
least  color  to  ungenerous  and  illiberal  minds  to  make 
such  an  unfair  interpretation,  he  thinks  it  necessary  to 

1  M6moires  de  ma  Main,  i.  57. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS   OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          479 

say  that  as  he  could  not  possibly  be  acquainted  with  the 
orders  of  the  French  admiral,  he  could  not  determine 
whether  the  removal  of  the  fleet  was  absolutely  necessary 
or  not,  and  therefore  did  not  mean  to  censure  an  act  which 
the  admiral's  orders  might  render  absolutely  necessary."  l 

This  painful  situation  had  continued  but  a  short  time 
when  La  Fayette  appealed  to  General  Washington  in  a 
letter  which  reflects  his  feelings  and  the  strained  relations 
between  himself  and  the  other  French  officers  with  their 
American  comrades  as  well  as  any  document  that  we  now 
possess  in  relation  to  the  event.  It  drew  from  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief  a  soothing  reply,  in  which,  with  his  wise 
judgment  and  paternal  kindness,  he  touched  gently  upon 
the  injured  places  in  the  young  officer's  mind,  allaying 
the  irritation  caused  by  angry  words  and  personal  offences, 
and  encouraging  him  with  assurances  of  his  warm  friend 
ship  and  affectionate  sympathy.  At  the  same  time,  he 
wrote  conciliatory  letters  to  General  Sullivan  and  General 
Greene,  and  shortly  afterward  the  tension  was  relieved, 
and  the  former  cordial  relations  were  restored. 

La  Fayette's  letter  to  General  Washington  was  as  fol 
lows  : 2 

"CAMP  BEFORE  NEWPORT,  25th  August,  1778. 

"MY  DEAR  GENERAL, — I  had  expected  in  answering  your  first 
letter  that  something  interesting  would  have  happened  that  I 
might  communicate  to  your  excellency.  Every  day  was  going  to 
terminate  our  uncertainties ;  nay,  every  day  was  going  to  bring 
the  hope  of  a  success  which  I  did  promise  myself  to  acquaint  you 
of.  Such  was  the  reason  of  my  deferring  what  my  duty  and  in 
clination  did  urge  me  to  do  much  sooner.  I  am  now  indebted  for 
two  favours  of  yours,  which  I  beg  leave  to  offer  here  my  thanks 
for.  The  first  letter  reached  me  in  the  time  we  expected  to  hear 
again  from  the  French  fleet ;  the  second  I  have  just  received. 
My  reason  for  not  writing  the  same  day  the  French  fleet  went  to 
Boston  was,  that  I  did  not  choose  to  trouble  your  friendship  with 
the  sentiments  of  an  afflicted,  injured  heart,  and  injured  by  that 

1  Glover  MSS.,  in  the  Essex  Institute. 

2  La  Fayette's  Memoirs,  American  edition,  i.  186. 


480          OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES   AT    NEWPORT.        [1778. 

very  people  I  canae  from  so  far  to  love  and  support.  Don't 
be  surprised,  my  dear  General ;  the  generosity  of  your  honest 
mind  would  be  offended  at  the  shocking  sight  I  have  under  my 
eyes. 

"  So  far  am  I  from  a  critical  disposition  that  I  will  not  give  you 
the  journal  of  our  operations,  neither  of  several  instances  during 
our  staying  here,  which,  however,  might  occupy  some  room  in 
this  letter.  I  will  not  even  say  to  you,  how  contracted  was  the 
French  fleet  when  they  wanted  to  come  in  at  their  arrival ;  which, 
according  to  the  report  of  the  advertors,  would  have  had  the 
greatest  effect.  How  surprised  was  the  Admiral,  when,  after  a 
formal  and  agreed  convention,  one  hour  after  the  American  gen 
eral  had  given  a  new  written  assurance,  our  troops  made  the 
landing  a  day  before  it  was  expected.  How  mortified  the  French 
officers  were  to  find  out  that  there  was  not  a  gun  left  in  these 
very  forts  to  whose  protection  they  were  recommended.  All 
these  things,  and  many  others,  I  would  not  take  notice  of,  if 
they  were  not  at  this  moment  the  supposed  ground  upon  which, 
it  is  said,  that  the  Count  d'Estaing  is  gone  on  to  Boston.  Believe 
me,  my  dear  sir,  upon  my  honour,  the  Admiral,  though  a  little 
astonished  by  some  instances  of  conduct  on  our  part,  did  con 
sider  them  in  the  same  light  as  you  and  myself  would  have  done, 
and  if  he  is  gone  off,  it  is  because  he  thought  himself  obliged  by 
necessity. 

1  i  Let  us  consider,  my  dear  general,  the  motions  of  that  fleet 
since  it  was  proposed  by  the  Count  d'Estaing  himself,  and  granted 
by  the  King  in  behalf  of  the  United  States.  I  will  not  go  so  far 
up  as  to  remember  other  instances  of  the  affection  the  French 
nation  have  for  the  Americans.  The  news  of  that  fleet  have  occa 
sioned  the  evacuation  of  Philadelphia.  Its  arrival  has  opened 
all  the  harbours,  secured  all  the  coasts,  obliged  the  British  navy 
to  be  together.  Six  of  those  frigates,  two  of  them  I  have  seen, 
sufficient  for  terrifying  all  the  trading  people  of  the  two  Caro- 
linas,  are  taken  or  burnt.  The  Count  d'Estaing  went  to  offer 
battle,  and  act  as  a  check  to  the  British  navy  for  a  long  time.  At 
~New  York,  it  was  agreed  he  should  go  to  Ehode  Island,  and  there 
he  went.  They  prevented  him  from  going  in  at  first ;  afterwards, 
he  was  desired  to  come  in,  and  so  he  did.  The  same  day  we 
landed  without  his  knowledge  ;  an  English  fleet  appears  in  sight. 
His  being  divided  into  three  parts  by  our  directions,  for,  though  he 
is  a  lieutenant  general,  he  never  availed  himself  of  that  title,  made 
him  uneasy  about  his  situation.  But  finding  the  next  morning 
that  the  wind  was  northerly,  being  also  convinced  that  it  was  his 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         481 

duty  to  prevent  any  reinforcement  at  Newport,  he  goes  out  under 
the  hottest  fire  of  the  British  land  batteries,  he  puts  the  British 
navy  to  flight,  and  pursues  them,  and  they  were  all  in  his  hands 
when  that  horrid  storm  arrives  to  ruin  all  our  hopes.  Both  fleets 
are  divided,  scattered  ;  the  Caesar,  a  74  gun  ship,  is  lost ;  the 
Marseillais,  of  the  same  size,  loses  her  masts,  and  after  that  acci 
dent  is  obliged  to  send  back  an  enemy's  ship  of  64  ;  the  Langue- 
doc  having  lost  her  masts,  unable  to  be  governed  and  make  any 
motions,  separated  from  the  others,  is  attacked  by  a  ship  of  the 
line  against  which  she  could  only  bring  six  guns. 

"When  the  storm  was  over,  they  met  again  in  a  shattered 
condition,  and  the  Caesar  was  not  to  be  found.  All  the  captains 
represented  to  their  general  that,  after  a  so  long  navigation,  in 
such  a  want  of  victuals,  water,  &c.,  which  they  had  not  been  yet 
supplied  with,  after  the  intelligence  given  by  General  Sullivan 
that  there  was  a  British  fleet  coming,  they  should  go  to  Boston  ; 
but  the  Count  d'Estaing  had  promised  to  come  here  again,  and 
so  he  did  at  all  events.  The  news  of  his  arrival  and  situation 
came  by  the  Senegal,  a  frigate  taken  from  the  enemy.  General 
Greene  and  myself  went  on  board.  The  Count  expressed  to  me 
not  so  much  as  to  the  envoy  from  General  Sullivan,  than  as  to 
his  friend,  the  unhappy  circumstances  he  was  in.  Bound  by  ex 
press  orders  from  the  King  to  go  to  Boston  in  case  of  an  accident 
or  a  superior  fleet,  engaged,  by  the  common  sentiment  of  all  the 
officers,  even  of  Home  American  pilots,  that  he  would  ruin  all  his 
squadron  in  deferring  his  going  to  Boston,  he  called  a  new  coun 
cil  of  war,  and  linding  everybody  of  the  same  opinion,  he  did  not 
think  himself  justifiable  in  staying  here  any  longer,  and  took 
leave  of  me  with  true  affliction  not  being  able  to  assist  America 
for  some  days,  which  has  been  rewarded  with  the  most  horrid 
ungratefulness  ;  but  no  matter.  I  am  only  speaking  of  facts.  The 
Count  said  to  me  these  last  words  :  after  many  months  of  suffer 
ings,  my  men  will  rest  some  days  ;  I  will  man  my  ships,  and,  if 
I  urn  assisted  in  getting  masts,  &c.,  three  weeks  after  my  arrival 
I  shall  go  out  again,  and  then  we  shall  fight  for  the  glory  of  the 
French  name,  and  the  interests  of  America. 

"The  day  the  Count  went  off,  the  general  American  officers 
divw  a  protestation,  which,  as  I  had  been  very  strangely  called 
there,  I  refused  to  sign,  but  I  wrote  a  letter  to  the  admiral.  The 
protestation  and  the  letter  did  not  arrive  in  time. 

"Now,   my  dear  general,   I  am  going  to  hurt  your  generous 
feelings   by  an  imperfect  picture  of  what  I  am  forced  to  see. 
Forgive  me  for  it ;  it  is  not  to  the  commander- in- chief,  it  is  to  my 
VOL.  I.— 31 


482         OPERATIONS    OF   THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

most  dearest  friend,  General  Washington,  that  I  am  speaking.  I 
want  to  lament  with  him  the  ungenerous  sentiments  I  have  been 
forced  to  see  in  many  American  breasts. 

"  Could  you  believe,  that  forgetting  any  national  obligation, 
forgetting  what  they  were  owing  to  that  same  fleet,  what  they 
were  yet  to  expect  from  them,  and  instead  of  resenting  their  ac 
cidents  as  these  of  allies  and  brothers,  the  people  turned  mad  at 
their  departure,  and  wishing  them  all  the  evils  in  the  world,  did 
treat  them  as  a  generous  one  would  be  ashamed  to  treat  the  most 
inveterate  enemies.  You  cannot  have  any  idea  of  the  horrors 
which  were  to  be  heard  in  that  occasion.  Many  leaders  them 
selves  finding  they  were  disappointed,  abandoned  their  minds  to 
illiberality  and  ungratefulness.  Frenchmen  of  the  highest  char 
acter  have  been  exposed  to  the  most  disagreeable  circumstances, 
and  yet,  myself,  the  friend  of  America — the  friend  of  General 
Washington.  I  am  more  upon  a  warlike  footing  in  the  Ameri 
can  lines,  than  when  I  come  near  the  British  lines  at  Newport. 

"Such  is,  my  dear  general,  the  true  state  of  matters.  I  am 
sure  it  will  infinitely  displease  and  hurt  your  feelings.  I  am 
also  sure  you  will  approve  the  part  I  have  taken  in  it,  which 
was  to  stay  much  at  home  with  all  the  French  gentlemen  who 
are  here,  and  declare,  at  the  same  time,  that  anything  thrown 
before  me  against  my  nation  I  would  take  as  the  most  par 
ticular  affront. 

"  Inclosed  I  send  you  the  general  orders  of  the  24th,  upon 
which  I  thought  I  was  obliged  to  pay  a  visit  to  General  Sullivan, 
who  has  agreed  to  alter  them  in  the  following  manner.  Remem 
ber,  my  dear  general,  that  I  don't  speak  to  the  Commander-in- 
chief,  but  to  my  friend,  that  I  am  far  from  complaining  of  any 
body.  I  have  no  complaints  at  all  to  make  you  against  any  one  ; 
but  I  lament  with  you  that  I  have  had  an  occasion  of  seeing  so 
ungenerous  sentiments  in  American  hearts. 

"I  will  tell  you  the  true  reason.  The  leaders  of  the  expedi 
tion  are,  most  of  them,  ashamed  to  return  after  having  spoken  of 
their  Ehode  Island  success  in  proud  terms  before  their  family, 
their  friends,  their  internal  enemies.  The  others,  regardless  of 
the  expense  France  has  been  put  to  by  that  fleet,  of  the  tedious, 
tiresome  voyage,  which  so  many  men  have  had  for  their  service, 
though  they  are  angry  that  the  fleet  takes  three  weeks,  upon  the 
whole  campaign,  to  refit  themselves,  they  cannot  bear  the  idea  of 
being  brought  to  a  small  expense,  to  the  loss  of  a  little  time,  to 
the  fatigue  of  staying  some  few  days  more  in  a  camp  at  some  few 
miles  off  their  houses ;  for  I  am  very  far  from  looking  upon  the 


1778.]        OPERATIONS   OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          483 

expedition  as  having  miscarried,  and  there  I  see  even  a  certainty 
of  success. 

"If,  as  soon  as  the  fleet  is  repaired,  which  (in  case  they  are 
treated  as  one  is  in  a  country  one  is  not  at  war  with,)  would  be 
done  in  three  weeks  from  this  time,  the  Count  d'Estaing  was  to 
come  around,  the  expedition  seems  to  offer  a  very  good  prospect. 
If  the  enemy  evacuates  New  York,  we  have  the  whole  continental 
army,  if  not,  we  might  perhaps  have  some  more  men,  what  num 
ber,  however,  I  cannot  pretend  to  judge.  All  that  I  know  is, 
that  I  shall  be  very  happy  to  see  the  fleet  co-operating  with 
General  Washington  himself. 

"I  think  I  shall  be  forced,  by  the  board  of  general  officers,  to 
go  soon  to  Boston.  That  I  will  do  as  soon  as  required,  though 
with  reluctance,  for  I  do  not  believe  that  our  position  on  this  part 
of  the  island  is  without  danger  ;  but  my  principle  is  to  do  every 
thing  which  is  thought  good  for  the  service.  I  have  very  often 
rode  express  to  the  fleet,  to  the  frigates,  and  that,  I  assure  you, 
with  the  greatest  pleasure  ;  on  the  other  hand,  I  may  perhaps  be 
useful  to  the  fleet.  Perhaps,  too,  it  will  be  in  the  power  of  the 
Count  to  do  something  which  might  satisfy  them.  I  wish,  my 
dear  general,  you  could  know  as  well  as  myself,  how  desirous  the 
Count  d'Estaing  is  to  forward  the  public  good,  to  help  your  suc 
cess,  and  to  serve  the  cause  of  America. 

"  I  earnestly  beg  you  will  recommend  to  the  several  chief  per 
sons  of  Boston  to  do  everything  they  can  to  put  the  French  fleet 
in  a  situation  for  sailing  soon.  Give  me  leave  to  add,  that  I  wish 
many  people,  by  the  declaration  of  your  sentiments  in  that  affair, 
could  learn  how  to  regulate  theirs,  and  blush  at  the  sight  of  your 
generosity. 

"You  will  find  my  letter  immense.  I  began  it  one  day  and 
finished  it  the  next,  as  my  time  was  swallowed  up  by  those  eternal 
councils  of  war.  I  shall  have  the  pleasure  of  writing  you  from 
Boston.  I  am  afraid  the  Count  d'Estaing  will  have  felt  to  the 
quick  the  behaviour  of  the  people  on  this  occasion.  You  cannot 
conceive  how  distressed  he  was  to  be  prevented  from  serving  this 
country  for  some  time.  I  do  assure  you  his  circumstances  were 
very  critical  and  distressing. 

"For  my  part,  my  sentiments  are  known  to  the  world.  My 
tender  affection  for  General  Washington  is  added  to  them  ;  there 
fore  I  want  no  apologies  for  writing  upon  what  has  afflicted  me 
both  as  an  American  and  a  Frenchman. 

"  I  am  much  obliged  to  you  for  the  care  you  are  so  kind  as  to 
take  of  that  poor  horse  of  mine  j  had  he  not  found  such  a  good 


484         OPEKATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

stable  as  this  at  headquarters,  he  would  have  cut  a  pitiful  figure 
at  the  end  of  his  travels,  and  I  should  have  been  too  happy  if 
there  had  remained  so  much  of  the  horse  as  the  bones,  the  skin, 
and  the  four  shoes. 

"  Farewell,  my  dear  general ;  whenever  I  quit  you,  I  meet  with 
some  disappointment  and  misfortune.  I  did  not  need  it  to  desire 
seeing  you  as  much  as  possible.  With  the  most  tender  affection 
and  high  regard,  I  have  the  honour  to  be,  &c. 

"Dear  General, — I  must  add  to  my  letter,  that  I  have  received 
one  from  General  Greene,  very  different  from  the  expressions  I 
have  to  complain  of,  he  seems  there  very  sensible  of  what  I  feel. 
I  am  very  happy  when  placed  in  a  situation  to  do  justice  to  any 
one." 

To  this  General  Washington  replied  as  follows : 1 

"WHITE  PLAINS,  1  September,  1778. 

"MY  DEAR  MARQUIS, — I  have  been  honored  with  your  favor 
of  the  25th  ultimo  by  Monsieur  Pontgebaud,  and  I  wish  my  time, 
which  at  present  is  taken  up  by  a  committee  of  Congress,  would 
permit  me  to  go  fully  into  the  contents  of  it.  This,  however,  it  is 
not  in  my  power  to  do.  But  in  one  word  let  me  say,  I  feel  every 
thing  that  hurts  the  sensibility  of  a  gentleman,  and  consequently 
upon  the  present  occasion  I  feel  for  you  and  for  our  good  and 
great  allies  the  French.  I  feel  myself  hurt,  also,  at  every  illiberal 
and  unthinking  reflection,  which  may  have  been  cast  upon  the 
Count  d'Estaing,  or  the  conduct  of  the  fleet  under  his  command  ; 
and  lastly  I  feel  for  my  country.  Let  me  entreat  you,  therefore, 
my  dear  Marquis,  to  take  no  exception  at  unmeaning  expressions, 
uttered  perhaps  without  consideration,  and  in  the  first  transport 
of  disappointed  hope.  Everybody,  Sir,  who  reasons  will  acknowl 
edge  the  advantages  which  we  have  derived  from  the  French  fleet, 
and  the  zeal  of  the  commander  of  it ;  but,  in  a  free  and  repub 
lican  government,  you  cannot  restrain  the  voice  of  the  multitude. 
Every  man  will  speak  as  he  thinks,  or,  more  properly,  without 
thinking,  and  consequently  will  judge  of  effects  without  attend 
ing  to  the  causes.  The  censures,  which  have  been  levelled  at  the 
officers  of  the  French  fleet,  would  more  than  probably  have  fallen 
in  a  much  higher  degree  upon  a  fleet  of  our  own,  if  we  had  one 
in  the  same  situation.  It  is  the  nature  of  man  to  be  displeased 
with  everything  that  disappoints  a  favorite  hope  or  flattering 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  49. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         485 

project ;   and  it  is  the  folly  of  too  many  of  them  to  condemn 
without  investigating  circumstances. 

"  Let  me  beseech  you  therefore,  my  good  Sir,  to  afford  a  healing 
hand  to  the  wound,  that  unintentionally  has  been  made.  America 
esteems  your  virtues  and  your  services,  and  admires  the  principles 
upon  which  you  act.  Your  countrymen  in  our  army  look  up  to 
you  as  their  patron.  The  Count  and  his  officers  consider  you  as  a 
man  high  in  rank,  and  high  in  estimation  here  and  also  in  France  ; 
and  I,  your  friend,  have  no  doubt  but  you  will  use  your  utmost 
endeavours  to  restore  harmony,  that  the  honor,  glory,  and  mutual 
interest  of  the  two  nations  may  be  promoted  and  cemented  in  the 
firmest  manner.  I  would  say  more  on  the  subject,  but  am  re 
strained  for  the  want  of  time  ;  and  therefore  shall  only  add,  that, 
with  every  sentiment  of  esteem  and  regard,  I  am,  my  dear  Mar 
quis,  &c."  l 

The  influence  which  General  Washington  exerted  upon 
the  troubled  spirits  in  the  camp,  as  well  as  upon  the 
wounded  sensibilities  of  the  French  officers  in  the  fleet, 
by  the  conciliatory  tone  of  his  letters  and  the  wisdom  of 
his  counsels,  was  extremely  effective  in  restoring  friend 
ship,  so  that  even  General  Sullivan,  whose  violent  expres 
sions  of  disappointment  were  softened  by  the  consideration 
of  more  serious  questions  which  affected  the  welfare  of  the 
whole  nation,  wrote,  on  the  3d  of  September,  to  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, — 

"The  justice  of  the  observations  in  your  Excellency's  letter, 
respecting  the  departure  of  the  French  fleet,  are  so  obvious,  that, 
if  a  consciousness  of  my  duty  to  yield  implicit  obedience  to  your 
Excellency's  commands  did  not  even  make  that  obedience  a 
pleasure,  the  reasoning  alone  must  have  pointed  out  the  part  I 
have  to  act.  I  have  the  pleasure  to  inform  your  Excellency,  that, 
though  the  first  struggles  of  passion,  on  so  important  a  disappoint 
ment,  were  scarcely  to  be  restrained,  yet,  in  a  few  days,  as  it  has 
subsided,  I  found  means  to  restore  the  former  harmony  between 
the  American  and  French  officers  of  the  army.  The  Count 

1  See  also  General  Washington's  letters  to  General  Sullivan,  28th  of  August, 
to  General  Heath,  28th  of  August,  to  General  Greene,  1st  of  September,  to 
the  President  of  Congress,  4th  of  September,  and  to  the  Comte  d'Estaing, 
2d  and  llth  of  September,  1778  :  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington. 


486         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

d'Estaing  and  myself  are  in  the  same  friendship  as  heretofore. 
The  reason  of  the  protest  has  been  explained  to  him,  and  he  is 
now  perfectly  satisfied.  He  has  offered  to  come  on  with  his  land 
forces,  and  do  everything  which  I  may  request  of  him  and  his 
troops  ;  but  the  step  has  become  unnecessary."  * 

In  the  mean  time  the  services  of  La  Fayette  had  again 
been  called  upon,  and  he  had  been  employed,  in  his  ca 
pacity  of  ambassador  between  the  two  armies,  in  one  last 
effort  which  General  Sullivan  decided  to  make  in  order 
to  obtain  from  the  Comte  d'Estaing  an  auxiliary  force 
which  would  enable  him  to  continue  the  siege  of  Newport. 
He  therefore  requested  General  de  La  Fayette  to  go  to 
Boston,  to  meet  the  admiral  there,  and,  after  having  taken 
every  possible  measure  which  could  incite  the  government 
of  Massachusetts  to  hasten  the  repairs  to  his  vessels,  to 
beg  of  him  that  he  would  send  his  land  troops  to  join  the 
American  army  in  Rhode  Island.  General  Greene  an 
nounced  this  to  General  Washington  in  a  letter  2  in  which 
he  says,  — 

"Your  Excellency  may  rest  assured  that  I  have  done  every 
thing  in  my  power  to  cultivate  and  promote  a  good  understand 
ing  both  with  the  Count  and  the  Marquis,  arid  natter  myself  that 
I  am  upon  very  good  terms  with  them  both.  The  Marquis's 
great  thirst  for  glory  and  national  attachment  often  run  him 
into  errors.  However,  he  did  everything  to  prevail  upon  the 
Admiral  to  cooperate  with  us  that  man  could  do.  People  cen 
sure  the  Admiral  with  great  freedom,  and  many  are  impudent 
enough  to  reproach  the  nation  through  the  Admiral.  General 
Sullivan  very  imprudently  issued  something  like  a  censure  in 
general  orders.  Indeed  it  was  an  absolute  censure.  It  opened 
the  mouths  of  the  army  in  very  clamorous  strains.  The  Gen 
eral  was  obliged  to  explain  it  away  in  a  few  days.  The  fer 
mentation  seems  to  be  now  subsiding  and  all  things  appear  as 
if  they  would  go  smoothly  on.  The  Marquis  is  going  to  Boston 
also,  to  hasten  the  Count's  return,  and  if  possible  to  get  the 


1  Amory's  Sullivan,  p.  79. 

2  28th  August,  Greenes  Life  of  Greene,  ii.  127. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         487 

French  troops  to  join  the  land  forces  here,  which  will  the  more 
effectually  interest  the  Count  in  the  success  of  the  expedition." 

La  Fayette  complied  immediately  with  General  Sul 
livan's  request.  Mounting  his  horse,  he  set  out  on 
Friday,  the  28th  of  August,  the  same  day  upon  which 
General  Greene's  letter  was  written  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  and,  having  ridden  seventy  miles  in  seven 
hours,  he  reached  Boston  just  as  the  French  fleet  had 
entered  the  harbor.  It  was  a  personal  sacrifice  on  his 
part  to  leave  the  army  at  that  moment,  because  every 
thing  indicated  that  an  action  was  likely  to  take  place 
with  the  British  forces,  from  which  nothing  but  the  most 
urgent  requirements  of  duty  could  have  induced  him  to 
absent  himself.  But  he  consoled  himself  with  the  re 
flection  that  by  making  the  greatest  haste  possible  he 
might  perform  an  important  service  to  the  country  and 
still  be  back  in  time  to  take  his  place  upon  the  field.  He 
spent  the  following  day,  Saturday,  and  part  of  Sunday, 
in  Boston,  and  on  Sunday  night  he  was  again  before 
Newport,  having  made  his  return  journey  in  six  hours 
and  a  half. 

General  Sullivan  had  maintained  his  position  on  Rhode 
Island  up  to  the  28th  of  August  with  a  determination 
which  was  extremely  creditable  to  him  as  a  soldier,  and 
at  least  deserved  success.  But  circumstances  were  un 
favorable  to  him,  because  he  was  conducting  a  siege 
against  a  well-appointed  and  well-disciplined  force  with 
an  army  composed  for  the  most  part  of  raw  troops,  not 
more  than  fifteen  hundred  of  his  men  having  ever  been 
under  fire  before.  Besides  this,  the  militia  began  to  re 
turn  home  when  it  became  evident  that  no  immediate 
assistance  was  to  be  expected  from  the  French  fleet ;  be 
tween  two  and  three  thousand  of  them  left  him  in  a 
single  day,  and  his  army,  which  he  had  estimated  at  be 
tween  eight  thousand  and  nine  thousand  men,  was  re- 


488  OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.        [1778. 

duced  almost  immediately  to  a  total  of  five  thousand, — 
less  than  the  number  of  British  troops  known  to  be 
under  General  Pigot's  command  at  Newport.  His  situ 
ation  was  weakened,  therefore,  to  such  an  extent  that  he 
could  not  hope  to  accomplish  any  offensive  undertaking ; 
in  fact,  it  became  a  question  whether  he  should  now  be 
able  even  to  effect  a  retreat  with  his  army  under  the 
difficulties  that  confronted  him  in  the  necessity  of  trans 
ferring  it  to  the  mainland  in  the  face  of  the  enemy. 

At  a  council  of  war  called  by  him,  it  was  decided 
unanimously  that  the  army  should  retire  to  the  northern 
end  of  the  island,  to  fortify  the  camp  there  and  to  secure 
the  communication  with  the  mainland.  He  sent  forward 
his  stores  and  baggage  at  nightfall  on  the  28th  of  August, 
and  moved  with  his  troops  to  Butt's  Hill,  where  he  en 
camped  about  two  o'clock  in  the  morning,  with  his  right 
wing  resting  upon  the  west  road  and  his  left  on  the  east 
road,  secured  by  covering  and  flanking  parties  toward  the 
water  on  the  right  and  left,  under  Colonel  Laurens  and 
Colonel  Livingston,  and  by  a  picket  under  Colonel  Wade. 
As  soon  as  it  was  day,  the  enemy  discovered  General  Sul 
livan's  movement,  and  early  in  the  morning  attacked 
him  with  nearly  their  whole  force,  divided  into  two 
columns.  They  met  with  a  firm  resistance  from  Colonels 
Laurens,  Livingston,  and  Wade,  to  whose  assistance 
General  Sullivan  sent  forward  two  regiments,  directing 
them  to  retire  upon  the  main  army  in  the  best  order 
they  could  preserve.  This  they  did  with  excellent  man 
agement,  keeping  up  as  they  retreated  a  steady  fire  upon 
the  enemy.  The  British  troops  advanced  very  close  to 
the  position  of  General  Sullivan's  left  wing,  but  were 
repulsed  by  General  Glover,  after  which  they  retired  to 
Quaker  Hill,  where  they  formed,  about  a  mile  in  front 
of  General  Sullivan's  position  at  Butt's  Hill.  A  heavy 
fire  of  cannon  was  begun  upon  both  sides  about  nine 
o'clock,  and  was  kept  up,  with  several  skirmishes  between 


1778.]        OPERATIONS   OF    THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          489 

the  advanced  parties,  until  about  ten  o'clock,  when  two 
ships  of  war  belonging  to  the  enemy,  and  some  smaller 
armed  vessels,  gained  the  American  right  flank  and 
opened  fire  upon  it,  whilst  the  whole  British  force 
united,  under  the  fire  of  the  ships,  to  turn  General  Sul 
livan's  right.  An  exceedingly  hot  contest  took  place  at 
this  point,  in  which  General  Greene,  who  commanded 
the  right  wing,  distinguished  himself  by  his  personal 
bravery  and  the  skill  with  which  he  conducted  the  ac 
tion.  The  British  troops  were  driven  back  twice,  and 
twice  they  returned  to  the  attack,  to  be  finally  completely 
routed  and  fall  back  in  disorder  to  the  hill  where  they 
had  first  formed,  leaving  large  numbers  of  their  dead  and 
wounded  behind  them.  This  action  lasted  about  an  hour. 
Afterward  the  fire  of  the  artillery  was  continued,  with 
light  skirmishes,  throughout  the  day,  until  nightfall. 
The  American  army  held  its  position  at  Butt's  Hill,  and 
the  enemy  occupied  the  night  in  fortifying  their  camp. 
Upon  the  following  morning,  the  30th  of  August,  Gen 
eral  Sullivan  received  a  letter  from  General  Washington 
which  informed  him  that  Lord  Howe  had  left  New  York 
with  his  fleet l  on  the  preceding  Tuesday,  the  25th,  with 
the  probable  design  of  relieving  the  garrison  at  Newport ; 
and,  while  the  Commander-in-Chief  did  not  directly  order 
him  to  retreat  to  the  mainland,  the  tone  of  his  letter 
indicated  his  judgment  that  this  step  had  now  become 
necessary.  A  council  of  war  which  was  immediately  con 
vened  by  General  Sullivan  unanimously  decided  that  the 
army  should  quit  the  island. 

In  order  to  perform  this  exceedingly  difficult  task, 
which  required  all  the  greater  caution  since  the  British 
outposts  were  only  two  hundred  yards  distant  from  the 
American  sentries,  General  Sullivan  determined  to  cover 
his  design  by  an  appearance  of  active  preparation  for 

1  Letter  of  28th  August :  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  40. 


490         OPERATIONS    OF   THE   ALLIES   AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

further  hostilities,  and  ordered  several  tents  to  be  pitched 
in  sight  of  the  enemy  whilst  he  made  an  imposing  demon 
stration  of  employing  his  whole  army  in  strengthening 
his  fortifications. 

Meanwhile  he  was  sending  his  heavy  baggage  and  stores 
to  the  rear,  and  these  were  being  shipped  across  without 
having  aroused  the  suspicion  of  the  enemy.  At  dark  he 
ordered  all  the  tents  to  be  struck,  and  soon  after  he  began 
crossing  his  troops.  By  midnight  they  were  all  in  safety 
upon  the  mainland  near  Tiverton.  It  was  during  this 
evening  that  the  Marquis  de  La  Fayette  returned  from 
Boston.  He  arrived  upon  the  island  at  eleven  o'clock  on 
the  night  of  the  30th,  and,  notwithstanding  his  ride  of 
seventy  miles,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  he  had  made  in 
six  hours  and  a  half,  forgetful  of  fatigue,  he  resumed  his 
command  at  once,  and  took  charge  of  the  rear-guard  of 
the  army.  He  was  still  in  time  to  fulfil  his  prediction  to 
the  Comte  d'Estaing  that  the  last  boat  should  be  the  one 
to  take  him  over,  and  that  nobody  should  be  left  upon  the 
island  after  he  had  gone.  General  Sullivan  said  of  him 
in  his  letter  to  Congress,  "  The  Marquis  de  Lafayette 
arrived  about  eleven  in  the  evening  from  Boston ;  where 
he  had  been,  by  request  of  the  general  officers,  to  solicit 
the  speedy  return  of  the  fleet.  He  was  sensibly  morti 
fied  that  he  was  out  of  action ;  and,  that  he  might  not 
be  out  of  the  way  in  case  of  action,  he  had  ridden  hence 
to  Boston  in  seven  hours,  and  returned  in  six  and  a 
half, — the  distance  nearly  seventy  miles.  He  returned 
in  time  enough  to  bring  off  the  pickets  and  other  parties 
which  covered  the  retreat  of  the  army,  which  he  did  in 
excellent  order ;  not  a  man  was  left  behind,  nor  the 
smallest  article  lost."1  This  retreat  was  most  fortunate 
for  the  American  army,  because  upon  the  following  morn 
ing  Lord  Howe's  fleet  appeared,  consisting  of  one  hun- 

1  General  Sullivan  to  Congress,  31st  August,  1778. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES   AT    NEWPORT.          491 

dred  ships  of  various  kinds,  with  a  strong  reinforcement 
of  land  troops  for  the  garrison  under  command  of  Sir 
Henry  Clinton  in  person.  If  General  Sullivan  had  been 
overtaken  by  this  force  while  still  upon  the  island,  his 
chances  of  escaping  a  disaster  would  have  been  slender 
indeed.  Congress  recognized  his  services  and  voted  its 
thanks  to  him  and  the  officers  and  troops  under  his 
command  for  their  fortitude  in  the  action  of  the  29th 
of  August,  in  which  they  repulsed  the  British  forces 
and  maintained  the  field ;  and  it  was  resolved  that  the 
retreat  was  prudent,  timely,  and  well  conducted.1 

Whilst  La  Fayette  was  in  Boston  he  had  employed 
every  inducement  at  his  command  to  persuade  the  Comte 
d'Estaing  to  return  to  the  army  with  his  land  forces ;  and 
his  arguments  were  of  such  weight  with  the  admiral  that 
he  agreed  to  land  his  battalions  of  Foix  and  Hainault 
and  to  march  with  them  to  put  himself  under  the  com 
mand  of  General  Sullivan  at  Newport.  A  session  of  the 
Council  of  Massachusetts  was  convened,  largely  through 
the  influence  of  General  Heath  and  General  Hancock, 
the  latter  of  whom  had  gone  to  Boston  for  the  purpose  of 
aiding  the  restoration  of  the  French  fleet,  and  La  Fayette 
appeared  with  the  admiral  at  a  conference  held  between 
him  and  the  Council  upon  the  subjects  of  providing  for 
the  fleet  and  of  reinforcing  General  Sullivan.  When 
General  de  La  Fayette  returned  to  the  army  he  bore 
with  him  a  letter  from  the  admiral  to  General  Sullivan, 
in  which  M.  d'Estaing  announced  his  proposal  to  the 
Council  that  he  should  join  the  army,  and  referred  to  the 
protest  with  the  assurance  that  he  should  not  allow  the 
offence  given  him  by  that  incident  to  affect  his  present 
conduct.  "  To  prove  this,"  he  added,  "  is  one  of  the 
strongest  motives  which  have  determined  me  to  place 
myself  under  your  orders,  as  soon  as  I  shall  have  been 


Journals  of  Congress,  9th  September,  1778. 


492         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

honored  with  a  positive  answer  from  the  Council.  My 
opinion  upon  the  measures  to  be  taken  need  never  re 
strain  yours.  It  shall  not  only  be  subject  to  yours,  but 
even  remain  unrevealed  whenever  you  shall  not  require 
me  to  give  it."  1 

There  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  earnest  desire  of  M. 
d'Estaing  to  serve  America.  His  constant  efforts  to  prove 
this  were  defeated  by  a  chain  of  events  over  which  he 
could  have  had  no  control.  But  his  disposition  remained 
steadfast  even  to  this  final  offer,  in  which  he  declared  his 
willingness  to  sink  his  own  personal  feelings  as  to  what 
had  gone  before,  and  to  waive  his  rank,  by  taking  the 
field  at  the  head  of  a  regiment  like  any  other  officer 
under  General  Sullivan's  command.  "  I  offered  and  was 
ready,"  he  wrote  to  General  Washington,2  "  at  the  head 
of  a  regiment,  to  go  and  serve  under  General  Sullivan, 
as  I  formerly  did  under  Marshal  Saxe  in  the  war  which 
terminated  in  1748.  I  should  not  have  taken  this  step 
with  the  idea  of  strengthening  an  army  with  such  a  hand 
ful  of  men,  nor  of  proving  what  is  already  known,  that 
the  French  nation  can  sacrifice  life  with  a  good  grace ; 
but  I  was  anxious  to  demonstrate  that  my  countrymen 
could  not  be  offended  by  a  sudden  expression  of  feeling, 
and  that  he  who  had  the  honor  of  commanding  them 
in  America  was  and  would  be  at  all  times  one  of  the 
most  devoted  and  zealous  servants  of  the  United  States." 
After  the  action  at  Newport,  however,  and  after  the  re 
treat  to  the  mainland  had  been  effected,  this  offer  was 
no  longer  available.  M.  d'Estaing's  letter  to  General 
Washington  called  forth  a  reply  which,  aside  from  its 
expression  of  the  generous  sentiment  with  which  the 
Commander-in-Chief  addressed  a  brother  officer  under 
peculiarly  distressing  circumstances,  is  one  of  the  most 
important  documents  we  possess  as  a  contemporary  esti- 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  59. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  58. 


1778.]         OPERATIONS    OF    THE   ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.          493 

mate  of  D'Estaing,  and  of  the  value  of  his  fleet  in  this 
expedition.1 

"To  COUNT  D'ESTAING. 

"HEAD-QUARTERS,  11  September,  1778. 

"  SIR, — I  have  had  the  honor  of  receiving  your  letter  of  the  5th 
instant,  accompanied  by  a  copy  of  two  letters  to  Congress  and 
General  Sullivan.  The  confidence,  which  you  have  been  pleased 
to  show  in  communicating  these  papers,  engages  niy  sincere  thanks. 
If  the  deepest  regret,  that  the  best  concerted  enterprise  and 
bravest  exertions  should  have  been  rendered  fruitless  by  a  dis 
aster,  which  human  prudence  wras  incapable  of  foreseeing  or  pre 
venting,  can  alleviate  disappointment,  you  may  be  assured,  that 
the  whole  continent  sympathizes  with  you.  It  will  be  a  consola 
tion  to  you  to  reflect,  that  the  thinking  part  of  mankind  do  not 
form  their  judgment  from  events  ;  and  that  their  equity  will  ever 
attach  equal  glory  to  those  actions  which  deserve  success,  and 
those  which  have  been  crowned  with  it.  It  is  in  the  trying  cir 
cumstances  to  which  your  Excellency  has  been  exposed,  that  the 
virtues  of  a  great  mind  are  displayed  in  their  brightest  lustre,  and 
that  a  general's  character  is  better  known,  than  in  the  moment  of 
victory.  It  was  yours,  by  every  title  that  can  give  it ;  and  the 
adverse  element,  which  robbed  you  of  your  prize,  can  never  de 
prive  you  of  the  glory  due  to  you.  Though  your  success  has  not 
been  equal  to  your  expectations,  yet  you  have  the  satisfaction 
of  reflect  ing,  that  you  have  rendered  essential  services  to  the 
common  cause. 

"I  exceedingly  lament,  that,  in  addition  to  our  misfortunes, 
there  has  been  the  least  suspension  of  harmony  and  good  under 
standing  between  the  generals  of  allied  nations,  whose  views  must, 
like  their  interests,  be  the  same.  On  the  first  intimation  of  it,  I 
employed  my  influence  in  restoring  what  I  regard  as  essential  to 
the  permanence  of  a  union  founded  on  mutual  inclination,  and 
the  strongest  ties  of  reciprocal  advantage.  Your  Excellency's 
offer  to  the  Council  of  Boston  had  a  powerful  tendency  to  pro 
mote  the  same  end,  and  was  a  distinguished  proof  of  your  zeal 
and  magnanimity. 

"The  present  superiority  of  the  enemy  in  naval  force  must  for 
a  time  suspend  all  plans  of  offensive  cooperation  between  us.  It 
is  not  easy  to  foresee  what  change  may  take  place  by  the  arrival 
of  succours  to  you  from  Europe,  or  what  opening  the  enemy  may 

1  Sparks,  Writings  of  Washington,  vi.  57. 


494         OPERATIONS    OF   THE    ALLIES    AT    NEWPORT.         [1778. 

give  you  to  resume  your  activity.  In  this  moment,  therefore, 
every  consultation  on  this  subject  would  be  premature.  But  it  is 
of  infinite  importance,  that  we  should  take  all  the  means  that  our 
circumstances  will  allow  for  the  defence  of  the  squadron,  which 
is  so  precious  to  the  common  cause  of  France  and  America,  and 
which  may  have  become  a  capital  object  with  the  enemy."  l 

Finally,  M.  d'Estaing  had  the  consolation  of  knowing 
that  his  conduct  of  the  expedition  was  understood  and 
appreciated  in  America  by  those  whose  good  opinion  he 
valued  most,  that  he  had  won  friendship  and  esteem  which 
outlived  the  momentary  ill  feeling  of  the  people  after  the 
events  at  Newport,  and  that  Congress,  speaking  for  the 
nation,  openly  recognized  his  zeal  in  the  common  cause  by 
expressions  of  cordial  sympathy  and  good  will. 

On  the  17th  of  October,  1778,  the  following  Resolution 
was  adopted : 2 

"Resolved,  That  his  excellency  count  D'Estaing  hath  behaved 
as  a  brave  and  wise  officer,  and  that  his  excellency  and  the  officers 
and  men  under  his  command  have  rendered  every  benefit  to  these 
States  which  the  circumstances  and  nature  of  the  service  would 
admit  of,  and  are  fully  entitled  to  the  regards  of  the  friends  of 
America. 

"  Resolved,  That  the  president  transmit  the  foregoing  resolution 
to  his  excellency  the  count  D'Estaing,  and  inform  him  that  Con 
gress  entertain  the  highest  sense  of  his  zeal  and  attachment  mani 
fested  in  repeated  instances,  and  particularly  in  his  spirited  offer 
to  lead  the  troops  under  his  command  from  Boston,  and  to  co 
operate  against  Ehode  Island." 

1  For  the  Comte  d'Estaing' s  account  of  his  expedition,  addressed  to  Con 
gress,  26th  August,   1778,  see  Doniol,  Histoire  de  la  Participation  de  la 
France  a  1' Etablissement  des  Etats-Unis  d'Amerique,  tome  Hi.,  Annexe  du 
chapitre  vii.,  p.  384  ;  and  for  his  official  report  to  the  Secretary  of  the  French 
Navy,  5th  November,  1778,  quoted  above,  see  ibid.,  Annexes  du  chapitre 
viii.,  p.  447.    See  also  the  letter  of  the  Comte  d'Estaing  to  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy,  5th  November,  1778,  Doniol,  La  Participation  de  la  France,  iii.  361. 

2  Journals  of  Congress,  17th  October,  1778. 


END  or  VOLUME  i. 


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